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We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung."}],"volume":863,"date_created":"2023-08-16T10:50:11Z","status":"public","department":[{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"keyword":["prudence","risk preferences","prevention","vaccination","screening"],"author":[{"first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Mayrhofer, Thomas","last_name":"Mayrhofer"},{"last_name":"Schmitz","id":"48879","first_name":"Hendrik","full_name":"Schmitz, Hendrik"}],"publisher":"RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen"},{"title":"Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change","user_id":"186","publication":"German Economic Review","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"author":[{"first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","last_name":"Gries","id":"186"},{"last_name":"Jungblut","full_name":"Jungblut, Stefan","first_name":"Stefan"},{"first_name":"Tim","full_name":"Krieger, Tim","last_name":"Krieger"},{"first_name":"Henning","full_name":"Meyer, Henning","last_name":"Meyer"}],"volume":20,"date_created":"2018-05-18T10:27:14Z","status":"public","intvolume":" 20","_id":"2808","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:51Z","doi":"10.1111/geer.12140","issue":"2","page":"129-170","year":"2019","citation":{"short":"T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, H. Meyer, German Economic Review 20 (2019) 129–170.","ieee":"T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, and H. Meyer, “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change,” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 129–170, 2019.","apa":"Gries, T., Jungblut, S., Krieger, T., & Meyer, H. (2019). Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review, 20(2), 129–170. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140","ama":"Gries T, Jungblut S, Krieger T, Meyer H. Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review. 2019;20(2):129-170. doi:10.1111/geer.12140","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, Stefan Jungblut, Tim Krieger, and Henning Meyer. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review 20, no. 2 (2019): 129–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140.","mla":"Gries, Thomas, et al. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 2019, pp. 129–70, doi:10.1111/geer.12140.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Jungblut_Krieger_Meyer_2019, title={Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}, volume={20}, DOI={10.1111/geer.12140}, number={2}, journal={German Economic Review}, author={Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}, year={2019}, pages={129–170} }"},"type":"journal_article","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"183"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","project":[{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4","_id":"8"},{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"}],"title":"Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:51:00Z","doi":"10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","publisher":"Taylor and Francis Online","author":[{"last_name":"Kaimann","id":"18949","first_name":"Daniel","full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel"},{"last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","publication":"Applied Economics Letters","file":[{"file_size":625230,"file_id":"5307","creator":"ups","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","success":1,"relation":"main_file","file_name":"KaimannHoyer.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","access_level":"closed"}],"volume":26,"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2018-01-31T08:34:35Z","abstract":[{"text":"We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.","lang":"eng"}],"ddc":["000"],"user_id":"18949","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141"}],"type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.","short":"D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57.","mla":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.","bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}, number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57} }","apa":"Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters, 26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","ama":"Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57. doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141."},"year":"2019","page":"54-57","_id":"1139","intvolume":" 26","issue":"1"},{"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","author":[{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"},{"full_name":"Haller, Hans","first_name":"Hans","last_name":"Haller"}],"volume":162,"date_created":"2018-04-06T07:59:01Z","status":"public","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."}],"user_id":"477","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824"}],"page":"146-163","citation":{"ieee":"B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019.","short":"B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019) 146–163.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","ama":"Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","intvolume":" 162","_id":"2256","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_status":"published","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"title":"The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:36Z","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011"},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:49Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4","_id":"8"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"179"},{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?","year":"2019","citation":{"chicago":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019): 708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","apa":"Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","ama":"Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","bibtex":"@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={708–734} }","mla":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","short":"A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734.","ieee":"A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019."},"type":"journal_article","page":"708-734","intvolume":" 157","_id":"80","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:07Z","volume":157,"file":[{"file_name":"Publication Jebo.