@inbook{3098, abstract = {{One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results from mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of theoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented. Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing enforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In this note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu (1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution design is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized game or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a competitive equilibrium of an economy.}}, author = {{Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, booktitle = {{Studies in Economic Design}}, editor = {{Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, William}}, issn = {{2510-3970}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Thoughts on Social Design}}}, volume = {{(n.d.)}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{3101, abstract = {{Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment.}}, author = {{Hilleringmann, Vanessa}}, keywords = {{Corruption, Reciprocity, Physician-Patient Relationship}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series}}, title = {{{The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4564, abstract = {{ In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness. }}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, journal = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{905--932}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4982, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, journal = {{Games}}, number = {{4}}, publisher = {{MDPI}}, title = {{{ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{5330, abstract = {{In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again.}}, author = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, issn = {{1932-6203}}, journal = {{PLoS ONE}}, number = {{11}}, publisher = {{Public Library of Science}}, title = {{{Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}}}, doi = {{10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}}, volume = {{13}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15206, abstract = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}}, volume = {{111}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15207, abstract = {{The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.}}, author = {{Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Chain Store Game, reputation building, entry deterrence, Trockel's game}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game}}}, volume = {{117}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{3081, author = {{Kolodziej, Ingo WK and Reichert, Arndt R and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health services research}}, number = {{4}}, title = {{{New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe}}}, doi = {{10.111/1475-6773.12840}}, volume = {{53}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5235, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Winkler, Svenja}}, booktitle = {{Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance}}, publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}, title = {{{Information, Risk Aversion, and Health Care Economics}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{2728, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete and Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa}}, issn = {{0177-798X}}, journal = {{Theoretical and Applied Climatology}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{31807, abstract = {{Drawing upon recent advances in machine learning and natural language processing, we introduce new tools that automatically ingest, parse, disambiguate, and build an updated database using U.S. patent data. The tools identify unique inventor, assignee, and location entities mentioned on each granted U.S. patent from 1976 to 2016. We describe data flow, algorithms, user interfaces, descriptive statistics, and a novelty measure based on the first appearance of a word in the patent corpus. We illustrate an automated coinventor network mapping tool and visualize trends in patenting over the last 40 years.}}, author = {{Balsmeier, Benjamin and Assaf, Mohamad and Chesebro, Tyler and Fierro, Gabe and Johnson, Kevin and Johnson, Scott and Li, Guan‐Cheng and Lück, Sonja and O'Reagan, Doug and Yeh, Bill and Zang, Guangzheng and Fleming, Lee}}, issn = {{1058-6407}}, journal = {{Journal of Economics & Management Strategy}}, keywords = {{Management of Technology and Innovation, Strategy and Management, Economics and Econometrics, General Business, Management and Accounting, General Medicine}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{535--553}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jems.12259}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{58506, author = {{Gutsche, Gunnar and Köbrich León, Anja and Ziegler, Andreas}}, issn = {{0030-7653}}, journal = {{Oxford Economic Papers}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{756--776}}, publisher = {{Oxford University Press (OUP)}}, title = {{{On the relevance of contextual factors for socially responsible investments: an econometric analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1093/oep/gpy051}}, volume = {{71}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{3070, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Feng, Yuanhua}}, journal = {{Review of Economics}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{153--166}}, title = {{{Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain}}}, doi = {{10.1515/roe-2017-0008}}, volume = {{68 }}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{4633, author = {{Zhang, Xuehai and Feng, Yuanhua and Peitz, Christian}}, title = {{{A general class of SemiGARCH models based on the Box-Cox transformation}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{4671, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Gries, Thomas}}, title = {{{Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{5236, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Schiele, Valentin}}, journal = {{Atlas of Science}}, title = {{{Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @inbook{5238, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, booktitle = {{Krankenversicherung im Rating}}, editor = {{Adolph, T.}}, publisher = {{Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH}}, title = {{{Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders die Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten?}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1054, abstract = {{We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. }}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, number = {{53}}, pages = {{6--20}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{The effects of competition on medical service provision}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3583}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2017}}, } @techreport{1055, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, year = {{2017}}, }