---
_id: '42285'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: 'N. N. Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn; 2019.'
apa: 'N., N. (2019). Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn.'
bibtex: '@book{N._2019, title={Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine
spieltheoretische Analyse}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.},
year={2019} }'
chicago: 'N., N. Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn, 2019.'
ieee: 'N. N., Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn, 2019.'
mla: 'N., N. Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn, 2019.'
short: 'N. N., Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische
Analyse, Universität Paderborn, 2019.'
date_created: 2023-02-22T10:58:10Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:47:40Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: 'Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische Analyse'
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '42281'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. A Bargaining Model for Relative Profit and Market Share Delegation
Contracts. Universität Paderborn; 2019.
apa: N., N. (2019). A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation
contracts. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2019, title={A bargaining model for relative profit and market
share delegation contracts}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.},
year={2019} }'
chicago: N., N. A Bargaining Model for Relative Profit and Market Share Delegation
Contracts. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
ieee: N. N., A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation
contracts. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
mla: N., N. A Bargaining Model for Relative Profit and Market Share Delegation
Contracts. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
short: N. N., A Bargaining Model for Relative Profit and Market Share Delegation
Contracts, Universität Paderborn, 2019.
date_created: 2023-02-22T10:53:58Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:47:58Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation contracts
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '41926'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden.
Universität Paderborn; 2019.
apa: N., N. (2019). Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten
Kunden. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2019, title={Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten
Kunden}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2019} }'
chicago: N., N. Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten
Kunden. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
ieee: N. N., Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden.
Universität Paderborn, 2019.
mla: N., N. Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden.
Universität Paderborn, 2019.
short: N. N., Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden,
Universität Paderborn, 2019.
date_created: 2023-02-09T09:23:13Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:48:17Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '42277'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität. Universität
Paderborn; 2019.
apa: N., N. (2019). Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2019, title={Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2019} }'
chicago: N., N. Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität.
Universität Paderborn, 2019.
ieee: N. N., Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität. Universität
Paderborn, 2019.
mla: N., N. Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität. Universität
Paderborn, 2019.
short: N. N., Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität, Universität
Paderborn, 2019.
date_created: 2023-02-22T10:49:08Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:48:10Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '42283'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Student’s School Matching Mechanisms in the US. Universität Paderborn;
2019.
apa: N., N. (2019). Student’s school matching mechanisms in the US. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2019, title={Student’s school matching mechanisms in the US},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2019} }'
chicago: N., N. Student’s School Matching Mechanisms in the US. Universität
Paderborn, 2019.
ieee: N. N., Student’s school matching mechanisms in the US. Universität
Paderborn, 2019.
mla: N., N. Student’s School Matching Mechanisms in the US. Universität Paderborn,
2019.
short: N. N., Student’s School Matching Mechanisms in the US, Universität Paderborn,
2019.
date_created: 2023-02-22T10:55:19Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:47:52Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Student's school matching mechanisms in the US
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '58507'
author:
- first_name: Gunnar
full_name: Gutsche, Gunnar
id: '113411'
last_name: Gutsche
- first_name: Andreas
full_name: Ziegler, Andreas
last_name: Ziegler
citation:
ama: Gutsche G, Ziegler A. Which private investors are willing to pay for sustainable
investments? Empirical evidence from stated choice experiments. Journal of
Banking & Finance. 2019;102:193-214. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.007
apa: Gutsche, G., & Ziegler, A. (2019). Which private investors are willing
to pay for sustainable investments? Empirical evidence from stated choice experiments.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 102, 193–214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.007
bibtex: '@article{Gutsche_Ziegler_2019, title={Which private investors are willing
to pay for sustainable investments? Empirical evidence from stated choice experiments},
volume={102}, DOI={10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.007},
journal={Journal of Banking & Finance}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Gutsche,
Gunnar and Ziegler, Andreas}, year={2019}, pages={193–214} }'
chicago: 'Gutsche, Gunnar, and Andreas Ziegler. “Which Private Investors Are Willing
to Pay for Sustainable Investments? Empirical Evidence from Stated Choice Experiments.”
