@article{33087, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{0030-7653}}, journal = {{Oxford Economic Papers}}, keywords = {{Economics and Econometrics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{83--103}}, publisher = {{Oxford University Press (OUP)}}, title = {{{Oppressive governments, dependence on the USA, and anti-American terrorism}}}, doi = {{10.1093/oep/gpu038}}, volume = {{67}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2543, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, issn = {{0165-1765}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{224--227}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2843, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Bilkic, Natascha and Carerras Painter, Ben}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{1 -- 45}}, title = {{{Unsustainable Sovereign Debt - Is the Euro Crisis only the Tip of the Iceberg?}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-013-0230-2}}, volume = {{10}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2844, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, journal = {{Oxford University Press}}, pages = {{293--323}}, title = {{{Global Asymmetries and their Implications for Climate and Industrial Policies, in: Pathways to Industrialization in the Twenty-First Century - New Challenges and Emerging Paradigms}}}, doi = {{10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199667857.001.0001}}, volume = {{ch. 11}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2845, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel}}, journal = {{Economics Letters }}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{321--324}}, title = {{{Do banking crises cause terrorism?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.009}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2846, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, DAniel}}, journal = {{Journal of Peace Research}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{91 -- 104}}, title = {{{Causality Between Terrorism and Economic Growth}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022343312445650}}, volume = {{50}}, year = {{2013}}, } @techreport{2733, author = {{Dimant, Eugen and Krieger, Tim and Redlin, Margarete}}, publisher = {{Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics}}, title = {{{A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? - On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption}}}, volume = {{2013-14}}, year = {{2013}}, } @techreport{2739, author = {{Dimant, Eugen and Krieger, Tim and Redlin, Margarete}}, publisher = {{Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik, Universität Freiburg}}, title = {{{A crook is a crook ... but is he still a crook abroad? On the effect of immigration on destination-country corruption}}}, volume = {{2013-03}}, year = {{2013}}, } @techreport{4657, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Sun, Lixin}}, title = {{{A Semi-APARCH approach for comparing long-term and short-term risk in Chinese financial market and in mature financial markets}}}, year = {{2013}}, } @techreport{4658, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua}}, title = {{{Double-conditional smoothing of high-frequency volatility surface in a spatial multiplicative component GARCH with random effects}}}, year = {{2013}}, } @techreport{5146, abstract = {{In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, keywords = {{Transfer Pricing, Negotiation, Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution, Incomplete Information}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}}, volume = {{64}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2961, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1240--1249}}, title = {{{Practice budgets and the patient mix of physicians-Evaluating the effects of remuneration system reforms on physician behaviour in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.09.013}}, volume = {{32}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{3084, author = {{Augurzky, Boris and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{The European Journal of Health Economics}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{615--627}}, title = {{{What accounts for the regional differences in the utilisation of hospitals in Germany?}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10198-012-0407-6}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2962, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka, Magdalena A}}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, pages = {{305--322}}, title = {{{Health and the double burden of full-time work and informal care provision—Evidence from administrative data}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2013.09.006}}, volume = {{24}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2519, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}}, issn = {{0926-2644}}, journal = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{657--680}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Negotiating Transfer Prices}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2521, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{583--612}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3}}, volume = {{10}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2949, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Bilkic, Natascha and Pilichowski, Margarethe}}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{706 -- 717}}, title = {{{Stay in school or start working?- The human capital investment decision under uncertainty and irreversibility}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2012.04.005}}, volume = {{19}}, year = {{2012}}, } @inbook{2950, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Xue, Jinjun}}, booktitle = {{ Rising China in the Changing World Economy}}, editor = {{Wang, Liming}}, isbn = {{9781138816732}}, pages = {{396 -- 412}}, title = {{{Poverty in Shenzhen}}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2951, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{447 -- 470}}, title = {{{Economic performance and terrorist activity in Latin America}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2012.656945}}, volume = {{23}}, year = {{2012}}, } @techreport{2249, abstract = {{The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent, although they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the "common enemy effect". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links within the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the network. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of stable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, title = {{{Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect}}}, volume = {{12-06}}, year = {{2012}}, }