TY - GEN AB - We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Streck, Thomas ID - 32106 KW - Asymmetric bargaining power KW - Nash bargaining solution KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution TI - Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power VL - 148 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - De Jaegher, Kris ID - 31881 JF - International Journal of Game Theory TI - Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect ER - TY - JOUR AB - AbstractNon-pharmaceutical interventions are an effective strategy to prevent and control COVID-19 transmission in the community. However, the timing and stringency to which these measures have been implemented varied between countries and regions. The differences in stringency can only to a limited extent be explained by the number of infections and the prevailing vaccination strategies. Our study aims to shed more light on the lockdown strategies and to identify the determinants underlying the differences between countries on regional, economic, institutional, and political level. Based on daily panel data for 173 countries and the period from January 2020 to October 2021 we find significant regional differences in lockdown strategies. Further, more prosperous countries implemented milder restrictions but responded more quickly, while poorer countries introduced more stringent measures but had a longer response time. Finally, democratic regimes and stronger manifested institutions alleviated and slowed down the introduction of lockdown measures. AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 33221 JF - Journal of Regulatory Economics KW - Economics and Econometrics SN - 0922-680X TI - Differences in NPI strategies against COVID-19 ER - TY - JOUR AB - AbstractWe provide a partial equilibrium model wherein AI provides abilities combined with human skills to provide an aggregate intermediate service good. We use the model to find that the extent of automation through AI will be greater if (a) the economy is relatively abundant in sophisticated programs and machine abilities compared to human skills; (b) the economy hosts a relatively large number of AI-providing firms and experts; and (c) the task-specific productivity of AI services is relatively high compared to the task-specific productivity of general labor and labor skills. We also illustrate that the contribution of AI to aggregate productive labor service depends not only on the amount of AI services available but on the endogenous number of automated tasks, the relative productivity of standard and IT-related labor, and the substitutability of tasks. These determinants also affect the income distribution between the two kinds of labor. We derive several empirical implications and identify possible future extensions. AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Naudé, Wim ID - 33220 IS - 1 JF - Journal for Labour Market Research KW - General Medicine SN - 2510-5019 TI - Modelling artificial intelligence in economics VL - 56 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Müller, Veronika AU - Jost, John T. ID - 33219 IS - 2 JF - Psychological Inquiry KW - General Psychology SN - 1047-840X TI - The Market for Belief Systems: A Formal Model of Ideological Choice VL - 33 ER - TY - GEN AB - We study the effects of product differentiation on the bundling incentives of a two-product retailer. Two monopolistic manufacturers each produce a differentiated good. One sells it to both retailers, while the other only supplies a single retailer. Retailers compete in prices. Retail bundling is profitable when the goods are close substitutes. Only then is competition so intense that the retailer uses bundling to relax competition both within and across product markets, despite an aggravation of the double marginalization problem. Our asymmetric market structure arises endogenously for the case of close substitutes. In this case, bundling reduces social welfare. AU - Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Heinzel, Joachim ID - 44091 KW - Retail bundling KW - upstream market power KW - double marginalization KW - product differentiation TI - The Impact of Product Differentiation on Retail Bundling in a Vertical Market ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42326 TI - Manipulation durch Fake-Bewertungen: Einfluss von Such- und Erfahrungsgütern auf das manipulative Verhalten des Verkäufers ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42322 TI - An Analysis of Coalition Formation Methods to achieve Maximum Social Surplus ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42324 TI - Die Möglichkeiten der Blockchain-Technologie im Supply Chain Management - eine spieltheoretische Analyse ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42318 TI - Kindergarten Allocation and the Tradeoff between Stability and Diversity Considerations ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42319 TI - Effect of the Agent's bargaining positions in the efficiency of matching markets ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42323 TI - Stabile Zuordnung mit Paaren - Der neue NRMP Algorithmus ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42320 TI - School choice with reserves and quotas ER - TY - GEN AU - N., N. ID - 42325 TI - Organisation von Zeitbörsen ER - TY - JOUR AB - We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Upmann, Thorsten AU - Duman, Papatya ID - 30940 IS - 2 JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics KW - Labour market negotiations KW - efficient bargains KW - Nash bargaining solution KW - sequential bargaining KW - restricted bargaining games TI - Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining VL - 125 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We study the effect of unemployment on cognitive abilities among individuals aged between 50 and 65 in Europe. To this end, we exploit plant closures and use flexible event-study estimations together with an experimentally elicited measure of fluid intelligence, namely word recall. We find that, within a time period of around eight years after the event of unemployment, cognitive abilities only deteriorate marginally — the effects are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. We do, however, find significant effects of late-career unemployment on the likelihood to leave the labor force, and short-term effects on mental health problems such as depression and sleep problems. AU - Freise, Diana AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Westphal, Matthias ID - 33458 JF - Journal of Health Economics TI - Late-Career Unemployment and Cognitive Abilities VL - 86 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Westphal, Matthias AU - Kamhöfer, Daniel A. AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 30235 IS - 646 JF - Economic Journal TI - Marginal College Wage Premium under Selection into Employment VL - 132 ER - TY - JOUR AB - In this paper, we analyze the effect of light conditions on road accidents and estimate the long run consequences of different time regimes for road safety. Identification is based on variation in light conditions induced by differences in sunrise and sunset times across space and time. We estimate that darkness causes annual costs of more than £500 million in Great Britain. By setting daylight saving time year-round 8 percent of these costs could be saved. Thus, focusing solely on the short run costs related to the transition itself underestimates the total costs of the current time regime. AU - Bünnings, Christian AU - Schiele, Valentin ID - 15073 IS - 1 JF - The Review of Economics and Statistics SN - 0034-6535 TI - Spring Forward, Don't Fall Back: The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Road Safety VL - 103 ER - TY - JOUR AB - AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Trockel, Walter ID - 29152 JF - Review of Economic Design SN - 1434-4742 TI - Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium ER - TY - JOUR AB - AbstractUsing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984–2018, we analyze the intergenerational education mobility of immigrants in Germany by identifying the determinants of differences in educational stocks for first- and second-generation immigrants in comparison to individuals without a migration background. Our results show that on average, first-generation immigrants have fewer years of schooling than native-born Germans and have a disproportionate share of lower educational qualifications. This gap is strongly driven by age at immigration, with immigration age and education revealing a nonlinear relationship. While the gap is relatively small among individuals who migrate at a young age, integrating in the school system at secondary school age leads to large disadvantages. Examining the educational mobility of immigrants in Germany, we identify an inter-generational catch-up in education. The gap in education between immigrants and natives is reduced for the second generation. Finally, we find that country of origin differences can account for much of the education gap. While immigrants with an ethnic background closer to the German language and culture show the best education outcomes, immigrants from Turkey, Italy, and other southern European countries and especially the group of war refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other MENA countries, have the lowest educational attainment. AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Redlin, Margarete AU - Zehra, Moonum ID - 22715 JF - Journal of International Migration and Integration SN - 1488-3473 TI - Educational Assimilation of First-Generation and Second-Generation Immigrants in Germany ER -