---
_id: '2933'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the
maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution
and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which
includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider
a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining
solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique
up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters.
We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash
and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining
theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great
variety of new bargaining solutions.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Cheng-Zhong
full_name: Qin, Cheng-Zhong
last_name: Qin
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem.
Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2018.'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J., & Qin, C.-Z. (2018). On unification of solutions to the
bargaining problem (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.'
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers
CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions
to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University:
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, On unification of solutions to the bargaining
problem, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2018.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to
the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
short: C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2018-05-28T07:00:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:48Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:15:31Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
file_id: '3855'
file_name: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf
file_size: 469001
relation: main_file
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 113'
keyword:
- Bargaining problem
- CES Function
- Normalized CES Function
- Nash solution
- Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
- Egalitarian Solution.
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
type: working_paper
urn: '29332'
user_id: '65453'
volume: 113
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3098'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom
mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically
established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz
(2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement
of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis
note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952)
is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign
is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame
or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive
equilibrium of an economy."
author:
- first_name: Walter
full_name: Trockel, Walter
last_name: Trockel
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H,
Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. Studies in Economic Design. Vol (n.d.). Studies
in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer.'
apa: 'Trockel, W., & Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F.
Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, & W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic
Design (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.'
bibtex: '@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic
Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies
in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi
and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }'
chicago: 'Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.”
In Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin,
Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg:
Springer, n.d.'
ieee: 'W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in Studies in
Economic Design, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W.
Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer.'
mla: Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” Studies
in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer.
short: 'W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker
(Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.'
date_created: 2018-06-06T17:07:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
editor:
- first_name: Jean-Francois
full_name: Laslier, Jean-Francois
last_name: Laslier
- first_name: Herve
full_name: Moulin, Herve
last_name: Moulin
- first_name: Remzi
full_name: Sanver, Remzi
last_name: Sanver
- first_name: William
full_name: Zwicker, William
last_name: Zwicker
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:36:24Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
file_id: '3857'
file_name: WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf
file_size: 141983
relation: main_file
title: Thoughts on Social Design
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
place: Heidelberg
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Studies in Economic Design
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2510-3970
publication_status: accepted
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
series_title: Studies in Economic Design
status: public
title: Thoughts on Social Design
type: book_chapter
urn: '30987'
user_id: '477'
volume: (n.d.)
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3101'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Focusing on a physician''s relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment
analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician''s treatment decision. We conduct
a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole
experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched
every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity
between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally
we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants.
We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment
physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity
between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences
in the participants'' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in
our experiment.'
author:
- first_name: Vanessa
full_name: Hilleringmann, Vanessa
id: '34491'
last_name: Hilleringmann
citation:
ama: Hilleringmann V. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a
Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series;
2018.
apa: Hilleringmann, V. (2018). The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity
on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper
Series.
bibtex: '@book{Hilleringmann_2018, title={The Influence of Bribery and Relative
Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment}, publisher={CIE
Working Paper Series}, author={Hilleringmann, Vanessa}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity
on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper
Series, 2018.
ieee: V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on
a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series,
2018.
mla: Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity
on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper
Series, 2018.
short: V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a
Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment, CIE Working Paper Series, 2018.
date_created: 2018-06-07T07:42:31Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
keyword:
- Corruption
- Reciprocity
- Physician-Patient Relationship
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription
Decision - An Experiment
type: working_paper
user_id: '42447'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4564'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n
\ determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n
\ upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n
\ revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative
bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two
divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms
that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or
ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each,
we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether
or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us
to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer
payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining
solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints
are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore,
by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n
\ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n
\ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff
between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision
and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8},
number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining
Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group
Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation,
vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.
short: C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.
date_created: 2018-10-02T07:15:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:11Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
file_id: '5107'
file_name: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations
Under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 636521
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 27'
issue: '6'
jel:
- C78
language:
- iso: eng
page: 905-932
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 27
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4982'
article_number: '89'
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Stephanie
full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie
last_name: Rosenkranz
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation
- An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).
apa: Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4).
