[{"doi":"10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417","title":"The Game of Reciprocation Habits","extern":"1","author":[{"full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb","first_name":"Gleb","last_name":"Polevoy","id":"83983"},{"last_name":"de Weerdt","first_name":"M.M.","full_name":"de Weerdt, M.M."},{"last_name":"Jonker","full_name":"Jonker, C.M.","first_name":"C.M."}],"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_Jonker_2016, series={Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications}, title={The Game of Reciprocation Habits}, volume={Volume 285: ECAI 2016}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417\">10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417</a>}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M. and Jonker, C.M.}, year={2016}, pages={417–425}, collection={Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications} }","mla":"Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “The Game of Reciprocation Habits.” <i>Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>, vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, 2016, pp. 417–25, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417\">10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417</a>.","short":"G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, C.M. Jonker, in: Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016, pp. 417–425.","ama":"Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM, Jonker CM. The Game of Reciprocation Habits. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>. Vol Volume 285: ECAI 2016. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. ; 2016:417-425. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417\">10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417</a>","apa":"Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M. M., &#38; Jonker, C. M. (2016). The Game of Reciprocation Habits. In <i>Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i> (Vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, pp. 417–425). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417\">https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417</a>","ieee":"G. Polevoy, M. M. de Weerdt, and C. M. Jonker, “The Game of Reciprocation Habits,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>, 2016, vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, pp. 417–425.","chicago":"Polevoy, Gleb, M.M. de Weerdt, and C.M. Jonker. “The Game of Reciprocation Habits.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence</i>, Volume 285: ECAI 2016:417–25. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, 2016. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417\">https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417</a>."},"series_title":"Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications","keyword":["agents","action","repeated reciprocation","fixed","floating","network","Nash equilibrium","social welfare","price of anarchy","price of stability","convex combination"],"user_id":"83983","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"type":"conference","year":"2016","status":"public","date_created":"2020-08-06T15:20:30Z","publication":"Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","page":"417-425","_id":"17655","volume":"Volume 285: ECAI 2016"},{"publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-4503-4239-1"]},"type":"conference","year":"2016","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"status":"public","publication":"Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems","date_created":"2020-08-06T15:20:45Z","publisher":"International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","page":"1431-1432","_id":"17656","place":"Richland, SC","title":"The Convergence of Reciprocation","author":[{"first_name":"Gleb","full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb","last_name":"Polevoy","id":"83983"},{"first_name":"Mathijs","full_name":"de Weerdt, Mathijs","last_name":"de Weerdt"},{"last_name":"Jonker","first_name":"Catholijn","full_name":"Jonker, Catholijn"}],"extern":"1","department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"series_title":"AAMAS '16","citation":{"ieee":"G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, and C. Jonker, “The Convergence of Reciprocation,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems</i>, 2016, pp. 1431–1432.","chicago":"Polevoy, Gleb, Mathijs de Weerdt, and Catholijn Jonker. “The Convergence of Reciprocation.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems</i>, 1431–32. AAMAS ’16. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016.","apa":"Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M., &#38; Jonker, C. (2016). The Convergence of Reciprocation. In <i>Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems</i> (pp. 1431–1432). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.","ama":"Polevoy G, de Weerdt M, Jonker C. The Convergence of Reciprocation. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems</i>. AAMAS ’16. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2016:1431-1432.","short":"G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, C. Jonker, in: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2016, pp. 1431–1432.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_Jonker_2016, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’16}, title={The Convergence of Reciprocation}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Jonker, Catholijn}, year={2016}, pages={1431–1432}, collection={AAMAS ’16} }","mla":"Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “The Convergence of Reciprocation.” <i>Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems</i>, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016, pp. 1431–32."},"user_id":"83983","keyword":["agent's influence","behavior","convergence","perron-frobenius","reciprocal interaction","repeated reciprocation"]},{"type":"conference","ddc":["000"],"publication":"Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)","page":"655--669","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"doi":"10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47","has_accepted_license":"1","abstract":[{"text":"We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.","lang":"eng"}],"title":"Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives","file":[{"success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-10-31T17:03:44Z","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5233","access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-10-31T17:03:44Z","creator":"feldi","file_name":"Feldotto2016_Chapter_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf","file_size":235739}],"external_id":{"arxiv":["1607.05143"]},"user_id":"14052","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2016","status":"public","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:32Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:54:41Z","_id":"209","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T17:03:44Z","author":[{"last_name":"Feldotto","id":"14052","full_name":"Feldotto, Matthias","first_name":"Matthias","orcid":"0000-0003-1348-6516"},{"first_name":"Lennart","full_name":"Leder, Lennart","last_name":"Leder"},{"full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","first_name":"Alexander","id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik"}],"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"apa":"Feldotto, M., Leder, L., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i> (pp. 655--669). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>","ama":"Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>. LNCS. ; 2016:655--669. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47\">10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>","ieee":"M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 2016, pp. 655--669.","chicago":"Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 655--669. LNCS, 2016. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47\">10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={655--669}, collection={LNCS} }","mla":"Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 2016, pp. 655--669, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47\">10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47</a>.","short":"M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669."},"series_title":"LNCS"},{"date_created":"2017-12-19T10:10:17Z","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"type":"bachelorsthesis","year":"2016","status":"public","_id":"1082","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:51Z","title":"Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken","author":[{"first_name":"Tobias","full_name":"Handirk, Tobias","last_name":"Handirk"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Alexander","full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","last_name":"Skopalik","id":"40384"}],"citation":{"short":"T. Handirk, Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken, Universität Paderborn, 2016.","mla":"Handirk, Tobias. <i>Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2016.","bibtex":"@book{Handirk_2016, title={Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Handirk, Tobias}, year={2016} }","chicago":"Handirk, Tobias. <i>Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2016.","ieee":"T. Handirk, <i>Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2016.","apa":"Handirk, T. (2016). <i>Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken</i>. Universität Paderborn.","ama":"Handirk T. <i>Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2016."},"user_id":"14052","department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}]},{"issue":"4","page":"2553 - 2562","type":"journal_article","publication":"IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","has_accepted_license":"1","abstract":[{"text":"Abstract—Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approachto a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the usersin a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformlyraising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacityconstraints. We consider an extension of these allocations byraising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniformtime-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocationsare used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, whichwe formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present avariety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these gamespossess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation ingeneral is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms forprominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), includingthe case when all users have the same source-destination pair.We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nashand strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players havedifferent or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, weshow that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possibleto design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial resultson polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived.","lang":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"file":[{"creator":"florida","file_name":"159-Harks-Hoefer-Schewior-Skopalik2016.pdf","file_size":1655309,"content_type":"application/pdf","access_level":"closed","file_id":"1547","date_created":"2018-03-21T12:48:02Z","date_updated":"2018-03-21T12:48:02Z","relation":"main_file","success":1}],"title":"Routing Games With Progressive Filling","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:40Z","_id":"159","file_date_updated":"2018-03-21T12:48:02Z","status":"public","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2016","publisher":"IEEE","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:23Z","department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"short":"T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (2016) 2553–2562.","bibtex":"@article{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2016, title={Routing Games With Progressive Filling}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>}, number={4}, journal={IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={2553–2562} }","mla":"Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games With Progressive Filling.” <i>IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking</i>, no. 4, IEEE, 2016, pp. 2553–62, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>.","ieee":"T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games With Progressive Filling,” <i>IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking</i>, no. 4, pp. 2553–2562, 2016.","chicago":"Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing Games With Progressive Filling.” <i>IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking</i>, no. 4 (2016): 2553–62. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>.","ama":"Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games With Progressive Filling. <i>IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking</i>. 2016;(4):2553-2562. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>","apa":"Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2016). Routing Games With Progressive Filling. <i>IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking</i>, (4), 2553–2562. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>"},"author":[{"full_name":"Harks, Tobias","first_name":"Tobias","last_name":"Harks"},{"last_name":"Höfer","first_name":"Martin","full_name":"Höfer, Martin"},{"last_name":"Schewior","full_name":"Schewior, Kevin","first_name":"Kevin"},{"first_name":"Alexander","full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik"}]},{"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"short":"M. Drees, B. Feldkord, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Drees_Feldkord_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Strategic Online Facility Location}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43\">10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43</a>}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldkord, Björn and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={593--607}, collection={LNCS} }","mla":"Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Strategic Online Facility Location.” <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 2016, pp. 593--607, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43\">10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43</a>.","ieee":"M. Drees, B. Feldkord, and A. Skopalik, “Strategic Online Facility Location,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 2016, pp. 593--607.","chicago":"Drees, Maximilian, Björn Feldkord, and Alexander Skopalik. “Strategic Online Facility Location.