@misc{277,
author = {{Kothe, Nils}},
publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}},
title = {{{Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk}}},
year = {{2015}},
}
@article{17657,
abstract = {{Inter-datacenter transfers of non-interactive but timely large flows over a private (managed) network is an important problem faced by many cloud service providers. The considered flows are non-interactive because they do not explicitly target the end users. However, most of them must be performed on a timely basis and are associated with a deadline. We propose to schedule these flows by a centralized controller, which determines when to transmit each flow and which path to use. Two scheduling models are presented in this paper. In the first, the controller also determines the rate of each flow, while in the second bandwidth is assigned by the network according to the TCP rules. We develop scheduling algorithms for both models and compare their complexity and performance.}},
author = {{Cohen, R. and Polevoy, Gleb}},
issn = {{2168-7161}},
journal = {{Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on}},
keywords = {{Approximation algorithms, Approximation methods, Bandwidth, Cloud computing, Routing, Schedules, Scheduling}},
number = {{99}},
pages = {{1--1}},
title = {{{Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows}}},
doi = {{10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964}},
volume = {{PP}},
year = {{2015}},
}
@article{17658,
abstract = {{Abstract We study the problem of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences. In this problem the input consists of a set of users and a set of base stations. Each user has a list of requests, each consisting of a base station, a frequency demand, and a profit that may be gained by scheduling this request. The goal is to find a maximum profit set of user requests S that satisfies the following conditions: (i) S contains at most one request per user, (ii) the frequency sets allotted to requests in S that correspond to the same base station are pairwise non-intersecting, and (iii) the QoS received by any user at any frequency is reasonable according to an interference model. In this paper we consider two variants of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences. In the first each request specifies a demand that can be satisfied by any subset of frequencies that is large enough. In the second each request specifies a specific frequency interval. Furthermore, we consider two interference models, multiplicative and additive. We show that these problems are extremely hard to approximate if the interferences depend on both the interfered and the interfering base stations. On the other hand, we provide constant factor approximation algorithms for both variants of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences for the case where the interferences depend only on the interfering base stations. We also consider a restrictive special case that is closely related to the Knapsack problem. We show that this special case is NP-hard and that it admits an FPTAS. }},
author = {{Bar-Yehuda, Reuven and Polevoy, Gleb and Rawitz, Dror}},
issn = {{0166-218X}},
journal = {{Discrete Applied Mathematics }},
keywords = {{Local ratio}},
pages = {{23 -- 36}},
publisher = {{Elsevier}},
title = {{{Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences}}},
doi = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013}},
volume = {{194}},
year = {{2015}},
}
@inproceedings{370,
abstract = {{Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints. We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs).We present a variety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived. }},
author = {{Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'14)}},
pages = {{352--360}},
title = {{{Routing Games with Progressive Filling}}},
doi = {{10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@misc{373,
author = {{Pahl, David}},
publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}},
title = {{{Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen}}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{17659,
author = {{Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}},
isbn = {{978-1-4503-2738-1}},
keywords = {{competition, equilibrium, market, models, shared effort games, simulation}},
pages = {{861--868}},
publisher = {{International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}},
title = {{{Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{17660,
author = {{Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}},
isbn = {{978-1-4503-2738-1}},
keywords = {{dynamics, emotion modeling, negotiation, network interaction, shared effort game}},
pages = {{1741--1742}},
publisher = {{International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}},
title = {{{Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing}}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{17661,
author = {{King, Thomas C. and Liu, Qingzhi and Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Dignum, Virginia and van Riemsdijk, M. Birna and Warnier, Martijn}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}},
isbn = {{978-1-4503-2738-1}},
keywords = {{crowd-sensing, crowdsourcing, data aggregation, game theory, norms, reciprocation, self interested agents, simulation}},
pages = {{1651--1652}},
publisher = {{International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}},
title = {{{Request Driven Social Sensing}}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@article{17662,
author = {{Polevoy, Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}},
issn = {{2167-8375}},
journal = {{ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}},
keywords = {{Competition, efficiency, equilibrium, market, social welfare}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{1:1--1:16}},
publisher = {{ACM}},
title = {{{Signaling Competition and Social Welfare}}},
doi = {{10.1145/2560766}},
volume = {{2}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{451,
abstract = {{We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria are analysed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence towards an equilibrium may be exponential.}},
author = {{Drees, Maximilian and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}},
editor = {{Lavi, Ron}},
pages = {{110--121}},
title = {{{Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions}}},
doi = {{10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{452,