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games},
publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018}
}'
chicago: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium
Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018).
ieee: B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network
Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI,
2018.
short: B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018).
date_created: 2018-10-29T10:27:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:33Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
file_id: '5296'
file_name: games-09-00089.pdf
file_size: 492018
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/
oa: '1'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Games
publisher: MDPI
status: public
title: ' Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 9
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5330'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact
once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is
particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality
of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness
of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may
make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service
provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate
the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer
is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits
an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation
profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that
the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the
reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive
and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider
optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding
process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign
we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider
deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on
the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices
we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a
good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is
delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality
is chosen until the price increases again."
article_number: e0207172
article_type: review
author:
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Rene
full_name: Fahr, Rene
id: '111'
last_name: Fahr
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation
when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
apa: Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE,
13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
bibtex: '@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172},
number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science},
author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker,
Sonja}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE
13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
ieee: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13,
no. 11, 2018.
mla: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer
Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library
of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
short: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).
date_created: 2018-11-03T11:51:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
file_id: '5542'
file_name: Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf
file_size: 1107189
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 13'
issue: '11'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: PLoS ONE
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1932-6203
publication_status: published
publisher: Public Library of Science
status: public
title: Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 13
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '15206'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC)
generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according
to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides
with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism
that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic
behavior.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with
Reciprocal Preferences. Vol 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2018.
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). A Note on Manipulability in
School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences (Vol. 111). CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={A Note
on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={111},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability
in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111. Working Papers CIE.
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
ieee: C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice
with Reciprocal Preferences, vol. 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability in
School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111, CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2018.
short: C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with
Reciprocal Preferences, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:03:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:17Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:07:24Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:07:24Z
file_id: '15209'
file_name: WP - A Note on Manipulability in Scho ol Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.pdf
file_size: 328319
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:07:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 111'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 111
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '15207'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the
classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine
whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally
tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With
complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze
the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed
in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively
derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible,
alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative
game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which
the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’
equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium
is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this
study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the
same purpose.'
author:
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
last_name: Duman
citation:
ama: Duman P. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University; 2018.
apa: Duman, P. (2018). Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game (Vol. 117). CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Duman_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Does Informational
Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game},
volume={117}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Duman,
Papatya}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117. Working Papers CIE. CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
ieee: P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, vol. 117. CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2018.
mla: Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117, CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2018.
short: P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:06:11Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:18Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
file_id: '15208'
file_name: WP - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior_ An Experimental
Study on Trockel's Game.pdf
file_size: 678790
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 117'
keyword:
- Chain Store Game
- reputation building
- entry deterrence
- Trockel's game
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental
Study on Trockel's Game
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 117
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1029'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing
on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest
if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security
forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate,
he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures,
which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive
repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and
makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability
of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead
has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring
effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy).
However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect
by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).
author:
- first_name: Kris
full_name: De Jaegher, Kris
last_name: De Jaegher
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron
Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2018;63(2):502--527.
doi:10.1177/0022002717750450'
apa: 'De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2018). Preemptive Repression: Deterrence,
Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
63(2), 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450'
bibtex: '@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2018, title={Preemptive Repression: Deterrence,
Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}, volume={63}, DOI={10.1177/0022002717750450},
number={2}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications},
author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2018}, pages={502--527} }'
chicago: 'De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence,
Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
63, no. 2 (2018): 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450.'
ieee: 'K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring,
Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63,
no. 2, pp. 502--527, 2018.'
mla: 'De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring,
Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63,
no. 2, SAGE Publications, 2018, pp. 502--527, doi:10.1177/0022002717750450.'
short: K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (2018) 502--527.
date_created: 2017-12-06T10:52:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:35Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1177/0022002717750450
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T16:07:11Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T16:07:11Z
file_id: '5323'
file_name: 0022002717750450.pdf
file_size: 335051
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T16:07:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 63'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 502--527
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Conflict Resolution
publisher: SAGE Publications
status: public
title: 'Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves'
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 63
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3081'
author:
- first_name: Ingo WK
full_name: Kolodziej, Ingo WK
last_name: Kolodziej
- first_name: Arndt R
full_name: Reichert, Arndt R
last_name: Reichert
- first_name: Hendrik
full_name: Schmitz, Hendrik
id: '48879'
last_name: Schmitz
citation:
ama: Kolodziej IW, Reichert AR, Schmitz H. New Evidence on Employment Effects of
Informal Care Provision in Europe. Health services research. 2018;53(4).