Journal of Banking & Finance 102 (2019): 193–214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.007.'
ieee: 'G. Gutsche and A. Ziegler, “Which private investors are willing to pay for
sustainable investments? Empirical evidence from stated choice experiments,” Journal
of Banking & Finance, vol. 102, pp. 193–214, 2019, doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.007.'
mla: Gutsche, Gunnar, and Andreas Ziegler. “Which Private Investors Are Willing
to Pay for Sustainable Investments? Empirical Evidence from Stated Choice Experiments.”
Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 102, Elsevier BV, 2019, pp.
193–214, doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.007.
short: G. Gutsche, A. Ziegler, Journal of Banking & Finance 102 (2019) 193–214.
date_created: 2025-02-04T11:43:29Z
date_updated: 2025-02-04T11:44:40Z
department:
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.03.007
intvolume: ' 102'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 193-214
publication: Journal of Banking & Finance
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0378-4266
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier BV
status: public
title: Which private investors are willing to pay for sustainable investments? Empirical
evidence from stated choice experiments
type: journal_article
user_id: '37953'
volume: 102
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2727'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Margarete
full_name: Redlin, Margarete
id: '135'
last_name: Redlin
citation:
ama: 'Gries T, Redlin M. Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth
Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy. Defence and Peace
Economics. 2019;30(3):309-323. doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797'
apa: 'Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2019). Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The
Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.
Defence and Peace Economics, 30(3), 309–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Redlin_2019, title={Pirates – The Young and the Jobless:
The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy},
volume={30}, DOI={10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797},
number={3}, journal={Defence and Peace Economics}, publisher={Informa UK Limited},
author={Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}, year={2019}, pages={309–323} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless:
The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.”
Defence and Peace Economics 30, no. 3 (2019): 309–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.'
ieee: 'T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect
of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy,” Defence
and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 309–323, 2019, doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless:
The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.”
Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, Informa UK Limited, 2019,
pp. 309–23, doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.'
short: T. Gries, M. Redlin, Defence and Peace Economics 30 (2019) 309–323.
date_created: 2018-05-11T10:11:46Z
date_updated: 2025-11-10T09:39:02Z
department:
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797
intvolume: ' 30'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 309-323
publication: Defence and Peace Economics
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1024-2694
- 1476-8267
publication_status: published
publisher: Informa UK Limited
status: public
title: 'Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth
Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy'
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: 30
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '10090'
article_number: '056943451984647'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
citation:
ama: 'Gries T. A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The
American Economist. Published online 2019. doi:10.1177/0569434519846477'
apa: 'Gries, T. (2019). A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.
The American Economist, Article 056943451984647. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_2019, title={A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The
Basic Idea}, DOI={10.1177/0569434519846477},
number={056943451984647}, journal={The American Economist}, author={Gries, Thomas},
year={2019} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.”
The American Economist, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477.'
ieee: 'T. Gries, “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea,” The
American Economist, Art. no. 056943451984647, 2019, doi: 10.1177/0569434519846477.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.”
The American Economist, 056943451984647, 2019, doi:10.1177/0569434519846477.'
short: T. Gries, The American Economist (2019).
date_created: 2019-06-03T07:46:47Z
date_updated: 2025-11-10T09:46:40Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1177/0569434519846477
language:
- iso: eng
publication: The American Economist
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0569-4345
- 2328-1235
publication_status: published
status: public
title: 'A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea'
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2814'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Rainer
full_name: Grundmann, Rainer
last_name: Grundmann
citation:
ama: 'Gries T, Grundmann R. Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization
in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development. 2018;30(3):493-506.
doi:10.1002/jid.3104'
apa: 'Gries, T., & Grundmann, R. (2018). Fertility and Modernization: The Role
of Urbanization in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development,
30(3), 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104'
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Grundmann_2018, title={Fertility and Modernization: The
Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1002/jid.3104},
number={3}, journal={Journal of International Development}, author={Gries, Thomas
and Grundmann, Rainer}, year={2018}, pages={493–506} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The
Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development
30, no. 3 (2018): 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104.'
