TY - GEN
AB - We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Streck, Thomas
ID - 32106
KW - Asymmetric bargaining power
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
TI - Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power
VL - 148
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - De Jaegher, Kris
ID - 31881
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
TI - Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractNon-pharmaceutical interventions are an effective strategy to prevent and control COVID-19 transmission in the community. However, the timing and stringency to which these measures have been implemented varied between countries and regions. The differences in stringency can only to a limited extent be explained by the number of infections and the prevailing vaccination strategies. Our study aims to shed more light on the lockdown strategies and to identify the determinants underlying the differences between countries on regional, economic, institutional, and political level. Based on daily panel data for 173 countries and the period from January 2020 to October 2021 we find significant regional differences in lockdown strategies. Further, more prosperous countries implemented milder restrictions but responded more quickly, while poorer countries introduced more stringent measures but had a longer response time. Finally, democratic regimes and stronger manifested institutions alleviated and slowed down the introduction of lockdown measures.
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 33221
JF - Journal of Regulatory Economics
KW - Economics and Econometrics
SN - 0922-680X
TI - Differences in NPI strategies against COVID-19
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractWe provide a partial equilibrium model wherein AI provides abilities combined with human skills to provide an aggregate intermediate service good. We use the model to find that the extent of automation through AI will be greater if (a) the economy is relatively abundant in sophisticated programs and machine abilities compared to human skills; (b) the economy hosts a relatively large number of AI-providing firms and experts; and (c) the task-specific productivity of AI services is relatively high compared to the task-specific productivity of general labor and labor skills. We also illustrate that the contribution of AI to aggregate productive labor service depends not only on the amount of AI services available but on the endogenous number of automated tasks, the relative productivity of standard and IT-related labor, and the substitutability of tasks. These determinants also affect the income distribution between the two kinds of labor. We derive several empirical implications and identify possible future extensions.
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Naudé, Wim
ID - 33220
IS - 1
JF - Journal for Labour Market Research
KW - General Medicine
SN - 2510-5019
TI - Modelling artificial intelligence in economics
VL - 56
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Müller, Veronika
AU - Jost, John T.
ID - 33219
IS - 2
JF - Psychological Inquiry
KW - General Psychology
SN - 1047-840X
TI - The Market for Belief Systems: A Formal Model of Ideological Choice
VL - 33
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.
AU - Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Heinzel, Joachim
ID - 44091
KW - Retail bundling
KW - upstream market power
KW - double marginalization
KW - product differentiation
TI - The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42326
TI - Manipulation durch Fake-Bewertungen: Einfluss von Such- und Erfahrungsgütern auf das manipulative Verhalten des Verkäufers
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42322
TI - An Analysis of Coalition Formation Methods to achieve Maximum Social Surplus
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42324
TI - Die Möglichkeiten der Blockchain-Technologie im Supply Chain Management - eine spieltheoretische Analyse
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42318
TI - Kindergarten Allocation and the Tradeoff between Stability and Diversity Considerations
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42319
TI - Effect of the Agent's bargaining positions in the efficiency of matching markets
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42323
TI - Stabile Zuordnung mit Paaren - Der neue NRMP Algorithmus
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42320
TI - School choice with reserves and quotas
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42325
TI - Organisation von Zeitbörsen
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying
the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).
We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two
one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution
of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type
of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual
negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining
problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world
negotiations.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Upmann, Thorsten
AU - Duman, Papatya
ID - 30940
IS - 2
JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics
KW - Labour market negotiations
KW - efficient bargains
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - sequential bargaining
KW - restricted bargaining games
TI - Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining
VL - 125
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We study the effect of unemployment on cognitive abilities among individuals aged between 50 and 65 in Europe. To this end, we exploit plant closures and use flexible event-study estimations together with an experimentally elicited measure of fluid intelligence, namely word recall. We find that, within a time period of around eight years after the event of unemployment, cognitive abilities only deteriorate marginally — the effects are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. We do, however, find significant effects of late-career unemployment on the likelihood to leave the labor force, and short-term effects on mental health problems such as depression and sleep problems.
