--- _id: '34040' abstract: - lang: eng text: "Consider the practical goal of making a desired action profile played,\r\n\r\nwhen the planner can only change the payoffs, bound by \r\n\r\nstringent constraints.\r\n\r\nApplications include motivating people\r\n\r\nto choose the closest school, the closest subway station, or to coordinate\r\n\r\non a communication protocol or an investment strategy.\r\n\r\nEmploying subsidies and tolls, we adjust the game so that choosing this predefined action profile\r\n\r\nbecomes strictly dominant. \r\n\r\nInspired mainly by the work of Monderer and Tennenholtz,\r\n\r\nwhere the promised subsidies do not materialise in the not played\r\n\r\nprofiles, we provide a fair and individually rational game\r\n\r\nadjustment, such that the total outside investments sum up\r\n\r\nto zero at any profile, thereby facilitating easy and frequent\r\n\r\nusage of our adjustment without bearing costs, even if some\r\n\r\nplayers behave unexpectedly. The resultant action profile itself needs no\r\n\r\nadjustment. Importantly, we also prove that our adjustment minimises \r\n\r\nthe general transfer among all such adjustments, counting the total subsidising and taxation." author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Marcin full_name: Dziubiński, Marcin last_name: Dziubiński citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, Dziubiński M. Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment. In: De Raedt L, ed. Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization; 2022. doi:10.24963/ijcai.2022/64' apa: Polevoy, G., & Dziubiński, M. (2022). Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment. In L. De Raedt (Ed.), Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Dziubiński_2022, title={Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment}, DOI={10.24963/ijcai.2022/64}, booktitle={Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, publisher={International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Dziubiński, Marcin}, editor={De Raedt, Luc}, year={2022} }' chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and Marcin Dziubiński. “Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment.” In Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, edited by Luc De Raedt. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64. ieee: 'G. Polevoy and M. Dziubiński, “Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment,” in Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Vienna, 2022, doi: 10.24963/ijcai.2022/64.' mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and Marcin Dziubiński. “Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment.” Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, edited by Luc De Raedt, International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022, doi:10.24963/ijcai.2022/64. short: 'G. Polevoy, M. Dziubiński, in: L. De Raedt (Ed.), Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022.' conference: end_date: 2022-07-29 location: Vienna name: THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE start_date: 2022-07-23 date_created: 2022-11-08T16:53:31Z date_updated: 2022-11-08T17:34:36Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.24963/ijcai.2022/64 editor: - first_name: Luc full_name: De Raedt, Luc last_name: De Raedt keyword: - adjustment - strictly dominant - fairness - individually rational - transfer - tax - subsidy language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/64 publication: Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence publication_status: published publisher: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization status: public title: Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2022' ... --- _id: '17667' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Resolving distributed attacks benefits from collaboration between networks. We present three approaches for the same multi-domain defensive action that can be applied in such an alliance: 1) Counteract Everywhere, 2) Minimize Countermeasures, and 3) Minimize Propagation. First, we provide a formula to compute efficiency of a defense; then we use this formula to compute the efficiency of the approaches under various circumstances. Finally, we discuss how task execution order and timing influence defense efficiency. Our results show that the Minimize Propagation approach is the most efficient method when defending against the chosen attack.' author: - first_name: Ralph full_name: Koning, Ralph last_name: Koning - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Lydia full_name: Meijer, Lydia last_name: Meijer - first_name: Cees full_name: de Laat, Cees last_name: de Laat - first_name: Paola full_name: Grosso, Paola last_name: Grosso citation: ama: 'Koning R, Polevoy G, Meijer L, de Laat C, Grosso P. Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments. In: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom). 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom). ; 2019:113-123. doi:10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9' apa: Koning, R., Polevoy, G., Meijer, L., de Laat, C., & Grosso, P. (2019). Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments. In 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom) (pp. 113–123). https://doi.org/10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Koning_Polevoy_Meijer_de Laat_Grosso_2019, series={2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)}, title={Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments}, DOI={10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9}, booktitle={2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)}, author={Koning, Ralph and Polevoy, Gleb and Meijer, Lydia and de Laat, Cees and Grosso, Paola}, year={2019}, pages={113–123}, collection={2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)} }' chicago: Koning, Ralph, Gleb Polevoy, Lydia Meijer, Cees de Laat, and Paola Grosso. “Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments.” In 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom), 113–23. 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9. ieee: R. Koning, G. Polevoy, L. Meijer, C. de Laat, and P. Grosso, “Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments,” in 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom), 2019, pp. 113–123. mla: Koning, Ralph, et al. “Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments.” 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom), 2019, pp. 113–23, doi:10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9. short: 'R. Koning, G. Polevoy, L. Meijer, C. de Laat, P. Grosso, in: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom), 2019, pp. 113–123.' conference: name: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom) date_created: 2020-08-06T15:23:23Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9 extern: '1' keyword: - computer network security - multinetwork environments - multidomain defensive action - task execution order - timing influence defense efficiency - distributed attacks - collaborative security defence approach - minimize propagation approach - minimize countermeasure approach - counteract everywhere approach - Conferences - Cloud computing - Computer crime - Edge computing - Security - Defense Approaches - Multi-Domain Defense - Collaborative Defense - Defense Algorithms - Computer Networks language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8854057/authors#authors page: 113-123 publication: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom) publication_identifier: issn: - 'null' quality_controlled: '1' series_title: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom) status: public title: Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2019' ... --- _id: '8080' abstract: - lang: eng text: This thesis investigates approximate pure Nash equilibria in different game-theoretic models. In such an outcome, no player can improve her objective by more than a given factor through a deviation to another strategy. In the first part, we investigate two variants of Congestion Games in which the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed through a potential function argument. However, the computation of such equilibria might be hard. We construct and analyze approximation algorithms that enable the computation of states with low approximation factors in polynomial time. To show their guarantees we use sub games among players, bound the potential function values of arbitrary states and exploit a connection between Shapley and proportional cost shares. Furthermore, we apply and analyze sampling techniques for the computation of approximate Shapley values in different settings. In the second part, we concentrate on the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in games in which no pure Nash equilibria exist in general. In the model of Coevolving Opinion Formation Games, we bound the approximation guarantees for natural states nearly independent of the specific definition of the players' neighborhoods by applying a concept of virtual costs. For the special case of only one influential neighbor, we even show lower approximation factors for a natural strategy. Then, we investigate a two-sided Facility Location Game among facilities and clients on a line with an objective function consisting of distance and load. We show tight bounds on the approximation factor for settings with three facilities and infinitely many clients. For the general scenario with an arbitrary number of facilities, we bound the approximation factor for two promising candidates, namely facilities that are uniformly distributed and which are paired. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 citation: ama: Feldotto M. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn; 2019. doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-588 apa: Feldotto, M. (2019). Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588 bibtex: '@book{Feldotto_2019, place={Universität Paderborn}, title={Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games}, DOI={10.17619/UNIPB/1-588}, author={Feldotto, Matthias}, year={2019} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn, 2019. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588. ieee: M. Feldotto, Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn, 2019. mla: Feldotto, Matthias. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games. 2019, doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-588. short: M. Feldotto, Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games, Universität Paderborn, 2019. date_created: 2019-02-25T13:03:02Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:50Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' doi: 10.17619/UNIPB/1-588 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: ups date_created: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z date_updated: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z file_id: '8715' file_name: Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games.pdf file_size: 3116177 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: http://digital.ub.uni-paderborn.de/hs/download/pdf/3005508?originalFilename=true place: Universität Paderborn project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games type: dissertation user_id: '15415' year: '2019' ... --- _id: '5471' abstract: - lang: eng text: "We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations that are increasing in the number of units in possession, and the more specific class of valuations that are increasing and submodular. \r\nFurthermore, we present some approximation results about the performance of certain such mechanisms, in terms of social welfare: For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1-e) approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting." author: - first_name: Philip full_name: Lazos, Philip last_name: Lazos - first_name: Paul full_name: Goldberg, Paul last_name: Goldberg - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik - first_name: Matthias full_name: Gerstgrasser, Matthias last_name: Gerstgrasser - first_name: Bart full_name: de Keijzer, Bart last_name: de Keijzer citation: ama: 'Lazos P, Goldberg P, Skopalik A, Gerstgrasser M, de Keijzer B. Multi-unit Bilateral Trade. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). ; 2019. doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973' apa: Lazos, P., Goldberg, P., Skopalik, A., Gerstgrasser, M., & de Keijzer, B. (2019). Multi-unit Bilateral Trade. Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Lazos_Goldberg_Skopalik_Gerstgrasser_de Keijzer_2019, title={ Multi-unit Bilateral Trade}, DOI={10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973}, booktitle={Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)}, author={Lazos, Philip and Goldberg, Paul and Skopalik, Alexander and Gerstgrasser, Matthias and de Keijzer, Bart}, year={2019} }' chicago: Lazos, Philip, Paul Goldberg, Alexander Skopalik, Matthias Gerstgrasser, and Bart de Keijzer. “ Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade.” In Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973. ieee: 'P. Lazos, P. Goldberg, A. Skopalik, M. Gerstgrasser, and B. de Keijzer, “ Multi-unit Bilateral Trade,” presented at the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, 2019, doi: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.' mla: Lazos, Philip, et al. “ Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade.” Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019, doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973. short: 'P. Lazos, P. Goldberg, A. Skopalik, M. Gerstgrasser, B. de Keijzer, in: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019.' conference: end_date: 2019-02-01 location: Honolulu, Hawaii, USA name: Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) start_date: 2019-01-27 date_created: 2018-11-12T09:38:16Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:55Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' doi: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: feldi date_created: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z date_updated: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z file_id: '6018' file_name: 1811.05130.pdf file_size: 315877 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) publication_status: published status: public title: ' Multi-unit Bilateral Trade' type: conference user_id: '15415' year: '2019' ... --- _id: '10281' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Competing firms tend to select similar locations for their stores. This phenomenon, called the principle of minimum differentiation, was captured by Hotelling with a landmark model of spatial competition but is still the object of an ongoing scientific debate. Although consistently observed in practice, many more realistic variants of Hotelling''s model fail to support minimum differentiation or do not have pure equilibria at all. In particular, it was recently proven for a generalized model which incorporates negative network externalities and which contains Hotelling''s model and classical selfish load balancing as special cases, that the unique equilibria do not adhere to minimum differentiation. Furthermore, it was shown that for a significant parameter range pure equilibria do not exist. We derive a sharp contrast to these previous results by investigating Hotelling''s model with negative network externalities from an entirely new angle: approximate pure subgame perfect equilibria. This approach allows us to prove analytically and via agent-based simulations that approximate equilibria having good approximation guarantees and that adhere to minimum differentiation exist for the full parameter range of the model. Moreover, we show that the obtained approximate equilibria have high social welfare.' author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: 'Pascal ' full_name: 'Lenzner, Pascal ' last_name: Lenzner - first_name: Louise full_name: Molitor, Louise last_name: Molitor - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Lenzner P, Molitor L, Skopalik A. From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. In: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2019:1949--1951.' apa: 'Feldotto, M., Lenzner, P., Molitor, L., & Skopalik, A. (2019). From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (pp. 1949--1951). Montreal QC, Canada: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Lenzner_Molitor_Skopalik_2019, title={ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Lenzner, Pascal and Molitor, Louise and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2019}, pages={1949--1951} }' chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, and Alexander Skopalik. “ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.” In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 1949--1951. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019.' ieee: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, and A. Skopalik, “ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation,” in Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, Montreal QC, Canada, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.' mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.” Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.' short: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.' conference: location: Montreal QC, Canada name: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems date_created: 2019-06-20T14:46:08Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:33Z ddc: - '004' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: ups date_created: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z file_id: '12962' file_name: 1903.04265.pdf file_size: 698599 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - url: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3331973 page: 1949--1951 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems publication_status: published publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems status: public title: ' From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation' type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2019' ... --- _id: '2484' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study the classic bin packing problem in a fully-dynamic setting, where new items can arrive and old items may depart. We want algorithms with low asymptotic competitive ratio while repacking items sparingly between updates. Formally, each item i has a movement cost c_i >= 0, and we want to use alpha * OPT bins and incur a movement cost gamma * c_i, either in the worst case, or in an amortized sense, for alpha, gamma as small as possible. We call gamma the recourse of the algorithm. This is motivated by cloud storage applications, where fully-dynamic bin packing models the problem of data backup to minimize the number of disks used, as well as communication incurred in moving file backups between disks. Since the set of files changes over time, we could recompute a solution periodically from scratch, but this would give a high number of disk rewrites, incurring a high energy cost and possible wear and tear of the disks. In this work, we present optimal tradeoffs between number of bins used and number of items repacked, as well as natural extensions of the latter measure. author: - first_name: Björn full_name: Feldkord, Björn id: '22704' last_name: Feldkord - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Anupam full_name: Gupta, Anupam last_name: Gupta - first_name: Guru full_name: Guruganesh, Guru last_name: Guruganesh - first_name: 'Amit ' full_name: 'Kumar, Amit ' last_name: Kumar - first_name: Sören full_name: Riechers, Sören last_name: Riechers - first_name: David full_name: Wajc, David last_name: Wajc citation: ama: 'Feldkord B, Feldotto M, Gupta A, et al. Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking. In: Chatzigiannakis I, Kaklamanis C, Marx D, Sannella D, eds. 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018). Vol 107. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik; 2018:51:1-51:24. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51' apa: 'Feldkord, B., Feldotto, M., Gupta, A., Guruganesh, G., Kumar, A., Riechers, S., & Wajc, D. (2018). Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking. In I. Chatzigiannakis, C. Kaklamanis, D. Marx, & D. Sannella (Eds.), 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018) (Vol. 107, pp. 51:1-51:24). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldkord_Feldotto_Gupta_Guruganesh_Kumar_Riechers_Wajc_2018, place={Dagstuhl, Germany}, series={Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, title={Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking}, volume={107}, DOI={10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51}, booktitle={45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)}, publisher={Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik}, author={Feldkord, Björn and Feldotto, Matthias and Gupta, Anupam and Guruganesh, Guru and Kumar, Amit and Riechers, Sören and Wajc, David}, editor={Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Kaklamanis, Christos and Marx, Dániel and Sannella, DonaldEditors}, year={2018}, pages={51:1-51:24}, collection={Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)} }' chicago: 'Feldkord, Björn, Matthias Feldotto, Anupam Gupta, Guru Guruganesh, Amit Kumar, Sören Riechers, and David Wajc. “Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking.” In 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018), edited by Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, Christos Kaklamanis, Dániel Marx, and Donald Sannella, 107:51:1-51:24. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51.' ieee: B. Feldkord et al., “Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking,” in 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018), Prag, 2018, vol. 107, pp. 51:1-51:24. mla: Feldkord, Björn, et al. “Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking.” 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018), edited by Ioannis Chatzigiannakis et al., vol. 107, Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2018, pp. 51:1-51:24, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51. short: 'B. Feldkord, M. Feldotto, A. Gupta, G. Guruganesh, A. Kumar, S. Riechers, D. Wajc, in: I. Chatzigiannakis, C. Kaklamanis, D. Marx, D. Sannella (Eds.), 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018), Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2018, pp. 51:1-51:24.' conference: end_date: 2018-07-13 location: Prag name: 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018) start_date: 2018-07-10 date_created: 2018-04-24T15:21:56Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:39Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51 editor: - first_name: Ioannis full_name: Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis last_name: Chatzigiannakis - first_name: Christos full_name: Kaklamanis, Christos last_name: Kaklamanis - first_name: Dániel full_name: Marx, Dániel last_name: Marx - first_name: Donald full_name: Sannella, Donald last_name: Sannella external_id: arxiv: - '1711.01231' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: feldi date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:18Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:18Z file_id: '5227' file_name: LIPIcs-ICALP-2018-51.pdf file_size: 723824 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:18Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 107' language: - iso: eng page: 51:1-51:24 place: Dagstuhl, Germany project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '4' name: SFB 901 - Project Area C - _id: '5' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '16' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4 publication: 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018) publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-3-95977-076-7 issn: - 1868-8969 publication_status: published publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik series_title: Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs) status: public title: Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking type: conference user_id: '14052' volume: 107 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '2831' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.' author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Claus-Jochen full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen id: '20801' last_name: Haake - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik - first_name: Nadja full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja id: '13264' last_name: Stroh-Maraun citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Haake C-J, Skopalik A, Stroh-Maraun N. Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018). ; 2018:5:1-5:6. doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659' apa: Feldotto, M., Haake, C.-J., Skopalik, A., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) (pp. 5:1-5:6). Irvine, California, USA. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={10.1145/3230654.3230659}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Claus-Jochen Haake, Alexander Skopalik, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 5:1-5:6, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659. ieee: M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value,” in Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), Irvine, California, USA, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659. short: 'M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.' conference: end_date: 2018-06-18 location: Irvine, California, USA name: The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) start_date: 2018-06-18 date_created: 2018-05-22T10:28:51Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:01Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' - _id: '205' - _id: '475' doi: 10.1145/3230654.3230659 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: nmaraun date_created: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z file_id: '3910' file_name: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf file_size: 1450171 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 5:1-5:6 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publication: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-1-4503-5916-0 publication_status: published status: public title: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2018' ... --- _id: '3851' author: - first_name: Samuel full_name: Koop, Samuel last_name: Koop citation: ama: Koop S. Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität Paderborn; 2018. apa: Koop, S. (2018). Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Koop_2018, title={Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Koop, Samuel}, year={2018} }' chicago: Koop, Samuel. Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität Paderborn, 2018. ieee: S. Koop, Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität Paderborn, 2018. mla: Koop, Samuel. Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität Paderborn, 2018. short: S. Koop, Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien, Universität Paderborn, 2018. date_created: 2018-08-08T11:56:37Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:45Z department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2018' ... --- _id: '17651' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Consider mitigating the effects of denial of service or of malicious traffic in networks by deleting edges. Edge deletion reduces the DoS or the number of the malicious flows, but it also inadvertently removes some of the desired flows. To model this important problem, we formulate two problems: (1) remove all the undesirable flows while minimizing the damage to the desirable ones and (2) balance removing the undesirable flows and not removing too many of the desirable flows. We prove these problems are equivalent to important theoretical problems, thereby being important not only practically but also theoretically, and very hard to approximate in a general network. We employ reductions to nonetheless approximate the problem and also provide a greedy approximation. When the network is a tree, the problems are still MAX SNP-hard, but we provide a greedy-based 2l-approximation algorithm, where l is the longest desirable flow. We also provide an algorithm, approximating the first and the second problem within {\$}{\$}2 {\backslash}sqrt{\{} 2{\backslash}left| E {\backslash}right| {\}}{\$}{\$}and {\$}{\$}2 {\backslash}sqrt{\{}2 ({\backslash}left| E {\backslash}right| + {\backslash}left| {\backslash}text {\{}undesirable flows{\}} {\backslash}right| ){\}}{\$}{\$}, respectively, where E is the set of the edges of the network. We also provide a fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm. Finally, if the tree has a root such that every flow in the tree flows on the path from the root to a leaf, we solve the problem exactly using dynamic programming.' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Stojan full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan last_name: Trajanovski - first_name: Paola full_name: Grosso, Paola last_name: Grosso - first_name: Cees full_name: de Laat, Cees last_name: de Laat citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, Grosso P, de Laat C. Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion. In: Kim D, Uma RN, Zelikovsky A, eds. Combinatorial Optimization and Applications. Cham: Springer International Publishing; 2018:217-232.' apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., Grosso, P., & de Laat, C. (2018). Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion. In D. Kim, R. N. Uma, & A. Zelikovsky (Eds.), Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (pp. 217–232). Cham: Springer International Publishing.' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_Grosso_de Laat_2018, place={Cham}, title={Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion}, booktitle={Combinatorial Optimization and Applications}, publisher={Springer International Publishing}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and Grosso, Paola and de Laat, Cees}, editor={Kim, Donghyun and Uma, R. N. and Zelikovsky, AlexanderEditors}, year={2018}, pages={217–232} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, Paola Grosso, and Cees de Laat. “Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion.” In Combinatorial Optimization and Applications, edited by Donghyun Kim, R. N. Uma, and Alexander Zelikovsky, 217–32. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.' ieee: G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, and C. de Laat, “Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion,” in Combinatorial Optimization and Applications, 2018, pp. 217–232. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion.” Combinatorial Optimization and Applications, edited by Donghyun Kim et al., Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 217–32. short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, C. de Laat, in: D. Kim, R.N. Uma, A. Zelikovsky (Eds.), Combinatorial Optimization and Applications, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2018, pp. 217–232.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:19:36Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' editor: - first_name: Donghyun full_name: Kim, Donghyun last_name: Kim - first_name: R. N. full_name: Uma, R. N. last_name: Uma - first_name: Alexander full_name: Zelikovsky, Alexander last_name: Zelikovsky extern: '1' keyword: - flow - Red-Blue Set Cover - Positive-Negative Partial Set Cover - approximation - tree - MAX SNP-hard - root - leaf - dynamic programming - FPT language: - iso: eng page: 217-232 place: Cham publication: Combinatorial Optimization and Applications publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-3-030-04651-4 publisher: Springer International Publishing status: public title: Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2018' ... --- _id: '17666' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Software Defined Networks (SDN) and Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) provide the basis for autonomous response and mitigation against attacks on networked computer infrastructures. We propose a new framework that uses SDNs and NFV to achieve this goal: Secure Autonomous Response Network (SARNET). In a SARNET, an agent running a control loop constantly assesses the security state of the network by means of observables. The agent reacts to and resolves security problems, while learning from its previous decisions. Two main metrics govern the decision process in a SARNET: impact and efficiency; these metrics can be used to compare and evaluate countermeasures and are the building blocks for self-learning SARNETs that exhibit autonomous response. In this paper we present the software implementation of the SARNET framework, evaluate it in a real-life network and discuss the tradeoffs between parameters used by the SARNET agent and the efficiency of its actions.' author: - first_name: R. full_name: Koning, R. last_name: Koning - first_name: B. full_name: de Graaff, B. last_name: de Graaff - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: R. full_name: Meijer, R. last_name: Meijer - first_name: C. full_name: de Laat, C. last_name: de Laat - first_name: P. full_name: Grosso, P. last_name: Grosso citation: ama: Koning R, de Graaff B, Polevoy G, Meijer R, de Laat C, Grosso P. Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures. Future Generation Computer Systems. 2018. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011 apa: Koning, R., de Graaff, B., Polevoy, G., Meijer, R., de Laat, C., & Grosso, P. (2018). Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures. Future Generation Computer Systems. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011 bibtex: '@article{Koning_de Graaff_Polevoy_Meijer_de Laat_Grosso_2018, title={Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures}, DOI={https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011}, journal={Future Generation Computer Systems}, author={Koning, R. and de Graaff, B. and Polevoy, Gleb and Meijer, R. and de Laat, C. and Grosso, P.}, year={2018} }' chicago: Koning, R., B. de Graaff, Gleb Polevoy, R. Meijer, C. de Laat, and P. Grosso. “Measuring the Efficiency of SDN Mitigations against Attacks on Computer Infrastructures.” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011. ieee: R. Koning, B. de Graaff, G. Polevoy, R. Meijer, C. de Laat, and P. Grosso, “Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures,” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2018. mla: Koning, R., et al. “Measuring the Efficiency of SDN Mitigations against Attacks on Computer Infrastructures.” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2018, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011. short: R. Koning, B. de Graaff, G. Polevoy, R. Meijer, C. de Laat, P. Grosso, Future Generation Computer Systems (2018). date_created: 2020-08-06T15:23:11Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011 extern: '1' keyword: - Software defined networks - Network function virtualization - Cyber attacks - Cyber security - Defense efficiency - Overlay networks language: - iso: eng publication: Future Generation Computer Systems publication_identifier: issn: - 0167-739X status: public title: Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures type: journal_article user_id: '83983' year: '2018' ... --- _id: '669' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games andits bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to modelnetwork scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.We characterize the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergenceof improvement dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of thedecision problem. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approx-imation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Lennart full_name: Leder, Lennart last_name: Leder - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion games with mixed objectives. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018;36(4):1145-1167. doi:10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2018). Congestion games with mixed objectives. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 36(4), 1145–1167. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y bibtex: '@article{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2018, title={Congestion games with mixed objectives}, volume={36}, DOI={10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y}, number={4}, journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2018}, pages={1145–1167} }' chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization 36, no. 4 (2018): 1145–67. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y.' ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion games with mixed objectives,” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1145–1167, 2018. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, vol. 36, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2018, pp. 1145–67, doi:10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y. short: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial Optimization 36 (2018) 1145–1167. date_created: 2017-10-26T14:11:04Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:15Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y external_id: arxiv: - '1607.05143' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: feldi date_created: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z file_id: '5226' file_name: Feldotto2018_Article_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf file_size: 605207 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 36' issue: '4' language: - iso: eng page: 1145-1167 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization publication_identifier: issn: - 1382-6905 - 1573-2886 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Nature status: public title: Congestion games with mixed objectives type: journal_article user_id: '14052' volume: 36 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '1186' author: - first_name: Arne full_name: Kemper, Arne last_name: Kemper citation: ama: Kemper A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions. Universität Paderborn; 2018. apa: Kemper, A. (2018). Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Kemper_2018, title={Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kemper, Arne}, year={2018} }' chicago: Kemper, Arne. Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions. Universität Paderborn, 2018. ieee: A. Kemper, Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions. Universität Paderborn, 2018. mla: Kemper, Arne. Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions. Universität Paderborn, 2018. short: A. Kemper, Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions, Universität Paderborn, 2018. date_created: 2018-03-02T13:47:57Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:11Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions type: mastersthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2018' ... --- _id: '1187' author: - first_name: Marcel full_name: Nachtigall, Marcel last_name: Nachtigall citation: ama: Nachtigall M. Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition Game Model. Universität Paderborn; 2018. apa: Nachtigall, M. (2018). Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition Game Model. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Nachtigall_2018, title={Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition Game Model}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Nachtigall, Marcel}, year={2018} }' chicago: Nachtigall, Marcel. Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition Game Model. Universität Paderborn, 2018. ieee: M. Nachtigall, Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition Game Model. Universität Paderborn, 2018. mla: Nachtigall, Marcel. Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition Game Model. Universität Paderborn, 2018. short: M. Nachtigall, Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition Game Model, Universität Paderborn, 2018. date_created: 2018-03-02T13:49:39Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:11Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition Game Model type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2018' ... --- _id: '1188' author: - first_name: Jérôme full_name: Kempf, Jérôme last_name: Kempf citation: ama: Kempf J. Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions. Universität Paderborn; 2018. apa: Kempf, J. (2018). Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Kempf_2018, title={Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kempf, Jérôme}, year={2018} }' chicago: Kempf, Jérôme. Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions. Universität Paderborn, 2018. ieee: J. Kempf, Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions. Universität Paderborn, 2018. mla: Kempf, Jérôme. Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions. Universität Paderborn, 2018. short: J. Kempf, Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions, Universität Paderborn, 2018. date_created: 2018-03-02T13:51:14Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:11Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2018' ... --- _id: '1369' abstract: - lang: eng text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE) do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual player. author: - first_name: Maximilian full_name: Drees, Maximilian last_name: Drees - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Sören full_name: Riechers, Sören last_name: Riechers - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018. doi:10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7 apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2018). Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7 bibtex: '@article{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2018, title={Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games}, DOI={10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7}, journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2018} }' chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7. ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games,” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018. mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer Nature, 2018, doi:10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7. short: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (2018). date_created: 2018-03-18T11:12:49Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:42Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: feldi date_created: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z file_id: '5225' file_name: Drees2018_Article_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf file_size: 561187 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '4' name: SFB 901 - Project Area C - _id: '16' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4 publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization publication_identifier: issn: - 1382-6905 - 1573-2886 publication_status: epub_ahead publisher: Springer Nature status: public title: Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games type: journal_article user_id: '14052' year: '2018' ... --- _id: '112' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study $L_p$ norms and analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally, we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Lennart full_name: Leder, Lennart last_name: Leder - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Complementarities. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC). LNCS. ; 2017:222--233. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19' apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Congestion Games with Complementarities. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC) (pp. 222--233). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion Games with Complementarities}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={222--233}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion Games with Complementarities.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 222--233. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19. ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Complementarities,” in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Complementarities.” Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19. short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:58Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19 external_id: arxiv: - '1701.07304' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z file_id: '1566' file_name: 112-FeldottoLederSkopalik2017.pdf file_size: 264089 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z has_accepted_license: '1' page: 222--233 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Congestion Games with Complementarities type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '113' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to proportional shares) for distributing the total cost of each resource among its users. We focus on the interesting subclass of such games with polynomial resource cost functions and present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria with a polynomial number of strategy updates. Since computing a single strategy update is hard, we apply sampling techniques which allow us to achieve polynomial running time. The algorithm builds on the algorithmic ideas of [7], however, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithmic result on computation of approximate equilibria using other than proportional shares as player costs in this setting. We present a novel relation that approximates the Shapley value of a player by her proportional share and vice versa. As side results, we upper bound the approximate price of anarchy of such games and significantly improve the best known factor for computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games of [7]. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Martin full_name: Gairing, Martin last_name: Gairing - first_name: Grammateia full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia last_name: Kotsialou - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). ; 2017. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14' apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2017, title={Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander Skopalik. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14. ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games,” in Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14. short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:59Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14 external_id: arxiv: - '1710.01634' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: feldi date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z file_id: '5231' file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_ComputingApproximatePureNashEq.pdf file_size: 279055 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) status: public title: Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '17652' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Stojan full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan last_name: Trajanovski - first_name: Paola full_name: Grosso, Paola last_name: Grosso - first_name: Cees full_name: de Laat, Cees last_name: de Laat citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, Grosso P, de Laat C. Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks. In: Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing; 2017:3-17. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1' apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., Grosso, P., & de Laat, C. (2017). Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks. In Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I (pp. 3–17). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_Grosso_de Laat_2017, place={Cham}, series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, title={Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1}, booktitle={Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I}, publisher={Springer International Publishing}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and Grosso, Paola and de Laat, Cees}, year={2017}, pages={3–17}, collection={Lecture Notes in Computer Science} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, Paola Grosso, and Cees de Laat. “Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks.” In Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, 3–17. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1.' ieee: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, and C. de Laat, “Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks,” in Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, 2017, pp. 3–17.' mla: 'Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks.” Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 3–17, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1.' short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, C. de Laat, in: Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2017, pp. 3–17.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:19:48Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1 extern: '1' keyword: - flow - filter - MMSA - set cover - approximation - local ratio algorithm language: - iso: eng page: 3-17 place: Cham publication: 'Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I' publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-3-319-71150-8 publisher: Springer International Publishing series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science status: public title: Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '17653' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: M.M. full_name: de Weerdt, M.M. last_name: de Weerdt citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Reciprocation Effort Games. In: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer; 2017.' apa: Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2017). Reciprocation Effort Games. In Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Springer. bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2017, series={CCIS}, title={Reciprocation Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, publisher={Springer}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M.}, year={2017}, collection={CCIS} }' chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and M.M. de Weerdt. “Reciprocation Effort Games.” In Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer, 2017. ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Reciprocation Effort Games,” in Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and M. M. de Weerdt. “Reciprocation Effort Games.” Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017. short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:09Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' keyword: - interaction - reciprocation - contribute - shared effort - curbing - convergence - threshold - Nash equilibrium - social welfare - efficiency - price of anarchy - price of stability language: - iso: eng publication: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence publisher: Springer series_title: CCIS status: public title: Reciprocation Effort Games type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '17654' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: M.M. full_name: de Weerdt, M.M. last_name: de Weerdt citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Competition between Cooperative Projects. In: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer; 2017.' apa: Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2017). Competition between Cooperative Projects. In Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Springer. bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2017, series={CCIS}, title={Competition between Cooperative Projects}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, publisher={Springer}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M.}, year={2017}, collection={CCIS} }' chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and M.M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.” In Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer, 2017. ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Competition between Cooperative Projects,” in Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and M. M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.” Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017. short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:19Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' keyword: - agents - projects - contribute - shared effort game - competition - quota - threshold - Nash equilibrium - social welfare - efficiency - price of anarchy - price of stability language: - iso: eng publication: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence publisher: Springer series_title: CCIS status: public title: Competition between Cooperative Projects type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '59' abstract: - lang: eng text: We consider a scheduling problem on $m$ identical processors sharing an arbitrarily divisible resource. In addition to assigning jobs to processors, the scheduler must distribute the resource among the processors (e.g., for three processors in shares of 20\%, 15\%, and 65\%) and adjust this distribution over time. Each job $j$ comes with a size $p_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and a resource requirement $r_j > 0$. Jobs do not benefit when receiving a share larger than $r_j$ of the resource. But providing them with a fraction of the resource requirement causes a linear decrease in the processing efficiency. We seek a (non-preemptive) job and resource assignment minimizing the makespan.Our main result is an efficient approximation algorithm which achieves an approximation ratio of $2 + 1/(m-2)$. It can be improved to an (asymptotic) ratio of $1 + 1/(m-1)$ if all jobs have unit size. Our algorithms also imply new results for a well-known bin packing problem with splittable items and a restricted number of allowed item parts per bin.Based upon the above solution, we also derive an approximation algorithm with similar guarantees for a setting in which we introduce so-called tasks each containing several jobs and where we are interested in the average completion time of tasks (a task is completed when all its jobs are completed). author: - first_name: Peter full_name: Kling, Peter last_name: Kling - first_name: Alexander full_name: Mäcker, Alexander id: '13536' last_name: Mäcker - first_name: Sören full_name: Riechers, Sören last_name: Riechers - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Kling P, Mäcker A, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA). ; 2017:123--132. doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578' apa: 'Kling, P., Mäcker, A., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA) (pp. 123--132). https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Kling_Mäcker_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, title={Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource}, DOI={10.1145/3087556.3087578}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)}, author={Kling, Peter and Mäcker, Alexander and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={123--132} }' chicago: 'Kling, Peter, Alexander Mäcker, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource.” In Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 123--132, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578.' ieee: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource,” in Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132.' mla: 'Kling, Peter, et al. “Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource.” Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132, doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578.' short: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:02Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:46Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1145/3087556.3087578 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z file_id: '1578' file_name: 59-progress.pdf file_size: 784867 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 123--132 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '4' name: SFB 901 - Project Area C - _id: '16' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA) status: public title: 'Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource' type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '66' abstract: - lang: eng text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE) do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual player. author: - first_name: Maximilian full_name: Drees, Maximilian last_name: Drees - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Sören full_name: Riechers, Sören last_name: Riechers - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games. In: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON). LNCS. ; 2017:175--187. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15' apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON) (pp. 175--187). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={175--187}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” In Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 175--187. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15. ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games,” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187. mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15. short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:04Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:13Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: feldi date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z file_id: '5228' file_name: Drees2017_Chapter_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf file_size: 346390 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 175--187 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '16' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '4' name: SFB 901 - Project Area C publication: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '1073' author: - first_name: Simon full_name: Nachtigall, Simon last_name: Nachtigall citation: ama: Nachtigall S. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn; 2017. apa: Nachtigall, S. (2017). Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Nachtigall_2017, title={Sortieren dynamischer Daten}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Nachtigall, Simon}, year={2017} }' chicago: Nachtigall, Simon. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn, 2017. ieee: S. Nachtigall, Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn, 2017. mla: Nachtigall, Simon. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn, 2017. short: S. Nachtigall, Sortieren dynamischer Daten, Universität Paderborn, 2017. date_created: 2017-12-19T09:59:32Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Sortieren dynamischer Daten type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '1074' author: - first_name: Simon full_name: Pukrop, Simon last_name: Pukrop citation: ama: Pukrop S. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn; 2017. apa: Pukrop, S. (2017). Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Pukrop_2017, title={Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pukrop, Simon}, year={2017} }' chicago: Pukrop, Simon. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn, 2017. ieee: S. Pukrop, Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn, 2017. mla: Pukrop, Simon. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn, 2017. short: S. Pukrop, Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games, Universität Paderborn, 2017. date_created: 2017-12-19T10:00:25Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '1080' author: - first_name: Jan full_name: Bürmann, Jan last_name: Bürmann citation: ama: Bürmann J. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty. Universität Paderborn; 2017. apa: Bürmann, J. (2017). Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Bürmann_2017, title={Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Bürmann, Jan}, year={2017} }' chicago: Bürmann, Jan. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty. Universität Paderborn, 2017. ieee: J. Bürmann, Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty. Universität Paderborn, 2017. mla: Bürmann, Jan. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty. Universität Paderborn, 2017. short: J. Bürmann, Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty, Universität Paderborn, 2017. date_created: 2017-12-19T10:07:35Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty type: mastersthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '1081' author: - first_name: Vipin Ravindran full_name: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran last_name: Vijayalakshmi citation: ama: Vijayalakshmi VR. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn; 2017. apa: Vijayalakshmi, V. R. (2017). Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Vijayalakshmi_2017, title={Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran}, year={2017} }' chicago: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017. ieee: V. R. Vijayalakshmi, Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017. mla: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017. short: V.R. Vijayalakshmi, Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation, Universität Paderborn, 2017. date_created: 2017-12-19T10:08:44Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:51Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation type: mastersthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '1094' abstract: - lang: eng text: Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification has the potential to address these problems. However, gamification is hardly used in education, because current approaches to gamification require instructors to engage in the time-consuming preparation of their course contents for use in quizzes, mini-games and the like. Drawing on research on limited attention and present bias, we propose a "lean" approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying learning activities (rather than learning contents) and increasing their salience. In this paper, we present the app StudyNow that implements such a lean gamification approach. With this app, we aim to enable more students and instructors to benefit from the advantages of gamification. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Thomas full_name: John, Thomas id: '3952' last_name: John - first_name: Dennis full_name: Kundisch, Dennis id: '21117' last_name: Kundisch - first_name: Paul full_name: Hemsen, Paul id: '22546' last_name: Hemsen - first_name: Katrin full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin last_name: Klingsieck - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, John T, Kundisch D, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Skopalik A. Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App. In: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST). LNCS. ; 2017:462-467. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32' apa: 'Feldotto, M., John, T., Kundisch, D., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST) (pp. 462–467). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_John_Kundisch_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and John, Thomas and Kundisch, Dennis and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={462–467}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Thomas John, Dennis Kundisch, Paul Hemsen, Katrin Klingsieck, and Alexander Skopalik. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST), 462–67. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.' ieee: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, and A. Skopalik, “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App,” in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST), 2017, pp. 462–467.' mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST), 2017, pp. 462–67, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.' short: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST), 2017, pp. 462–467.' date_created: 2018-01-05T08:37:52Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' - _id: '276' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: feldi date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z file_id: '5230' file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_MakingGamificationEasyForThePr.pdf file_size: 1576363 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 462-467 publication: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST) series_title: LNCS status: public title: 'Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App' type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '1095' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification has the potential to address these problems. However, using gamification currently is rather tedious and time-consuming for instructors because current approaches to gamification require instructors to engage in the time-consuming preparation of course contents (e.g., for quizzes or mini-games). In reply to this issue, we propose a “lean” approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying learning activities rather than learning contents. The learning activities that are gamified in the lean approach can typically be drawn from existing course syllabi (e.g., attend certain lectures, hand in assignments, read book chapters and articles). Hence, compared to existing approaches, lean gamification substantially lowers the time requirements posed on instructors for gamifying a given course. Drawing on research on limited attention and the present bias, we provide the theoretical foundation for the lean gamification approach. In addition, we present a mobile application that implements lean gamification and outline a mixed-methods study that is currently under way for evaluating whether lean gamification does indeed have the potential to increase students’ motivation. We thereby hope to allow more students and instructors to benefit from the advantages of gamification. ' author: - first_name: Thomas full_name: John, Thomas id: '3952' last_name: John - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Paul full_name: Hemsen, Paul id: '22546' last_name: Hemsen - first_name: Katrin full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin last_name: Klingsieck - first_name: Dennis full_name: Kundisch, Dennis id: '21117' last_name: Kundisch - first_name: Mike full_name: Langendorf, Mike last_name: Langendorf citation: ama: 'John T, Feldotto M, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Kundisch D, Langendorf M. Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS). ; 2017:2970-2979.' apa: John, T., Feldotto, M., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., Kundisch, D., & Langendorf, M. (2017). Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) (pp. 2970–2979). bibtex: '@inproceedings{John_Feldotto_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Kundisch_Langendorf_2017, title={Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)}, author={John, Thomas and Feldotto, Matthias and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin and Kundisch, Dennis and Langendorf, Mike}, year={2017}, pages={2970–2979} }' chicago: John, Thomas, Matthias Feldotto, Paul Hemsen, Katrin Klingsieck, Dennis Kundisch, and Mike Langendorf. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.” In Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2970–79, 2017. ieee: T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, and M. Langendorf, “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education,” in Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017, pp. 2970–2979. mla: John, Thomas, et al. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.” Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017, pp. 2970–79. short: 'T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, M. Langendorf, in: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017, pp. 2970–2979.' date_created: 2018-01-05T08:39:41Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' - _id: '178' - _id: '185' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: feldi date_created: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z file_id: '5232' file_name: TOWARDS A LEAN APPROACH TO GAMIFYING EDUCATION.pdf file_size: 485333 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - open_access: '1' url: https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2017_rip/46 oa: '1' page: 2970-2979 publication: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) status: public title: Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2017' ... --- _id: '200' author: - first_name: Maximilian full_name: Drees, Maximilian last_name: Drees citation: ama: Drees M. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games. Universität Paderborn; 2016. apa: Drees, M. (2016). Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Drees_2016, title={Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Drees, Maximilian}, year={2016} }' chicago: Drees, Maximilian. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games. Universität Paderborn, 2016. ieee: M. Drees, Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games. Universität Paderborn, 2016. mla: Drees, Maximilian. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games. Universität Paderborn, 2016. short: M. Drees, Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games, Universität Paderborn, 2016. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:31Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:18Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z date_updated: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z file_id: '1525' file_name: 200-thesis.pdf file_size: 880390 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: Universität Paderborn related_material: link: - relation: confirmation url: https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:466:2-24915 status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games type: dissertation user_id: '15415' year: '2016' ... --- _id: '210' author: - first_name: Lennart full_name: Leder, Lennart last_name: Leder citation: ama: Leder L. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn; 2016. apa: Leder, L. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Leder_2016, title={Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Leder, Lennart}, year={2016} }' chicago: Leder, Lennart. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn, 2016. ieee: L. Leder, Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn, 2016. mla: Leder, Lennart. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn, 2016. short: L. Leder, Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives, Universität Paderborn, 2016. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:33Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:42Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives type: mastersthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2016' ... --- _id: '17655' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: M.M. full_name: de Weerdt, M.M. last_name: de Weerdt - first_name: C.M. full_name: Jonker, C.M. last_name: Jonker citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM, Jonker CM. The Game of Reciprocation Habits. In: Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Vol Volume 285: ECAI 2016. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. ; 2016:417-425. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417' apa: 'Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M. M., & Jonker, C. M. (2016). The Game of Reciprocation Habits. In Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, pp. 417–425). https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_Jonker_2016, series={Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications}, title={The Game of Reciprocation Habits}, volume={Volume 285: ECAI 2016}, DOI={10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M. and Jonker, C.M.}, year={2016}, pages={417–425}, collection={Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, M.M. de Weerdt, and C.M. Jonker. “The Game of Reciprocation Habits.” In Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Volume 285: ECAI 2016:417–25. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, 2016. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417.' ieee: 'G. Polevoy, M. M. de Weerdt, and C. M. Jonker, “The Game of Reciprocation Habits,” in Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016, vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, pp. 417–425.' mla: 'Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “The Game of Reciprocation Habits.” Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, 2016, pp. 417–25, doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417.' short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, C.M. Jonker, in: Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016, pp. 417–425.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:30Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417 extern: '1' keyword: - agents - action - repeated reciprocation - fixed - floating - network - Nash equilibrium - social welfare - price of anarchy - price of stability - convex combination language: - iso: eng page: 417-425 publication: Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence series_title: Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications status: public title: The Game of Reciprocation Habits type: conference user_id: '83983' volume: 'Volume 285: ECAI 2016' year: '2016' ... --- _id: '17656' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Mathijs full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs last_name: de Weerdt - first_name: Catholijn full_name: Jonker, Catholijn last_name: Jonker citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt M, Jonker C. The Convergence of Reciprocation. In: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. AAMAS ’16. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2016:1431-1432.' apa: 'Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M., & Jonker, C. (2016). The Convergence of Reciprocation. In Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 1431–1432). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_Jonker_2016, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’16}, title={The Convergence of Reciprocation}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Jonker, Catholijn}, year={2016}, pages={1431–1432}, collection={AAMAS ’16} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Mathijs de Weerdt, and Catholijn Jonker. “The Convergence of Reciprocation.” In Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 1431–32. AAMAS ’16. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016.' ieee: G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, and C. Jonker, “The Convergence of Reciprocation,” in Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016, pp. 1431–1432. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “The Convergence of Reciprocation.” Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016, pp. 1431–32. short: 'G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, C. Jonker, in: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2016, pp. 1431–1432.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:45Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' keyword: - agent's influence - behavior - convergence - perron-frobenius - reciprocal interaction - repeated reciprocation language: - iso: eng page: 1431-1432 place: Richland, SC publication: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-1-4503-4239-1 publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems series_title: AAMAS '16 status: public title: The Convergence of Reciprocation type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2016' ... --- _id: '209' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Lennart full_name: Leder, Lennart last_name: Leder - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. In: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA). LNCS. ; 2016:655--669. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47' apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA) (pp. 655--669). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={655--669}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 655--669. LNCS, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47. ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives,” in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47. short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:32Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:41Z ddc: - '000' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47 external_id: arxiv: - '1607.05143' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: feldi date_created: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z file_id: '5233' file_name: Feldotto2016_Chapter_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf file_size: 235739 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 655--669 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2016' ... --- _id: '1082' author: - first_name: Tobias full_name: Handirk, Tobias last_name: Handirk citation: ama: Handirk T. Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken. Universität Paderborn; 2016. apa: Handirk, T. (2016). Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Handirk_2016, title={Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Handirk, Tobias}, year={2016} }' chicago: Handirk, Tobias. Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken. Universität Paderborn, 2016. ieee: T. Handirk, Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken. Universität Paderborn, 2016. mla: Handirk, Tobias. Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken. Universität Paderborn, 2016. short: T. Handirk, Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken, Universität Paderborn, 2016. date_created: 2017-12-19T10:10:17Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:51Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2016' ... --- _id: '159' abstract: - lang: eng text: Abstract—Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approachto a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the usersin a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformlyraising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacityconstraints. We consider an extension of these allocations byraising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniformtime-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocationsare used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, whichwe formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present avariety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these gamespossess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation ingeneral is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms forprominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), includingthe case when all users have the same source-destination pair.We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nashand strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players havedifferent or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, weshow that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possibleto design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial resultson polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived. author: - first_name: Tobias full_name: Harks, Tobias last_name: Harks - first_name: Martin full_name: Höfer, Martin last_name: Höfer - first_name: Kevin full_name: Schewior, Kevin last_name: Schewior - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games With Progressive Filling. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 2016;(4):2553-2562. doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571 apa: Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Routing Games With Progressive Filling. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, (4), 2553–2562. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571 bibtex: '@article{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2016, title={Routing Games With Progressive Filling}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571}, number={4}, journal={IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={2553–2562} }' chicago: 'Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no. 4 (2016): 2553–62. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.' ieee: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games With Progressive Filling,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no. 4, pp. 2553–2562, 2016. mla: Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no. 4, IEEE, 2016, pp. 2553–62, doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571. short: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (2016) 2553–2562. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:23Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:40Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z file_id: '1547' file_name: 159-Harks-Hoefer-Schewior-Skopalik2016.pdf file_size: 1655309 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z has_accepted_license: '1' issue: '4' language: - iso: eng page: 2553 - 2562 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking publisher: IEEE status: public title: Routing Games With Progressive Filling type: journal_article user_id: '477' year: '2016' ... --- _id: '149' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'In this paper we consider a strategic variant of the online facility location problem. Given is a graph in which each node serves two roles: it is a strategic client stating requests as well as a potential location for a facility. In each time step one client states a request which induces private costs equal to the distance to the closest facility. Before serving, the clients may collectively decide to open new facilities, sharing the corresponding price. Instead of optimizing the global costs, each client acts selfishly. The prices of new facilities vary between nodes and also change over time, but are always bounded by some fixed value α. Both the requests as well as the facility prices are given by an online sequence and are not known in advance.We characterize the optimal strategies of the clients and analyze their overall performance in comparison to a centralized offline solution. If all players optimize their own competitiveness, the global performance of the system is O(√α⋅α) times worse than the offline optimum. A restriction to a natural subclass of strategies improves this result to O(α). We also show that for fixed facility costs, we can find strategies such that this bound further improves to O(√α).' author: - first_name: Maximilian full_name: Drees, Maximilian last_name: Drees - first_name: Björn full_name: Feldkord, Björn id: '22704' last_name: Feldkord - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Drees M, Feldkord B, Skopalik A. Strategic Online Facility Location. In: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA). LNCS. ; 2016:593--607. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43' apa: Drees, M., Feldkord, B., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Strategic Online Facility Location. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA) (pp. 593--607). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldkord_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Strategic Online Facility Location}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldkord, Björn and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={593--607}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Björn Feldkord, and Alexander Skopalik. “Strategic Online Facility Location.” In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 593--607. LNCS, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43. ieee: M. Drees, B. Feldkord, and A. Skopalik, “Strategic Online Facility Location,” in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607. mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Strategic Online Facility Location.” Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43. short: 'M. Drees, B. Feldkord, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:21Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:10Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z file_id: '1553' file_name: 149-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-319-48749-6_43.pdf file_size: 236253 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 593--607 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '5' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Strategic Online Facility Location type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2016' ... --- _id: '145' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Comparative evaluations of peer-to-peer protocols through simulations are a viable approach to judge the performance and costs of the individual protocols in large-scale networks. In order to support this work, we present the peer-to-peer system simulator PeerfactSim.KOM, which we extended over the last years. PeerfactSim.KOM comes with an extensive layer model to support various facets and protocols of peer-to-peer networking. In this article, we describe PeerfactSim.KOM and show how it can be used for detailed measurements of large-scale peer-to-peer networks. We enhanced PeerfactSim.KOM with a fine-grained analyzer concept, with exhaustive automated measurements and gnuplot generators as well as a coordination control to evaluate sets of experiment setups in parallel. Thus, by configuring all experiments and protocols only once and starting the simulator, all desired measurements are performed, analyzed, evaluated, and combined, resulting in a holistic environment for the comparative evaluation of peer-to-peer systems. An immediate comparison of different configurations and overlays under different aspects is possible directly after the execution without any manual post-processing. ' author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Kalman full_name: Graffi, Kalman last_name: Graffi citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Graffi K. Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience. 2016;28(5):1655-1677. doi:10.1002/cpe.3716' apa: 'Feldotto, M., & Graffi, K. (2016). Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 28(5), 1655–1677. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716' bibtex: '@article{Feldotto_Graffi_2016, title={Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM}, volume={28}, DOI={10.1002/cpe.3716}, number={5}, journal={Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience}, publisher={Wiley Online Library}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Graffi, Kalman}, year={2016}, pages={1655–1677} }' chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience 28, no. 5 (2016): 1655–77. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716.' ieee: 'M. Feldotto and K. Graffi, “Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM,” Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 1655–1677, 2016.' mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, vol. 28, no. 5, Wiley Online Library, 2016, pp. 1655–77, doi:10.1002/cpe.3716.' short: 'M. Feldotto, K. Graffi, Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience 28 (2016) 1655–1677.