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Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen. Universität Paderborn; 2020.","apa":"N., N. (2020). Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen. Universität Paderborn.","ieee":"N. N., Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","short":"N. N., Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen, Universität Paderborn, 2020."},"year":"2020","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"supervisor":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"}]},{"user_id":"477","title":"Productivity optimization through project matching","department":[{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"author":[{"first_name":"N.","full_name":"N., N.","last_name":"N."}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","project":[{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"date_created":"2023-02-22T11:10:47Z","status":"public","date_updated":"2023-05-23T12:46:30Z","_id":"42298","supervisor":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@book{N._2020, title={Productivity optimization through project matching}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020} }","mla":"N., N. Productivity Optimization through Project Matching. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","apa":"N., N. (2020). Productivity optimization through project matching. Universität Paderborn.","ama":"N. N. Productivity Optimization through Project Matching. Universität Paderborn; 2020.","chicago":"N., N. Productivity Optimization through Project Matching. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","ieee":"N. N., Productivity optimization through project matching. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","short":"N. N., Productivity Optimization through Project Matching, Universität Paderborn, 2020."},"type":"bachelorsthesis","year":"2020"},{"author":[{"last_name":"N.","full_name":"N., N.","first_name":"N."}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","department":[{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"status":"public","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"date_created":"2023-02-22T11:18:47Z","title":"Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange","user_id":"477","type":"mastersthesis","citation":{"chicago":"N., N. Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","ama":"N. N. Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange. Universität Paderborn; 2020.","apa":"N., N. (2020). Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange. 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N., Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen, Universität Paderborn, 2020.","bibtex":"@book{N._2020, title={Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020} }","mla":"N., N. Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","apa":"N., N. (2020). Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn.","ama":"N. N. Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn; 2020.","chicago":"N., N. Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020."},"year":"2020","type":"bachelorsthesis","user_id":"477","title":"Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen","author":[{"last_name":"N.","full_name":"N., N.","first_name":"N."}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","department":[{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"status":"public","project":[{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"date_created":"2023-02-22T11:15:31Z"},{"title":"Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen","user_id":"477","status":"public","date_created":"2023-02-22T11:04:42Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901: SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","author":[{"full_name":"N., N.","first_name":"N.","last_name":"N."}],"department":[{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"date_updated":"2023-05-23T12:46:58Z","_id":"42292","citation":{"ama":"N. N. Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn; 2020.","apa":"N., N. (2020). Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn.","chicago":"N., N. Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","bibtex":"@book{N._2020, title={Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020} }","mla":"N., N. Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","short":"N. N., Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen, Universität Paderborn, 2020.","ieee":"N. N., Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020."},"type":"mastersthesis","year":"2020","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"}]},{"supervisor":[{"last_name":"Haake","id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"}],"language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"year":"2020","type":"mastersthesis","citation":{"ieee":"N. N., Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","short":"N. N., Matching in Netzwerken, Universität Paderborn, 2020.","bibtex":"@book{N._2020, title={Matching in Netzwerken}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020} }","mla":"N., N. Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","chicago":"N., N. Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn, 2020.","ama":"N. N. Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn; 2020.","apa":"N., N. (2020). Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn."},"date_updated":"2023-05-23T12:46:44Z","_id":"42294","date_created":"2023-02-22T11:06:52Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"status":"public","department":[{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"publisher":"Universität Paderborn","author":[{"full_name":"N., N.","first_name":"N.","last_name":"N."}],"user_id":"477","title":"Matching in Netzwerken"},{"_id":"46541","intvolume":" 863","date_updated":"2023-08-20T17:55:46Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"type":"working_paper","year":"2020","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Mayrhofer_Schmitz_2020, series={ Ruhr Economic Papers}, title={Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence}, volume={863}, publisher={RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen}, author={Mayrhofer, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}, year={2020}, collection={ Ruhr Economic Papers} }","mla":"Mayrhofer, Thomas, and Hendrik Schmitz. Prudence and Prevention: Empirical Evidence. RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2020.","chicago":"Mayrhofer, Thomas, and Hendrik Schmitz. Prudence and Prevention: Empirical Evidence. Vol. 863. Ruhr Economic Papers. RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2020.","apa":"Mayrhofer, T., & Schmitz, H. (2020). Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence (Vol. 863). RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.","ama":"Mayrhofer T, Schmitz H. Prudence and Prevention: Empirical Evidence. Vol 863. RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen; 2020.","ieee":"T. Mayrhofer and H. Schmitz, Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence, vol. 863. RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2020.","short":"T. Mayrhofer, H. Schmitz, Prudence and Prevention: Empirical Evidence, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2020."},"series_title":" Ruhr Economic Papers","user_id":"53779","title":"Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and whether prudent individuals show less preventive (self-protection) effort than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on higher-order risk preferences and various measures of observed real-world prevention behavior. We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung."}],"status":"public","date_created":"2023-08-16T10:50:11Z","volume":863,"author":[{"last_name":"Mayrhofer","full_name":"Mayrhofer, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"},{"first_name":"Hendrik","full_name":"Schmitz, Hendrik","last_name":"Schmitz","id":"48879"}],"publisher":"RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen","department":[{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"keyword":["prudence","risk preferences","prevention","vaccination","screening"]},{"status":"public","date_created":"2018-05-18T10:27:14Z","volume":20,"author":[{"first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","last_name":"Gries","id":"186"},{"full_name":"Jungblut, Stefan","first_name":"Stefan","last_name":"Jungblut"},{"last_name":"Krieger","full_name":"Krieger, Tim","first_name":"Tim"},{"full_name":"Meyer, Henning","first_name":"Henning","last_name":"Meyer"}],"publication":"German Economic Review","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"user_id":"186","title":"Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2019","citation":{"short":"T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, H. Meyer, German Economic Review 20 (2019) 129–170.","ieee":"T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, and H. Meyer, “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change,” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 129–170, 2019.","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, Stefan Jungblut, Tim Krieger, and Henning Meyer. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review 20, no. 2 (2019): 129–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140.","apa":"Gries, T., Jungblut, S., Krieger, T., & Meyer, H. (2019). Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review, 20(2), 129–170. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140","ama":"Gries T, Jungblut S, Krieger T, Meyer H. Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review. 2019;20(2):129-170. doi:10.1111/geer.12140","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Jungblut_Krieger_Meyer_2019, title={Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}, volume={20}, DOI={10.1111/geer.12140}, number={2}, journal={German Economic Review}, author={Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}, year={2019}, pages={129–170} }","mla":"Gries, Thomas, et al. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 2019, pp. 129–70, doi:10.1111/geer.12140."},"type":"journal_article","page":"129-170","issue":"2","doi":"10.1111/geer.12140","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:51Z","_id":"2808","intvolume":" 20"},{"year":"2019","type":"journal_article","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}, number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57} }","mla":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.","apa":"Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters, 26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","ama":"Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57. doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","ieee":"D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.","short":"D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57."},"page":"54-57","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141"}],"issue":"1","_id":"1139","intvolume":" 26","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2018-01-31T08:34:35Z","volume":26,"file":[{"success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5307","creator":"ups","file_size":625230,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"KaimannHoyer.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z"}],"publisher":"Taylor and Francis Online","author":[{"last_name":"Kaimann","id":"18949","first_name":"Daniel","full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel"},{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"}],"publication":"Applied Economics Letters","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","user_id":"18949","ddc":["000"],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase."}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:51:00Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4","_id":"8"},{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"183"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market"},{"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:36Z","status":"public","date_created":"2018-04-06T07:59:01Z","volume":162,"author":[{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"},{"first_name":"Hans","full_name":"Haller, Hans","last_name":"Haller"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","user_id":"477","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."}],"year":"2019","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019.","short":"B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019) 146–163.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.","ama":"Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011"},"page":"146-163","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824"}],"intvolume":" 162","_id":"2256"},{"page":"708-734","year":"2019","type":"journal_article","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={708–734} }","mla":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","ama":"Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","apa":"Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","chicago":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019): 708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","ieee":"A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.","short":"A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734."},"intvolume":" 157","_id":"80","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:07Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","volume":157,"file":[{"date_created":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","file_name":"Publication Jebo.