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","access_level":"closed","creator":"bhoyer","file_id":"5723","file_size":1569991,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z"}],"author":[{"first_name":"Angelika Elfriede","full_name":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede","last_name":"Endres","id":"48794"},{"full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Recker"},{"first_name":"Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","last_name":"Mir Djawadi","id":"26032"},{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ","user_id":"42447","ddc":["330"],"article_type":"original","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."}]},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:42Z","report_number":"2019-01","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","title":"Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts","place":"Paderborn University","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"intvolume":" 118","_id":"7630","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}, volume={118}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol. 118, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts (Vol. 118). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol. 118. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, vol. 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019."},"year":"2019","type":"report","user_id":"477","ddc":["330"],"abstract":[{"text":"In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2019-02-12T08:18:02Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","volume":118,"jel":["D82","I11","L15"],"file":[{"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","file_name":"WP118.pdf","relation":"main_file","success":1,"date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"7631","creator":"jheinzel","file_size":286367}],"file_date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","keyword":["credence goods","treatment efficiency","heterogeneous experts","overcharging"],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","author":[{"last_name":"Heinzel","id":"53445","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef"}]},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:04:05Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"title":"Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts","place":"Paderborn University","type":"report","citation":{"ama":"Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts. Vol 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts (Vol. 119). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts. Vol. 119. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}, volume={119}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts. Vol. 119, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts, vol. 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"year":"2019","_id":"8873","intvolume":" 119","date_created":"2019-04-11T08:13:53Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","volume":119,"jel":["D82","I11","L15"],"file":[{"success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z","content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"jheinzel","file_id":"8875","file_size":315297,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"WP119.pdf","date_created":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z"}],"keyword":["credence goods","heterogeneous experts","fairness","overcharging"],"file_date_updated":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z","author":[{"id":"53445","last_name":"Heinzel","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","user_id":"53445","ddc":["330"],"abstract":[{"text":"We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.","lang":"eng"}]},{"title":"Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?","user_id":"186","publication_status":"published","volume":181,"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0165-1765"]},"date_created":"2019-05-23T07:55:48Z","status":"public","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication":"Economics Letters","author":[{"first_name":"Marlon","full_name":"Fritz, Marlon","last_name":"Fritz"},{"full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas","id":"186","last_name":"Gries"},{"last_name":"Feng","first_name":"Yuanhua","full_name":"Feng, Yuanhua"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","_id":"9920","intvolume":" 181","date_updated":"2019-05-31T08:18:38Z","page":"47-50","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"M. Fritz, T. Gries, and Y. Feng, “Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?,” Economics Letters, vol. 181, pp. 47–50, 2019.","short":"M. Fritz, T. Gries, Y. Feng, Economics Letters 181 (2019) 47–50.","bibtex":"@article{Fritz_Gries_Feng_2019, title={Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}, volume={181}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}, journal={Economics Letters}, author={Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}, year={2019}, pages={47–50} }","mla":"Fritz, Marlon, et al. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters, vol. 181, 2019, pp. 47–50, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.","ama":"Fritz M, Gries T, Feng Y. Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters. 2019;181:47-50. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","apa":"Fritz, M., Gries, T., & Feng, Y. (2019). Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters, 181, 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","chicago":"Fritz, Marlon, Thomas Gries, and Yuanhua Feng. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters 181 (2019): 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021."},"year":"2019","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"issue":"1","doi":"10.1111/obes.12267","intvolume":" 81","_id":"6734","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:17Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"page":"62-78","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Gries_Fritz_Yuanhua_2019, title={Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}, volume={81}, DOI={10.1111/obes.12267}, number={1}, journal={Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, author={Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}, year={2019}, pages={62–78} }","mla":"Gries, Thomas, et al. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, 2019, pp. 62–78, doi:10.1111/obes.12267.","ama":"Gries T, Fritz M, Yuanhua F. Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2019;81(1):62-78. doi:10.1111/obes.12267","apa":"Gries, T., Fritz, M., & Yuanhua, F. (2019). Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 81(1), 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, Marlon Fritz, and Feng Yuanhua. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 1 (2019): 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267.","ieee":"T. Gries, M. Fritz, and F. Yuanhua, “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 62–78, 2019.","short":"T. Gries, M. Fritz, F. Yuanhua, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81 (2019) 62–78."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","user_id":"186","title":"Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics","date_created":"2019-01-15T11:16:38Z","status":"public","volume":81,"publication":"Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"author":[{"id":"186","last_name":"Gries","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"},{"last_name":"Fritz","first_name":"Marlon","full_name":"Fritz, Marlon"},{"full_name":"Yuanhua, Feng","first_name":"Feng","last_name":"Yuanhua"}]},{"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2019-11-28T09:49:08Z","volume":128,"file":[{"date_created":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","file_name":"WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf","access_level":"closed","creator":"stela","file_id":"15203","file_size":1068284,"success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","content_type":"application/pdf"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","author":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"},{"last_name":"Upmann","full_name":"Upmann, Thorsten","first_name":"Thorsten"},{"id":"72752","last_name":"Duman","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya"}],"keyword":["Labor market negotiations","Efficient bargains","Nash bargaining solution","Sequential bargaining","Restricted bargaining games"],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments."}],"type":"working_paper","year":"2019","citation":{"apa":"Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2019). The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ama":"Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019."},"intvolume":" 128","_id":"15202","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:16Z"},{"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Duality for General TU-games Redefined","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:17Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:00:41Z","volume":121,"file":[{"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:01:40Z","file_name":"WP - Duality for General TU-games Redefined.pdf","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:01:40Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"file_size":369323,"creator":"stela","file_id":"15205"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","author":[{"full_name":"Aslan, Fatma","first_name":"Fatma","last_name":"Aslan"},{"last_name":"Duman","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya"},{"last_name":"Trockel","first_name":"Walter","full_name":"Trockel, Walter"}],"keyword":["TU-games","duality","core","c-Core","cohesive games","complete game efficiency"],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:01:40Z","user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"abstract":[{"text":"We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \\coalition building\". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.","lang":"eng"}],"year":"2019","type":"working_paper","citation":{"ieee":"F. Aslan, P. Duman, and W. Trockel, Duality for General TU-games Redefined, vol. 121. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","short":"F. Aslan, P. Duman, W. Trockel, Duality for General TU-Games Redefined, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","mla":"Aslan, Fatma, et al. Duality for General TU-Games Redefined. Vol. 121, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Aslan_Duman_Trockel_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Duality for General TU-games Redefined}, volume={121}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","apa":"Aslan, F., Duman, P., & Trockel, W. (2019). Duality for General TU-games Redefined (Vol. 121). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ama":"Aslan F, Duman P, Trockel W. Duality for General TU-Games Redefined. Vol 121. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019.","chicago":"Aslan, Fatma, Papatya Duman, and Walter Trockel. Duality for General TU-Games Redefined. Vol. 121. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019."},"intvolume":" 121","_id":"15204"},{"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","citation":{"mla":"Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 056943451984647, 2019, doi:10.1177/0569434519846477.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_2019, title={A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea}, DOI={10.1177/0569434519846477}, number={056943451984647}, journal={The American Economist}, author={Gries, Thomas}, year={2019} }","chicago":"Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477.","ama":"Gries T. A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. 2019. doi:10.1177/0569434519846477","apa":"Gries, T. (2019). A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477","ieee":"T. Gries, “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea,” The American Economist, 2019.","short":"T. Gries, The American Economist (2019)."},"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:28Z","_id":"10090","article_number":"056943451984647","doi":"10.1177/0569434519846477","author":[{"full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas","id":"186","last_name":"Gries"}],"publication":"The American Economist","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0569-4345","2328-1235"]},"status":"public","date_created":"2019-06-03T07:46:47Z","title":"A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea","user_id":"186"},{"title":"Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition","place":"Paderborn University","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:37Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"user_id":"53445","ddc":["330"],"abstract":[{"text":"We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2019-06-28T08:42:49Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","file":[{"file_name":"WP120.pdf","date_created":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","access_level":"closed","file_size":375054,"creator":"jheinzel","file_id":"10333","date_updated":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"relation":"main_file"}],"keyword":["retail bundling","leverage theory","double marginalization"],"file_date_updated":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","author":[{"full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","id":"53445","last_name":"Heinzel"}],"_id":"10332","type":"report","citation":{"ama":"Heinzel JMJ. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). 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Universität Paderborn, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{N._2019, title={Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2019} }","ama":"N. N. Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden. Universität Paderborn; 2019.","apa":"N., N. (2019). Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden. Universität Paderborn.","chicago":"N., N. Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden. Universität Paderborn, 2019.","ieee":"N. N., Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden. Universität Paderborn, 2019.","short":"N. N., Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden, Universität Paderborn, 2019."},"date_updated":"2023-05-23T12:48:17Z","_id":"41926","department":[{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","author":[{"full_name":"N., N.","first_name":"N.","last_name":"N."}],"date_created":"2023-02-09T09:23:13Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"status":"public","user_id":"477","title":"Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden"},{"status":"public","project":[{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"date_created":"2023-02-22T10:49:08Z","author":[{"last_name":"N.","first_name":"N.","full_name":"N., N."}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","department":[{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"user_id":"477","title":"Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"supervisor":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"}],"type":"bachelorsthesis","citation":{"short":"N. N., Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität, Universität Paderborn, 2019.","ieee":"N. N., Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität. Universität Paderborn, 2019.","chicago":"N., N. Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität. Universität Paderborn, 2019.","ama":"N. N. Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität. Universität Paderborn; 2019.","apa":"N., N. (2019). Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität. Universität Paderborn.","bibtex":"@book{N._2019, title={Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2019} }","mla":"N., N. Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität. Universität Paderborn, 2019."},"year":"2019","date_updated":"2023-05-23T12:48:10Z","_id":"42277"},{"type":"bachelorsthesis","citation":{"mla":"N., N. Student’s School Matching Mechanisms in the US. Universität Paderborn, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{N._2019, title={Student’s school matching mechanisms in the US}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2019} }","chicago":"N., N. Student’s School Matching Mechanisms in the US. Universität Paderborn, 2019.","apa":"N., N. (2019). Student’s school matching mechanisms in the US. Universität Paderborn.","ama":"N. N. Student’s School Matching Mechanisms in the US. Universität Paderborn; 2019.","ieee":"N. N., Student’s school matching mechanisms in the US. Universität Paderborn, 2019.","short":"N. N., Student’s School Matching Mechanisms in the US, Universität Paderborn, 2019."},"year":"2019","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"}],"date_updated":"2023-05-23T12:47:52Z","_id":"42283","date_created":"2023-02-22T10:55:19Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"status":"public","department":[{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","author":[{"first_name":"N.","full_name":"N., N.","last_name":"N."}],"title":"Student's school matching mechanisms in the US","user_id":"477"},{"user_id":"186","title":"Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries","author":[{"id":"186","last_name":"Gries","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"},{"last_name":"Grundmann","full_name":"Grundmann, Rainer","first_name":"Rainer"}],"department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication":"Journal of International Development","status":"public","date_created":"2018-05-18T11:05:19Z","volume":30,"_id":"2814","intvolume":" 30","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:52Z","issue":"3","doi":"10.1002/jid.3104","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2018","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ama":"Gries T, Grundmann R. 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Journal of International Development, 30(3), 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development 30, no. 3 (2018): 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104.","mla":"Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development, vol. 30, no. 3, 2018, pp. 493–506, doi:10.1002/jid.3104.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Grundmann_2018, title={Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1002/jid.3104}, number={3}, journal={Journal of International Development}, author={Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}, year={2018}, pages={493–506} }","short":"T. Gries, R. Grundmann, Journal of International Development 30 (2018) 493–506.","ieee":"T. Gries and R. Grundmann, “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Development, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 493–506, 2018."},"page":"493-506"},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1145/3230654.3230659","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:01Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-4503-5916-0"]},"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"541"},{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value","page":"5:1-5:6","type":"conference","citation":{"short":"M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.","ieee":"M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. 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In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) (pp. 5:1-5:6). Irvine, California, USA. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659","mla":"Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={10.1145/3230654.3230659}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6} }"},"year":"2018","conference":{"end_date":"2018-06-18","location":"Irvine, California, USA","start_date":"2018-06-18","name":"The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)"},"_id":"2831","date_created":"2018-05-22T10:28:51Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","file":[{"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-08-15T07:30:50Z","file_name":"Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:30:50Z","success":1,"relation":"main_file","file_size":1450171,"creator":"nmaraun","file_id":"3910"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:30:50Z","publication":"Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)","author":[{"last_name":"Feldotto","id":"14052","first_name":"Matthias","full_name":"Feldotto, Matthias","orcid":"0000-0003-1348-6516"},{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","last_name":"Haake"},{"full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","first_name":"Alexander","id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik"},{"last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","id":"13264","first_name":"Nadja","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja"}],"user_id":"14052","ddc":["040"],"abstract":[{"text":"We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.","lang":"eng"}]},{"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:09Z","volume":112,"date_created":"2018-05-03T07:50:57Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","file_date_updated":"2018-09-13T07:29:48Z","keyword":["NTU differential games","variable Pareto weights","agreeability"],"author":[{"full_name":"Hoof, Simon","first_name":"Simon","id":"59676","last_name":"Hoof"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","file":[{"file_id":"4382","creator":"stela","file_size":263766,"success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-09-13T07:29:48Z","content_type":"application/pdf","file_name":"WP - Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games.pdf","date_created":"2018-09-13T07:29:48Z","access_level":"closed"}],"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"65453","abstract":[{"text":"This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.","lang":"eng"}],"year":"2018","citation":{"ieee":"S. Hoof, Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games, vol. 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"S. Hoof, Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Hoof_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}, volume={112}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Hoof, Simon}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Hoof, Simon. Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games. Vol. 112, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","chicago":"Hoof, Simon. Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games. Vol. 112. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Hoof S. Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games. Vol 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","apa":"Hoof, S. (2018). Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games (Vol. 112). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University."},"type":"working_paper","intvolume":" 112","_id":"2565"},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:48Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"place":"Paderborn University","title":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"intvolume":" 113","_id":"2933","urn":"29332","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Qin, C.-Z. (2018). On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018."},"type":"working_paper","year":"2018","abstract":[{"text":"We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions.","lang":"eng"}],"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"65453","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","author":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"},{"last_name":"Qin","full_name":"Qin, Cheng-Zhong","first_name":"Cheng-Zhong"}],"keyword":["Bargaining problem","CES Function","Normalized CES Function","Nash solution","Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution","Egalitarian Solution."],"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:52Z","file":[{"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:15:31Z","file_name":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:52Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":469001,"title":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem","file_id":"3855","creator":"cjhaake"}],"volume":113,"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2018-05-28T07:00:28Z"},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:55Z","series_title":"Studies in Economic Design","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"place":"Heidelberg","title":"Thoughts on Social Design","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2510-3970"]},"publication_status":"accepted","editor":[{"first_name":"Jean-Francois","full_name":"Laslier, Jean-Francois","last_name":"Laslier"},{"full_name":"Moulin, Herve","first_name":"Herve","last_name":"Moulin"},{"full_name":"Sanver, Remzi","first_name":"Remzi","last_name":"Sanver"},{"last_name":"Zwicker","full_name":"Zwicker, William","first_name":"William"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"urn":"30987","_id":"3098","year":"2018","type":"book_chapter","citation":{"ama":"Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H, Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. Studies in Economic Design. Vol (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer.","apa":"Trockel, W., & Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, & W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic Design (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.","chicago":"Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” In Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin, Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer, n.d.","mla":"Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer.","bibtex":"@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }","short":"W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.","ieee":"W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in Studies in Economic Design, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W. Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer."},"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive equilibrium of an economy."