@techreport{8836, abstract = {{While Islamic State is the most present example, it is a fact that in many places around the globe, throughout history initially small groups have tried to challenge and destabilize or even overthrow governments by means of terrorist and guerrilla strategies. Therefore, we answer two questions. Why does a small group of insurgents believe it can overthrow the government by turning violent, even if the government is clearly superior? And how does a conflict develop into terrorism, a guerilla war, or a major conventional civil war, or is resolved peacefully? We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices. Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a "destabilization war". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions using game theory analysis. First, insurgents rise up because they hope to destabilize through permanent challenging attacks. In this context, large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While each individual attack may have a low impact, at some point a large random event could lead to success. Hence, the duration of activities is a constitutive element of this kind of armed conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect rebels' degree of ideological motivation, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare or the conflict resolutions that develop are generally path-dependent and conditioned on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) influence different modes of warfare or a peaceful compromise in a complex way.}}, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, keywords = {{terrorism, civil war, conflict duration, game theory, stochastic process, ideology}}, title = {{{An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'}}}, volume = {{95}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2688, author = {{Schiele, Valentin and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{59--69}}, title = {{{Quantile treatment effects of job loss on health}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.005}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{3083, author = {{Herr, Annika and Nguyen, Thu-Van and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health Policy}}, number = {{10}}, pages = {{1162--1170}}, title = {{{Public reporting and the quality of care of German nursing homes}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.09.004 }}, volume = {{120}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2956, author = {{Göpffarth, Dirk and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health economics}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{801--815}}, title = {{{Determinants of regional variation in health expenditures in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3183}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{15259, author = {{Decker, Simon and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0167-6296}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{156--170}}, title = {{{Health shocks and risk aversion}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.006}}, volume = {{156-170}}, year = {{2016}}, } @techreport{249, abstract = {{We analyze the stability of networks when two intermediaries strategically form costly links to customers. We interpret these links as customer relationships that enable trade to sell a product. Equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities on the output as well as on the input market are determined endogenously for a given network of customer relationships. We investigate in how far the substitutability of the intermediaries' products and the costs of link formation influence the intermediaries' equilibrium profits and thus have an impact on the incentives to strategically form relationships to customers. For networks with three customers we characterize locally stable networks, in particular existence is guaranteed for any degree of substitutability. Moreover for the special cases of perfect complements, independent products and perfect substitutes, local stability coincides with the stronger concept of Nash stability. Additionally, for networks with n customers we analyze stability regions for selected networks and determine their limits when n goes to infinity. It turns out that the shape of the stability regions for those networks does not significantly change compared to a setting with a small number of customers. }}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Möhlmeier, Philipp}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks}}}, volume = {{91}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2815, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Naudé, Wim and Bilkic, Natascha}}, journal = {{The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance}}, pages = {{1--17}}, title = {{{Playing the Lottery or Dressing Up? A Model of Firm-Level Heterogeneity and the Decision to Export}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.qref.2015.02.010}}, volume = {{58}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2816, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua and Guo, Zhichao}}, journal = {{China Agricultural Economic Review}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{262--279}}, title = {{{Changes of China’s agri-food exports to Germany caused by its accession to WTO and the 2008 financial crisis}}}, doi = {{10.1108/CAER-11-2013-0152}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3295, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Palnau, Irene}}, journal = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}}, number = {{ 4}}, pages = {{467 --478}}, title = {{{Sustaining Civil Peace: a configurational comparative analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2015-0020}}, volume = {{21}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3296, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel and Redlin, Margarete}}, journal = {{Oxford Economic Papers}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{83 -- 103}}, title = {{{Oppressive Governments, Dependence on the United States and Anti-American Terrorism}}}, doi = {{10.1093/oep/gpu038}}, volume = {{67}}, year = {{2015}}, } @techreport{2730, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, pages = {{100}}, title = {{{Does technological change drive inclusive industrialization? - A review of major concepts and findings}}}, volume = {{2015-044}}, year = {{2015}}, } @techreport{4656, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Zhou, Chen}}, title = {{{An iterative plug-in algorithm for realized kernels}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{491, abstract = {{In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.}}, author = {{Buechel, Berno and Röhl, Nils}}, journal = {{European Journal of Operational Research}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{505--517}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Robust Equilibria in Location Games}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.019}}, volume = {{240}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{5239, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Patient Gesundheitswesen – Mission 2030 Unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung die Zukunft zu gestalten}}, publisher = {{Quintessenz Verlags-GmbH}}, title = {{{Rationalisierung vs. Rationierung Ist die Rationierung unvermeidbar? }}}, year = {{2015}}, } @techreport{1374, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, title = {{{Does technological change drive inclusive industrialization? A review of major concepts and findings}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2957, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{174--185}}, title = {{{Short-and medium-term effects of informal care provision on female caregivers’ health}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.03.002}}, volume = {{42}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2522, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, issn = {{0938-2259}}, journal = {{Economic Theory}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{529--554}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7}}, volume = {{57}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2819, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, journal = {{Journal of Population Economics}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{1165--1186}}, title = {{{Trade and fertility in the developing world: the impact of trade and trade structure}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00148-014-0508-x}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2842, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Dung, Ha Van}}, journal = {{Modern Economy}}, pages = {{878--894}}, title = {{{Household Savings and Productive Capital Formation in Rural Vietnam: Insurance vs. Social Network}}}, doi = {{10.4236/me.2014.58081}}, volume = {{5}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inbook{3289, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, booktitle = {{Low Carbon Economics }}, editor = {{Jinjun, Xue }}, isbn = {{978-9814383097}}, pages = {{361 -- 382}}, title = {{{Low Carbon Economics - Theory and application}}}, volume = {{Chapter 22}}, year = {{2014}}, }