AU - Freise, Diana
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Westphal, Matthias
ID - 33458
JF - Journal of Health Economics
TI - Late-Career Unemployment and Cognitive Abilities
VL - 86
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Westphal, Matthias
AU - Kamhöfer, Daniel A.
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 30235
IS - 646
JF - Economic Journal
TI - Marginal College Wage Premium under Selection into Employment
VL - 132
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In this paper, we analyze the effect of light conditions on road accidents and estimate the long run consequences of different time regimes for road safety. Identification is based on variation in light conditions induced by differences in sunrise and sunset times across space and time. We estimate that darkness causes annual costs of more than £500 million in Great Britain. By setting daylight saving time year-round 8 percent of these costs could be saved. Thus, focusing solely on the short run costs related to the transition itself underestimates the total costs of the current time regime.
AU - Bünnings, Christian
AU - Schiele, Valentin
ID - 15073
IS - 1
JF - The Review of Economics and Statistics
SN - 0034-6535
TI - Spring Forward, Don't Fall Back: The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Road Safety
VL - 103
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 29152
JF - Review of Economic Design
SN - 1434-4742
TI - Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractUsing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984–2018, we analyze the intergenerational education mobility of immigrants in Germany by identifying the determinants of differences in educational stocks for first- and second-generation immigrants in comparison to individuals without a migration background. Our results show that on average, first-generation immigrants have fewer years of schooling than native-born Germans and have a disproportionate share of lower educational qualifications. This gap is strongly driven by age at immigration, with immigration age and education revealing a nonlinear relationship. While the gap is relatively small among individuals who migrate at a young age, integrating in the school system at secondary school age leads to large disadvantages. Examining the educational mobility of immigrants in Germany, we identify an inter-generational catch-up in education. The gap in education between immigrants and natives is reduced for the second generation. Finally, we find that country of origin differences can account for much of the education gap. While immigrants with an ethnic background closer to the German language and culture show the best education outcomes, immigrants from Turkey, Italy, and other southern European countries and especially the group of war refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other MENA countries, have the lowest educational attainment.
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
AU - Zehra, Moonum
ID - 22715
JF - Journal of International Migration and Integration
SN - 1488-3473
TI - Educational Assimilation of First-Generation and Second-Generation Immigrants in Germany
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractUsing time series data for the period 1959–2015, our empirical analysis examines the simultaneous effects of the individual components of the global carbon budget on temperature. Specifically, we explore the possible effects of carbon emissions caused by fossil fuel combustion, cement production, land-use change emissions, and carbon sinks (here in terms of land sink and ocean sink) on climate change. The simultaneous inclusion of carbon emissions and carbon sinks allows us to look at the coexistent and opposing effects of the individual components of the carbon budget and thus provides a holistic perspective from which to explore the relationship between the global carbon budget and global warming. The results reveal a significant positive effect of carbon emissions on temperature for both fossil fuels emissions and emissions from land-use change, confirming previous results concerning carbon dioxide and temperature. Further, while ocean sink does not seem to have a significant effect, we identify a temperature-decreasing effect for land sink.