}],"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","publication":"Studies in Economic Design","file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:11Z","quality_controlled":"1","author":[{"last_name":"Trockel","first_name":"Walter","full_name":"Trockel, Walter"},{"last_name":"Haake","id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"}],"publisher":"Springer","file":[{"date_created":"2018-08-09T08:36:24Z","file_name":"WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf","access_level":"closed","title":"Thoughts on Social Design","creator":"cjhaake","file_id":"3857","file_size":141983,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:11Z"}],"volume":"(n.d.)","date_created":"2018-06-06T17:07:28Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1"},{"abstract":[{"text":"Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"42447","title":"The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"keyword":["Corruption","Reciprocity","Physician-Patient Relationship"],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","author":[{"first_name":"Vanessa","full_name":"Hilleringmann, Vanessa","last_name":"Hilleringmann","id":"34491"}],"date_created":"2018-06-07T07:42:31Z","status":"public","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:55Z","_id":"3101","type":"working_paper","citation":{"mla":"Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series, 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Hilleringmann_2018, title={The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Hilleringmann, Vanessa}, year={2018} }","chicago":"Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series, 2018.","apa":"Hilleringmann, V. (2018). The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series.","ama":"Hilleringmann V. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series; 2018.","ieee":"V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series, 2018.","short":"V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment, CIE Working Paper Series, 2018."},"year":"2018"},{"_id":"4564","intvolume":" 27","issue":"6","year":"2018","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}, number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.","ama":"Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.","short":"C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932."},"type":"journal_article","page":"905-932","article_type":"original","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":" In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"}],"user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"file":[{"access_level":"closed","file_name":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information.pdf","date_created":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"file_size":636521,"file_id":"5107","creator":"stela"}],"publisher":"Springer","author":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"},{"last_name":"Recker","first_name":"Sonja","full_name":"Recker, Sonja"}],"quality_controlled":"1","publication":"Group Decision and Negotiation","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2018-10-02T07:15:26Z","jel":["C78"],"volume":27,"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:11Z","doi":"10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"publication_status":"published"},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:33Z","oa":"1","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":" Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"_id":"4982","intvolume":" 9","article_number":"89","issue":"4","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/","open_access":"1"}],"type":"journal_article","citation":{"short":"B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018).","ieee":"B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4).","ama":"Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018).","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games}, publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI, 2018."},"year":"2018","ddc":["000"],"user_id":"42447","publication":"Games","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","publisher":"MDPI","author":[{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"},{"last_name":"Rosenkranz","full_name":"Rosenkranz, Stephanie","first_name":"Stephanie"}],"file":[{"date_created":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","file_name":"games-09-00089.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":492018,"file_id":"5296","creator":"ups","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","relation":"main_file","success":1}],"volume":9,"date_created":"2018-10-29T10:27:40Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public"},{"_id":"5330","intvolume":" 13","issue":"11","article_number":"e0207172","funded_apc":"1","citation":{"ieee":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, 2018.","short":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).","bibtex":"@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}, number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science}, author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018} }","mla":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.","ama":"Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","apa":"Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE, 13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","chicago":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE 13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2018","article_type":"review","abstract":[{"text":"In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality is chosen until the price increases again.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"477","ddc":["330"],"file":[{"date_created":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","file_name":"Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_id":"5542","creator":"cjhaake","file_size":1107189,"success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","content_type":"application/pdf"}],"publisher":"Public Library of Science","author":[{"last_name":"Mir Djawadi","id":"26032","first_name":"Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud"},{"last_name":"Fahr","id":"111","first_name":"Rene","full_name":"Fahr, Rene"},{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","last_name":"Haake"},{"last_name":"Recker","full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja"}],"publication":"PLoS ONE","file_date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2018-11-03T11:51:48Z","volume":13,"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:50Z","doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"},{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1932-6203"]},"publication_status":"published"},{"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:17Z","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"title":"A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences","year":"2018","type":"working_paper","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={111}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences (Vol. 111). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences, vol. 