[{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:48Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"place":"Paderborn University","title":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"urn":"29332","intvolume":" 113","_id":"2933","year":"2018","type":"working_paper","citation":{"short":"C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Qin, C.-Z. (2018). On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","bibtex":"@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018."},"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions."}],"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"file":[{"file_name":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:15:31Z","access_level":"closed","file_size":469001,"title":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem","creator":"cjhaake","file_id":"3855","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:52Z","content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file"}],"keyword":["Bargaining problem","CES Function","Normalized CES Function","Nash solution","Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution","Egalitarian Solution."],"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:52Z","author":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"},{"last_name":"Qin","first_name":"Cheng-Zhong","full_name":"Qin, Cheng-Zhong"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","date_created":"2018-05-28T07:00:28Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","volume":113},{"year":"2018","type":"book_chapter","citation":{"short":"W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.","ieee":"W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in Studies in Economic Design, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W. Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer.","ama":"Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H, Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. Studies in Economic Design. Vol (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer.","apa":"Trockel, W., & Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, & W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic Design (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.","chicago":"Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” In Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin, Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer, n.d.","bibtex":"@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }","mla":"Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer."},"_id":"3098","urn":"30987","file":[{"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:36:24Z","file_name":"WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:11Z","title":"Thoughts on Social Design","file_id":"3857","creator":"cjhaake","file_size":141983}],"author":[{"last_name":"Trockel","first_name":"Walter","full_name":"Trockel, Walter"},{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"}],"publisher":"Springer","quality_controlled":"1","file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:11Z","publication":"Studies in Economic Design","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2018-06-06T17:07:28Z","volume":"(n.d.)","abstract":[{"text":"One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive equilibrium of an economy.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"series_title":"Studies in Economic Design","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:55Z","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"editor":[{"first_name":"Jean-Francois","full_name":"Laslier, Jean-Francois","last_name":"Laslier"},{"full_name":"Moulin, Herve","first_name":"Herve","last_name":"Moulin"},{"full_name":"Sanver, Remzi","first_name":"Remzi","last_name":"Sanver"},{"full_name":"Zwicker, William","first_name":"William","last_name":"Zwicker"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2510-3970"]},"publication_status":"accepted","place":"Heidelberg","title":"Thoughts on Social Design"},{"keyword":["Corruption","Reciprocity","Physician-Patient Relationship"],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","author":[{"id":"34491","last_name":"Hilleringmann","full_name":"Hilleringmann, Vanessa","first_name":"Vanessa"}],"date_created":"2018-06-07T07:42:31Z","status":"public","abstract":[{"text":"Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"42447","title":"The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment","citation":{"chicago":"Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series, 2018.","apa":"Hilleringmann, V. (2018). The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series.","ama":"Hilleringmann V. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series; 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Hilleringmann_2018, title={The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Hilleringmann, Vanessa}, year={2018} }","mla":"Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series, 2018.","short":"V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment, CIE Working Paper Series, 2018.","ieee":"V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series, 2018."},"type":"working_paper","year":"2018","_id":"3101","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:55Z"},{"user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":" In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"}],"article_type":"original","date_created":"2018-10-02T07:15:26Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","volume":27,"jel":["C78"],"file":[{"file_name":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information.pdf","date_created":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","access_level":"closed","file_size":636521,"file_id":"5107","creator":"stela","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","success":1,"relation":"main_file"}],"publication":"Group Decision and Negotiation","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","publisher":"Springer","author":[{"last_name":"Haake","id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"last_name":"Recker","first_name":"Sonja","full_name":"Recker, Sonja"}],"quality_controlled":"1","issue":"6","intvolume":" 27","_id":"4564","page":"905-932","type":"journal_article","year":"2018","citation":{"chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","ama":"Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}, number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }","short":"C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018."},"title":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"doi":"10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:11Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/","open_access":"1"}],"type":"journal_article","citation":{"mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI, 2018.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games}, publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018} }","ama":"Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4).","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018).","ieee":"B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.","short":"B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018)."},"year":"2018","_id":"4982","intvolume":" 9","issue":"4","article_number":"89","file":[{"access_level":"closed","file_name":"games-09-00089.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"relation":"main_file","file_size":492018,"creator":"ups","file_id":"5296"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"},{"full_name":"Rosenkranz, Stephanie","first_name":"Stephanie","last_name":"Rosenkranz"}],"publisher":"MDPI","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","publication":"Games","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2018-10-29T10:27:40Z","volume":9,"user_id":"42447","ddc":["000"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:33Z","oa":"1","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"title":" Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment"},{"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1932-6203"]},"project":[{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4","_id":"8"},{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"title":"Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:50Z","doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","author":[{"last_name":"Mir Djawadi","id":"26032","first_name":"Behnud","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912"},{"first_name":"Rene","full_name":"Fahr, Rene","last_name":"Fahr","id":"111"},{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","last_name":"Haake"},{"last_name":"Recker","first_name":"Sonja","full_name":"Recker, Sonja"}],"publisher":"Public Library of Science","file_date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","publication":"PLoS ONE","file":[{"file_name":"Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","access_level":"closed","file_id":"5542","creator":"cjhaake","file_size":1107189,"success":1,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z"}],"volume":13,"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2018-11-03T11:51:48Z","article_type":"review","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality is chosen until the price increases again."