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 593--607. LNCS, 2016. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43</a>.","ama":"Drees M, Feldkord B, Skopalik A. Strategic Online Facility Location. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>. LNCS. ; 2016:593--607. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43\">10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43</a>","apa":"Drees, M., Feldkord, B., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2016). Strategic Online Facility Location. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i> (pp. 593--607). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43</a>"},"series_title":"LNCS","author":[{"first_name":"Maximilian","full_name":"Drees, Maximilian","last_name":"Drees"},{"full_name":"Feldkord, Björn","first_name":"Björn","id":"22704","last_name":"Feldkord"},{"full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","first_name":"Alexander","id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:10Z","_id":"149","file_date_updated":"2018-03-21T12:55:43Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2016","status":"public","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:21Z","user_id":"477","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"5","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In this paper we consider a strategic variant of the online facility location problem. Given is a graph in which each node serves two roles: it is a strategic client stating requests as well as a potential location for a facility. In each time step one client states a request which induces private costs equal to the distance to the closest facility. Before serving, the clients may collectively decide to open new facilities, sharing the corresponding price. Instead of optimizing the global costs, each client acts selfishly. The prices of new facilities vary between nodes and also change over time, but are always bounded by some fixed value α. Both the requests as well as the facility prices are given by an online sequence and are not known in advance.We characterize the optimal strategies of the clients and analyze their overall performance in comparison to a centralized offline solution. If all players optimize their own competitiveness, the global performance of the system is O(√α⋅α) times worse than the offline optimum. A restriction to a natural subclass of strategies improves this result to O(α). We also show that for fixed facility costs, we can find strategies such that this bound further improves to O(√α)."}],"has_accepted_license":"1","doi":"10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43","title":"Strategic Online Facility Location","file":[{"file_size":236253,"file_name":"149-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-319-48749-6_43.pdf","creator":"florida","date_created":"2018-03-21T12:55:43Z","access_level":"closed","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"1553","date_updated":"2018-03-21T12:55:43Z","relation":"main_file","success":1}],"page":"593--607","type":"conference","ddc":["040"],"publication":"Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)"},{"publication":"Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience","ddc":["040"],"type":"journal_article","volume":28,"page":"1655-1677","issue":"5","file":[{"creator":"florida","file_name":"145-Feldotto_et_al-2016-Concurrency_and_Computation-_Practice_and_Experience.pdf","file_size":3121363,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"1556","access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-03-21T12:57:57Z","date_updated":"2018-03-21T12:57:57Z","relation":"main_file","success":1}],"title":"Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM","abstract":[{"text":"Comparative evaluations of peer-to-peer protocols through simulations are a viable approach to judge the performance and costs of the individual protocols in large-scale networks. In order to support this work, we present the peer-to-peer system simulator PeerfactSim.KOM, which we extended over the last years. PeerfactSim.KOM comes with an extensive layer model to support various facets and protocols of peer-to-peer networking. In this article, we describe PeerfactSim.KOM and show how it can be used for detailed measurements of large-scale peer-to-peer networks. We enhanced PeerfactSim.KOM with a fine-grained analyzer concept, with exhaustive automated measurements and gnuplot generators as well as a coordination control to evaluate sets of experiment setups in parallel. Thus, by configuring all experiments and protocols only once and starting the simulator, all desired measurements are performed, analyzed, evaluated, and combined, resulting in a holistic environment for the comparative evaluation of peer-to-peer systems. An immediate comparison of different configurations and overlays under different aspects is possible directly after the execution without any manual post-processing. ","lang":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1002/cpe.3716","has_accepted_license":"1","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1","_id":"5"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"user_id":"14052","publisher":"Wiley Online Library","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:20Z","status":"public","year":"2016","file_date_updated":"2018-03-21T12:57:57Z","_id":"145","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:00Z","author":[{"orcid":"0000-0003-1348-6516","id":"14052","last_name":"Feldotto","full_name":"Feldotto, Matthias","first_name":"Matthias"},{"first_name":"Kalman","full_name":"Graffi, Kalman","last_name":"Graffi"}],"intvolume":"        28","publication_status":"published","citation":{"short":"M. Feldotto, K. Graffi, Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience 28 (2016) 1655–1677.","bibtex":"@article{Feldotto_Graffi_2016, title={Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM}, volume={28}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716\">10.1002/cpe.3716</a>}, number={5}, journal={Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience}, publisher={Wiley Online Library}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Graffi, Kalman}, year={2016}, pages={1655–1677} }","mla":"Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i>, vol. 28, no. 5, Wiley Online Library, 2016, pp. 1655–77, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716\">10.1002/cpe.3716</a>.","ieee":"M. Feldotto and K. Graffi, “Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM,” <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i>, vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 1655–1677, 2016.","chicago":"Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i> 28, no. 5 (2016): 1655–77. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716\">https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716</a>.","apa":"Feldotto, M., &#38; Graffi, K. (2016). Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM. <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i>, <i>28</i>(5), 1655–1677. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716\">https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716</a>","ama":"Feldotto M, Graffi K. Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM. <i>Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience</i>. 2016;28(5):1655-1677. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716\">10.1002/cpe.3716</a>"},"department":[{"_id":"79"},{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}]},{"user_id":"14052","citation":{"short":"K. Pfannschmidt, Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem, Universität Paderborn, 2015.","mla":"Pfannschmidt, Karlson. <i>Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","bibtex":"@book{Pfannschmidt_2015, title={Solving the aggregated bandits problem}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pfannschmidt, Karlson}, year={2015} }","chicago":"Pfannschmidt, Karlson. <i>Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","ieee":"K. Pfannschmidt, <i>Solving the aggregated bandits problem</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","ama":"Pfannschmidt K. <i>Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2015.","apa":"Pfannschmidt, K. (2015). <i>Solving the aggregated bandits problem</i>. Universität Paderborn."},"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"author":[{"first_name":"Karlson","full_name":"Pfannschmidt, Karlson","last_name":"Pfannschmidt"}],"title":"Solving the aggregated bandits problem","supervisor":[{"full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","first_name":"Alexander","id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"_id":"251","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:50Z","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:41Z","status":"public","year":"2015","type":"mastersthesis"},{"volume":3,"issue":"1","article_number":"2","publication":"Transactions on Economics and Computation","ddc":["040"],"type":"journal_article","user_id":"477","file":[{"success":1,"date_updated":"2018-03-20T07:40:55Z","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","access_level":"closed","file_id":"1433","date_created":"2018-03-20T07:40:55Z","creator":"florida","file_name":"320-a2-caragiannis.pdf","file_size":260503}],"title":"Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by a potential function argument. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing pure Nash equilibria in such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players have unit weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic) latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts. A ρ--approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a state of a (weighted congestion) game from which no player has any incentive to deviate in order to improve her cost by a multiplicative factor higher than ρ. Do such equilibria exist for small values of ρ? And if so, can we compute them efficiently?We provide positive answers to both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions by exploiting an “approximation” of such games by a new class of potential games that we call Ψ-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!-approximate pure Nash equilibria, where d is the maximum degree of the latency functions. Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate pure Nash equilibria when d is a constant. For games with linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee is 3+√5/2 + Oγ for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for latency functions with maximum degree d≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d). The running time is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ. As a byproduct of our techniques, we also show the following interesting structural statement for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state to a dO(d2)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified in such games as long as d is a constant.To the best of our knowledge, these are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. Our techniques significantly extend our recent work on unweighted congestion games through the use of Ψ-games. The concept of approximating nonpotential games by potential ones is interesting in itself and might have further applications."}],"has_accepted_license":"1","doi":"10.1145/2614687","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"_id":"320","file_date_updated":"2018-03-20T07:40:55Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:59:04Z","publisher":"ACM","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:54Z","status":"public","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2015","citation":{"chicago":"Caragiannis, Ioannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.” <i>Transactions on Economics and Computation</i> 3, no. 1 (2015). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687\">https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687</a>.","ieee":"I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure,” <i>Transactions on Economics and Computation</i>, vol. 3, no. 1, 2015.","ama":"Caragiannis I, Fanelli A, Gravin N, Skopalik A. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure. <i>Transactions on Economics and Computation</i>. 2015;3(1). doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687\">10.1145/2614687</a>","apa":"Caragiannis, I., Fanelli, A., Gravin, N., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2015). Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure. <i>Transactions on Economics and Computation</i>, <i>3</i>(1). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687\">https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687</a>","short":"I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik, Transactions on Economics and Computation 3 (2015).","mla":"Caragiannis, Ioannis, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.” <i>Transactions on Economics and Computation</i>, vol. 3, no. 1, 2, ACM, 2015, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687\">10.1145/2614687</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Caragiannis_Fanelli_Gravin_Skopalik_2015, title={Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure}, volume={3}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687\">10.1145/2614687</a>}, number={12}, journal={Transactions on Economics and Computation}, publisher={ACM}, author={Caragiannis, Ioannis and Fanelli, Angelo and Gravin, Nick and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2015} }"},"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Caragiannis","full_name":"Caragiannis, Ioannis","first_name":"Ioannis"},{"first_name":"Angelo","full_name":"Fanelli, Angelo","last_name":"Fanelli"},{"first_name":"Nick","full_name":"Gravin, Nick","last_name":"Gravin"},{"first_name":"Alexander","full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","last_name":"Skopalik","id":"40384"}],"intvolume":"         3"},{"supervisor":[{"id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik","first_name":"Alexander","full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Pautz","first_name":"Jannis","full_name":"Pautz, Jannis"}],"title":"Budget Games with priced strategies","department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"user_id":"14052","citation":{"short":"J. Pautz, Budget Games with Priced Strategies, Universität Paderborn, 2015.","mla":"Pautz, Jannis. <i>Budget Games with Priced Strategies</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","bibtex":"@book{Pautz_2015, title={Budget Games with priced strategies}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pautz, Jannis}, year={2015} }","chicago":"Pautz, Jannis. <i>Budget Games with Priced Strategies</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","ieee":"J. Pautz, <i>Budget Games with priced strategies</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","ama":"Pautz J. <i>Budget Games with Priced Strategies</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2015.","apa":"Pautz, J. (2015). <i>Budget Games with priced strategies</i>. Universität Paderborn."},"status":"public","type":"bachelorsthesis","year":"2015","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:53Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:59:01Z","_id":"316"},{"external_id":{"arxiv":["1507.02908"]},"user_id":"14052","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"16","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject C4"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area C","_id":"4"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In \\emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor $\\alpha$ through unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold $\\alpha_\\delta$ (where $\\delta$ is a parameter that limits the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that $\\alpha$-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist for $\\alpha \\geq \\alpha_\\delta$, but not for $\\alpha < \\alpha_\\delta$. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold $\\alpha_\\delta$ and show that the corresponding decision problem is ${\\sf NP}$-hard. We also show that the $\\alpha$-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is $\\alpha+1$. For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close to the optimum."}],"doi":"10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14","has_accepted_license":"1","title":"On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games","file":[{"file_size":256718,"file_name":"271-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-662-48433-3_14.pdf","creator":"florida","date_created":"2018-03-21T09:29:34Z","file_id":"1475","content_type":"application/pdf","access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-03-21T09:29:34Z","success":1}],"page":"178-189","type":"conference","ddc":["040"],"publication":"Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)","department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"ieee":"M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, 2015, pp. 178–189.","chicago":"Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, 178–89. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>.","ama":"Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. ; 2015:178-189. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14\">10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>","apa":"Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2015). On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i> (pp. 178–189). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>","short":"M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–189.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2015, series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, title={On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14\">10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2015}, pages={178–189}, collection={Lecture Notes in Computer Science} }","mla":"Drees, Maximilian, et al. “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, 2015, pp. 178–89, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14\">10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14</a>."},"series_title":"Lecture Notes in Computer Science","author":[{"last_name":"Drees","full_name":"Drees, Maximilian","first_name":"Maximilian"},{"orcid":"0000-0003-1348-6516","last_name":"Feldotto","id":"14052","full_name":"Feldotto, Matthias","first_name":"Matthias"},{"first_name":"Sören","full_name":"Riechers, Sören","last_name":"Riechers"},{"id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik","first_name":"Alexander","full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:34Z","_id":"271","file_date_updated":"2018-03-21T09:29:34Z","year":"2015","status":"public","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:45Z"},{"_id":"277","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:44Z","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:46Z","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"type":"bachelorsthesis","year":"2015","status":"public","citation":{"short":"N. Kothe, Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk, Universität Paderborn, 2015.","mla":"Kothe, Nils. <i>Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","bibtex":"@book{Kothe_2015, title={Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kothe, Nils}, year={2015} }","chicago":"Kothe, Nils. <i>Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","ieee":"N. Kothe, <i>Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","apa":"Kothe, N. (2015). <i>Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk</i>. Universität Paderborn.","ama":"Kothe N. <i>Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2015."},"user_id":"14052","department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"title":"Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk","author":[{"full_name":"Kothe, Nils","first_name":"Nils","last_name":"Kothe"}],"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Alexander","full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik"}]},{"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"short":"R. Cohen, G. Polevoy, Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On PP (2015) 1–1.","mla":"Cohen, R., and Gleb Polevoy. “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows.” <i>Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On</i>, vol. PP, no. 99, 2015, pp. 1–1, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964\">10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Cohen_Polevoy_2015, title={Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows}, volume={PP}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964\">10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964</a>}, number={99}, journal={Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on}, author={Cohen, R. and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2015}, pages={1–1} }","chicago":"Cohen, R., and Gleb Polevoy. “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows.” <i>Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On</i> PP, no. 99 (2015): 1–1. