TY - GEN
AB - We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Streck, Thomas
ID - 32106
KW - Asymmetric bargaining power
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
TI - Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power
VL - 148
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - De Jaegher, Kris
ID - 31881
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
TI - Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractNon-pharmaceutical interventions are an effective strategy to prevent and control COVID-19 transmission in the community. However, the timing and stringency to which these measures have been implemented varied between countries and regions. The differences in stringency can only to a limited extent be explained by the number of infections and the prevailing vaccination strategies. Our study aims to shed more light on the lockdown strategies and to identify the determinants underlying the differences between countries on regional, economic, institutional, and political level. Based on daily panel data for 173 countries and the period from January 2020 to October 2021 we find significant regional differences in lockdown strategies. Further, more prosperous countries implemented milder restrictions but responded more quickly, while poorer countries introduced more stringent measures but had a longer response time. Finally, democratic regimes and stronger manifested institutions alleviated and slowed down the introduction of lockdown measures.
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 33221
JF - Journal of Regulatory Economics
KW - Economics and Econometrics
SN - 0922-680X
TI - Differences in NPI strategies against COVID-19
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractWe provide a partial equilibrium model wherein AI provides abilities combined with human skills to provide an aggregate intermediate service good. We use the model to find that the extent of automation through AI will be greater if (a) the economy is relatively abundant in sophisticated programs and machine abilities compared to human skills; (b) the economy hosts a relatively large number of AI-providing firms and experts; and (c) the task-specific productivity of AI services is relatively high compared to the task-specific productivity of general labor and labor skills. We also illustrate that the contribution of AI to aggregate productive labor service depends not only on the amount of AI services available but on the endogenous number of automated tasks, the relative productivity of standard and IT-related labor, and the substitutability of tasks. These determinants also affect the income distribution between the two kinds of labor. We derive several empirical implications and identify possible future extensions.
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Naudé, Wim
ID - 33220
IS - 1
JF - Journal for Labour Market Research
KW - General Medicine
SN - 2510-5019
TI - Modelling artificial intelligence in economics
VL - 56
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Müller, Veronika
AU - Jost, John T.
ID - 33219
IS - 2
JF - Psychological Inquiry
KW - General Psychology
SN - 1047-840X
TI - The Market for Belief Systems: A Formal Model of Ideological Choice
VL - 33
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare.
AU - Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Heinzel, Joachim
ID - 44091
KW - Retail bundling
KW - upstream market power
KW - double marginalization
KW - product differentiation
TI - The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42326
TI - Manipulation durch Fake-Bewertungen: Einfluss von Such- und Erfahrungsgütern auf das manipulative Verhalten des Verkäufers
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42322
TI - An Analysis of Coalition Formation Methods to achieve Maximum Social Surplus
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42324
TI - Die Möglichkeiten der Blockchain-Technologie im Supply Chain Management - eine spieltheoretische Analyse
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42318
TI - Kindergarten Allocation and the Tradeoff between Stability and Diversity Considerations
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42319
TI - Effect of the Agent's bargaining positions in the efficiency of matching markets
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42323
TI - Stabile Zuordnung mit Paaren - Der neue NRMP Algorithmus
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42320
TI - School choice with reserves and quotas
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - N., N.
ID - 42325
TI - Organisation von Zeitbörsen
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying
the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).
We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two
one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution
of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type
of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual
negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining
problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world
negotiations.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Upmann, Thorsten
AU - Duman, Papatya
ID - 30940
IS - 2
JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics
KW - Labour market negotiations
KW - efficient bargains
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - sequential bargaining
KW - restricted bargaining games
TI - Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining
VL - 125
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We study the effect of unemployment on cognitive abilities among individuals aged between 50 and 65 in Europe. To this end, we exploit plant closures and use flexible event-study estimations together with an experimentally elicited measure of fluid intelligence, namely word recall. We find that, within a time period of around eight years after the event of unemployment, cognitive abilities only deteriorate marginally — the effects are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. We do, however, find significant effects of late-career unemployment on the likelihood to leave the labor force, and short-term effects on mental health problems such as depression and sleep problems.
AU - Freise, Diana
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Westphal, Matthias
ID - 33458
JF - Journal of Health Economics
TI - Late-Career Unemployment and Cognitive Abilities
VL - 86
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Westphal, Matthias
AU - Kamhöfer, Daniel A.
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 30235
IS - 646
JF - Economic Journal
TI - Marginal College Wage Premium under Selection into Employment
VL - 132
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In this paper, we analyze the effect of light conditions on road accidents and estimate the long run consequences of different time regimes for road safety. Identification is based on variation in light conditions induced by differences in sunrise and sunset times across space and time. We estimate that darkness causes annual costs of more than £500 million in Great Britain. By setting daylight saving time year-round 8 percent of these costs could be saved. Thus, focusing solely on the short run costs related to the transition itself underestimates the total costs of the current time regime.
AU - Bünnings, Christian
AU - Schiele, Valentin
ID - 15073
IS - 1
JF - The Review of Economics and Statistics
SN - 0034-6535
TI - Spring Forward, Don't Fall Back: The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Road Safety
VL - 103
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 29152
JF - Review of Economic Design
SN - 1434-4742
TI - Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractUsing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984–2018, we analyze the intergenerational education mobility of immigrants in Germany by identifying the determinants of differences in educational stocks for first- and second-generation immigrants in comparison to individuals without a migration background. Our results show that on average, first-generation immigrants have fewer years of schooling than native-born Germans and have a disproportionate share of lower educational qualifications. This gap is strongly driven by age at immigration, with immigration age and education revealing a nonlinear relationship. While the gap is relatively small among individuals who migrate at a young age, integrating in the school system at secondary school age leads to large disadvantages. Examining the educational mobility of immigrants in Germany, we identify an inter-generational catch-up in education. The gap in education between immigrants and natives is reduced for the second generation. Finally, we find that country of origin differences can account for much of the education gap. While immigrants with an ethnic background closer to the German language and culture show the best education outcomes, immigrants from Turkey, Italy, and other southern European countries and especially the group of war refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other MENA countries, have the lowest educational attainment.
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
AU - Zehra, Moonum
ID - 22715
JF - Journal of International Migration and Integration
SN - 1488-3473
TI - Educational Assimilation of First-Generation and Second-Generation Immigrants in Germany
ER -