TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 2961 IS - 6 JF - Journal of Health Economics TI - Practice budgets and the patient mix of physicians-Evaluating the effects of remuneration system reforms on physician behaviour in Germany VL - 32 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Augurzky, Boris AU - Kopetsch, Thomas AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 3084 IS - 4 JF - The European Journal of Health Economics TI - What accounts for the regional differences in the utilisation of hospitals in Germany? VL - 14 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Stroka, Magdalena A ID - 2962 JF - Labour Economics TI - Health and the double burden of full-time work and informal care provision—Evidence from administrative data VL - 24 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Martini, Jan Thomas ID - 2519 IS - 4 JF - Group Decision and Negotiation SN - 0926-2644 TI - Negotiating Transfer Prices VL - 22 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Krieger, Tim AU - Minter, Steffen ID - 2521 IS - 4 JF - International Economics and Economic Policy SN - 1612-4804 TI - On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU VL - 10 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Bilkic, Natascha AU - Pilichowski, Margarethe ID - 2949 IS - 5 JF - Labour Economics TI - Stay in school or start working?- The human capital investment decision under uncertainty and irreversibility VL - 19 ER - TY - CHAP AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Xue, Jinjun ED - Wang, Liming ID - 2950 SN - 9781138816732 T2 - Rising China in the Changing World Economy TI - Poverty in Shenzhen ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Meierrieks, Daniel ID - 2951 IS - 5 JF - Defence and Peace Economics TI - Economic performance and terrorist activity in Latin America VL - 23 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Prior, Ulrich AU - Sureth, Caren ID - 2952 IS - 3 JF - Journal of Public Economics Theory TI - A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty VL - 14 ER - TY - GEN AB - The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent, although they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the "common enemy effect". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links within the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the network. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of stable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - De Jaegher, Kris ID - 2249 TI - Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect VL - 12-06 ER -