doi:10.111/1475-6773.12840
apa: Kolodziej, I. W., Reichert, A. R., & Schmitz, H. (2018). New Evidence on
Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe. Health Services Research,
53(4). https://doi.org/10.111/1475-6773.12840
bibtex: '@article{Kolodziej_Reichert_Schmitz_2018, title={New Evidence on Employment
Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe}, volume={53}, DOI={10.111/1475-6773.12840},
number={4}, journal={Health services research}, author={Kolodziej, Ingo WK and
Reichert, Arndt R and Schmitz, Hendrik}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Kolodziej, Ingo WK, Arndt R Reichert, and Hendrik Schmitz. “New Evidence
on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe.” Health Services
Research 53, no. 4 (2018). https://doi.org/10.111/1475-6773.12840.
ieee: 'I. W. Kolodziej, A. R. Reichert, and H. Schmitz, “New Evidence on Employment
Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe,” Health services research,
vol. 53, no. 4, 2018, doi: 10.111/1475-6773.12840.'
mla: Kolodziej, Ingo WK, et al. “New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal
Care Provision in Europe.” Health Services Research, vol. 53, no. 4, 2018,
doi:10.111/1475-6773.12840.
short: I.W. Kolodziej, A.R. Reichert, H. Schmitz, Health Services Research 53 (2018).
date_created: 2018-06-06T10:57:16Z
date_updated: 2022-03-10T13:43:12Z
department:
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.111/1475-6773.12840
intvolume: ' 53'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Health services research
publication_status: published
status: public
title: New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe
type: journal_article
user_id: '53779'
volume: 53
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5235'
author:
- first_name: Hendrik
full_name: Schmitz, Hendrik
id: '48879'
last_name: Schmitz
- first_name: Svenja
full_name: Winkler, Svenja
last_name: Winkler
citation:
ama: 'Schmitz H, Winkler S. Information, Risk Aversion, and Health Care Economics.
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance. Oxford University
Press; 2018.'
apa: Schmitz, H., & Winkler, S. (2018). Information, Risk Aversion, and Health
Care Economics. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance.
Oxford University Press.
bibtex: '@inbook{Schmitz_Winkler_2018, title={Information, Risk Aversion, and Health
Care Economics}, booktitle={Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance},
publisher={Oxford University Press}, author={Schmitz, Hendrik and Winkler, Svenja},
year={2018} }'
chicago: Schmitz, Hendrik, and Svenja Winkler. “Information, Risk Aversion, and
Health Care Economics.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance.
Oxford University Press, 2018.
ieee: H. Schmitz and S. Winkler, “Information, Risk Aversion, and Health Care Economics,”
in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance, Oxford University
Press, 2018.
mla: Schmitz, Hendrik, and Svenja Winkler. “Information, Risk Aversion, and Health
Care Economics.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance,
Oxford University Press, 2018.
short: 'H. Schmitz, S. Winkler, in: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and
Finance, Oxford University Press, 2018.'
date_created: 2018-11-01T15:46:04Z
date_updated: 2022-03-10T13:45:34Z
department:
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance
publication_status: published
publisher: Oxford University Press
status: public
title: Information, Risk Aversion, and Health Care Economics
type: encyclopedia_article
user_id: '53779'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2728'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Margarete
full_name: Redlin, Margarete
id: '135'
last_name: Redlin
- first_name: Juliette Espinosa
full_name: Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa
last_name: Ugarte
citation:
ama: 'Gries T, Redlin M, Ugarte JE. Human-induced climate change: the impact of
land-use change. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. Published online
2018. doi:10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8'
apa: 'Gries, T., Redlin, M., & Ugarte, J. E. (2018). Human-induced climate change:
the impact of land-use change. Theoretical and Applied Climatology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Redlin_Ugarte_2018, title={Human-induced climate change:
the impact of land-use change}, DOI={10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8},
journal={Theoretical and Applied Climatology}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Gries,
Thomas and Redlin, Margarete and Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa}, year={2018} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, Margarete Redlin, and Juliette Espinosa Ugarte. “Human-Induced
Climate Change: The Impact of Land-Use Change.” Theoretical and Applied Climatology,
2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8.'