abstract = {{Today's networks, like the Internet, do not consist of one but a mixture of several interconnected networks. Each has individual qualities and hence the performance of a network node results from the networks' interplay.We introduce a new game theoretic model capturing the interplay between a high-speed backbone network and a low-speed general purpose network. In our model, n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway node. A gateway node pays a fixed price for its connection to the high-speed network, but can utilize the high-speed network to gain communication distance 0 to all other gateways. Communication distances in the low-speed network are given by the hop distances. The effective communication distance between any two nodes then is given by the shortest path, which is possibly improved by using gateways as shortcuts.Every node v has the objective to minimize its communication costs, given by the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of the effective communication distances from v to all other nodes plus a fixed price \alpha > 0, if it decides to be a gateway. For both games and different ranges of \alpha, we study the existence of equilibria, the price of anarchy, and convergence properties of best-response dynamics.}},
author = {{Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}},
editor = {{Lavi, Ron}},
pages = {{294}},
title = {{{Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games}}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{453,
abstract = {{In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions. For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides the first guarantees for general latency functions.}},
author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Skopalik, Alexander}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}},
pages = {{30--43}},
title = {{{Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria}}},
doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{455,
abstract = {{We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games and develop techniques to obtain approximate potential functions that prove the existence of alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria and the convergence of alpha-improvement steps. Specifically, we show how to obtain upper bounds for approximation factor alpha for a given class of cost functions. For example for concave cost functions the factor is at most 3/2, for quadratic cost functions it is at most 4/3, and for polynomial cost functions of maximal degree d it is at at most d + 1. For games with two players we obtain tight bounds which are as small as for example 1.054 in the case of quadratic cost functions.}},
author = {{Hansknecht, Christoph and Klimm, Max and Skopalik, Alexander}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)}},
pages = {{242 -- 257}},
title = {{{Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games}}},
doi = {{10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{456,
abstract = {{We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19].}},
author = {{Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}},
pages = {{480 -- 485}},
title = {{{Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}}},
doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{462,
abstract = {{We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future.}},
author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}},
pages = {{625--630}},
title = {{{A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}}},
doi = {{10.5220/0005110406250630}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{395,
abstract = {{We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game) ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1)) the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game, weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1. Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that it is not weakly acyclic.}},
author = {{Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}},
pages = {{435--440}},
title = {{{Multilevel Network Games}}},
doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@inproceedings{412,
abstract = {{In this paper we present and analyze HSkip+, a self-stabilizing overlay network for nodes with arbitrary heterogeneous bandwidths. HSkip+ has the same topology as the Skip+ graph proposed by Jacob et al. [PODC 2009] but its self-stabilization mechanism significantly outperforms the self-stabilization mechanism proposed for Skip+. Also, the nodes are now ordered according to their bandwidths and not according to their identifiers. Various other solutions have already been proposed for overlay networks with heterogeneous bandwidths, but they are not self-stabilizing. In addition to HSkip+ being self-stabilizing, its performance is on par with the best previous bounds on the time and work for joining or leaving a network of peers of logarithmic diameter and degree and arbitrary bandwidths. Also, the dilation and congestion for routing messages is on par with the best previous bounds for such networks, so that HSkip+ combines the advantages of both worlds. Our theoretical investigations are backed by simulations demonstrating that HSkip+ is indeed performing much better than Skip+ and working correctly under high churn rates.}},
author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Scheideler, Christian and Graffi, Kalman}},
booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P)}},
pages = {{1--10}},
title = {{{HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths}}},
doi = {{10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300}},
year = {{2014}},
}
@article{17663,
abstract = {{In this paper, we define and study a new problem, referred to as the Dependent Unsplittable Flow Problem (D-UFP). We present and discuss this problem in the context of large-scale powerful (radar/camera) sensor networks, but we believe it has important applications on the admission of large flows in other networks as well. In order to optimize the selection of flows transmitted to the gateway, D-UFP takes into account possible dependencies between flows. We show that D-UFP is more difficult than NP-hard problems for which no good approximation is known. Then, we address two special cases of this problem: the case where all the sensors have a shared channel and the case where the sensors form a mesh and route to the gateway over a spanning tree.}},
author = {{Cohen, R. and Nudelman, I. and Polevoy, Gleb}},
issn = {{1063-6692}},
journal = {{Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on}},
keywords = {{Approximation algorithms, Approximation methods, Bandwidth, Logic gates, Radar, Vectors, Wireless sensor networks, Dependent flow scheduling, sensor networks}},
number = {{5}},
pages = {{1461--1471}},
title = {{{On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks}}},
doi = {{10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792}},
volume = {{21}},
year = {{2013}},
}
@inproceedings{17664,
author = {{Cohen, Reuven and Nudelman, Ilia and Polevoy, Gleb}},
booktitle = {{Infocom'2012, Orlando, Florida}},
title = {{{On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks}}},
year = {{2012}},
}
@inproceedings{17665,
author = {{Bar-Yehuda, Reuven and Polevoy, Gleb and Rawitz, Dror}},
booktitle = {{DIALM-PODC}},
pages = {{33--42}},
title = {{{Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences}}},
year = {{2010}},
}