@inproceedings{456,
abstract = {We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19].},
author = {Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)},
pages = {480 -- 485},
title = {{Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43},
year = {2014},
}
@inproceedings{452,
abstract = {Today's networks, like the Internet, do not consist of one but a mixture of several interconnected networks. Each has individual qualities and hence the performance of a network node results from the networks' interplay.We introduce a new game theoretic model capturing the interplay between a high-speed backbone network and a low-speed general purpose network. In our model, n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway node. A gateway node pays a fixed price for its connection to the high-speed network, but can utilize the high-speed network to gain communication distance 0 to all other gateways. Communication distances in the low-speed network are given by the hop distances. The effective communication distance between any two nodes then is given by the shortest path, which is possibly improved by using gateways as shortcuts.Every node v has the objective to minimize its communication costs, given by the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of the effective communication distances from v to all other nodes plus a fixed price \alpha > 0, if it decides to be a gateway. For both games and different ranges of \alpha, we study the existence of equilibria, the price of anarchy, and convergence properties of best-response dynamics.},
author = {Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)},
editor = {Lavi, Ron},
pages = {294},
title = {{Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games}},
year = {2014},
}
@inproceedings{370,
abstract = {Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints. We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs).We present a variety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived. },
author = {Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'14)},
pages = {352--360},
title = {{Routing Games with Progressive Filling}},
doi = {10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571},
year = {2014},
}