ieee: 'T. Gries, M. Redlin, and J. E. Ugarte, “Human-induced climate change: the
impact of land-use change,” Theoretical and Applied Climatology, 2018,
doi: 10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas, et al. “Human-Induced Climate Change: The Impact of Land-Use
Change.” Theoretical and Applied Climatology, Springer Nature, 2018, doi:10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8.'
short: T. Gries, M. Redlin, J.E. Ugarte, Theoretical and Applied Climatology (2018).
date_created: 2018-05-11T10:17:18Z
date_updated: 2022-08-23T08:25:50Z
department:
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Theoretical and Applied Climatology
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0177-798X
- 1434-4483
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: 'Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change'
type: journal_article
user_id: '135'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '31807'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Drawing upon recent advances in machine learning and natural language processing,
we introduce new tools that automatically ingest, parse, disambiguate, and build
an updated database using U.S. patent data. The tools identify unique inventor,
assignee, and location entities mentioned on each granted U.S. patent from 1976
to 2016. We describe data flow, algorithms, user interfaces, descriptive statistics,
and a novelty measure based on the first appearance of a word in the patent corpus.
We illustrate an automated coinventor network mapping tool and visualize trends
in patenting over the last 40 years.
author:
- first_name: Benjamin
full_name: Balsmeier, Benjamin
last_name: Balsmeier
- first_name: Mohamad
full_name: Assaf, Mohamad
last_name: Assaf
- first_name: Tyler
full_name: Chesebro, Tyler
last_name: Chesebro
- first_name: Gabe
full_name: Fierro, Gabe
last_name: Fierro
- first_name: Kevin
full_name: Johnson, Kevin
last_name: Johnson
- first_name: Scott
full_name: Johnson, Scott
last_name: Johnson
- first_name: Guan‐Cheng
full_name: Li, Guan‐Cheng
last_name: Li
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Lück, Sonja
id: '950'
last_name: Lück
orcid: 0000-0003-0380-1965
- first_name: Doug
full_name: O'Reagan, Doug
last_name: O'Reagan
- first_name: Bill
full_name: Yeh, Bill
last_name: Yeh
- first_name: Guangzheng
full_name: Zang, Guangzheng
last_name: Zang
- first_name: Lee
full_name: Fleming, Lee
last_name: Fleming
citation:
ama: 'Balsmeier B, Assaf M, Chesebro T, et al. Machine learning and natural language
processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures. Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy. 2018;27(3):535-553. doi:10.1111/jems.12259'
apa: 'Balsmeier, B., Assaf, M., Chesebro, T., Fierro, G., Johnson, K., Johnson,
S., Li, G., Lück, S., O’Reagan, D., Yeh, B., Zang, G., & Fleming, L. (2018).
Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools,
and new measures. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 27(3),
535–553. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12259'
bibtex: '@article{Balsmeier_Assaf_Chesebro_Fierro_Johnson_Johnson_Li_Lück_O’Reagan_Yeh_et
al._2018, title={Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent
corpus: Data, tools, and new measures}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1111/jems.12259},
number={3}, journal={Journal of Economics & Management Strategy}, publisher={Wiley},
author={Balsmeier, Benjamin and Assaf, Mohamad and Chesebro, Tyler and Fierro,
Gabe and Johnson, Kevin and Johnson, Scott and Li, Guan‐Cheng and Lück, Sonja
and O’Reagan, Doug and Yeh, Bill and et al.}, year={2018}, pages={535–553} }'
chicago: 'Balsmeier, Benjamin, Mohamad Assaf, Tyler Chesebro, Gabe Fierro, Kevin
Johnson, Scott Johnson, Guan‐Cheng Li, et al. “Machine Learning and Natural Language
Processing on the Patent Corpus: Data, Tools, and New Measures.” Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy 27, no. 3 (2018): 535–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12259.'