AU - Redlin, Margarete
AU - Gries, Thomas
ID - 23594
JF - Theoretical and Applied Climatology
SN - 0177-798X
TI - Anthropogenic climate change: the impact of the global carbon budget
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42317
TI - Die Aufteilung der Barentsseegebiete mithilfe des Adjusted Winner Verfahrens bei asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42315
TI - Versionisierung von Serviceleistungen auf Videoplattformen
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42321
TI - Kindergarten Allocation through Matching Mechanisms
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42309
TI - Faire Profitverteilung in Energienetzwerken - eine spieltheoretische Analyse von Microgrids
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42311
TI - "First-Party-Content" auf zweiseitigen Märkten
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42314
TI - Stability in many-to-many matchings with contracts
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42313
TI - Preissetzungsstrategien für Neuprodukte
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42310
TI - Co-opetition in Two-Sided Markets
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42312
TI - Matching mit Minderheiten
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42316
TI - Piracy and Visioning
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42303
TI - Revenue Sharing Contracts: Horizontale Koordination in der E-Commerce-Logistik
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - I study a dynamic variant of the DixitâStiglitz (Am Econ Rev 67(3), 1977) model of monopolistic competition by introducing price stickiness à la Fershtman and Kamien (Econometrica 55(5), 1987). The analysis is restricted to bounded quantity and price paths that fulfill the necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium. I show that there exists a symmetric steady state and that its stability depends on the degree of product differentiation. When moving from complements to perfect substitutes, the steady state is either a locally asymptotically unstable (spiral) source, a stable (spiral) sink or a saddle point. I further apply the Hopf bifurcation theorem and prove the existence of limit cycles, when passing from a stable to an unstable steady state. Lastly, I provide a numerical example and show that there exists a stable limit cycle.
AU - Hoof, Simon
ID - 45640
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
SN - 1573-2878
TI - Dynamic Monopolistic Competition
VL - 189
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - Individual cognitive functioning declines over time. We seek to understand how adverse physical health shocks in older ages contribute to this development. By use of event-study methods and data from the USA, England and several countries in Continental Europe we find evidence that health shocks lead to an immediate and persistent decline in cognitive functioning. This robust finding holds in all regions representing different health insurance systems and seems to be independent of underlying individual demographic characteristics such as sex and age. We also ask whether variables that are susceptible to policy action can reduce the negative consequences of a health shock. Our results suggest that neither compulsory education nor retirement regulations moderate the effects, thus emphasizing the importance of maintaining good physical health in old age for cognitive functioning.
AU - Schiele, Valentin
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 46540
KW - Cognitive decline
KW - health shocks
KW - retirement
KW - education
KW - event study
TI - Understanding cognitive decline in older ages: The role of health shocks
VL - 919
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We study effects of retirement on cognitive abilities (up to ten years after retirement) using data from 21 countries in Continental Europe, England, and the US, and exploiting early-retirement thresholds for identification. For this purpose, combines event-study estimations with the marginal treatment effect framework to allow for effect heterogeneity. This helps to decompose event-study estimates into true medium-run effects of retirement and effects driven by differential retirement preferences. Our results suggest considerable negative effects of retirement on cognitive abilities. We also detect substantial effect heterogeneity: Those who retire as early as possible are not affected while those who retire later exhibit negative effects.
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Westphal, Matthias
ID - 46537
KW - Cognitive abilities
KW - retirement
KW - event study
KW - marginal treatment effects
TI - The dynamic and heterogeneous effects of retirement on cognitive decline
VL - 918
ER -
TY - CONF
AU - Krauter, Stefan
AU - Böcker, Joachim
AU - Freitag, Christine
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Hilleringmann, Ulrich
AU - Temmen, Katrin
AU - Klaus, Tobias
AU - Rohrer, Nicolaus
AU - Lehmann, Sven
ID - 22218
KW - Art-D
KW - Afrika
KW - Resilienz
KW - Resilience
KW - Grid stability
KW - robustness
KW - microgrids
SN - 978-3-948176-14-3
T2 - Tagungsband des 36. PV-Symposiums, 18.-26 Mai 2021
TI - Projekt Art-D Grids: Nachhaltige und stabile Microgrids in Afrika - eine Plattform für Forschung und Lehre für die Entwicklung
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Fritz, Marlon
ID - 17072
JF - Journal of Nonparametric Statistics
SN - 1048-5252
TI - Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, Rainer
ID - 17074
JF - Review of Development Economics
SN - 1363-6669
TI - Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting
and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,
we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university
course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus
questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme
for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)
varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on
average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,
the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the
questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the
questions are difficult.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - van Huizen, Thomas
AU - Keijzer, Linda
AU - Rezaei, Sarah
AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie
AU - Westbrock, Bastian
ID - 16273
JF - Labour Economics
TI - Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
ID - 16334
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse
VL - 121
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.
