@misc{42306,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42300,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Cartel Fines in the European Union}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42302,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42292,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42294,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Matching in Netzwerken}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{46541,
  abstract     = {{Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and whether prudent individuals show less preventive (self-protection) effort than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on higher-order risk preferences and various measures of observed real-world prevention behavior. We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung.}},
  author       = {{Mayrhofer, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}},
  keywords     = {{prudence, risk preferences, prevention, vaccination, screening}},
  publisher    = {{RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}},
  title        = {{{Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence}}},
  volume       = {{863}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{60041,
  abstract     = {{<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Given the increasing role of socially responsible investing (SRI), but still limited participation of individual (i.e. small, retail) investors, the objective of this study is twofold: (i) We aim to identify investment barriers regarding SRI for individual investors and analyze to what extent these barriers vary across different investor groups. (ii) We analyze to what extent sustainability or transparency labels can help to overcome these barriers. To this end, we empirically analyze data from a survey and a stated choice experiment for a broad sample of financial decision makers in German households. The results suggest that a considerable amount of respondents can imagine to invest in a socially responsible manner, which is promising for policymakers and practitioners who aim to foster sustainable development and SRI. However, too high information costs are a severe barrier for potential future investors and a considerable share of respondents distrusts providers of socially responsible investment products. Banks, who could help to solve this problem, appear not to fulfill their role as intermediaries. But we find that labels might serve as a complement to banks. Especially sustainability certificates that confirm the consideration of sustainability criteria could decrease information costs and overcome at least some barriers for some investor groups, particularly for new investors. However, the results also suggest that a certain degree of basic knowledge and trust in providers of socially responsible investment products is required before labels work efficiently.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Gutsche, Gunnar and Zwergel, Bernhard}},
  issn         = {{1439-2917}},
  journal      = {{Schmalenbach Business Review}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{111--157}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}},
  title        = {{{Investment Barriers and Labeling Schemes for Socially Responsible Investments}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s41464-020-00085-z}},
  volume       = {{72}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17073,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}},
  issn         = {{1363-6669}},
  journal      = {{Review of Development Economics}},
  pages        = {{644--667}},
  title        = {{{Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/rode.12663}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{2808,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}},
  journal      = {{German Economic Review}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{129--170}},
  title        = {{{Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/geer.12140}},
  volume       = {{20}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{1139,
  abstract     = {{We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.}},
  author       = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}},
  journal      = {{Applied Economics Letters}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{54--57}},
  publisher    = {{Taylor and Francis Online}},
  title        = {{{Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}}},
  doi          = {{10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}},
  volume       = {{26}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{2256,
  abstract     = {{Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon
that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario
is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider
appears who aims to disrupt the information 
flow within the network
by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds
to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous
connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way 
flow of
information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage
costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive
common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage
costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient
in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and inefficient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy
effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the
empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  pages        = {{146--163}},
  title        = {{{The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and  Disruption}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}},
  volume       = {{162}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{80,
  abstract     = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.

We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}},
  author       = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }},
  pages        = {{708--734}},
  title        = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}},
  volume       = {{157}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{7630,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.}},
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}},
  keywords     = {{credence goods, treatment efficiency, heterogeneous experts, overcharging}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series}},
  title        = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}}},
  volume       = {{118}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{8873,
  abstract     = {{We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.}},
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}},
  keywords     = {{credence goods, heterogeneous experts, fairness, overcharging}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series}},
  title        = {{{Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}}},
  volume       = {{119}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{9920,
  author       = {{Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}},
  issn         = {{0165-1765}},
  journal      = {{Economics Letters}},
  pages        = {{47--50}},
  title        = {{{Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}},
  volume       = {{181}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{6734,
  author       = {{Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}},
  journal      = {{Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{62--78}},
  title        = {{{Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/obes.12267}},
  volume       = {{81}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{15202,
  abstract     = {{In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}},
  keywords     = {{Labor market negotiations, Efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, Sequential bargaining, Restricted bargaining games}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}}},
  volume       = {{128}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{15204,
  abstract     = {{We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.}},
  author       = {{Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}},
  keywords     = {{TU-games, duality, core, c-Core, cohesive games, complete game efficiency}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Duality for General TU-games Redefined}}},
  volume       = {{121}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{10332,
  abstract     = {{We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.}},
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}},
  keywords     = {{retail bundling, leverage theory, double marginalization}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series}},
  title        = {{{Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{15075,
  author       = {{Bünnings, Christian and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}},
  issn         = {{0022-4367}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Risk and Insurance}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{415--449}},
  title        = {{{The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/jori.12219}},
  volume       = {{86}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}