ieee: 'B. Balsmeier et al., “Machine learning and natural language processing
on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures,” Journal of Economics
& Management Strategy, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 535–553, 2018, doi: 10.1111/jems.12259.'
mla: 'Balsmeier, Benjamin, et al. “Machine Learning and Natural Language Processing
on the Patent Corpus: Data, Tools, and New Measures.” Journal of Economics
& Management Strategy, vol. 27, no. 3, Wiley, 2018, pp. 535–53, doi:10.1111/jems.12259.'
short: B. Balsmeier, M. Assaf, T. Chesebro, G. Fierro, K. Johnson, S. Johnson, G.
Li, S. Lück, D. O’Reagan, B. Yeh, G. Zang, L. Fleming, Journal of Economics &
Management Strategy 27 (2018) 535–553.
date_created: 2022-06-08T08:49:54Z
date_updated: 2023-08-16T13:25:22Z
department:
- _id: '200'
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1111/jems.12259
intvolume: ' 27'
issue: '3'
keyword:
- Management of Technology and Innovation
- Strategy and Management
- Economics and Econometrics
- General Business
- Management and Accounting
- General Medicine
language:
- iso: eng
page: 535-553
publication: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1058-6407
- 1530-9134
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley
status: public
title: 'Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data,
tools, and new measures'
type: journal_article
user_id: '53779'
volume: 27
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3070'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Marlon
full_name: Fritz, Marlon
last_name: Fritz
- first_name: Yuanhua
full_name: Feng, Yuanhua
last_name: Feng
citation:
ama: 'Gries T, Fritz M, Feng Y. Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business
Cycles in Spain. Review of Economics. 2017;68(2):153-166. doi:10.1515/roe-2017-0008'
apa: 'Gries, T., Fritz, M., & Feng, Y. (2017). Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160
Years of Business Cycles in Spain. Review of Economics, 68(2), 153–166.
https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2017-0008'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Fritz_Feng_2017, title={Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years
of Business Cycles in Spain}, volume={68}, DOI={10.1515/roe-2017-0008},
number={2}, journal={Review of Economics}, author={Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon
and Feng, Yuanhua}, year={2017}, pages={153–166} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, Marlon Fritz, and Yuanhua Feng. “Slow Booms and Deep Busts:
160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain.” Review of Economics 68, no. 2 (2017):
153–66. https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2017-0008.'
ieee: 'T. Gries, M. Fritz, and Y. Feng, “Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of
Business Cycles in Spain,” Review of Economics, vol. 68, no. 2, pp. 153–166,
2017.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas, et al. “Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles
in Spain.” Review of Economics, vol. 68, no. 2, 2017, pp. 153–66, doi:10.1515/roe-2017-0008.'
short: T. Gries, M. Fritz, Y. Feng, Review of Economics 68 (2017) 153–166.
date_created: 2018-06-05T12:44:32Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1515/roe-2017-0008
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 153-166
publication: Review of Economics
status: public
title: 'Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain'
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: '68 '
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '4633'
author:
- first_name: Xuehai
full_name: Zhang, Xuehai
last_name: Zhang
- first_name: Yuanhua
full_name: Feng, Yuanhua
id: '20760'
last_name: Feng
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Peitz, Christian
id: '2980'
last_name: Peitz
citation:
ama: Zhang X, Feng Y, Peitz C. A General Class of SemiGARCH Models Based on the
Box-Cox Transformation.; 2017.
apa: Zhang, X., Feng, Y., & Peitz, C. (2017). A general class of SemiGARCH
models based on the Box-Cox transformation.
bibtex: '@book{Zhang_Feng_Peitz_2017, title={A general class of SemiGARCH models
based on the Box-Cox transformation}, author={Zhang, Xuehai and Feng, Yuanhua
and Peitz, Christian}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Zhang, Xuehai, Yuanhua Feng, and Christian Peitz. A General Class of
SemiGARCH Models Based on the Box-Cox Transformation, 2017.