ieee: 'T. Gries and R. Grundmann, “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization
in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Development, vol. 30,
no. 3, pp. 493–506, 2018.'
mla: 'Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role
of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development,
vol. 30, no. 3, 2018, pp. 493–506, doi:10.1002/jid.3104.'
short: T. Gries, R. Grundmann, Journal of International Development 30 (2018) 493–506.
date_created: 2018-05-18T11:05:19Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:52Z
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '202'
doi: 10.1002/jid.3104
intvolume: ' 30'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 493-506
publication: Journal of International Development
status: public
title: 'Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries'
type: journal_article
user_id: '186'
volume: 30
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2831'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of
a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed
product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance
of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose
is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess
the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations
across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive
valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted)
average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation
method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In
addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate
solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly
optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified
Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation
profiles are incomplete.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Haake C-J, Skopalik A, Stroh-Maraun N. Disaggregating User Evaluations
Using the Shapley Value. In: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics
of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018). ; 2018:5:1-5:6. doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659'
apa: Feldotto, M., Haake, C.-J., Skopalik, A., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) (pp. 5:1-5:6).
Irvine, California, USA. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={10.1145/3230654.3230659},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6}
}'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Claus-Jochen Haake, Alexander Skopalik, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun.
“Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” In Proceedings of
the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018),
5:1-5:6, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659.
ieee: M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value,” in Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), Irvine,
California, USA, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley
Value.” Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659.
short: 'M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings
of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.'
conference:
end_date: 2018-06-18
location: Irvine, California, USA
name: The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018)
start_date: 2018-06-18
date_created: 2018-05-22T10:28:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:01Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1145/3230654.3230659
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: nmaraun
date_created: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
file_id: '3910'
file_name: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf
file_size: 1450171
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 5:1-5:6
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation (NetEcon 2018)
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-5916-0
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2565'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential
games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient
cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights
fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept
is applied to an adverting differential game.
author:
- first_name: Simon
full_name: Hoof, Simon
id: '59676'
last_name: Hoof
citation:
ama: Hoof S. Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games.
Vol 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.
apa: Hoof, S. (2018). Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential
games (Vol. 112). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Hoof_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Feedback Pareto weights
in cooperative NTU differential games}, volume={112}, publisher={CIE Working Paper
Series, Paderborn University}, author={Hoof, Simon}, year={2018}, collection={Working
Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Hoof, Simon. Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential
Games. Vol. 112. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
ieee: S. Hoof, Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games,
vol. 112. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
mla: Hoof, Simon. Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games.
Vol. 112, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
short: S. Hoof, Feedback Pareto Weights in Cooperative NTU Differential Games, CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2018-05-03T07:50:57Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-09-13T07:29:48Z
date_updated: 2018-09-13T07:29:48Z
file_id: '4382'
file_name: WP - Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games.pdf
file_size: 263766
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-09-13T07:29:48Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 112'
keyword:
- NTU differential games
- variable Pareto weights
- agreeability
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 112
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2933'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the
maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution
and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which
includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider
a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining
solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique
up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters.
We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash
and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining
theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great
variety of new bargaining solutions.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Cheng-Zhong
full_name: Qin, Cheng-Zhong
last_name: Qin
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem.
Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2018.'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J., & Qin, C.-Z. (2018). On unification of solutions to the
bargaining problem (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.'
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers
CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions
to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University:
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, On unification of solutions to the bargaining
problem, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2018.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to
the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
short: C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2018-05-28T07:00:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:48Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:15:31Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
file_id: '3855'
file_name: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf
file_size: 469001
relation: main_file
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 113'
keyword:
- Bargaining problem
- CES Function
- Normalized CES Function
- Nash solution
- Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
- Egalitarian Solution.
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
type: working_paper
urn: '29332'
user_id: '65453'
volume: 113
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3098'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom
mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically
established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz
(2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement
of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis
note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952)
is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign
is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame
or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive
equilibrium of an economy."
author:
- first_name: Walter
full_name: Trockel, Walter
last_name: Trockel
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H,
Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. Studies in Economic Design. Vol (n.d.). Studies
in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer.'
apa: 'Trockel, W., & Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F.
Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, & W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic
Design (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.'
bibtex: '@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic
Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies
in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi
and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }'
chicago: 'Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.”
In Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin,
Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg:
Springer, n.d.'
ieee: 'W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in Studies in
Economic Design, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W.
Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer.'
mla: Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” Studies
in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer.
short: 'W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker
(Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.'
date_created: 2018-06-06T17:07:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
editor:
- first_name: Jean-Francois
full_name: Laslier, Jean-Francois
last_name: Laslier
- first_name: Herve
full_name: Moulin, Herve
last_name: Moulin
- first_name: Remzi
full_name: Sanver, Remzi
last_name: Sanver
- first_name: William
full_name: Zwicker, William
last_name: Zwicker
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:36:24Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
file_id: '3857'
file_name: WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf
file_size: 141983
relation: main_file
title: Thoughts on Social Design
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
place: Heidelberg
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Studies in Economic Design
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2510-3970
publication_status: accepted
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
series_title: Studies in Economic Design
status: public
title: Thoughts on Social Design
type: book_chapter
urn: '30987'
user_id: '477'
volume: (n.d.)
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3101'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Focusing on a physician''s relationship to a briber and a patient, this experiment
analyzes the influence of a bribe on a physician''s treatment decision. We conduct
a partner treatment, in which briber and physician play together for the whole
experiment and a stranger treament, where briber and physician are re-matched
every period. With the help of the two treatments, we vary the relative reciprocity
between the physician and the two other actors, briber and patient. Additionally
we use a follow up questionnaire to measure the behavioral motivation of the participants.
We find that reciprocity leads to bribery relationships: In the partner treatment
physicians act corruptly more often. Just the variation of the relative reciprocity
between the treatments shows differences in the behavior of the subjects. Differences
in the participants'' preferences deliver no explanation for their behavior in
our experiment.'
author:
- first_name: Vanessa
full_name: Hilleringmann, Vanessa
id: '34491'
last_name: Hilleringmann
citation:
ama: Hilleringmann V. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a
Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series;
2018.
apa: Hilleringmann, V. (2018). The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity
on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper
Series.
bibtex: '@book{Hilleringmann_2018, title={The Influence of Bribery and Relative
Reciprocity on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment}, publisher={CIE
Working Paper Series}, author={Hilleringmann, Vanessa}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity
on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper
Series, 2018.
ieee: V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on
a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper Series,
2018.
mla: Hilleringmann, Vanessa. The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity
on a Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment. CIE Working Paper
Series, 2018.
short: V. Hilleringmann, The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a
Physician’s Prescription Decision - An Experiment, CIE Working Paper Series, 2018.
date_created: 2018-06-07T07:42:31Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
keyword:
- Corruption
- Reciprocity
- Physician-Patient Relationship
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: The Influence of Bribery and Relative Reciprocity on a Physician's Prescription
Decision - An Experiment
type: working_paper
user_id: '42447'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4564'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n
\ determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n
\ upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n
\ revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative
bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two
divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms
that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or
ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each,
we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether
or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us
to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer
payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining
solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints
are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore,
by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n
\ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n
\ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff
between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision
and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8},
number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining
Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group
Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation,
vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.
short: C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.
date_created: 2018-10-02T07:15:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:11Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
file_id: '5107'
file_name: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations
Under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 636521
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 27'
issue: '6'
jel:
- C78
language:
- iso: eng
page: 905-932
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 27
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4982'
article_number: '89'
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Stephanie
full_name: Rosenkranz, Stephanie
last_name: Rosenkranz
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation
- An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).
apa: Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4).