ID - 30234
IS - 7
JF - Health Economics
KW - Health Policy
SN - 1057-9230
TI - Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?
VL - 29
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
AU - Lück, Sonja
AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin
AU - Seliger, Florian
AU - Fleming, Lee
ID - 31802
IS - 6
JF - Management Science
KW - Management Science and Operations Research
KW - Strategy and Management
SN - 0025-1909
TI - Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test
VL - 66
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 34115
IS - 1-2
JF - Homo Oeconomicus
KW - Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
KW - Environmental Engineering
SN - 0943-0180
TI - Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
VL - 37
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Kaarbøe, Odvar M.
ID - 17350
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets
VL - 177
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 17086
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity
VL - 17
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42278
TI - Zuordnungsverfahren für Tauschbörsen
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42307
TI - Weitsichtigkeit zur Bildung stabiler Koalitionen - eine spieltheoretische Analyse
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42308
TI - Verhandeltes strategisches Verhalten
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42301
TI - Kronzeugenprogramme zur Aufdeckung von Kartellen - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42299
TI - Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42304
TI - Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42298
TI - Productivity optimization through project matching
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42306
TI - Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42300
TI - Cartel Fines in the European Union
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42302
TI - Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42292
TI - Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42294
TI - Matching in Netzwerken
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and whether prudent individuals show less preventive (self-protection) effort than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on higher-order risk preferences and various measures of observed real-world prevention behavior. We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung.
AU - Mayrhofer, Thomas
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 46541
KW - prudence
KW - risk preferences
KW - prevention
KW - vaccination
KW - screening
TI - Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence
VL - 863
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Jungblut, Stefan
AU - Krieger, Tim
AU - Meyer, Henning
ID - 2808
IS - 2
JF - German Economic Review
TI - Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change
VL - 20
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.
AU - Kaimann, Daniel
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1139
IS - 1
JF - Applied Economics Letters
TI - Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market
VL - 26
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon
that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario
is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider
appears who aims to disrupt the information
flow within the network
by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds
to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous
connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way
flow of
information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage
costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive
common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage
costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient
in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and inefficient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy
effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the
empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Haller, Hans
ID - 2256
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption
VL - 162
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.
We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).
AU - Endres, Angelika Elfriede
AU - Recker, Sonja
AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 80
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
TI - Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?
VL - 157
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.
AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef
ID - 7630
KW - credence goods
KW - treatment efficiency
KW - heterogeneous experts
KW - overcharging
TI - Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts
VL - 118
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians.
AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef
ID - 8873
KW - credence goods
KW - heterogeneous experts
KW - fairness
KW - overcharging
TI - Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts
VL - 119
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
ID - 9920
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
TI - Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?
VL - 181
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Yuanhua, Feng
ID - 6734
IS - 1
JF - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
TI - Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics
VL - 81
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Upmann, Thorsten
AU - Duman, Papatya
ID - 15202
KW - Labor market negotiations
KW - Efficient bargains
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - Sequential bargaining
KW - Restricted bargaining games
TI - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
VL - 128
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.
AU - Aslan, Fatma
AU - Duman, Papatya
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 15204
KW - TU-games
KW - duality
KW - core
KW - c-Core
KW - cohesive games
KW - complete game efficiency
TI - Duality for General TU-games Redefined
VL - 121
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
ID - 10090
JF - The American Economist
SN - 0569-4345
TI - A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.
AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef
ID - 10332
KW - retail bundling
KW - leverage theory
KW - double marginalization
TI - Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Bünnings, Christian
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Tauchmann, Harald
AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
ID - 15075
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Risk and Insurance
SN - 0022-4367
TI - The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice
VL - 86
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 2727
IS - 3
JF - Defence and Peace Economics
SN - 1024-2694
TI - Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy
VL - 30
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42296
TI - Intermediaries in Networks
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42286
TI - Logrolling-Prozess: Theorie und formale Darstellung einer verhandlungsunterstützenden Methode
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42290
TI - Stability in two-sided matchings with asymmetric information
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42289
TI - Sincere and Sophisticated Players in Matching Markets
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42291
TI - Mechanismen zur Informationsgewinnung in Verhandlungen
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42288
TI - Die faire Verteilung unteilbarer Güter
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42295
TI - Axiomatisierungen des Banzhaf-Wertes
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42293
TI - Compatibilities in Matching Mechanisms
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42284
TI - Faire Aufteilung von unteilbaren Gütern: Untersuchung von Algorithmen auf Effizienz und Neidfreiheit
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42280
TI - Anwendung und Vergleich von Verhandlungslösungen auf das Netzwerk-Design-Problem
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42285
TI - Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische Analyse
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42281
TI - A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation contracts
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 41926
TI - Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42277
TI - Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42283
TI - Student's school matching mechanisms in the US
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, Rainer
ID - 2814
IS - 3
JF - Journal of International Development
TI - Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries
VL - 30
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.
AU - Feldotto, Matthias
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Skopalik, Alexander
AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
ID - 2831
SN - 978-1-4503-5916-0
T2 - Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)
TI - Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.
AU - Hoof, Simon
ID - 2565
KW - NTU differential games
KW - variable Pareto weights
KW - agreeability
TI - Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games
VL - 112
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Qin, Cheng-Zhong
ID - 2933
KW - Bargaining problem
KW - CES Function
KW - Normalized CES Function
KW - Nash solution
KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
KW - Egalitarian Solution.
TI - On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
VL - 113
ER -
TY - CHAP
AB - One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results
from mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of
theoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.
Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing
enforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In
this note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu
(1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution
design is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized
game or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a
competitive equilibrium of an economy.
AU - Trockel, Walter
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
ED - Laslier, Jean-Francois
ED - Moulin, Herve
ED - Sanver, Remzi
ED - Zwicker, William
ID - 3098
SN - 2510-3970
T2 - Studies in Economic Design
TI - Thoughts on Social Design
VL - (n.d.)
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment.
AU - Hilleringmann, Vanessa
ID - 3101
KW - Corruption
KW - Reciprocity
KW - Physician-Patient Relationship
TI - The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to
determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the
upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)
revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider
cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means
that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by
mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive
compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for
buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is
regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints
are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer
quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to
balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in
place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by
means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution
for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with
the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a
tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Recker, Sonja
ID - 4564
IS - 6
JF - Group Decision and Negotiation
TI - The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information
VL - 27
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie
ID - 4982
IS - 4
JF - Games
TI - Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment
VL - 9
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.
To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to
reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this
study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries
when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,
a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to
evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is
not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous
rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three
sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality
decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of
receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service
provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation
building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental
design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates
from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation
profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking
strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price
is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then
high quality is chosen until the price increases again.
AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud
AU - Fahr, Rene
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Recker, Sonja
ID - 5330
IS - 11
JF - PLoS ONE
TI - Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
VL - 13
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
ID - 15206
TI - A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences
VL - 111
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.
AU - Duman, Papatya
ID - 15207
KW - Chain Store Game
KW - reputation building
KW - entry deterrence
KW - Trockel's game
TI - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game
VL - 117
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).
AU - De Jaegher, Kris
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1029
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution
TI - Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves
VL - 63
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Kolodziej, Ingo WK
AU - Reichert, Arndt R
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 3081
IS - 4
JF - Health services research
TI - New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe
VL - 53
ER -