@article{2256, abstract = {{Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{146--163}}, title = {{{The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}}, volume = {{162}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{80, abstract = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}}, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }}, pages = {{708--734}}, title = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}}, volume = {{157}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{7630, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, treatment efficiency, heterogeneous experts, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}}}, volume = {{118}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{8873, abstract = {{We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{credence goods, heterogeneous experts, fairness, overcharging}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{9920, author = {{Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}}, issn = {{0165-1765}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, pages = {{47--50}}, title = {{{Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}}, volume = {{181}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{6734, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}}, journal = {{Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{62--78}}, title = {{{Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}}}, doi = {{10.1111/obes.12267}}, volume = {{81}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{15202, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Labor market negotiations, Efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, Sequential bargaining, Restricted bargaining games}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}}}, volume = {{128}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{15204, abstract = {{We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.}}, author = {{Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}}, keywords = {{TU-games, duality, core, c-Core, cohesive games, complete game efficiency}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Duality for General TU-games Redefined}}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2019}}, } @techreport{10332, abstract = {{We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.}}, author = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}}, keywords = {{retail bundling, leverage theory, double marginalization}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{15075, author = {{Bünnings, Christian and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}}, issn = {{0022-4367}}, journal = {{Journal of Risk and Insurance}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{415--449}}, title = {{{The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jori.12219}}, volume = {{86}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42296, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Intermediaries in Networks}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42286, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Logrolling-Prozess: Theorie und formale Darstellung einer verhandlungsunterstützenden Methode}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42290, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Stability in two-sided matchings with asymmetric information}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42289, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Sincere and Sophisticated Players in Matching Markets}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42291, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Mechanismen zur Informationsgewinnung in Verhandlungen}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42288, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die faire Verteilung unteilbarer Güter}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42295, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Axiomatisierungen des Banzhaf-Wertes}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42293, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Compatibilities in Matching Mechanisms}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42284, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Faire Aufteilung von unteilbaren Gütern: Untersuchung von Algorithmen auf Effizienz und Neidfreiheit}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42280, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Anwendung und Vergleich von Verhandlungslösungen auf das Netzwerk-Design-Problem}}}, year = {{2019}}, }