@article{17350,
  abstract     = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}},
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  pages        = {{641--660}},
  title        = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}},
  volume       = {{177}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17086,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}},
  issn         = {{1612-4804}},
  journal      = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}},
  pages        = {{923--944}},
  title        = {{{Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1}},
  volume       = {{17}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17064,
  author       = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon}},
  issn         = {{1048-5252}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Nonparametric Statistics}},
  pages        = {{510--533}},
  title        = {{{Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/10485252.2020.1759598}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42278,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zuordnungsverfahren für Tauschbörsen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42307,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Weitsichtigkeit zur Bildung stabiler Koalitionen - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42308,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Verhandeltes strategisches Verhalten}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42301,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Kronzeugenprogramme zur Aufdeckung von Kartellen - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42299,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42304,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42298,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Productivity optimization through project matching}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42306,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42300,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Cartel Fines in the European Union}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42302,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42292,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42294,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Matching in Netzwerken}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{46541,
  abstract     = {{Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and whether prudent individuals show less preventive (self-protection) effort than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on higher-order risk preferences and various measures of observed real-world prevention behavior. We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung.}},
  author       = {{Mayrhofer, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}},
  keywords     = {{prudence, risk preferences, prevention, vaccination, screening}},
  publisher    = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}},
  title        = {{{Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence}}},
  volume       = {{863}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{60041,
  abstract     = {{<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Given the increasing role of socially responsible investing (SRI), but still limited participation of individual (i.e. small, retail) investors, the objective of this study is twofold: (i) We aim to identify investment barriers regarding SRI for individual investors and analyze to what extent these barriers vary across different investor groups. (ii) We analyze to what extent sustainability or transparency labels can help to overcome these barriers. To this end, we empirically analyze data from a survey and a stated choice experiment for a broad sample of financial decision makers in German households. The results suggest that a considerable amount of respondents can imagine to invest in a socially responsible manner, which is promising for policymakers and practitioners who aim to foster sustainable development and SRI. However, too high information costs are a severe barrier for potential future investors and a considerable share of respondents distrusts providers of socially responsible investment products. Banks, who could help to solve this problem, appear not to fulfill their role as intermediaries. But we find that labels might serve as a complement to banks. Especially sustainability certificates that confirm the consideration of sustainability criteria could decrease information costs and overcome at least some barriers for some investor groups, particularly for new investors. However, the results also suggest that a certain degree of basic knowledge and trust in providers of socially responsible investment products is required before labels work efficiently.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Gutsche, Gunnar and Zwergel, Bernhard}},
  issn         = {{1439-2917}},
  journal      = {{Schmalenbach Business Review}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{111--157}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}},
  title        = {{{Investment Barriers and Labeling Schemes for Socially Responsible Investments}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s41464-020-00085-z}},
  volume       = {{72}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17073,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}},
  issn         = {{1363-6669}},
  journal      = {{Review of Development Economics}},
  pages        = {{644--667}},
  title        = {{{Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/rode.12663}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{2808,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}},
  journal      = {{German Economic Review}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{129--170}},
  title        = {{{Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/geer.12140}},
  volume       = {{20}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{1139,
  abstract     = {{We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.}},
  author       = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}},
  journal      = {{Applied Economics Letters}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{54--57}},
  publisher    = {{Taylor and Francis Online}},
  title        = {{{Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}},
  volume       = {{26}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}