@article{60006,
  author       = {{Gutsche, Gunnar and Wetzel, Heike and Ziegler, Andreas}},
  issn         = {{0167-2681}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  pages        = {{491--508}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Determinants of individual sustainable investment behavior - A framed field experiment}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2023.03.016}},
  volume       = {{209}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}

@article{30341,
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Straaten, Dirk}},
  issn         = {{2214-8043}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}},
  keywords     = {{General Social Sciences, Economics and Econometrics, Applied Psychology}},
  pages        = {{101869}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869}},
  volume       = {{98}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@techreport{32106,
  abstract     = {{We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Streck, Thomas}},
  keywords     = {{Asymmetric bargaining power, Nash bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution}},
  pages        = {{17}},
  title        = {{{Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power}}},
  volume       = {{148}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{31881,
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}},
  journal      = {{International Journal of Game Theory}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{33221,
  abstract     = {{<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Non-pharmaceutical interventions are an effective strategy to prevent and control COVID-19 transmission in the community. However, the timing and stringency to which these measures have been implemented varied between countries and regions. The differences in stringency can only to a limited extent be explained by the number of infections and the prevailing vaccination strategies. Our study aims to shed more light on the lockdown strategies and to identify the determinants underlying the differences between countries on regional, economic, institutional, and political level. Based on daily panel data for 173 countries and the period from January 2020 to October 2021 we find significant regional differences in lockdown strategies. Further, more prosperous countries implemented milder restrictions but responded more quickly, while poorer countries introduced more stringent measures but had a longer response time. Finally, democratic regimes and stronger manifested institutions alleviated and slowed down the introduction of lockdown measures.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Redlin, Margarete}},
  issn         = {{0922-680X}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Regulatory Economics}},
  keywords     = {{Economics and Econometrics}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}},
  title        = {{{Differences in NPI strategies against COVID-19}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s11149-022-09452-9}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{33220,
  abstract     = {{<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>We provide a partial equilibrium model wherein AI provides abilities combined with human skills to provide an aggregate intermediate service good. We use the model to find that the extent of automation through AI will be greater if (a) the economy is relatively abundant in sophisticated programs and machine abilities compared to human skills; (b) the economy hosts a relatively large number of AI-providing firms and experts; and (c) the task-specific productivity of AI services is relatively high compared to the task-specific productivity of general labor and labor skills. We also illustrate that the contribution of AI to aggregate productive labor service depends not only on the amount of AI services available but on the endogenous number of automated tasks, the relative productivity of standard and IT-related labor, and the substitutability of tasks. These determinants also affect the income distribution between the two kinds of labor. We derive several empirical implications and identify possible future extensions.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Naudé, Wim}},
  issn         = {{2510-5019}},
  journal      = {{Journal for Labour Market Research}},
  keywords     = {{General Medicine}},
  number       = {{1}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}},
  title        = {{{Modelling artificial intelligence in economics}}},
  doi          = {{10.1186/s12651-022-00319-2}},
  volume       = {{56}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{33219,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Müller, Veronika and Jost, John T.}},
  issn         = {{1047-840X}},
  journal      = {{Psychological Inquiry}},
  keywords     = {{General Psychology}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{65--83}},
  publisher    = {{Informa UK Limited}},
  title        = {{{The Market for Belief Systems: A Formal Model of Ideological Choice}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/1047840x.2022.2065128}},
  volume       = {{33}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{50024,
  author       = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Gries, Thomas and Letmathe, Sebastian and Schulz, Dominik}},
  issn         = {{2073-4859}},
  journal      = {{The R Journal}},
  keywords     = {{Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Numerical Analysis, Statistics and Probability}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{182--195}},
  publisher    = {{The R Foundation}},
  title        = {{{The smoots Package in R for Semiparametric Modeling of Trend Stationary Time Series}}},
  doi          = {{10.32614/rj-2022-017}},
  volume       = {{14}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@techreport{44091,
  abstract     = {{We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.}},
  author       = {{Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Heinzel, Joachim}},
  keywords     = {{Retail bundling, upstream market power, double marginalization, product differentiation}},
  pages        = {{43}},
  title        = {{{The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42326,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Manipulation durch Fake-Bewertungen: Einfluss von Such- und Erfahrungsgütern auf das manipulative Verhalten des Verkäufers}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42322,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{An Analysis of Coalition Formation Methods to achieve Maximum Social Surplus}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42324,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Möglichkeiten der Blockchain-Technologie im Supply Chain Management - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42318,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Kindergarten Allocation and the Tradeoff between Stability and Diversity Considerations}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42319,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Effect of the Agent's bargaining positions in the efficiency of matching markets}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42323,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Stabile Zuordnung mit Paaren - Der neue NRMP Algorithmus}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42320,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{School choice with reserves and quotas}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{42325,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Organisation von Zeitbörsen}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{30940,
  abstract     = {{We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying
the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).
We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two
one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution
of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied.  The axiom of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type
of decomposability.  This result has significant implications for actual
negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining
problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world
negotiations.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}},
  issn         = {{0347-0520}},
  journal      = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}},
  keywords     = {{Labour market negotiations, efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, sequential bargaining, restricted bargaining games}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{403--440}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley}},
  title        = {{{Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}}},
  doi          = {{https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}},
  volume       = {{125}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{33458,
  abstract     = {{We study the effect of unemployment on cognitive abilities among individuals aged between 50 and 65 in Europe. To this end, we exploit plant closures and use flexible event-study estimations together with an experimentally elicited measure of fluid intelligence, namely word recall. We find that, within a time period of around eight years after the event of unemployment, cognitive abilities only deteriorate marginally — the effects are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. We do, however, find significant effects of late-career unemployment on the likelihood to leave the labor force, and short-term effects on mental health problems such as depression and sleep problems.}},
  author       = {{Freise, Diana and Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Health Economics}},
  title        = {{{Late-Career Unemployment and Cognitive Abilities}}},
  doi          = {{https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102689}},
  volume       = {{86}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{30235,
  author       = {{Westphal, Matthias and Kamhöfer, Daniel A. and Schmitz, Hendrik}},
  journal      = {{Economic Journal}},
  number       = {{646}},
  pages        = {{2231--2272}},
  title        = {{{Marginal College Wage Premium under Selection into Employment}}},
  doi          = {{10.1093/ej/ueac021}},
  volume       = {{132}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}