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_id":"5723","creator":"bhoyer","file_size":1569991,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ","file_date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","author":[{"last_name":"Endres","id":"48794","first_name":"Angelika Elfriede","full_name":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede"},{"last_name":"Recker","first_name":"Sonja","full_name":"Recker, Sonja"},{"last_name":"Mir Djawadi","id":"26032","first_name":"Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud"},{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"}],"user_id":"42447","ddc":["330"],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."}],"article_type":"original","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:49Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4","_id":"8"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"179"},{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?"},{"citation":{"ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, vol. 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}, volume={118}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol. 118, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts (Vol. 118). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol. 118. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"year":"2019","type":"report","intvolume":" 118","_id":"7630","volume":118,"jel":["D82","I11","L15"],"date_created":"2019-02-12T08:18:02Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","file_date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","keyword":["credence goods","treatment efficiency","heterogeneous experts","overcharging"],"author":[{"id":"53445","last_name":"Heinzel","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","file":[{"file_name":"WP118.pdf","date_created":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","access_level":"closed","file_size":286367,"creator":"jheinzel","file_id":"7631","date_updated":"2019-02-12T08:21:37Z","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"relation":"main_file"}],"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"477","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud."}],"report_number":"2019-01","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:42Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts","place":"Paderborn University"},{"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2019-04-11T08:13:53Z","jel":["D82","I11","L15"],"volume":119,"file":[{"file_size":315297,"file_id":"8875","creator":"jheinzel","date_updated":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z","content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","success":1,"date_created":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z","file_name":"WP119.pdf","access_level":"closed"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","author":[{"full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","id":"53445","last_name":"Heinzel"}],"keyword":["credence goods","heterogeneous experts","fairness","overcharging"],"file_date_updated":"2019-04-11T08:23:33Z","user_id":"53445","ddc":["330"],"abstract":[{"text":"We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.","lang":"eng"}],"type":"report","year":"2019","citation":{"ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts, vol. 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts. Vol. 119, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}, volume={119}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019}, collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts (Vol. 119). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts. Vol 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts. Vol. 119. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019."},"_id":"8873","intvolume":" 119","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"}],"title":"Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts","place":"Paderborn University","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"CIE Working Paper Series","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:04:05Z"},{"user_id":"186","title":"Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?","status":"public","date_created":"2019-05-23T07:55:48Z","volume":181,"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0165-1765"]},"author":[{"first_name":"Marlon","full_name":"Fritz, Marlon","last_name":"Fritz"},{"first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","last_name":"Gries","id":"186"},{"first_name":"Yuanhua","full_name":"Feng, Yuanhua","last_name":"Feng"}],"publication":"Economics Letters","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","intvolume":" 181","_id":"9920","date_updated":"2019-05-31T08:18:38Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","citation":{"chicago":"Fritz, Marlon, Thomas Gries, and Yuanhua Feng. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters 181 (2019): 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.","ama":"Fritz M, Gries T, Feng Y. Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters. 2019;181:47-50. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","apa":"Fritz, M., Gries, T., & Feng, Y. (2019). Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters, 181, 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","mla":"Fritz, Marlon, et al. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters, vol. 181, 2019, pp. 47–50, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.","bibtex":"@article{Fritz_Gries_Feng_2019, title={Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}, volume={181}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}, journal={Economics Letters}, author={Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}, year={2019}, pages={47–50} }","short":"M. Fritz, T. Gries, Y. Feng, Economics Letters 181 (2019) 47–50.","ieee":"M. Fritz, T. Gries, and Y. Feng, “Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?,” Economics Letters, vol. 181, pp. 47–50, 2019."},"page":"47-50"},{"doi":"10.1111/obes.12267","issue":"1","_id":"6734","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:17Z","intvolume":" 81","page":"62-78","citation":{"ieee":"T. Gries, M. Fritz, and F. Yuanhua, “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 62–78, 2019.","short":"T. Gries, M. Fritz, F. Yuanhua, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81 (2019) 62–78.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Fritz_Yuanhua_2019, title={Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}, volume={81}, DOI={10.1111/obes.12267}, number={1}, journal={Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, author={Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}, year={2019}, pages={62–78} }","mla":"Gries, Thomas, et al. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, 2019, pp. 62–78, doi:10.1111/obes.12267.","ama":"Gries T, Fritz M, Yuanhua F. Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2019;81(1):62-78. doi:10.1111/obes.12267","apa":"Gries, T., Fritz, M., & Yuanhua, F. (2019). Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 81(1), 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, Marlon Fritz, and Feng Yuanhua. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 1 (2019): 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics","user_id":"186","volume":81,"date_created":"2019-01-15T11:16:38Z","status":"public","publication":"Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"author":[{"id":"186","last_name":"Gries","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"},{"last_name":"Fritz","first_name":"Marlon","full_name":"Fritz, Marlon"},{"last_name":"Yuanhua","full_name":"Yuanhua, Feng","first_name":"Feng"}]},{"intvolume":" 128","_id":"15202","year":"2019","citation":{"ieee":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","ama":"Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2019). The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University."},"type":"working_paper","abstract":[{"text":"In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.","lang":"eng"}],"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","keyword":["Labor market negotiations","Efficient bargains","Nash bargaining solution","Sequential bargaining","Restricted bargaining games"],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","author":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"},{"full_name":"Upmann, Thorsten","first_name":"Thorsten","last_name":"Upmann"},{"full_name":"Duman, Papatya","first_name":"Papatya","id":"72752","last_name":"Duman"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","file":[{"creator":"stela","file_id":"15203","file_size":1068284,"relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","file_name":"WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf","date_created":"2019-11-28T09:50:10Z","access_level":"closed"}],"volume":128,"date_created":"2019-11-28T09:49:08Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:16Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}]},{"_id":"15204","intvolume":" 121","year":"2019","type":"working_paper","citation":{"ieee":"F. Aslan, P. Duman, and W. Trockel, Duality for General TU-games Redefined, vol. 121. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","short":"F. Aslan, P. Duman, W. Trockel, Duality for General TU-Games Redefined, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","bibtex":"@book{Aslan_Duman_Trockel_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Duality for General TU-games Redefined}, volume={121}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Aslan, Fatma, et al. Duality for General TU-Games Redefined. Vol. 121, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.","ama":"Aslan F, Duman P, Trockel W. Duality for General TU-Games Redefined. Vol 121. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019.","apa":"Aslan, F., Duman, P., & Trockel, W. (2019). Duality for General TU-games Redefined (Vol. 121). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","chicago":"Aslan, Fatma, Papatya Duman, and Walter Trockel. Duality for General TU-Games Redefined. Vol. 121. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019."},"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \\coalition building\". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations."}],"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:00:41Z","volume":121,"file":[{"relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:01:40Z","file_id":"15205","creator":"stela","file_size":369323,"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2019-11-28T10:01:40Z","file_name":"WP - Duality for General TU-games Redefined.pdf"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Aslan","first_name":"Fatma","full_name":"Aslan, Fatma"},{"first_name":"Papatya","full_name":"Duman, Papatya","last_name":"Duman"},{"first_name":"Walter","full_name":"Trockel, Walter","last_name":"Trockel"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","keyword":["TU-games","duality","core","c-Core","cohesive games","complete game efficiency"],"file_date_updated":"2019-11-28T10:01:40Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:17Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","title":"Duality for General TU-games Redefined","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}]},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:28Z","_id":"10090","article_number":"056943451984647","doi":"10.1177/0569434519846477","type":"journal_article","year":"2019","citation":{"mla":"Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 056943451984647, 2019, doi:10.1177/0569434519846477.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_2019, title={A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea}, DOI={10.1177/0569434519846477}, number={056943451984647}, journal={The American Economist}, author={Gries, Thomas}, year={2019} }","chicago":"Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477.","apa":"Gries, T. (2019). A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477","ama":"Gries T. A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. 2019. doi:10.1177/0569434519846477","ieee":"T. Gries, “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea,” The American Economist, 2019.","short":"T. Gries, The American Economist (2019)."},"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea","user_id":"186","author":[{"id":"186","last_name":"Gries","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"}],"publication":"The American Economist","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0569-4345","2328-1235"]},"publication_status":"published","status":"public","date_created":"2019-06-03T07:46:47Z"},{"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"place":"Paderborn University","title":"Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:37Z","author":[{"first_name":"Joachim Maria Josef","full_name":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef","last_name":"Heinzel","id":"53445"}],"publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series","keyword":["retail bundling","leverage theory","double marginalization"],"file_date_updated":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","file":[{"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","file_name":"WP120.pdf","date_updated":"2019-06-28T08:44:52Z","content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","success":1,"file_size":375054,"file_id":"10333","creator":"jheinzel"}],"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2019-06-28T08:42:49Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium."}],"ddc":["330"],"user_id":"53445","year":"2019","type":"report","citation":{"bibtex":"@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, title={Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019} }","mla":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","chicago":"Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","apa":"Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.","ama":"Heinzel JMJ. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.","ieee":"J. M. J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.","short":"J.M.J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019."},"_id":"10332"}]