@article{2811, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, journal = {{Peace Economics and Peace Science}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{377--384}}, title = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2813, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Naudé, Wim}}, journal = {{International Journal of Economic Theory}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{151--165}}, title = {{{The Entrepreneurship Beveridge Curve}}}, doi = {{10.1111/ijet.12086}}, volume = {{12}}, year = {{2016}}, } @techreport{2570, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market we consider vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the impact of simultaneous competition for resources and the demand of customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries may arise due to distinct product qualities as well as by reasons of different production technologies. The intermediaries compete on the output market by choosing production quantities sequentially and for the supplies of a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. It turns out that there exist differences in product quality and productivities such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader has no incentive to procure inputs, whereas in the role of the Stackelberg follower will participate in the market. Moreover, we find that given an intermediary is more competitive, his equilibrium output quantity is higher when being the leader than when being the follower. Interestingly, if the intermediary is less competitive and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries such that an intermediary being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher output quantities in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg leader.}}, author = {{Manegold, Jochen}}, keywords = {{Input Market, Product Quality, Quantity Competition, Stackelberg Competition, Product Innovation}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation}}}, volume = {{98}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2687, author = {{Kamhöfer, Daniel A. and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0883-7252}}, journal = {{Journal of Applied Econometrics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{912--919}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/jae.2461}}, volume = {{31}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{211, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}}, journal = {{Theoretical Economics Letters}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1341--1362}}, publisher = {{Scientific Research Publishing (SCIRP)}}, title = {{{Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}}, doi = {{10.4236/tel.2016.66124}}, volume = {{6}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1919, abstract = {{We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, issn = {{1097-3923}}, journal = {{Journal of Public Economic Theory}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{802--830}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Strategic Network Disruption and Defense}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jpet.12168}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1922, abstract = {{We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails.}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{0022-5193}}, journal = {{Journal of Theoretical Biology}}, pages = {{82--97}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034}}, volume = {{393}}, year = {{2016}}, } @techreport{2252, abstract = {{We study the willingness to compete in a cognitive task among an entire cohort of fresh man business and economics students. Combining data from a lab-in-thefield experiment with university admissions data, we trace the gender gap in competitiveness at different levels of high school performance. Our results confirm that, on average, men choose to compete more often. The gender gap disappears, however, among students with above average high school performance. Female high school top performers are equally competitive as their male counterparts. In fact, the overall gender gap is entirely driven by the group of female high school underperformers who shied away from competition, even when they performed well in our task. Overall, our findings suggest that high school grades are more than just a signal of cognitive abilities, because they seem to influence the receivers selfperception of his or her performance in a competitive environment involved in later on in life.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Tomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezai Khavas, Tahere and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, title = {{{Do talented women shy away from competition?}}}, volume = {{16-06}}, year = {{2016}}, } @techreport{8836, abstract = {{While Islamic State is the most present example, it is a fact that in many places around the globe, throughout history initially small groups have tried to challenge and destabilize or even overthrow governments by means of terrorist and guerrilla strategies. Therefore, we answer two questions. Why does a small group of insurgents believe it can overthrow the government by turning violent, even if the government is clearly superior? And how does a conflict develop into terrorism, a guerilla war, or a major conventional civil war, or is resolved peacefully? We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices. Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a "destabilization war". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions using game theory analysis. First, insurgents rise up because they hope to destabilize through permanent challenging attacks. In this context, large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While each individual attack may have a low impact, at some point a large random event could lead to success. Hence, the duration of activities is a constitutive element of this kind of armed conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect rebels' degree of ideological motivation, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare or the conflict resolutions that develop are generally path-dependent and conditioned on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) influence different modes of warfare or a peaceful compromise in a complex way.}}, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, keywords = {{terrorism, civil war, conflict duration, game theory, stochastic process, ideology}}, title = {{{An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'}}}, volume = {{95}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2688, author = {{Schiele, Valentin and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{59--69}}, title = {{{Quantile treatment effects of job loss on health}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.005}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{3083, author = {{Herr, Annika and Nguyen, Thu-Van and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health Policy}}, number = {{10}}, pages = {{1162--1170}}, title = {{{Public reporting and the quality of care of German nursing homes}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.09.004 }}, volume = {{120}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2956, author = {{Göpffarth, Dirk and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health economics}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{801--815}}, title = {{{Determinants of regional variation in health expenditures in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3183}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{15259, author = {{Decker, Simon and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0167-6296}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{156--170}}, title = {{{Health shocks and risk aversion}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.006}}, volume = {{156-170}}, year = {{2016}}, } @techreport{249, abstract = {{We analyze the stability of networks when two intermediaries strategically form costly links to customers. We interpret these links as customer relationships that enable trade to sell a product. Equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities on the output as well as on the input market are determined endogenously for a given network of customer relationships. We investigate in how far the substitutability of the intermediaries' products and the costs of link formation influence the intermediaries' equilibrium profits and thus have an impact on the incentives to strategically form relationships to customers. For networks with three customers we characterize locally stable networks, in particular existence is guaranteed for any degree of substitutability. Moreover for the special cases of perfect complements, independent products and perfect substitutes, local stability coincides with the stronger concept of Nash stability. Additionally, for networks with n customers we analyze stability regions for selected networks and determine their limits when n goes to infinity. It turns out that the shape of the stability regions for those networks does not significantly change compared to a setting with a small number of customers. }}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Möhlmeier, Philipp}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks}}}, volume = {{91}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2815, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Naudé, Wim and Bilkic, Natascha}}, journal = {{The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance}}, pages = {{1--17}}, title = {{{Playing the Lottery or Dressing Up? A Model of Firm-Level Heterogeneity and the Decision to Export}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.qref.2015.02.010}}, volume = {{58}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2816, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua and Guo, Zhichao}}, journal = {{China Agricultural Economic Review}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{262--279}}, title = {{{Changes of China’s agri-food exports to Germany caused by its accession to WTO and the 2008 financial crisis}}}, doi = {{10.1108/CAER-11-2013-0152}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3295, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Palnau, Irene}}, journal = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}}, number = {{ 4}}, pages = {{467 --478}}, title = {{{Sustaining Civil Peace: a configurational comparative analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2015-0020}}, volume = {{21}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3296, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel and Redlin, Margarete}}, journal = {{Oxford Economic Papers}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{83 -- 103}}, title = {{{Oppressive Governments, Dependence on the United States and Anti-American Terrorism}}}, doi = {{10.1093/oep/gpu038}}, volume = {{67}}, year = {{2015}}, } @techreport{2730, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, pages = {{100}}, title = {{{Does technological change drive inclusive industrialization? - A review of major concepts and findings}}}, volume = {{2015-044}}, year = {{2015}}, } @techreport{4656, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Zhou, Chen}}, title = {{{An iterative plug-in algorithm for realized kernels}}}, year = {{2015}}, }