@techreport{46537,
abstract = {{We study effects of retirement on cognitive abilities (up to ten years after retirement) using data from 21 countries in Continental Europe, England, and the US, and exploiting early-retirement thresholds for identification. For this purpose, combines event-study estimations with the marginal treatment effect framework to allow for effect heterogeneity. This helps to decompose event-study estimates into true medium-run effects of retirement and effects driven by differential retirement preferences. Our results suggest considerable negative effects of retirement on cognitive abilities. We also detect substantial effect heterogeneity: Those who retire as early as possible are not affected while those who retire later exhibit negative effects.}},
author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}},
keywords = {{Cognitive abilities, retirement, event study, marginal treatment effects}},
publisher = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}},
title = {{{The dynamic and heterogeneous effects of retirement on cognitive decline}}},
volume = {{918}},
year = {{2021}},
}
@article{58508,
author = {{Engler, Daniel and Groh, Elke D. and Gutsche, Gunnar and Ziegler, Andreas}},
issn = {{1469-3062}},
journal = {{Climate Policy}},
number = {{10}},
pages = {{1281--1297}},
publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}},
title = {{{Acceptance of climate-oriented policy measures under the COVID-19 crisis: an empirical analysis for Germany}}},
doi = {{10.1080/14693062.2020.1864269}},
volume = {{21}},
year = {{2021}},
}
@article{60009,
author = {{Fischer, Beate and Gutsche, Gunnar and Wetzel, Heike}},
issn = {{2214-6296}},
journal = {{Energy Research & Social Science}},
publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
title = {{{Who wants to get involved? Determining citizen willingness to participate in German renewable energy cooperatives}}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.erss.2021.102013}},
volume = {{76}},
year = {{2021}},
}
@article{17072,
author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon}},
issn = {{1048-5252}},
journal = {{Journal of Nonparametric Statistics}},
pages = {{510--533}},
title = {{{Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series}}},
doi = {{10.1080/10485252.2020.1759598}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@article{17074,
author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}},
issn = {{1363-6669}},
journal = {{Review of Development Economics}},
pages = {{644--667}},
title = {{{Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries}}},
doi = {{10.1111/rode.12663}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@article{16273,
abstract = {{This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting
and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,
we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university
course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus
questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme
for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)
varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on
average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,
the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the
questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the
questions are difficult.}},
author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }},
journal = {{Labour Economics}},
title = {{{Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@article{16334,
abstract = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}},
author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}},
pages = {{453 -- 481}},
title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}},
volume = {{121}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@article{30234,
author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.}},
issn = {{1057-9230}},
journal = {{Health Economics}},
keywords = {{Health Policy}},
number = {{7}},
pages = {{766--777}},
publisher = {{Wiley}},
title = {{{Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?}}},
doi = {{10.1002/hec.4018}},
volume = {{29}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@article{31802,
abstract = {{ Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. }},
author = {{Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier, Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}},
issn = {{0025-1909}},
journal = {{Management Science}},
keywords = {{Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management}},
number = {{6}},
pages = {{2677--2685}},
publisher = {{Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}},
title = {{{Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}}},
doi = {{10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521}},
volume = {{66}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@article{34115,
author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}},
issn = {{0943-0180}},
journal = {{Homo Oeconomicus}},
keywords = {{Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Environmental Engineering}},
number = {{1-2}},
pages = {{1--6}},
publisher = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}},
title = {{{Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}}},
doi = {{10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}},
volume = {{37}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@article{17350,
abstract = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}},
author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }},
journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
pages = {{641--660}},
title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}},
volume = {{177}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@article{17086,
author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}},
issn = {{1612-4804}},
journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}},
pages = {{923--944}},
title = {{{Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}}},
doi = {{10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1}},
volume = {{17}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@article{17064,
author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon}},
issn = {{1048-5252}},
journal = {{Journal of Nonparametric Statistics}},
pages = {{510--533}},
title = {{{Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series}}},
doi = {{10.1080/10485252.2020.1759598}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@misc{42278,
author = {{N., N.}},
publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}},
title = {{{Zuordnungsverfahren für Tauschbörsen}}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@misc{42307,
author = {{N., N.}},
publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}},
title = {{{Weitsichtigkeit zur Bildung stabiler Koalitionen - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@misc{42308,
author = {{N., N.}},
publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}},
title = {{{Verhandeltes strategisches Verhalten}}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@misc{42301,
author = {{N., N.}},
publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}},
title = {{{Kronzeugenprogramme zur Aufdeckung von Kartellen - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@misc{42299,
author = {{N., N.}},
publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}},
title = {{{Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten}}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@misc{42304,
author = {{N., N.}},
publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}},
title = {{{Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen}}},
year = {{2020}},
}
@misc{42298,
author = {{N., N.}},
publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}},
title = {{{Productivity optimization through project matching}}},
year = {{2020}},
}