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018."},"intvolume":" 111","_id":"15206","file":[{"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","file_name":"WP - A Note on Manipulability in Scho ol Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.pdf","success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"stela","file_id":"15209","file_size":328319}],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:07:24Z","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","author":[{"last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","first_name":"Nadja"}],"date_created":"2019-11-28T10:03:40Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","volume":111,"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior."}],"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"]},{"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose."}],"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"file":[{"success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:06:57Z","content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"stela","file_id":"15208","file_size":678790,"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:06:57Z","file_name":"WP - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior_ An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game.pdf"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","author":[{"first_name":"Papatya","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","last_name":"Duman"}],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:06:57Z","keyword":["Chain Store Game","reputation building","entry deterrence","Trockel's game"],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:06:11Z","volume":117,"_id":"15207","intvolume":" 117","type":"working_paper","citation":{"short":"P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ieee":"P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, vol. 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","chicago":"Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","ama":"Duman P. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","apa":"Duman, P. (2018). Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game (Vol. 117). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","bibtex":"@book{Duman_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game}, volume={117}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Duman, Papatya}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018."},"year":"2018","title":"Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:18Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:35Z","doi":"10.1177/0022002717750450","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"title":"Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves","year":"2018","citation":{"short":"K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (2018) 502--527.","ieee":"K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 502--527, 2018.","chicago":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 2 (2018): 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450.","apa":"De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2018). Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(2), 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450","ama":"De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2018;63(2):502--527. doi:10.1177/0022002717750450","mla":"De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63, no. 2, SAGE Publications, 2018, pp. 502--527, doi:10.1177/0022002717750450.","bibtex":"@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2018, title={Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}, volume={63}, DOI={10.1177/0022002717750450}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications}, author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2018}, pages={502--527} }"},"type":"journal_article","page":"502--527","_id":"1029","intvolume":" 63","issue":"2","publisher":"SAGE Publications","author":[{"first_name":"Kris","full_name":"De Jaegher, Kris","last_name":"De Jaegher"},{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T16:07:11Z","publication":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","file":[{"creator":"ups","file_id":"5323","file_size":335051,"relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-02T16:07:11Z","date_created":"2018-11-02T16:07:11Z","file_name":"0022002717750450.pdf","access_level":"closed"}],"volume":63,"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2017-12-06T10:52:44Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy)."}],"ddc":["000"],"user_id":"477"},{"_id":"3081","intvolume":" 53","date_updated":"2022-03-10T13:43:12Z","doi":"10.111/1475-6773.12840","issue":"4","type":"journal_article","year":"2018","citation":{"short":"I.W. Kolodziej, A.R. Reichert, H. Schmitz, Health Services Research 53 (2018).","ieee":"I. W. Kolodziej, A. R. Reichert, and H. Schmitz, “New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe,” Health services research, vol. 53, no. 4, 2018, doi: 10.111/1475-6773.12840.","chicago":"Kolodziej, Ingo WK, Arndt R Reichert, and Hendrik Schmitz. “New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe.” Health Services Research 53, no. 4 (2018). https://doi.org/10.111/1475-6773.12840.","ama":"Kolodziej IW, Reichert AR, Schmitz H. New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe. Health services research. 2018;53(4). doi:10.111/1475-6773.12840","apa":"Kolodziej, I. W., Reichert, A. R., & Schmitz, H. (2018). New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe. Health Services Research, 53(4). https://doi.org/10.111/1475-6773.12840","mla":"Kolodziej, Ingo WK, et al. “New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe.” Health Services Research, vol. 53, no. 4, 2018, doi:10.111/1475-6773.12840.","bibtex":"@article{Kolodziej_Reichert_Schmitz_2018, title={New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe}, volume={53}, DOI={10.111/1475-6773.12840}, number={4}, journal={Health services research}, author={Kolodziej, Ingo WK and Reichert, Arndt R and Schmitz, Hendrik}, year={2018} }"},"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe","user_id":"53779","author":[{"full_name":"Kolodziej, Ingo WK","first_name":"Ingo WK","last_name":"Kolodziej"},{"last_name":"Reichert","full_name":"Reichert, Arndt R","first_name":"Arndt R"},{"id":"48879","last_name":"Schmitz","full_name":"Schmitz, Hendrik","first_name":"Hendrik"}],"department":[{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication":"Health services research","volume":53,"publication_status":"published","status":"public","date_created":"2018-06-06T10:57:16Z"}]