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964\">https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964</a>.","ieee":"R. Cohen and G. Polevoy, “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows,” <i>Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on</i>, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2015.","apa":"Cohen, R., &#38; Polevoy, G. (2015). Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows. <i>Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On</i>, <i>PP</i>(99), 1–1. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964\">https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964</a>","ama":"Cohen R, Polevoy G. Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows. <i>Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on</i>. 2015;PP(99):1-1. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964\">10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964</a>"},"author":[{"last_name":"Cohen","full_name":"Cohen, R.","first_name":"R."},{"last_name":"Polevoy","id":"83983","full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb","first_name":"Gleb"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","_id":"17657","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2168-7161"]},"year":"2015","status":"public","date_created":"2020-08-06T15:20:58Z","keyword":["Approximation algorithms","Approximation methods","Bandwidth","Cloud computing","Routing","Schedules","Scheduling"],"user_id":"83983","doi":"10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964","abstract":[{"text":"Inter-datacenter transfers of non-interactive but timely large flows over a private (managed) network is an important problem faced by many cloud service providers. The considered flows are non-interactive because they do not explicitly target the end users. However, most of them must be performed on a timely basis and are associated with a deadline. We propose to schedule these flows by a centralized controller, which determines when to transmit each flow and which path to use. Two scheduling models are presented in this paper. In the first, the controller also determines the rate of each flow, while in the second bandwidth is assigned by the network according to the TCP rules. We develop scheduling algorithms for both models and compare their complexity and performance.","lang":"eng"}],"title":"Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows","extern":"1","issue":"99","page":"1-1","volume":"PP","type":"journal_article","publication":"Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on"},{"intvolume":"       194","author":[{"full_name":"Bar-Yehuda, Reuven","first_name":"Reuven","last_name":"Bar-Yehuda"},{"full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb","first_name":"Gleb","last_name":"Polevoy","id":"83983"},{"last_name":"Rawitz","full_name":"Rawitz, Dror","first_name":"Dror"}],"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"short":"R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, D. Rawitz, Discrete Applied Mathematics  194 (2015) 23–36.","bibtex":"@article{Bar-Yehuda_Polevoy_Rawitz_2015, title={Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences}, volume={194}, DOI={<a href=\"http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013\">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013</a>}, journal={Discrete Applied Mathematics }, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Bar-Yehuda, Reuven and Polevoy, Gleb and Rawitz, Dror}, year={2015}, pages={23–36} }","mla":"Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, et al. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” <i>Discrete Applied Mathematics </i>, vol. 194, Elsevier, 2015, pp. 23–36, doi:<a href=\"http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013\">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013</a>.","ieee":"R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, and D. Rawitz, “Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences,” <i>Discrete Applied Mathematics </i>, vol. 194, pp. 23–36, 2015.","chicago":"Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, Gleb Polevoy, and Dror Rawitz. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” <i>Discrete Applied Mathematics </i> 194 (2015): 23–36. <a href=\"http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013\">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013</a>.","ama":"Bar-Yehuda R, Polevoy G, Rawitz D. Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences. <i>Discrete Applied Mathematics </i>. 2015;194:23-36. doi:<a href=\"http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013\">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013</a>","apa":"Bar-Yehuda, R., Polevoy, G., &#38; Rawitz, D. (2015). Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences. <i>Discrete Applied Mathematics </i>, <i>194</i>, 23–36. <a href=\"http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013\">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013</a>"},"status":"public","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0166-218X"]},"year":"2015","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publisher":"Elsevier","date_created":"2020-08-06T15:21:15Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","_id":"17658","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Abstract We study the problem of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences. In this problem the input consists of a set of users and a set of base stations. Each user has a list of requests, each consisting of a base station, a frequency demand, and a profit that may be gained by scheduling this request. The goal is to find a maximum profit set of user requests S that satisfies the following conditions: (i) S contains at most one request per user, (ii) the frequency sets allotted to requests in S that correspond to the same base station are pairwise non-intersecting, and (iii) the QoS received by any user at any frequency is reasonable according to an interference model. In this paper we consider two variants of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences. In the first each request specifies a demand that can be satisfied by any subset of frequencies that is large enough. In the second each request specifies a specific frequency interval. Furthermore, we consider two interference models, multiplicative and additive. We show that these problems are extremely hard to approximate if the interferences depend on both the interfered and