@techreport{2732,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}},
  publisher    = {{Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics}},
  title        = {{{Maritime Piracy: Socio-Economic, Political, and Institutional Determinants}}},
  volume       = {{2014-75}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@techreport{2738,
  author       = {{Dimant, Eugen and Krieger, Tim and Redlin, Margarete}},
  publisher    = {{Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich}},
  title        = {{{A Crook is a Crook ... But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption}}},
  volume       = {{5032}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{1923,
  abstract     = {{How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).}},
  author       = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}},
  issn         = {{1024-2694}},
  journal      = {{Defence and Peace Economics}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{644--664}},
  publisher    = {{Informa UK Limited}},
  title        = {{{Collective action and the common enemy effect}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/10242694.2014.925676}},
  volume       = {{27}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{5241,
  author       = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Augurzky, B. and Roppel, U.}},
  journal      = {{RWI Position}},
  title        = {{{Kehrtwende in der Gesundheitspolitik - Unnötige Abkehr von einer erfolgreichen Reform zur Finanzierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung}}},
  volume       = {{59}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{2959,
  author       = {{Mayrhofer, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Population Economics}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{841--856}},
  title        = {{{Testing the relationship between income inequality and life expectancy: A simple correction for the aggregation effect when using aggregated data}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s00148-013-0483-7}},
  volume       = {{27}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{2960,
  author       = {{Keese, Matthias and Schmitz, Hendrik}},
  journal      = {{Review of Income and Wealth}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{525--541}},
  title        = {{{Broke, ill, and obese: is there an effect of household debt on health?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/roiw.12002}},
  volume       = {{60}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{2958,
  author       = {{Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}},
  journal      = {{Health Economics}},
  number       = {{12}},
  pages        = {{1481--1492}},
  title        = {{{Regional variation in the utilisation of ambulatory services in Germany}}},
  doi          = {{10.1002/hec.3001}},
  volume       = {{23}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{31817,
  author       = {{Lück, Sonja}},
  issn         = {{03427064}},
  journal      = {{Die Betriebswirtschaft}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{269--282}},
  title        = {{{Forschung und Lehre: Freund oder Feind?}}},
  volume       = {{74}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{2729,
  author       = {{Dimant, Eugen and Krieger, Tim and Redlin, Margarete}},
  issn         = {{1465-6485}},
  journal      = {{German Economic Review}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{464--489}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  title        = {{{A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/geer.12064}},
  volume       = {{16}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{33087,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel and Redlin, Margarete}},
  issn         = {{0030-7653}},
  journal      = {{Oxford Economic Papers}},
  keywords     = {{Economics and Econometrics}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{83--103}},
  publisher    = {{Oxford University Press (OUP)}},
  title        = {{{Oppressive governments, dependence on the USA, and anti-American terrorism}}},
  doi          = {{10.1093/oep/gpu038}},
  volume       = {{67}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{2543,
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}},
  issn         = {{0165-1765}},
  journal      = {{Economics Letters}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{224--227}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier}},
  title        = {{{Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013}},
  volume       = {{121}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{2843,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Bilkic, Natascha and Carerras Painter, Ben}},
  journal      = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{1 -- 45}},
  title        = {{{Unsustainable Sovereign Debt - Is the Euro Crisis only the Tip of the Iceberg?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10368-013-0230-2}},
  volume       = {{10}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{2844,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas}},
  journal      = {{Oxford University Press}},
  pages        = {{293--323}},
  title        = {{{Global Asymmetries and their Implications for Climate and Industrial Policies, in: Pathways to Industrialization in the Twenty-First Century - New Challenges and Emerging Paradigms}}},
  doi          = {{10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199667857.001.0001}},
  volume       = {{ch. 11}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{2845,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel}},
  journal      = {{Economics Letters }},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{321--324}},
  title        = {{{Do banking crises cause terrorism?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.009}},
  volume       = {{119}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@article{2846,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, DAniel}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Peace Research}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{91 -- 104}},
  title        = {{{Causality Between Terrorism and Economic Growth}}},
  doi          = {{10.1177/0022343312445650}},
  volume       = {{50}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@techreport{2733,
  author       = {{Dimant, Eugen and Krieger, Tim and Redlin, Margarete}},
  publisher    = {{Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics}},
  title        = {{{A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? - On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption}}},
  volume       = {{2013-14}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@techreport{2739,
  author       = {{Dimant, Eugen and Krieger, Tim  and Redlin, Margarete}},
  publisher    = {{Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik, Universität Freiburg}},
  title        = {{{A crook is a crook ... but is he still a crook abroad? On the effect of immigration on destination-country corruption}}},
  volume       = {{2013-03}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@techreport{4657,
  author       = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Sun, Lixin}},
  title        = {{{A Semi-APARCH approach for comparing long-term and short-term risk in Chinese financial market and in mature financial markets}}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@techreport{4658,
  author       = {{Feng, Yuanhua}},
  title        = {{{Double-conditional smoothing of high-frequency volatility surface in a spatial multiplicative component GARCH with random effects}}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

@techreport{5146,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).}},
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  keywords     = {{Transfer Pricing, Negotiation, Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution, Incomplete Information}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}},
  volume       = {{64}},
  year         = {{2013}},
}

