@misc{42285, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42281, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation contracts}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{41926, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42277, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42283, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Student's school matching mechanisms in the US}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{58507, author = {{Gutsche, Gunnar and Ziegler, Andreas}}, issn = {{0378-4266}}, journal = {{Journal of Banking & Finance}}, pages = {{193--214}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Which private investors are willing to pay for sustainable investments? Empirical evidence from stated choice experiments}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.007}}, volume = {{102}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2727, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1024-2694}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{309--323}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{10090, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, issn = {{0569-4345}}, journal = {{The American Economist}}, title = {{{A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0569434519846477}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2814, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, journal = {{Journal of International Development}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{493--506}}, title = {{{Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}}}, doi = {{10.1002/jid.3104}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{2831, abstract = {{We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}}, isbn = {{978-1-4503-5916-0}}, location = {{Irvine, California, USA}}, pages = {{5:1--5:6}}, title = {{{Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}}}, doi = {{10.1145/3230654.3230659}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{2565, abstract = {{This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.}}, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, keywords = {{NTU differential games, variable Pareto weights, agreeability}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}}}, volume = {{112}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{2933, abstract = {{We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}}, keywords = {{Bargaining problem, CES Function, Normalized CES Function, Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution, Egalitarian Solution.}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}}}, volume = {{113}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inbook{3098, abstract = {{One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results from mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of theoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented. Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing enforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In this note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu (1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution design is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized game or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a competitive equilibrium of an economy.}}, author = {{Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, booktitle = {{Studies in Economic Design}}, editor = {{Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, William}}, issn = {{2510-3970}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Thoughts on Social Design}}}, volume = {{(n.d.)}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{3101, abstract = {{Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment.}}, author = {{Hilleringmann, Vanessa}}, keywords = {{Corruption, Reciprocity, Physician-Patient Relationship}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4564, abstract = {{ In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness. }}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, journal = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{905--932}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4982, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, journal = {{Games}}, number = {{4}}, publisher = {{MDPI}}, title = {{{ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{5330, abstract = {{In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again.}}, author = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, issn = {{1932-6203}}, journal = {{PLoS ONE}}, number = {{11}}, publisher = {{Public Library of Science}}, title = {{{Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}}}, doi = {{10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}}, volume = {{13}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15206, abstract = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}}, volume = {{111}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15207, abstract = {{The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.}}, author = {{Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Chain Store Game, reputation building, entry deterrence, Trockel's game}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game}}}, volume = {{117}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, }