TY - GEN AB - We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Qin, Cheng-Zhong ID - 2933 KW - Bargaining problem KW - CES Function KW - Normalized CES Function KW - Nash solution KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution KW - Egalitarian Solution. TI - On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem VL - 113 ER - TY - CHAP AB - One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results from mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of theoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented. Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing enforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In this note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu (1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution design is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized game or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a competitive equilibrium of an economy. AU - Trockel, Walter AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen ED - Laslier, Jean-Francois ED - Moulin, Herve ED - Sanver, Remzi ED - Zwicker, William ID - 3098 SN - 2510-3970 T2 - Studies in Economic Design TI - Thoughts on Social Design VL - (n.d.) ER - TY - GEN AB - Focusing on a physician's relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician's treatment decision. We conduct a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants. We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences in the participants' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in our experiment. AU - Hilleringmann, Vanessa ID - 3101 KW - Corruption KW - Reciprocity KW - Physician-Patient Relationship TI - The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription Decision - An Experiment ER - TY - JOUR AB - In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Recker, Sonja ID - 4564 IS - 6 JF - Group Decision and Negotiation TI - The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie ID - 4982 IS - 4 JF - Games TI - Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment VL - 9 ER - TY - JOUR AB - In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again. AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud AU - Fahr, Rene AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Recker, Sonja ID - 5330 IS - 11 JF - PLoS ONE TI - Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate VL - 13 ER - TY - GEN AB - We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja ID - 15206 TI - A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences VL - 111 ER - TY - GEN AB - The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose. AU - Duman, Papatya ID - 15207 KW - Chain Store Game KW - reputation building KW - entry deterrence KW - Trockel's game TI - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game VL - 117 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy). AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1029 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution TI - Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves VL - 63 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kolodziej, Ingo WK AU - Reichert, Arndt R AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 3081 IS - 4 JF - Health services research TI - New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe VL - 53 ER - TY - GEN AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Winkler, Svenja ID - 5235 T2 - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance TI - Information, Risk Aversion, and Health Care Economics ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Redlin, Margarete AU - Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa ID - 2728 JF - Theoretical and Applied Climatology SN - 0177-798X TI - Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change ER - TY - JOUR AB - Drawing upon recent advances in machine learning and natural language processing, we introduce new tools that automatically ingest, parse, disambiguate, and build an updated database using U.S. patent data. The tools identify unique inventor, assignee, and location entities mentioned on each granted U.S. patent from 1976 to 2016. We describe data flow, algorithms, user interfaces, descriptive statistics, and a novelty measure based on the first appearance of a word in the patent corpus. We illustrate an automated coinventor network mapping tool and visualize trends in patenting over the last 40 years. AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin AU - Assaf, Mohamad AU - Chesebro, Tyler AU - Fierro, Gabe AU - Johnson, Kevin AU - Johnson, Scott AU - Li, Guan‐Cheng AU - Lück, Sonja AU - O'Reagan, Doug AU - Yeh, Bill AU - Zang, Guangzheng AU - Fleming, Lee ID - 31807 IS - 3 JF - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy KW - Management of Technology and Innovation KW - Strategy and Management KW - Economics and Econometrics KW - General Business KW - Management and Accounting KW - General Medicine SN - 1058-6407 TI - Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Fritz, Marlon AU - Feng, Yuanhua ID - 3070 IS - 2 JF - Review of Economics TI - Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain VL - 68 ER - TY - GEN AU - Zhang, Xuehai AU - Feng, Yuanhua AU - Peitz, Christian ID - 4633 TI - A general class of SemiGARCH models based on the Box-Cox transformation ER - TY - GEN AU - Feng, Yuanhua AU - Gries, Thomas ID - 4671 TI - Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Schiele, Valentin ID - 5236 JF - Atlas of Science TI - Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse ER - TY - CHAP AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ED - Adolph, T. ID - 5238 T2 - Krankenversicherung im Rating TI - Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders die Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten? ER - TY - JOUR AB - We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. AU - Brosig-Koch, Janet AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kokot, Johanna ID - 1054 IS - 53 JF - Health Economics TI - The effects of competition on medical service provision VL - 26 ER - TY - GEN AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kaarboe, Oddvar ID - 1055 TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets ER -