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:00Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '79' - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1002/cpe.3716 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z file_id: '1556' file_name: 145-Feldotto_et_al-2016-Concurrency_and_Computation-_Practice_and_Experience.pdf file_size: 3121363 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 28' issue: '5' page: 1655-1677 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '5' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: 'Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience' publication_status: published publisher: Wiley Online Library status: public title: Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM type: journal_article user_id: '14052' volume: 28 year: '2016' ... --- _id: '251' author: - first_name: Karlson full_name: Pfannschmidt, Karlson last_name: Pfannschmidt citation: ama: Pfannschmidt K. Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem. Universität Paderborn; 2015. apa: Pfannschmidt, K. (2015). Solving the aggregated bandits problem. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Pfannschmidt_2015, title={Solving the aggregated bandits problem}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pfannschmidt, Karlson}, year={2015} }' chicago: Pfannschmidt, Karlson. Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem. Universität Paderborn, 2015. ieee: K. Pfannschmidt, Solving the aggregated bandits problem. Universität Paderborn, 2015. mla: Pfannschmidt, Karlson. Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem. Universität Paderborn, 2015. short: K. Pfannschmidt, Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem, Universität Paderborn, 2015. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:41Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:50Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Solving the aggregated bandits problem type: mastersthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2015' ... --- _id: '320' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by a potential function argument. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing pure Nash equilibria in such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players have unit weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic) latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts. A ρ--approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a state of a (weighted congestion) game from which no player has any incentive to deviate in order to improve her cost by a multiplicative factor higher than ρ. Do such equilibria exist for small values of ρ? And if so, can we compute them efficiently?We provide positive answers to both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions by exploiting an “approximation” of such games by a new class of potential games that we call Ψ-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!-approximate pure Nash equilibria, where d is the maximum degree of the latency functions. Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate pure Nash equilibria when d is a constant. For games with linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee is 3+√5/2 + Oγ for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for latency functions with maximum degree d≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d). The running time is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ. As a byproduct of our techniques, we also show the following interesting structural statement for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state to a dO(d2)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified in such games as long as d is a constant.To the best of our knowledge, these are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. Our techniques significantly extend our recent work on unweighted congestion games through the use of Ψ-games. The concept of approximating nonpotential games by potential ones is interesting in itself and might have further applications.' article_number: '2' author: - first_name: Ioannis full_name: Caragiannis, Ioannis last_name: Caragiannis - first_name: Angelo full_name: Fanelli, Angelo last_name: Fanelli - first_name: Nick full_name: Gravin, Nick last_name: Gravin - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Caragiannis I, Fanelli A, Gravin N, Skopalik A. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure. Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2015;3(1). doi:10.1145/2614687' apa: 'Caragiannis, I., Fanelli, A., Gravin, N., & Skopalik, A. (2015). Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure. Transactions on Economics and Computation, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687' bibtex: '@article{Caragiannis_Fanelli_Gravin_Skopalik_2015, title={Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure}, volume={3}, DOI={10.1145/2614687}, number={12}, journal={Transactions on Economics and Computation}, publisher={ACM}, author={Caragiannis, Ioannis and Fanelli, Angelo and Gravin, Nick and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2015} }' chicago: 'Caragiannis, Ioannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.” Transactions on Economics and Computation 3, no. 1 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687.' ieee: 'I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure,” Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 3, no. 1, 2015.' mla: 'Caragiannis, Ioannis, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.” Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 3, no. 1, 2, ACM, 2015, doi:10.1145/2614687.' short: I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik, Transactions on Economics and Computation 3 (2015). date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:54Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:04Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1145/2614687 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z file_id: '1433' file_name: 320-a2-caragiannis.pdf file_size: 260503 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 3' issue: '1' language: - iso: eng project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Transactions on Economics and Computation publisher: ACM status: public title: 'Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure' type: journal_article user_id: '477' volume: 3 year: '2015' ... --- _id: '316' author: - first_name: Jannis full_name: Pautz, Jannis last_name: Pautz citation: ama: Pautz J. Budget Games with Priced Strategies. Universität Paderborn; 2015. apa: Pautz, J. (2015). Budget Games with priced strategies. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Pautz_2015, title={Budget Games with priced strategies}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pautz, Jannis}, year={2015} }' chicago: Pautz, Jannis. Budget Games with Priced Strategies. Universität Paderborn, 2015. ieee: J. Pautz, Budget Games with priced strategies. Universität Paderborn, 2015. mla: Pautz, Jannis. Budget Games with Priced Strategies. Universität Paderborn, 2015. short: J. Pautz, Budget Games with Priced Strategies, Universität Paderborn, 2015. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:53Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:01Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Budget Games with priced strategies type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2015' ... --- _id: '271' abstract: - lang: eng text: In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor $\alpha$ through unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold $\alpha_\delta$ (where $\delta$ is a parameter that limits the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that $\alpha$-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist for $\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta$, but not for $\alpha < \alpha_\delta$. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold $\alpha_\delta$ and show that the corresponding decision problem is ${\sf NP}$-hard. We also show that the $\alpha$-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is $\alpha+1$. For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close to the optimum. author: - first_name: Maximilian full_name: Drees, Maximilian last_name: Drees - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Sören full_name: Riechers, Sören last_name: Riechers - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. In: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). Lecture Notes in Computer Science. ; 2015:178-189. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14' apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2015). On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (pp. 178–189). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2015, series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, title={On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2015}, pages={178–189}, collection={Lecture Notes in Computer Science} }' chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.” In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 178–89. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14. ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games,” in Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–189. mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.” Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–89, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14. short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–189.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:45Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:34Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14 external_id: arxiv: - '1507.02908' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z file_id: '1475' file_name: 271-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-662-48433-3_14.pdf file_size: 256718 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z has_accepted_license: '1' page: 178-189 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '16' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '4' name: SFB 901 - Project Area C publication: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science status: public title: On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2015' ... --- _id: '277' author: - first_name: Nils full_name: Kothe, Nils last_name: Kothe citation: ama: Kothe N. Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn; 2015. apa: Kothe, N. (2015). Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Kothe_2015, title={Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kothe, Nils}, year={2015} }' chicago: Kothe, Nils. Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn, 2015. ieee: N. Kothe, Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn, 2015. mla: Kothe, Nils. Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn, 2015. short: N. Kothe, Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk, Universität Paderborn, 2015. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:46Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:44Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2015' ... --- _id: '17657' abstract: - lang: eng text: Inter-datacenter transfers of non-interactive but timely large flows over a private (managed) network is an important problem faced by many cloud service providers. The considered flows are non-interactive because they do not explicitly target the end users. However, most of them must be performed on a timely basis and are associated with a deadline. We propose to schedule these flows by a centralized controller, which determines when to transmit each flow and which path to use. Two scheduling models are presented in this paper. In the first, the controller also determines the rate of each flow, while in the second bandwidth is assigned by the network according to the TCP rules. We develop scheduling algorithms for both models and compare their complexity and performance. author: - first_name: R. full_name: Cohen, R. last_name: Cohen - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy citation: ama: Cohen R, Polevoy G. Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows. Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on. 2015;PP(99):1-1. doi:10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964 apa: Cohen, R., & Polevoy, G. (2015). Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows. Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On, PP(99), 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964 bibtex: '@article{Cohen_Polevoy_2015, title={Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows}, volume={PP}, DOI={10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964}, number={99}, journal={Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on}, author={Cohen, R. and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2015}, pages={1–1} }' chicago: 'Cohen, R., and Gleb Polevoy. “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows.” Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On PP, no. 99 (2015): 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964.' ieee: R. Cohen and G. Polevoy, “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows,” Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2015. mla: Cohen, R., and Gleb Polevoy. “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows.” Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On, vol. PP, no. 99, 2015, pp. 1–1, doi:10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964. short: R. Cohen, G. Polevoy, Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On PP (2015) 1–1. date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:58Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964 extern: '1' issue: '99' keyword: - Approximation algorithms - Approximation methods - Bandwidth - Cloud computing - Routing - Schedules - Scheduling language: - iso: eng page: 1-1 publication: Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on publication_identifier: issn: - 2168-7161 status: public title: Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows type: journal_article user_id: '83983' volume: PP year: '2015' ... --- _id: '17658' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Abstract We study the problem of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences. In this problem the input consists of a set of users and a set of base stations. Each user has a list of requests, each consisting of a base station, a frequency demand, and a profit that may be gained by scheduling this request. The goal is to find a maximum profit set of user requests S that satisfies the following conditions: (i) S contains at most one request per user, (ii) the frequency sets allotted to requests in S that correspond to the same base station are pairwise non-intersecting, and (iii) the QoS received by any user at any frequency is reasonable according to an interference model. In this paper we consider two variants of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences. In the first each request specifies a demand that can be satisfied by any subset of frequencies that is large enough. In the second each request specifies a specific frequency interval. Furthermore, we consider two interference models, multiplicative and additive. We show that these problems are extremely hard to approximate if the interferences depend on both the interfered and the interfering base stations. On the other hand, we provide constant factor approximation algorithms for both variants of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences for the case where the interferences depend only on the interfering base stations. We also consider a restrictive special case that is closely related to the Knapsack problem. We show that this special case is NP-hard and that it admits an FPTAS. ' author: - first_name: Reuven full_name: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven last_name: Bar-Yehuda - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Dror full_name: Rawitz, Dror last_name: Rawitz citation: ama: Bar-Yehuda R, Polevoy G, Rawitz D. Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences. Discrete Applied Mathematics . 2015;194:23-36. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013 apa: Bar-Yehuda, R., Polevoy, G., & Rawitz, D. (2015). Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences. Discrete Applied Mathematics , 194, 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013 bibtex: '@article{Bar-Yehuda_Polevoy_Rawitz_2015, title={Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences}, volume={194}, DOI={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013}, journal={Discrete Applied Mathematics }, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Bar-Yehuda, Reuven and Polevoy, Gleb and Rawitz, Dror}, year={2015}, pages={23–36} }' chicago: 'Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, Gleb Polevoy, and Dror Rawitz. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” Discrete Applied Mathematics 194 (2015): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013.' ieee: R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, and D. Rawitz, “Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences,” Discrete Applied Mathematics , vol. 194, pp. 23–36, 2015. mla: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, et al. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” Discrete Applied Mathematics , vol. 194, Elsevier, 2015, pp. 23–36, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013. short: R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, D. Rawitz, Discrete Applied Mathematics 194 (2015) 23–36. date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:15Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013 extern: '1' intvolume: ' 194' keyword: - Local ratio language: - iso: eng page: 23 - 36 publication: 'Discrete Applied Mathematics ' publication_identifier: issn: - 0166-218X publisher: Elsevier status: public title: Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences type: journal_article user_id: '83983' volume: 194 year: '2015' ... --- _id: '370' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints. We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs).We present a variety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived. ' author: - first_name: Tobias full_name: Harks, Tobias last_name: Harks - first_name: Martin full_name: Höfer, Martin last_name: Höfer - first_name: Kevin full_name: Schewior, Kevin last_name: Schewior - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games with Progressive Filling. In: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14). ; 2014:352-360. doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571' apa: Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Routing Games with Progressive Filling. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14) (pp. 352–360). https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2014, title={Routing Games with Progressive Filling}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)}, author={Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={352–360} }' chicago: Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing Games with Progressive Filling.” In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 352–60, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571. ieee: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games with Progressive Filling,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 2014, pp. 352–360. mla: Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games with Progressive Filling.” Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 2014, pp. 352–60, doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571. short: 'T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 2014, pp. 352–360.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:04Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:30Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z file_id: '1402' file_name: 370-HHSS14.pdf file_size: 179583 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 352-360 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'14) status: public title: Routing Games with Progressive Filling type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '373' author: - first_name: David full_name: Pahl, David last_name: Pahl citation: ama: Pahl D. Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn; 2014. apa: Pahl, D. (2014). Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Pahl_2014, title={Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pahl, David}, year={2014} }' chicago: Pahl, David. Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn, 2014. ieee: D. Pahl, Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn, 2014. mla: Pahl, David. Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn, 2014. short: D. Pahl, Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen, Universität Paderborn, 2014. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:04Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:31Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17659' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Stojan full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan last_name: Trajanovski - first_name: Mathijs M. full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs M. last_name: de Weerdt citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, de Weerdt MM. Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:861-868.' apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (pp. 861–868). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={861–868}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 861–68. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.' ieee: G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, and M. M. de Weerdt, “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games,” in Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, 2014, pp. 861–868. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 861–68. short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 861–868.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:26Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' keyword: - competition - equilibrium - market - models - shared effort games - simulation language: - iso: eng page: 861-868 place: Richland, SC publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-1-4503-2738-1 publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems series_title: AAMAS '14 status: public title: Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17660' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Mathijs M. full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs M. last_name: de Weerdt citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing. In: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:1741-1742.' apa: 'Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing. In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (pp. 1741–1742). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={1741–1742}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing.” In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 1741–42. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.' ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing,” in Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, 2014, pp. 1741–1742. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing.” Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 1741–42. short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1741–1742.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:35Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' keyword: - dynamics - emotion modeling - negotiation - network interaction - shared effort game language: - iso: eng page: 1741-1742 place: Richland, SC publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-1-4503-2738-1 publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems series_title: AAMAS '14 status: public title: Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17661' author: - first_name: Thomas C. full_name: King, Thomas C. last_name: King - first_name: Qingzhi full_name: Liu, Qingzhi last_name: Liu - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Mathijs full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs last_name: de Weerdt - first_name: Virginia full_name: Dignum, Virginia last_name: Dignum - first_name: M. Birna full_name: van Riemsdijk, M. Birna last_name: van Riemsdijk - first_name: Martijn full_name: Warnier, Martijn last_name: Warnier citation: ama: 'King TC, Liu Q, Polevoy G, et al. Request Driven Social Sensing. In: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:1651-1652.' apa: 'King, T. C., Liu, Q., Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M., Dignum, V., van Riemsdijk, M. B., & Warnier, M. (2014). Request Driven Social Sensing. In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (pp. 1651–1652). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.' bibtex: '@inproceedings{King_Liu_Polevoy_de Weerdt_Dignum_van Riemsdijk_Warnier_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Request Driven Social Sensing}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={King, Thomas C. and Liu, Qingzhi and Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Dignum, Virginia and van Riemsdijk, M. Birna and Warnier, Martijn}, year={2014}, pages={1651–1652}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }' chicago: 'King, Thomas C., Qingzhi Liu, Gleb Polevoy, Mathijs de Weerdt, Virginia Dignum, M. Birna van Riemsdijk, and Martijn Warnier. “Request Driven Social Sensing.” In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 1651–52. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.' ieee: T. C. King et al., “Request Driven Social Sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, 2014, pp. 1651–1652. mla: King, Thomas C., et al. “Request Driven Social Sensing.” Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 1651–52. short: 'T.C. King, Q. Liu, G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, V. Dignum, M.B. van Riemsdijk, M. Warnier, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1651–1652.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:45Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' keyword: - crowd-sensing - crowdsourcing - data aggregation - game theory - norms - reciprocation - self interested agents - simulation language: - iso: eng page: 1651-1652 place: Richland, SC publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-1-4503-2738-1 publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems series_title: AAMAS '14 status: public title: Request Driven Social Sensing type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17662' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Rann full_name: Smorodinsky, Rann last_name: Smorodinsky - first_name: Moshe full_name: Tennenholtz, Moshe last_name: Tennenholtz citation: ama: Polevoy G, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M. Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. ACM Trans Econ Comput. 2014;2(1):1:1-1:16. doi:10.1145/2560766 apa: Polevoy, G., Smorodinsky, R., & Tennenholtz, M. (2014). Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., 2(1), 1:1-1:16. https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766 bibtex: '@article{Polevoy_Smorodinsky_Tennenholtz_2014, title={Signaling Competition and Social Welfare}, volume={2}, DOI={10.1145/2560766}, number={1}, journal={ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}, publisher={ACM}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}, year={2014}, pages={1:1-1:16} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Rann Smorodinsky, and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2, no. 1 (2014): 1:1-1:16. https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766.' ieee: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, and M. Tennenholtz, “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare,” ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1:1-1:16, 2014. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., vol. 2, no. 1, ACM, 2014, pp. 1:1-1:16, doi:10.1145/2560766. short: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, M. Tennenholtz, ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2 (2014) 1:1-1:16. date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:55Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1145/2560766 extern: '1' intvolume: ' 2' issue: '1' keyword: - Competition - efficiency - equilibrium - market - social welfare language: - iso: eng page: 1:1-1:16 publication: ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. publication_identifier: issn: - 2167-8375 publisher: ACM status: public title: Signaling Competition and Social Welfare type: journal_article user_id: '83983' volume: 2 year: '2014' ... --- _id: '451' abstract: - lang: eng text: We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria are analysed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence towards an equilibrium may be exponential. author: - first_name: Maximilian full_name: Drees, Maximilian last_name: Drees - first_name: Sören full_name: Riechers, Sören last_name: Riechers - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Drees M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions. In: Lavi R, ed. Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). Lecture Notes in Computer Science. ; 2014:110-121. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10' apa: Drees, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions. In R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (pp. 110–121). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Riechers_Skopalik_2014, series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, title={Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={110–121}, collection={Lecture Notes in Computer Science} }' chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions.” In Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 110–21. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10. ieee: M. Drees, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, pp. 110–121. mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions.” Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, pp. 110–21, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10. short: 'M. Drees, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, pp. 110–121.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:07Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10 editor: - first_name: Ron full_name: Lavi, Ron last_name: Lavi file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z file_id: '1344' file_name: 451-DRS14.pdf file_size: 283266 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 110-121 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '14' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C2 - _id: '16' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '4' name: SFB 901 - Project Area C publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science status: public title: Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '452' abstract: - lang: eng text: Today's networks, like the Internet, do not consist of one but a mixture of several interconnected networks. Each has individual qualities and hence the performance of a network node results from the networks' interplay.We introduce a new game theoretic model capturing the interplay between a high-speed backbone network and a low-speed general purpose network. In our model, n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway node. A gateway node pays a fixed price for its connection to the high-speed network, but can utilize the high-speed network to gain communication distance 0 to all other gateways. Communication distances in the low-speed network are given by the hop distances. The effective communication distance between any two nodes then is given by the shortest path, which is possibly improved by using gateways as shortcuts.Every node v has the objective to minimize its communication costs, given by the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of the effective communication distances from v to all other nodes plus a fixed price \alpha > 0, if it decides to be a gateway. For both games and different ranges of \alpha, we study the existence of equilibria, the price of anarchy, and convergence properties of best-response dynamics. author: - first_name: Sebastian full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian last_name: Abshoff - first_name: Andreas full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas last_name: Cord-Landwehr - first_name: Daniel full_name: Jung, Daniel id: '37827' last_name: Jung - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games. In: Lavi R, ed. Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). LNCS. ; 2014:294.' apa: 'Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games. In R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (p. 294).' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}, editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={294}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander Skopalik. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games.” In Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 294. LNCS, 2014.' ieee: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p. 294.' mla: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games.” Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, p. 294.' short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p. 294.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:08Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' editor: - first_name: Ron full_name: Lavi, Ron last_name: Lavi file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z file_id: '1343' file_name: 452-title_multilevel-sagt.pdf file_size: 84783 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: '294' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '5' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) series_title: LNCS status: public title: 'Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games' type: conference user_id: '15415' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '453' abstract: - lang: eng text: In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions. For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides the first guarantees for general latency functions. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Martin full_name: Gairing, Martin last_name: Gairing - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Skopalik A. Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:30-43. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3' apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (pp. 30–43). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={30–43}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, and Alexander Skopalik. “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 30–43. LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3. ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, and A. Skopalik, “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria,” in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.” Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3. short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z file_id: '1342' file_name: 453-WINE14FGS.pdf file_size: 324307 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z has_accepted_license: '1' page: 30-43 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '455' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games and develop techniques to obtain approximate potential functions that prove the existence of alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria and the convergence of alpha-improvement steps. Specifically, we show how to obtain upper bounds for approximation factor alpha for a given class of cost functions. For example for concave cost functions the factor is at most 3/2, for quadratic cost functions it is at most 4/3, and for polynomial cost functions of maximal degree d it is at at most d + 1. For games with two players we obtain tight bounds which are as small as for example 1.054 in the case of quadratic cost functions. author: - first_name: Christoph full_name: Hansknecht, Christoph last_name: Hansknecht - first_name: Max full_name: Klimm, Max last_name: Klimm - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Hansknecht C, Klimm M, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. In: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX). LIPIcs. ; 2014:242-257. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242' apa: Hansknecht, C., Klimm, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. In Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX) (pp. 242–257). https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Hansknecht_Klimm_Skopalik_2014, series={LIPIcs}, title={Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games}, DOI={10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)}, author={Hansknecht, Christoph and Klimm, Max and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={242–257}, collection={LIPIcs} }' chicago: Hansknecht, Christoph, Max Klimm, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 242–57. LIPIcs, 2014. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242. ieee: C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games,” in Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 2014, pp. 242–257. mla: Hansknecht, Christoph, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 2014, pp. 242–57, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242. short: 'C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 2014, pp. 242–257.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z file_id: '1341' file_name: 455-HKS14.pdf file_size: 512712 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 242 - 257 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX) series_title: LIPIcs status: public title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '456' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19]. author: - first_name: Martin full_name: Gairing, Martin last_name: Gairing - first_name: Grammateia full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia last_name: Kotsialou - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:480-485. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43' apa: Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (pp. 480–485). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}, author={Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={480–485}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Gairing, Martin, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 480–85. LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43. ieee: M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games,” in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–485. mla: Gairing, Martin, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–85, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43. short: 'M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–485.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:21Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:10Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z file_id: '1340' file_name: 456-WINE14final.pdf file_size: 377378 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 480 - 485 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '462' abstract: - lang: eng text: We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Skopalik A. A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games. In: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014). ; 2014:625-630. doi:10.5220/0005110406250630' apa: Feldotto, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014) (pp. 625–630). https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Skopalik_2014, title={A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}, DOI={10.5220/0005110406250630}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={625–630} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014), 625–30, 2014. https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630. ieee: M. Feldotto and A. Skopalik, “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games,” in Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014), 2014, pp. 625–630. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014), 2014, pp. 625–30, doi:10.5220/0005110406250630. short: 'M. Feldotto, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014), 2014, pp. 625–630.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:22Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:15Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.5220/0005110406250630 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z file_id: '1337' file_name: 462-FS2014SIMULTECH.pdf file_size: 993721 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z has_accepted_license: '1' page: 625-630 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 publication: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014) status: public title: A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '395' abstract: - lang: eng text: We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game) ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1)) the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game, weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1. Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that it is not weakly acyclic. author: - first_name: Sebastian full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian last_name: Abshoff - first_name: Andreas full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas last_name: Cord-Landwehr - first_name: Daniel full_name: Jung, Daniel id: '37827' last_name: Jung - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Multilevel Network Games. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:435-440. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36' apa: Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Multilevel Network Games. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (pp. 435–440). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Multilevel Network Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}, author={Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={435–440}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander Skopalik. “Multilevel Network Games.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 435–40. LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36. ieee: S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Multilevel Network Games,” in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 435–440. mla: Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Multilevel Network Games.” Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 435–40, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36. short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 435–440.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:09Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:59Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z file_id: '1382' file_name: 395-WINE2014ACJS.pdf file_size: 161479 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 435-440 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '5' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Multilevel Network Games type: conference user_id: '15415' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '412' abstract: - lang: eng text: In this paper we present and analyze HSkip+, a self-stabilizing overlay network for nodes with arbitrary heterogeneous bandwidths. HSkip+ has the same topology as the Skip+ graph proposed by Jacob et al. [PODC 2009] but its self-stabilization mechanism significantly outperforms the self-stabilization mechanism proposed for Skip+. Also, the nodes are now ordered according to their bandwidths and not according to their identifiers. Various other solutions have already been proposed for overlay networks with heterogeneous bandwidths, but they are not self-stabilizing. In addition to HSkip+ being self-stabilizing, its performance is on par with the best previous bounds on the time and work for joining or leaving a network of peers of logarithmic diameter and degree and arbitrary bandwidths. Also, the dilation and congestion for routing messages is on par with the best previous bounds for such networks, so that HSkip+ combines the advantages of both worlds. Our theoretical investigations are backed by simulations demonstrating that HSkip+ is indeed performing much better than Skip+ and working correctly under high churn rates. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Christian full_name: Scheideler, Christian id: '20792' last_name: Scheideler - first_name: Kalman full_name: Graffi, Kalman last_name: Graffi citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Scheideler C, Graffi K. HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths. In: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P). ; 2014:1-10. doi:10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300' apa: 'Feldotto, M., Scheideler, C., & Graffi, K. (2014). HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P) (pp. 1–10). https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Scheideler_Graffi_2014, title={HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths}, DOI={10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Scheideler, Christian and Graffi, Kalman}, year={2014}, pages={1–10} }' chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Christian Scheideler, and Kalman Graffi. “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths.” In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 1–10, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300.' ieee: 'M. Feldotto, C. Scheideler, and K. Graffi, “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths,” in Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10.' mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths.” Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10, doi:10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300.' short: 'M. Feldotto, C. Scheideler, K. Graffi, in: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:12Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:20Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '79' - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300 external_id: arxiv: - '1408.0395' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z file_id: '1361' file_name: 412-FSG2014P2P.pdf file_size: 472321 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z has_accepted_license: '1' page: 1-10 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '5' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1 publication: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P) status: public title: 'HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths' type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17663' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'In this paper, we define and study a new problem, referred to as the Dependent Unsplittable Flow Problem (D-UFP). We present and discuss this problem in the context of large-scale powerful (radar/camera) sensor networks, but we believe it has important applications on the admission of large flows in other networks as well. In order to optimize the selection of flows transmitted to the gateway, D-UFP takes into account possible dependencies between flows. We show that D-UFP is more difficult than NP-hard problems for which no good approximation is known. Then, we address two special cases of this problem: the case where all the sensors have a shared channel and the case where the sensors form a mesh and route to the gateway over a spanning tree.' author: - first_name: R. full_name: Cohen, R. last_name: Cohen - first_name: I. full_name: Nudelman, I. last_name: Nudelman - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy citation: ama: Cohen R, Nudelman I, Polevoy G. On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on. 2013;21(5):1461-1471. doi:10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792 apa: Cohen, R., Nudelman, I., & Polevoy, G. (2013). On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On, 21(5), 1461–1471. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792 bibtex: '@article{Cohen_Nudelman_Polevoy_2013, title={On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks}, volume={21}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792}, number={5}, journal={Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on}, author={Cohen, R. and Nudelman, I. and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2013}, pages={1461–1471} }' chicago: 'Cohen, R., I. Nudelman, and Gleb Polevoy. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On 21, no. 5 (2013): 1461–71. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792.' ieee: R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, and G. Polevoy, “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks,” Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 1461–1471, 2013. mla: Cohen, R., et al. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On, vol. 21, no. 5, 2013, pp. 1461–71, doi:10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792. short: R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, G. Polevoy, Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On 21 (2013) 1461–1471. date_created: 2020-08-06T15:22:05Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792 extern: '1' intvolume: ' 21' issue: '5' keyword: - Approximation algorithms - Approximation methods - Bandwidth - Logic gates - Radar - Vectors - Wireless sensor networks - Dependent flow scheduling - sensor networks language: - iso: eng page: 1461-1471 publication: Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on publication_identifier: issn: - 1063-6692 status: public title: On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks type: journal_article user_id: '83983' volume: 21 year: '2013' ... --- _id: '17664' author: - first_name: Reuven full_name: Cohen, Reuven last_name: Cohen - first_name: Ilia full_name: Nudelman, Ilia last_name: Nudelman - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy citation: ama: 'Cohen R, Nudelman I, Polevoy G. On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. In: Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida. ; 2012.' apa: Cohen, R., Nudelman, I., & Polevoy, G. (2012). On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. In Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida. bibtex: '@inproceedings{Cohen_Nudelman_Polevoy_2012, title={On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks}, booktitle={Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida}, author={Cohen, Reuven and Nudelman, Ilia and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2012} }' chicago: Cohen, Reuven, Ilia Nudelman, and Gleb Polevoy. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” In Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012. ieee: R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, and G. Polevoy, “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks,” in Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012. mla: Cohen, Reuven, et al. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012. short: 'R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, G. Polevoy, in: Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:22:24Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' language: - iso: eng publication: Infocom'2012, Orlando, Florida status: public title: On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2012' ... --- _id: '17665' author: - first_name: Reuven full_name: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven last_name: Bar-Yehuda - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Dror full_name: Rawitz, Dror last_name: Rawitz citation: ama: 'Bar-Yehuda R, Polevoy G, Rawitz D. Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences. In: DIALM-PODC. ; 2010:33-42.' apa: Bar-Yehuda, R., Polevoy, G., & Rawitz, D. (2010). Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences. In DIALM-PODC (pp. 33–42). bibtex: '@inproceedings{Bar-Yehuda_Polevoy_Rawitz_2010, title={Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences}, booktitle={DIALM-PODC}, author={Bar-Yehuda, Reuven and Polevoy, Gleb and Rawitz, Dror}, year={2010}, pages={33–42} }' chicago: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, Gleb Polevoy, and Dror Rawitz. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” In DIALM-PODC, 33–42, 2010. ieee: R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, and D. Rawitz, “Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences,” in DIALM-PODC, 2010, pp. 33–42. mla: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, et al. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” DIALM-PODC, 2010, pp. 33–42. short: 'R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, D. Rawitz, in: DIALM-PODC, 2010, pp. 33–42.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:22:47Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 33-42 publication: DIALM-PODC status: public title: Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2010' ...