@inproceedings{17651,
abstract = {Consider mitigating the effects of denial of service or of malicious traffic in networks by deleting edges. Edge deletion reduces the DoS or the number of the malicious flows, but it also inadvertently removes some of the desired flows. To model this important problem, we formulate two problems: (1) remove all the undesirable flows while minimizing the damage to the desirable ones and (2) balance removing the undesirable flows and not removing too many of the desirable flows. We prove these problems are equivalent to important theoretical problems, thereby being important not only practically but also theoretically, and very hard to approximate in a general network. We employ reductions to nonetheless approximate the problem and also provide a greedy approximation. When the network is a tree, the problems are still MAX SNP-hard, but we provide a greedy-based 2l-approximation algorithm, where l is the longest desirable flow. We also provide an algorithm, approximating the first and the second problem within {\$}{\$}2 {\backslash}sqrt{\{} 2{\backslash}left| E {\backslash}right| {\}}{\$}{\$}and {\$}{\$}2 {\backslash}sqrt{\{}2 ({\backslash}left| E {\backslash}right| + {\backslash}left| {\backslash}text {\{}undesirable flows{\}} {\backslash}right| ){\}}{\$}{\$}, respectively, where E is the set of the edges of the network. We also provide a fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm. Finally, if the tree has a root such that every flow in the tree flows on the path from the root to a leaf, we solve the problem exactly using dynamic programming.},
author = {Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and Grosso, Paola and de Laat, Cees},
booktitle = {Combinatorial Optimization and Applications},
editor = {Kim, Donghyun and Uma, R. N. and Zelikovsky, Alexander},
isbn = {978-3-030-04651-4},
keyword = {flow, Red-Blue Set Cover, Positive-Negative Partial Set Cover, approximation, tree, MAX SNP-hard, root, leaf, dynamic programming, FPT},
pages = {217--232},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
title = {{Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion}},
year = {2018},
}
@misc{1188,
author = {Kempf, Jérôme},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions}},
year = {2018},
}
@inproceedings{2484,
abstract = {We study the classic bin packing problem in a fully-dynamic setting, where new items can arrive and old items may depart. We want algorithms with low asymptotic competitive ratio while repacking items sparingly between updates. Formally, each item i has a movement cost c_i >= 0, and we want to use alpha * OPT bins and incur a movement cost gamma * c_i, either in the worst case, or in an amortized sense, for alpha, gamma as small as possible. We call gamma the recourse of the algorithm. This is motivated by cloud storage applications, where fully-dynamic bin packing models the problem of data backup to minimize the number of disks used, as well as communication incurred in moving file backups between disks. Since the set of files changes over time, we could recompute a solution periodically from scratch, but this would give a high number of disk rewrites, incurring a high energy cost and possible wear and tear of the disks. In this work, we present optimal tradeoffs between number of bins used and number of items repacked, as well as natural extensions of the latter measure.},
author = {Feldkord, Björn and Feldotto, Matthias and Gupta, Anupam and Guruganesh, Guru and Kumar, Amit and Riechers, Sören and Wajc, David},
booktitle = {45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)},
editor = {Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Kaklamanis, Christos and Marx, Dániel and Sannella, Donald},
isbn = {978-3-95977-076-7},
issn = {1868-8969},
location = {Prag},
pages = {51:1--51:24},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
title = {{Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking}},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51},
volume = {107},
year = {2018},
}
@misc{3851,
author = {Koop, Samuel},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien}},
year = {2018},
}
@inproceedings{112,
abstract = {We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study $L_p$ norms and analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally, we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.},
author = {Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC)},
pages = {222----233},
title = {{Congestion Games with Complementarities}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19},
year = {2017},
}
@inproceedings{59,
abstract = {We consider a scheduling problem on $m$ identical processors sharing an arbitrarily divisible resource. In addition to assigning jobs to processors, the scheduler must distribute the resource among the processors (e.g., for three processors in shares of 20\%, 15\%, and 65\%) and adjust this distribution over time. Each job $j$ comes with a size $p_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and a resource requirement $r_j > 0$. Jobs do not benefit when receiving a share larger than $r_j$ of the resource. But providing them with a fraction of the resource requirement causes a linear decrease in the processing efficiency. We seek a (non-preemptive) job and resource assignment minimizing the makespan.Our main result is an efficient approximation algorithm which achieves an approximation ratio of $2 + 1/(m-2)$. It can be improved to an (asymptotic) ratio of $1 + 1/(m-1)$ if all jobs have unit size. Our algorithms also imply new results for a well-known bin packing problem with splittable items and a restricted number of allowed item parts per bin.Based upon the above solution, we also derive an approximation algorithm with similar guarantees for a setting in which we introduce so-called tasks each containing several jobs and where we are interested in the average completion time of tasks (a task is completed when all its jobs are completed).},
author = {Kling, Peter and Mäcker, Alexander and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)},
pages = {123----132},
title = {{Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource}},
doi = {10.1145/3087556.3087578},
year = {2017},
}
@inproceedings{66,
abstract = {In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE) do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual player.},
author = {Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)},
pages = {175----187},
title = {{Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15},
year = {2017},
}
@inproceedings{17654,
author = {Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
keyword = {agents, projects, contribute, shared effort game, competition, quota, threshold, Nash equilibrium, social welfare, efficiency, price of anarchy, price of stability},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Competition between Cooperative Projects}},
year = {2017},
}
@misc{1080,
author = {Bürmann, Jan},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty}},
year = {2017},
}
@misc{1073,
author = {Nachtigall, Simon},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Sortieren dynamischer Daten}},
year = {2017},
}