ieee: X. Zhang, Y. Feng, and C. Peitz, A general class of SemiGARCH models based
on the Box-Cox transformation. 2017.
mla: Zhang, Xuehai, et al. A General Class of SemiGARCH Models Based on the Box-Cox
Transformation. 2017.
short: X. Zhang, Y. Feng, C. Peitz, A General Class of SemiGARCH Models Based on
the Box-Cox Transformation, 2017.
date_created: 2018-10-11T06:43:53Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:16Z
department:
- _id: '206'
- _id: '475'
language:
- iso: eng
status: public
title: A general class of SemiGARCH models based on the Box-Cox transformation
type: working_paper
user_id: '10075'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '4671'
author:
- first_name: Yuanhua
full_name: Feng, Yuanhua
id: '20760'
last_name: Feng
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
citation:
ama: Feng Y, Gries T. Data-Driven Local Polynomial for the Trend and Its Derivatives
in Economic Time Series.; 2017.
apa: Feng, Y., & Gries, T. (2017). Data-driven local polynomial for the trend
and its derivatives in economic time series.
bibtex: '@book{Feng_Gries_2017, title={Data-driven local polynomial for the trend
and its derivatives in economic time series}, author={Feng, Yuanhua and Gries,
Thomas}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Feng, Yuanhua, and Thomas Gries. Data-Driven Local Polynomial for the
Trend and Its Derivatives in Economic Time Series, 2017.
ieee: Y. Feng and T. Gries, Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its
derivatives in economic time series. 2017.
mla: Feng, Yuanhua, and Thomas Gries. Data-Driven Local Polynomial for the Trend
and Its Derivatives in Economic Time Series. 2017.
short: Y. Feng, T. Gries, Data-Driven Local Polynomial for the Trend and Its Derivatives
in Economic Time Series, 2017.
date_created: 2018-10-11T12:43:07Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:17Z
department:
- _id: '206'
- _id: '475'
language:
- iso: eng
status: public
title: Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic
time series
type: working_paper
user_id: '10075'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '5236'
author:
- first_name: Hendrik
full_name: Schmitz, Hendrik
id: '48879'
last_name: Schmitz
- first_name: Valentin
full_name: Schiele, Valentin
id: '53779'
last_name: Schiele
citation:
ama: Schmitz H, Schiele V. Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse. Atlas
of Science. 2017.
apa: Schmitz, H., & Schiele, V. (2017). Sick already? Job loss makes it even
worse. Atlas of Science.
bibtex: '@article{Schmitz_Schiele_2017, title={Sick already? Job loss makes it even
worse}, journal={Atlas of Science}, author={Schmitz, Hendrik and Schiele, Valentin},
year={2017} }'
chicago: Schmitz, Hendrik, and Valentin Schiele. “Sick Already? Job Loss Makes It
Even Worse.” Atlas of Science, 2017.
ieee: H. Schmitz and V. Schiele, “Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse,” Atlas
of Science, 2017.
mla: Schmitz, Hendrik, and Valentin Schiele. “Sick Already? Job Loss Makes It Even
Worse.” Atlas of Science, 2017.
short: H. Schmitz, V. Schiele, Atlas of Science (2017).
date_created: 2018-11-01T15:50:56Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:47Z
department:
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Atlas of Science
status: public
title: Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse
type: journal_article
user_id: '63697'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '5238'
author:
- first_name: Hendrik
full_name: Schmitz, Hendrik
id: '48879'
last_name: Schmitz
citation:
ama: 'Schmitz H. Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders die Krankenkassenwahl
von gesetzlich Versicherten? In: Adolph T, ed. Krankenversicherung im Rating.
Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH; 2017.'
apa: 'Schmitz, H. (2017). Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders
die Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten? In T. Adolph (Ed.), Krankenversicherung
im Rating. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH.'
bibtex: '@inbook{Schmitz_2017, title={Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst
besonders die Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten?}, booktitle={Krankenversicherung
im Rating}, publisher={Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH}, author={Schmitz, Hendrik},
editor={Adolph, T.Editor}, year={2017} }'
chicago: 'Schmitz, Hendrik. “Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders
die Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten?” In Krankenversicherung
im Rating, edited by T. Adolph. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, 2017.'
ieee: 'H. Schmitz, “Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders die
Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten?,” in Krankenversicherung im
Rating, T. Adolph, Ed. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, 2017.'
mla: 'Schmitz, Hendrik. “Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders
die Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten?” Krankenversicherung im
Rating, edited by T. Adolph, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, 2017.'
short: 'H. Schmitz, in: T. Adolph (Ed.), Krankenversicherung im Rating, Springer
Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, 2017.'
date_created: 2018-11-01T15:55:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:47Z
department:
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
editor:
- first_name: T.
full_name: Adolph, T.
last_name: Adolph
language:
- iso: ger
publication: Krankenversicherung im Rating
publisher: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH
status: public
title: 'Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders die Krankenkassenwahl
von gesetzlich Versicherten?'
type: book_chapter
user_id: '63697'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1054'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision.
Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from
patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service.
Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact
with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches
providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired
direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical
benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental
conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit
from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line
with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision
and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics
and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced
with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related
experimental research on price competition. '
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Janet
full_name: Brosig-Koch, Janet
last_name: Brosig-Koch
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Johanna
full_name: Kokot, Johanna
last_name: Kokot
citation:
ama: Brosig-Koch J, Hehenkamp B, Kokot J. The effects of competition on medical
service provision. Health Economics. 2017;26(53):6-20. doi:10.1002/hec.3583
apa: Brosig-Koch, J., Hehenkamp, B., & Kokot, J. (2017). The effects of competition
on medical service provision. Health Economics, 26(53), 6–20. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3583
bibtex: '@article{Brosig-Koch_Hehenkamp_Kokot_2017, title={The effects of competition
on medical service provision}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1002/hec.3583},
number={53}, journal={Health Economics}, publisher={Wiley Online Library}, author={Brosig-Koch,
Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}, year={2017}, pages={6–20} }'
chicago: 'Brosig-Koch, Janet, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Johanna Kokot. “The Effects
of Competition on Medical Service Provision.” Health Economics 26, no.
53 (2017): 6–20. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3583.'
ieee: J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, and J. Kokot, “The effects of competition on
medical service provision,” Health Economics, vol. 26, no. 53, pp. 6–20,
2017.
mla: Brosig-Koch, Janet, et al. “The Effects of Competition on Medical Service Provision.”
Health Economics, vol. 26, no. 53, Wiley Online Library, 2017, pp. 6–20,
doi:10.1002/hec.3583.
short: J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, J. Kokot, Health Economics 26 (2017) 6–20.
date_created: 2017-12-15T11:16:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:43Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1002/hec.3583
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:39:01Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:39:01Z
file_id: '5309'
file_name: Brosig-Koch_et_al-2018-Health_Economics.pdf
file_size: 1116140
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:39:01Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 26'
issue: '53'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 6-20
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Health Economics
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley Online Library
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: The effects of competition on medical service provision
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 26
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1055'
author:
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Oddvar
full_name: Kaarboe, Oddvar
last_name: Kaarboe
citation:
ama: Hehenkamp B, Kaarboe O. Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed
Hospital Markets. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Hehenkamp, B., & Kaarboe, O. (2017). Location Choice and Quality Competition
in Mixed Hospital Markets. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Hehenkamp_Kaarboe_2017, title={Location Choice and Quality Competition
in Mixed Hospital Markets}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Hehenkamp,
Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar Kaarboe. Location Choice and Quality
Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: B. Hehenkamp and O. Kaarboe, Location Choice and Quality Competition in
Mixed Hospital Markets. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
mla: Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar Kaarboe. Location Choice and Quality Competition
in Mixed Hospital Markets. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
short: B. Hehenkamp, O. Kaarboe, Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed
Hospital Markets, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-15T11:19:12Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:44Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: bhoyer
date_created: 2018-11-06T14:01:20Z
date_updated: 2018-11-06T14:01:20Z
file_id: '5379'
file_name: HehenkampKaarboe_20180905.pdf
file_size: 318340
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-11-06T14:01:20Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets
type: report
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...