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games},
publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018}
}'
chicago: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium
Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018).
ieee: B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network
Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection
in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI,
2018.
short: B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018).
date_created: 2018-10-29T10:27:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:33Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
file_id: '5296'
file_name: games-09-00089.pdf
file_size: 492018
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:15:21Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/
oa: '1'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Games
publisher: MDPI
status: public
title: ' Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 9
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5330'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact
once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is
particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality
of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness
of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may
make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service
provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate
the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer
is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits
an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation
profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that
the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the
reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive
and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider
optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding
process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign
we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider
deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on
the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices
we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a
good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is
delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality
is chosen until the price increases again."
article_number: e0207172
article_type: review
author:
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Rene
full_name: Fahr, Rene
id: '111'
last_name: Fahr
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation
when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
apa: Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE,
13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
bibtex: '@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172},
number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science},
author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker,
Sonja}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE
13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
ieee: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13,
no. 11, 2018.
mla: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer
Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library
of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
short: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).
date_created: 2018-11-03T11:51:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
file_id: '5542'
file_name: Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf
file_size: 1107189
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 13'
issue: '11'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: PLoS ONE
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1932-6203
publication_status: published
publisher: Public Library of Science
status: public
title: Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 13
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '15206'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC)
generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according
to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides
with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism
that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic
behavior.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with
Reciprocal Preferences. Vol 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2018.
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). A Note on Manipulability in
School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences (Vol. 111). CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={A Note
on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={111},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability
in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111. Working Papers CIE.
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
ieee: C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice
with Reciprocal Preferences, vol. 111. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. A Note on Manipulability in
School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Vol. 111, CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2018.
short: C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with
Reciprocal Preferences, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:03:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:17Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:07:24Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:07:24Z
file_id: '15209'
file_name: WP - A Note on Manipulability in Scho ol Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.pdf
file_size: 328319
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:07:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 111'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 111
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '15207'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the
classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine
whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally
tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With
complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze
the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed
in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively
derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible,
alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative
game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which
the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’
equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium
is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this
study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the
same purpose.'
author:
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
last_name: Duman
citation:
ama: Duman P. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol 117. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University; 2018.
apa: Duman, P. (2018). Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game (Vol. 117). CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Duman_2018, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Does Informational
Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game},
volume={117}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Duman,
Papatya}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117. Working Papers CIE. CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.
ieee: P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, vol. 117. CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2018.
mla: Duman, Papatya. Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior?
An Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game. Vol. 117, CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2018.
short: P. Duman, Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An
Experimental Study on Trockel’s Game, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:06:11Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:18Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
file_id: '15208'
file_name: WP - Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior_ An Experimental
Study on Trockel's Game.pdf
file_size: 678790
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:06:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 117'
keyword:
- Chain Store Game
- reputation building
- entry deterrence
- Trockel's game
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental
Study on Trockel's Game
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 117
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1029'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing
on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest
if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security
forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate,
he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures,
which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive
repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and
makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability
of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead
has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring
effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy).
However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect
by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).
author:
- first_name: Kris
full_name: De Jaegher, Kris
last_name: De Jaegher
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'De Jaegher K, Hoyer B. Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron
Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2018;63(2):502--527.
doi:10.1177/0022002717750450'
apa: 'De Jaegher, K., & Hoyer, B. (2018). Preemptive Repression: Deterrence,
Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
63(2), 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450'
bibtex: '@article{De Jaegher_Hoyer_2018, title={Preemptive Repression: Deterrence,
Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}, volume={63}, DOI={10.1177/0022002717750450},
number={2}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications},
author={De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2018}, pages={502--527} }'
chicago: 'De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence,
Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
63, no. 2 (2018): 502--527. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717750450.'
ieee: 'K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring,
Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63,
no. 2, pp. 502--527, 2018.'
mla: 'De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. “Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring,
Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 63,
no. 2, SAGE Publications, 2018, pp. 502--527, doi:10.1177/0022002717750450.'
short: K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (2018) 502--527.
date_created: 2017-12-06T10:52:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:35Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1177/0022002717750450
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T16:07:11Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T16:07:11Z
file_id: '5323'
file_name: 0022002717750450.pdf
file_size: 335051
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T16:07:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 63'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 502--527
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Conflict Resolution
publisher: SAGE Publications
status: public
title: 'Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves'
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 63
year: '2018'
...