the interfering base stations. On the other hand, we provide constant factor approximation algorithms for both variants of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences for the case where the interferences depend only on the interfering base stations. We also consider a restrictive special case that is closely related to the Knapsack problem. We show that this special case is NP-hard and that it admits an FPTAS. "}],"doi":"http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013","extern":"1","title":"Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences","user_id":"83983","keyword":["Local ratio"],"type":"journal_article","publication":"Discrete Applied Mathematics ","volume":194,"page":"23 - 36"},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2014","status":"public","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:42:04Z","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:59:30Z","_id":"370","file_date_updated":"2018-03-20T07:17:04Z","author":[{"first_name":"Tobias","full_name":"Harks, Tobias","last_name":"Harks"},{"last_name":"Höfer","first_name":"Martin","full_name":"Höfer, Martin"},{"last_name":"Schewior","full_name":"Schewior, Kevin","first_name":"Kevin"},{"id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik","full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","first_name":"Alexander"}],"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"ama":"Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games with Progressive Filling. In: <i>Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i>. ; 2014:352-360. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>","apa":"Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Routing Games with Progressive Filling. In <i>Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i> (pp. 352–360). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>","chicago":"Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing Games with Progressive Filling.” In <i>Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i>, 352–60, 2014. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>.","ieee":"T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games with Progressive Filling,” in <i>Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i>, 2014, pp. 352–360.","mla":"Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games with Progressive Filling.” <i>Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i>, 2014, pp. 352–60, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2014, title={Routing Games with Progressive Filling}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571\">10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)}, author={Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={352–360} }","short":"T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 2014, pp. 352–360."},"type":"conference","publication":"Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'14)","ddc":["040"],"page":"352-360","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints. We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs).We present a variety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived. "}],"has_accepted_license":"1","doi":"10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571","title":"Routing Games with Progressive Filling","file":[{"success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-03-20T07:17:04Z","file_id":"1402","access_level":"closed","content_type":"application/pdf","date_created":"2018-03-20T07:17:04Z","creator":"florida","file_size":179583,"file_name":"370-HHSS14.pdf"}],"user_id":"477"},{"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"mla":"Pahl, David. <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","bibtex":"@book{Pahl_2014, title={Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pahl, David}, year={2014} }","short":"D. Pahl, Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen, Universität Paderborn, 2014.","apa":"Pahl, D. (2014). <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>. Universität Paderborn.","ama":"Pahl D. <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.","chicago":"Pahl, David. <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.","ieee":"D. Pahl, <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014."},"user_id":"14052","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"supervisor":[{"first_name":"Alexander","full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","id":"40384","last_name":"Skopalik"}],"title":"Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen","author":[{"full_name":"Pahl, David","first_name":"David","last_name":"Pahl"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:59:31Z","_id":"373","language":[{"iso":"ger"}],"year":"2014","type":"bachelorsthesis","status":"public","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:42:04Z","publisher":"Universität Paderborn"},{"place":"Richland, SC","extern":"1","author":[{"id":"83983","last_name":"Polevoy","first_name":"Gleb","full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb"},{"first_name":"Stojan","full_name":"Trajanovski, Stojan","last_name":"Trajanovski"},{"last_name":"de Weerdt","full_name":"de Weerdt, Mathijs M.","first_name":"Mathijs M."}],"title":"Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games","department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"keyword":["competition","equilibrium","market","models","shared effort games","simulation"],"user_id":"83983","citation":{"bibtex":"@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={861–868}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }","mla":"Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 861–68.","short":"G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 861–868.","ama":"Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, de Weerdt MM. Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:861-868.","apa":"Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., &#38; de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i> (pp. 861–868). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.","ieee":"G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, and M. M. de Weerdt, “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i>, 2014, pp. 861–868.","chicago":"Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, 861–68. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014."},"series_title":"AAMAS '14","status":"public","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2014","type":"conference","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-4503-2738-1"]},"publisher":"International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems","date_created":"2020-08-06T15:21:26Z","publication":"Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","page":"861-868","_id":"17659"},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","page":"1741-1742","_id":"17660","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-4503-2738-1"]},"year":"2014","type":"conference","status":"public","date_created":"2020-08-06T15:21:35Z","publication":"Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems","publisher":"International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems","department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"citation":{"ama":"Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:1741-1742.","apa":"Polevoy, G., &#38; de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing. In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i> (pp. 1741–1742). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.","chicago":"Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, 1741–42. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.","ieee":"G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i>, 2014, pp. 1741–1742.","mla":"Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing.” <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 1741–42.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={1741–1742}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }","short":"G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1741–1742."},"series_title":"AAMAS '14","keyword":["dynamics","emotion modeling","negotiation","network interaction","shared effort game"],"user_id":"83983","place":"Richland, SC","title":"Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing","extern":"1","author":[{"first_name":"Gleb","full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb","id":"83983","last_name":"Polevoy"},{"full_name":"de Weerdt, Mathijs M.","first_name":"Mathijs M.","last_name":"de Weerdt"}]},{"publisher":"International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems","publication":"Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems","date_created":"2020-08-06T15:21:45Z","status":"public","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-4503-2738-1"]},"type":"conference","year":"2014","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"17661","page":"1651-1652","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","author":[{"last_name":"King","full_name":"King, Thomas C.","first_name":"Thomas C."},{"first_name":"Qingzhi","full_name":"Liu, Qingzhi","last_name":"Liu"},{"full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb","first_name":"Gleb","last_name":"Polevoy","id":"83983"},{"last_name":"de Weerdt","first_name":"Mathijs","full_name":"de Weerdt, Mathijs"},{"first_name":"Virginia","full_name":"Dignum, Virginia","last_name":"Dignum"},{"last_name":"van Riemsdijk","full_name":"van Riemsdijk, M. Birna","first_name":"M. Birna"},{"full_name":"Warnier, Martijn","first_name":"Martijn","last_name":"Warnier"}],"extern":"1","title":"Request Driven Social Sensing","place":"Richland, SC","user_id":"83983","keyword":["crowd-sensing","crowdsourcing","data aggregation","game theory","norms","reciprocation","self interested agents","simulation"],"series_title":"AAMAS '14","citation":{"ieee":"T. C. King <i>et al.</i>, “Request Driven Social Sensing,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i>, 2014, pp. 1651–1652.","chicago":"King, Thomas C., Qingzhi Liu, Gleb Polevoy, Mathijs de Weerdt, Virginia Dignum, M. Birna van Riemsdijk, and Martijn Warnier. “Request Driven Social Sensing.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, 1651–52. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.","ama":"King TC, Liu Q, Polevoy G, et al. Request Driven Social Sensing. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:1651-1652.","apa":"King, T. C., Liu, Q., Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M., Dignum, V., van Riemsdijk, M. B., &#38; Warnier, M. (2014). Request Driven Social Sensing. In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i> (pp. 1651–1652). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.","short":"T.C. King, Q. Liu, G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, V. Dignum, M.B. van Riemsdijk, M. Warnier, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1651–1652.","bibtex":"@inproceedings{King_Liu_Polevoy_de Weerdt_Dignum_van Riemsdijk_Warnier_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Request Driven Social Sensing}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={King, Thomas C. and Liu, Qingzhi and Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Dignum, Virginia and van Riemsdijk, M. Birna and Warnier, Martijn}, year={2014}, pages={1651–1652}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }","mla":"King, Thomas C., et al. “Request Driven Social Sensing.” <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 1651–52."},"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}]},{"author":[{"first_name":"Gleb","full_name":"Polevoy, Gleb","id":"83983","last_name":"Polevoy"},{"first_name":"Rann","full_name":"Smorodinsky, Rann","last_name":"Smorodinsky"},{"first_name":"Moshe","full_name":"Tennenholtz, Moshe","last_name":"Tennenholtz"}],"intvolume":"         2","citation":{"mla":"Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, vol. 2, no. 1, ACM, 2014, pp. 1:1-1:16, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">10.1145/2560766</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Polevoy_Smorodinsky_Tennenholtz_2014, title={Signaling Competition and Social Welfare}, volume={2}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">10.1145/2560766</a>}, number={1}, journal={ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}, publisher={ACM}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}, year={2014}, pages={1:1-1:16} }","short":"G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, M. Tennenholtz, ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2 (2014) 1:1-1:16.","apa":"Polevoy, G., Smorodinsky, R., &#38; Tennenholtz, M. (2014). Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, <i>2</i>(1), 1:1-1:16. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766</a>","ama":"Polevoy G, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M. Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. <i>ACM Trans Econ Comput</i>. 2014;2(1):1:1-1:16. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">10.1145/2560766</a>","chicago":"Polevoy, Gleb, Rann Smorodinsky, and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i> 2, no. 1 (2014): 1:1-1:16. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766\">https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766</a>.","ieee":"G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, and M. Tennenholtz, “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare,” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1:1-1:16, 2014."},"department":[{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"541"}],"publisher":"ACM","date_created":"2020-08-06T15:21:55Z","status":"public","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2014","publication_identifier":{"issn":["2167-8375"]},"_id":"17662","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:53:16Z","extern":"1","title":"Signaling Competition and Social Welfare","doi":"10.1145/2560766","keyword":["Competition","efficiency","equilibrium","market","social welfare"],"user_id":"83983","publication":"ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.","type":"journal_article","volume":2,"page":"1:1-1:16","issue":"1"}]