TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42304 TI - Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42298 TI - Productivity optimization through project matching ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42306 TI - Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42300 TI - Cartel Fines in the European Union ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42302 TI - Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42292 TI - Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42294 TI - Matching in Netzwerken ER - TY - GEN AB - Theoretical papers show that optimal prevention decisions in the sense of selfprotection (i.e., primary prevention) depend not only on the level of (second-order) risk aversion but also on higher-order risk preferences such as prudence (third-order risk aversion). We study empirically whether these theoretical results hold and whether prudent individuals show less preventive (self-protection) effort than non-prudent individuals. We use a unique dataset that combines data on higher-order risk preferences and various measures of observed real-world prevention behavior. We find that prudent individuals indeed invest less in self-protection as measured by influenza vaccination. This result is driven by high risk individuals such as individuals >60 years of age or chronically ill. We do not find a clear empirical relationship between riskpreferences and prevention in the sense of self-insurance (i.e. secondary prevention). Neither risk aversion nor prudence is related to cancer screenings such as mammograms, Pap smears or X-rays of the lung. AU - Mayrhofer, Thomas AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 46541 KW - prudence KW - risk preferences KW - prevention KW - vaccination KW - screening TI - Prudence and prevention: Empirical evidence VL - 863 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Jungblut, Stefan AU - Krieger, Tim AU - Meyer, Henning ID - 2808 IS - 2 JF - German Economic Review TI - Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change VL - 20 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase. AU - Kaimann, Daniel AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1139 IS - 1 JF - Applied Economics Letters TI - Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market VL - 26 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Haller, Hans ID - 2256 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization TI - The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption VL - 162 ER - TY - JOUR AB - Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013). AU - Endres, Angelika Elfriede AU - Recker, Sonja AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 80 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization TI - Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? VL - 157 ER - TY - GEN AB - In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’ cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud. AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef ID - 7630 KW - credence goods KW - treatment efficiency KW - heterogeneous experts KW - overcharging TI - Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts VL - 118 ER - TY - GEN AB - We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns. The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently large share of fair physicians. AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef ID - 8873 KW - credence goods KW - heterogeneous experts KW - fairness KW - overcharging TI - Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts VL - 119 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Fritz, Marlon AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Feng, Yuanhua ID - 9920 JF - Economics Letters SN - 0165-1765 TI - Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? VL - 181 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Fritz, Marlon AU - Yuanhua, Feng ID - 6734 IS - 1 JF - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics TI - Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics VL - 81 ER - TY - GEN AB - In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow, 1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian) product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor markets and also in other environments. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Upmann, Thorsten AU - Duman, Papatya ID - 15202 KW - Labor market negotiations KW - Efficient bargains KW - Nash bargaining solution KW - Sequential bargaining KW - Restricted bargaining games TI - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets VL - 128 ER - TY - GEN AB - We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations. AU - Aslan, Fatma AU - Duman, Papatya AU - Trockel, Walter ID - 15204 KW - TU-games KW - duality KW - core KW - c-Core KW - cohesive games KW - complete game efficiency TI - Duality for General TU-games Redefined VL - 121 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas ID - 10090 JF - The American Economist SN - 0569-4345 TI - A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea ER - TY - GEN AB - We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium. AU - Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef ID - 10332 KW - retail bundling KW - leverage theory KW - double marginalization TI - Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bünnings, Christian AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Tauchmann, Harald AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R. ID - 15075 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Risk and Insurance SN - 0022-4367 TI - The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice VL - 86 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 2727 IS - 3 JF - Defence and Peace Economics SN - 1024-2694 TI - Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy VL - 30 ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42296 TI - Intermediaries in Networks ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42286 TI - Logrolling-Prozess: Theorie und formale Darstellung einer verhandlungsunterstützenden Methode ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42290 TI - Stability in two-sided matchings with asymmetric information ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42289 TI - Sincere and Sophisticated Players in Matching Markets ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42291 TI - Mechanismen zur Informationsgewinnung in Verhandlungen ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42288 TI - Die faire Verteilung unteilbarer Güter ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42295 TI - Axiomatisierungen des Banzhaf-Wertes ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42293 TI - Compatibilities in Matching Mechanisms ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42284 TI - Faire Aufteilung von unteilbaren Gütern: Untersuchung von Algorithmen auf Effizienz und Neidfreiheit ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42280 TI - Anwendung und Vergleich von Verhandlungslösungen auf das Netzwerk-Design-Problem ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42285 TI - Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42281 TI - A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation contracts ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 41926 TI - Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42277 TI - Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42283 TI - Student's school matching mechanisms in the US ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Grundmann, Rainer ID - 2814 IS - 3 JF - Journal of International Development TI - Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries VL - 30 ER - TY - CONF AB - We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete. AU - Feldotto, Matthias AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Skopalik, Alexander AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 2831 SN - 978-1-4503-5916-0 T2 - Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) TI - Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value ER - TY - GEN AB - This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game. AU - Hoof, Simon ID - 2565 KW - NTU differential games KW - variable Pareto weights KW - agreeability TI - Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games VL - 112 ER - TY - GEN AB - We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Qin, Cheng-Zhong ID - 2933 KW - Bargaining problem KW - CES Function KW - Normalized CES Function KW - Nash solution KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution KW - Egalitarian Solution. TI - On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem VL - 113 ER - TY - CHAP AB - One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results from mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of theoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented. Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing enforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In this note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu (1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution design is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized game or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a competitive equilibrium of an economy. AU - Trockel, Walter AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen ED - Laslier, Jean-Francois ED - Moulin, Herve ED - Sanver, Remzi ED - Zwicker, William ID - 3098 SN - 2510-3970 T2 - Studies in Economic Design TI - Thoughts on Social Design VL - (n.d.) ER - TY - GEN AB - Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment. AU - Hilleringmann, Vanessa ID - 3101 KW - Corruption KW - Reciprocity KW - Physician-Patient Relationship TI - The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment ER - TY - JOUR AB - In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Recker, Sonja ID - 4564 IS - 6 JF - Group Decision and Negotiation TI - The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie ID - 4982 IS - 4 JF - Games TI - Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment VL - 9 ER - TY - JOUR AB - In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again. AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud AU - Fahr, Rene AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Recker, Sonja ID - 5330 IS - 11 JF - PLoS ONE TI - Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate VL - 13 ER - TY - GEN AB - We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 15206 TI - A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences VL - 111 ER - TY - GEN AB - The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose. AU - Duman, Papatya ID - 15207 KW - Chain Store Game KW - reputation building KW - entry deterrence KW - Trockel's game TI - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game VL - 117 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy). AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1029 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution TI - Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves VL - 63 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kolodziej, Ingo WK AU - Reichert, Arndt R AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 3081 IS - 4 JF - Health services research TI - New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe VL - 53 ER - TY - GEN AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Winkler, Svenja ID - 5235 T2 - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance TI - Information, Risk Aversion, and Health Care Economics ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Redlin, Margarete AU - Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa ID - 2728 JF - Theoretical and Applied Climatology SN - 0177-798X TI - Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change ER - TY - JOUR AB - Drawing upon recent advances in machine learning and natural language processing, we introduce new tools that automatically ingest, parse, disambiguate, and build an updated database using U.S. patent data. The tools identify unique inventor, assignee, and location entities mentioned on each granted U.S. patent from 1976 to 2016. We describe data flow, algorithms, user interfaces, descriptive statistics, and a novelty measure based on the first appearance of a word in the patent corpus. We illustrate an automated coinventor network mapping tool and visualize trends in patenting over the last 40 years. AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin AU - Assaf, Mohamad AU - Chesebro, Tyler AU - Fierro, Gabe AU - Johnson, Kevin AU - Johnson, Scott AU - Li, Guan‐Cheng AU - Lück, Sonja AU - O'Reagan, Doug AU - Yeh, Bill AU - Zang, Guangzheng AU - Fleming, Lee ID - 31807 IS - 3 JF - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy KW - Management of Technology and Innovation KW - Strategy and Management KW - Economics and Econometrics KW - General Business KW - Management and Accounting KW - General Medicine SN - 1058-6407 TI - Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Fritz, Marlon AU - Feng, Yuanhua ID - 3070 IS - 2 JF - Review of Economics TI - Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain VL - 68 ER - TY - GEN AU - Zhang, Xuehai AU - Feng, Yuanhua AU - Peitz, Christian ID - 4633 TI - A general class of SemiGARCH models based on the Box-Cox transformation ER - TY - GEN AU - Feng, Yuanhua AU - Gries, Thomas ID - 4671 TI - Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Schiele, Valentin ID - 5236 JF - Atlas of Science TI - Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse ER - TY - CHAP AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ED - Adolph, T. ID - 5238 T2 - Krankenversicherung im Rating TI - Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders die Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten? ER - TY - JOUR AB - We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. AU - Brosig-Koch, Janet AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kokot, Johanna ID - 1054 IS - 53 JF - Health Economics TI - The effects of competition on medical service provision VL - 26 ER - TY - GEN AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarboe, Oddvar ID - 1055 TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets ER - TY - GEN AU - Gu, Yiguan AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Leininger, Wolfgang ID - 1056 TI - Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation ER - TY - GEN AB - In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 1083 TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse VL - 110 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, T. AU - Grundmann, R. AU - Palnau, Irene AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 1372 IS - 2 JF - International Economics and Economic Policy SN - 1612-4804 TI - Innovations, growth and participation in advanced economies - a review of major concepts and findings VL - 14 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R. ID - 15260 IS - 1 JF - Journal of Human Resources SN - 0022-166X TI - Does Price Framing Affect the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice? VL - 52 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Westphal, Matthias ID - 2635 JF - Journal of Health Economics TI - Informal Care and Long-term Labor Market Outcomes VL - 56 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Büyükdurmus, Tugba AU - Kopetsch, Thomas AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Tauchmann, Harald ID - 3082 IS - 2 JF - Health Economics Review TI - On the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital care in the German health system VL - 7 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Grundmann, R. AU - Palnau, Irene AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 1371 IS - 1 JF - International Economics and Economic Policy SN - 1612-4804 TI - Technology diffusion, international integration and participation in developing economies - a review of major concepts and findings VL - 15 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen ID - 2527 IS - 4 JF - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy SN - 1554-8597 TI - Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War VL - 22 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Brangewitz, Sonja AU - Brockhoff, Sarah ID - 2540 JF - European Journal of Political Economy SN - 0176-2680 TI - Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition VL - 49 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Kraft, Manfred AU - Simon, Manuel ID - 2810 IS - 95 JF - Papers in Regional Science TI - Explaining inter-provincial migration in China VL - 4 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen ID - 2811 IS - 4 JF - Peace Economics and Peace Science TI - Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War VL - 22 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Jungblut, Stefan AU - Naudé, Wim ID - 2813 IS - 2 JF - International Journal of Economic Theory TI - The Entrepreneurship Beveridge Curve VL - 12 ER - TY - GEN AB - On an intermediate goods market we consider vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the impact of simultaneous competition for resources and the demand of customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries may arise due to distinct product qualities as well as by reasons of different production technologies. The intermediaries compete on the output market by choosing production quantities sequentially and for the supplies of a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. It turns out that there exist differences in product quality and productivities such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader has no incentive to procure inputs, whereas in the role of the Stackelberg follower will participate in the market. Moreover, we find that given an intermediary is more competitive, his equilibrium output quantity is higher when being the leader than when being the follower. Interestingly, if the intermediary is less competitive and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries such that an intermediary being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher output quantities in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg leader. AU - Manegold, Jochen ID - 2570 KW - Input Market KW - Product Quality KW - Quantity Competition KW - Stackelberg Competition KW - Product Innovation TI - Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation VL - 98 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kamhöfer, Daniel A. AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 2687 IS - 5 JF - Journal of Applied Econometrics SN - 0883-7252 TI - Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany VL - 31 ER - TY - JOUR AB - On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries. AU - Brangewitz, Sonja AU - Manegold, Jochen ID - 211 IS - 6 JF - Theoretical Economics Letters TI - Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly VL - 6 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - De Jaegher, Kris ID - 1919 IS - 5 JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory SN - 1097-3923 TI - Strategic Network Disruption and Defense VL - 18 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails. AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1922 JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology SN - 0022-5193 TI - By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model VL - 393 ER - TY - GEN AB - We study the willingness to compete in a cognitive task among an entire cohort of fresh man business and economics students. Combining data from a lab-in-thefield experiment with university admissions data, we trace the gender gap in competitiveness at different levels of high school performance. Our results confirm that, on average, men choose to compete more often. The gender gap disappears, however, among students with above average high school performance. Female high school top performers are equally competitive as their male counterparts. In fact, the overall gender gap is entirely driven by the group of female high school underperformers who shied away from competition, even when they performed well in our task. Overall, our findings suggest that high school grades are more than just a signal of cognitive abilities, because they seem to influence the receivers selfperception of his or her performance in a competitive environment involved in later on in life. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - van Huizen, Tomas AU - Keijzer, Linda AU - Rezai Khavas, Tahere AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie ID - 2252 TI - Do talented women shy away from competition? VL - 16-06 ER - TY - GEN AB - While Islamic State is the most present example, it is a fact that in many places around the globe, throughout history initially small groups have tried to challenge and destabilize or even overthrow governments by means of terrorist and guerrilla strategies. Therefore, we answer two questions. Why does a small group of insurgents believe it can overthrow the government by turning violent, even if the government is clearly superior? And how does a conflict develop into terrorism, a guerilla war, or a major conventional civil war, or is resolved peacefully? We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices. Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a "destabilization war". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions using game theory analysis. First, insurgents rise up because they hope to destabilize through permanent challenging attacks. In this context, large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While each individual attack may have a low impact, at some point a large random event could lead to success. Hence, the duration of activities is a constitutive element of this kind of armed conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect rebels' degree of ideological motivation, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare or the conflict resolutions that develop are generally path-dependent and conditioned on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) influence different modes of warfare or a peaceful compromise in a complex way. AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen ID - 8836 KW - terrorism KW - civil war KW - conflict duration KW - game theory KW - stochastic process KW - ideology TI - An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War' VL - 95 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schiele, Valentin AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 2688 JF - Journal of Health Economics TI - Quantile treatment effects of job loss on health VL - 49 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Herr, Annika AU - Nguyen, Thu-Van AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 3083 IS - 10 JF - Health Policy TI - Public reporting and the quality of care of German nursing homes VL - 120 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Göpffarth, Dirk AU - Kopetsch, Thomas AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 2956 IS - 7 JF - Health economics TI - Determinants of regional variation in health expenditures in Germany VL - 25 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Decker, Simon AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 15259 JF - Journal of Health Economics SN - 0167-6296 TI - Health shocks and risk aversion VL - 156-170 ER - TY - GEN AB - We analyze the stability of networks when two intermediaries strategically form costly links to customers. We interpret these links as customer relationships that enable trade to sell a product. Equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities on the output as well as on the input market are determined endogenously for a given network of customer relationships. We investigate in how far the substitutability of the intermediaries' products and the costs of link formation influence the intermediaries' equilibrium profits and thus have an impact on the incentives to strategically form relationships to customers. For networks with three customers we characterize locally stable networks, in particular existence is guaranteed for any degree of substitutability. Moreover for the special cases of perfect complements, independent products and perfect substitutes, local stability coincides with the stronger concept of Nash stability. Additionally, for networks with n customers we analyze stability regions for selected networks and determine their limits when n goes to infinity. It turns out that the shape of the stability regions for those networks does not significantly change compared to a setting with a small number of customers. AU - Brangewitz, Sonja AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Möhlmeier, Philipp ID - 249 TI - Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks VL - 91 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Naudé, Wim AU - Bilkic, Natascha ID - 2815 JF - The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance TI - Playing the Lottery or Dressing Up? A Model of Firm-Level Heterogeneity and the Decision to Export VL - 58 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Feng, Yuanhua AU - Guo, Zhichao ID - 2816 IS - 2 JF - China Agricultural Economic Review TI - Changes of China’s agri-food exports to Germany caused by its accession to WTO and the 2008 financial crisis VL - 7 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Palnau, Irene ID - 3295 IS - 4 JF - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy TI - Sustaining Civil Peace: a configurational comparative analysis VL - 21 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Meierrieks, Daniel AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 3296 IS - 1 JF - Oxford Economic Papers TI - Oppressive Governments, Dependence on the United States and Anti-American Terrorism VL - 67 ER - TY - GEN AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Grundmann, Rainer AU - Palnau, Irene AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 2730 TI - Does technological change drive inclusive industrialization? - A review of major concepts and findings VL - 2015-044 ER - TY - GEN AU - Feng, Yuanhua AU - Zhou, Chen ID - 4656 TI - An iterative plug-in algorithm for realized kernels ER - TY - JOUR AB - In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters. AU - Buechel, Berno AU - Röhl, Nils ID - 491 IS - 2 JF - European Journal of Operational Research TI - Robust Equilibria in Location Games VL - 240 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 5239 JF - Patient Gesundheitswesen – Mission 2030 Unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung die Zukunft zu gestalten TI - Rationalisierung vs. Rationierung Ist die Rationierung unvermeidbar? ER - TY - GEN AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Grundmann, Rainer AU - Palnau, Irene AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 1374 TI - Does technological change drive inclusive industrialization? A review of major concepts and findings ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Westphal, Matthias ID - 2957 JF - Journal of Health Economics TI - Short-and medium-term effects of informal care provision on female caregivers’ health VL - 42 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Brangewitz, Sonja AU - Gamp, Jan-Philip ID - 2522 IS - 3 JF - Economic Theory SN - 0938-2259 TI - Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games VL - 57 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Grundmann, Rainer ID - 2819 IS - 4 JF - Journal of Population Economics TI - Trade and fertility in the developing world: the impact of trade and trade structure VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Dung, Ha Van ID - 2842 JF - Modern Economy TI - Household Savings and Productive Capital Formation in Rural Vietnam: Insurance vs. Social Network VL - 5 ER - TY - CHAP AU - Gries, Thomas ED - Jinjun, Xue ID - 3289 SN - 978-9814383097 T2 - Low Carbon Economics TI - Low Carbon Economics - Theory and application VL - Chapter 22 ER - TY - JOUR AB - This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. AU - Gu, Yiquan AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard ID - 2709 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE SN - 0932-4569 TI - Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency VL - 170 ER - TY - GEN AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Meierriecks, Daniel AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 2731 TI - Providing aid to repressive terrorist source countries does not make the U.S. any safer ER -