}],"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"477","funded_apc":"1","citation":{"ama":"Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","apa":"Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE, 13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","chicago":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE 13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.","bibtex":"@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}, number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science}, author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018} }","mla":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.","short":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).","ieee":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, 2018."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2018","intvolume":" 13","_id":"5330","article_number":"e0207172","issue":"11"},{"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:17Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:03:40Z","volume":111,"file":[{"date_created":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","file_name":"WP - A Note on Manipulability in Scho ol Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_id":"15209","creator":"stela","file_size":328319,"relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake"},{"first_name":"Nadja","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun"}],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"abstract":[{"text":"We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.","lang":"eng"}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={111}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences (Vol. 111). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences, vol. 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018."},"year":"2018","type":"working_paper","intvolume":" 111","_id":"15206"},{"_id":"15207","intvolume":" 117","type":"working_paper","year":"2018","citation":{"apa":"Duman, P. (2018). Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game (Vol. 117). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ama":"Duman P. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","chicago":"Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Duman_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game}, volume={117}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Duman, Papatya}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ieee":"P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, vol. 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018."},"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose."}],"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"65453","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","author":[{"full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya","last_name":"Duman"}],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:06:57Z","keyword":["Chain Store Game","reputation building","entry deterrence","Trockel's game"],"file":[{"file_id":"15208","creator":"stela","file_size":678790,"success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:06:57Z","content_type":"application/pdf","file_name":"WP - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior_ An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game.pdf","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:06:57Z","access_level":"closed"}],"volume":117,"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:06:11Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:18Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}]},{"title":"Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:35Z","doi":"10.1177/0022002717750450","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"text":"We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"477","ddc":["000"],"file":[{"date_created":"2018-11-02T16:07:11Z","file_name":"0022002717750450.pdf","access_level":"closed","creator":"ups","file_id":"5323","file_size":335051,"relation":"main_file","success":1,"date_updated":"2018-11-02T16:07:11Z","content_type":"application/pdf"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T16:07:11Z","publication":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","author":[{"last_name":"De Jaegher","full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris","first_name":"Kris"},{"last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"}],"publisher":"SAGE Publications","date_created":"2017-12-06T10:52:44Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","volume":63,"_id":"1029","intvolume":" 63","issue":"2","page":"502--527","year":"2018","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 502--527, 2018.","short":"K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (2018) 502--527.","bibtex":"@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2018, title={Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}, volume={63}, DOI={10.1177/0022002717750450}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications}, author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2018}, pages={502--527} }","mla":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63, no. 2, SAGE Publications, 2018, pp. 502--527, doi:10.1177/0022002717750450.","apa":"De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2018). Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(2), 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450","ama":"De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2018;63(2):502--527. doi:10.1177/0022002717750450","chicago":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 2 (2018): 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450."}},{"title":"New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe","user_id":"53779","author":[{"last_name":"Kolodziej","full_name":"Kolodziej, Ingo WK","first_name":"Ingo WK"},{"last_name":"Reichert","first_name":"Arndt R","full_name":"Reichert, Arndt R"},{"id":"48879","last_name":"Schmitz","full_name":"Schmitz, Hendrik","first_name":"Hendrik"}],"publication":"Health services research","department":[{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"volume":53,"publication_status":"published","status":"public","date_created":"2018-06-06T10:57:16Z","date_updated":"2022-03-10T13:43:12Z","_id":"3081","intvolume":" 53","doi":"10.111/1475-6773.12840","issue":"4","type":"journal_article","year":"2018","citation":{"mla":"Kolodziej, Ingo WK, et al. “New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe.” Health Services Research, vol. 53, no. 4, 2018, doi:10.111/1475-6773.12840.","bibtex":"@article{Kolodziej_Reichert_Schmitz_2018, title={New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe}, volume={53}, DOI={10.111/1475-6773.12840}, number={4}, journal={Health services research}, author={Kolodziej, Ingo WK and Reichert, Arndt R and Schmitz, Hendrik}, year={2018} }","apa":"Kolodziej, I. W., Reichert, A. R., & Schmitz, H. (2018). New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe. Health Services Research, 53(4). https://doi.org/10.111/1475-6773.12840","ama":"Kolodziej IW, Reichert AR, Schmitz H. New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe. Health services research. 2018;53(4). doi:10.111/1475-6773.12840","chicago":"Kolodziej, Ingo WK, Arndt R Reichert, and Hendrik Schmitz. “New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe.” Health Services Research 53, no. 4 (2018). https://doi.org/10.111/1475-6773.12840.","ieee":"I. W. Kolodziej, A. R. Reichert, and H. Schmitz, “New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe,” Health services research, vol. 53, no. 4, 2018, doi: 10.111/1475-6773.12840.","short":"I.W. Kolodziej, A.R. Reichert, H. Schmitz, Health Services Research 53 (2018)."},"language":[{"iso":"eng"}]}]