---
_id: '34040'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Consider the practical goal of making a desired action profile played,\r\n\r\nwhen
the planner can only change the payoffs, bound by \r\n\r\nstringent constraints.\r\n\r\nApplications
include motivating people\r\n\r\nto choose the closest school, the closest subway
station, or to coordinate\r\n\r\non a communication protocol or an investment
strategy.\r\n\r\nEmploying subsidies and tolls, we adjust the game so that choosing
this predefined action profile\r\n\r\nbecomes strictly dominant. \r\n\r\nInspired
mainly by the work of Monderer and Tennenholtz,\r\n\r\nwhere the promised subsidies
do not materialise in the not played\r\n\r\nprofiles, we provide a fair and individually
rational game\r\n\r\nadjustment, such that the total outside investments sum up\r\n\r\nto
zero at any profile, thereby facilitating easy and frequent\r\n\r\nusage of our
adjustment without bearing costs, even if some\r\n\r\nplayers behave unexpectedly.
The resultant action profile itself needs no\r\n\r\nadjustment. Importantly, we
also prove that our adjustment minimises \r\n\r\nthe general transfer among all
such adjustments, counting the total subsidising and taxation."
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Marcin
full_name: Dziubiński, Marcin
last_name: Dziubiński
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, Dziubiński M. Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment.
In: De Raedt L, ed. Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial
Intelligence Organization; 2022. doi:10.24963/ijcai.2022/64'
apa: Polevoy, G., & Dziubiński, M. (2022). Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap
Adjustment. In L. De Raedt (Ed.), Proceedings of the Thirty-First International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences
on Artificial Intelligence Organization. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Dziubiński_2022, title={Fair, Individually Rational
and Cheap Adjustment}, DOI={10.24963/ijcai.2022/64},
booktitle={Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence}, publisher={International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Organization}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Dziubiński, Marcin}, editor={De Raedt,
Luc}, year={2022} }'
chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and Marcin Dziubiński. “Fair, Individually Rational and
Cheap Adjustment.” In Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, edited by Luc De Raedt. International Joint Conferences
on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/64.
ieee: 'G. Polevoy and M. Dziubiński, “Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment,”
in Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, Vienna, 2022, doi: 10.24963/ijcai.2022/64.'
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and Marcin Dziubiński. “Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap
Adjustment.” Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, edited by Luc De Raedt, International Joint Conferences
on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022, doi:10.24963/ijcai.2022/64.
short: 'G. Polevoy, M. Dziubiński, in: L. De Raedt (Ed.), Proceedings of the Thirty-First
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, International Joint
Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022.'
conference:
end_date: 2022-07-29
location: Vienna
name: THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
start_date: 2022-07-23
date_created: 2022-11-08T16:53:31Z
date_updated: 2022-11-08T17:34:36Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.24963/ijcai.2022/64
editor:
- first_name: Luc
full_name: De Raedt, Luc
last_name: De Raedt
keyword:
- adjustment
- strictly dominant
- fairness
- individually rational
- transfer
- tax
- subsidy
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2022/64
publication: Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence
publication_status: published
publisher: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization
status: public
title: Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2022'
...
---
_id: '17667'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Resolving distributed attacks benefits from collaboration between networks.
We present three approaches for the same multi-domain defensive action that can
be applied in such an alliance: 1) Counteract Everywhere, 2) Minimize Countermeasures,
and 3) Minimize Propagation. First, we provide a formula to compute efficiency
of a defense; then we use this formula to compute the efficiency of the approaches
under various circumstances. Finally, we discuss how task execution order and
timing influence defense efficiency. Our results show that the Minimize Propagation
approach is the most efficient method when defending against the chosen attack.'
author:
- first_name: Ralph
full_name: Koning, Ralph
last_name: Koning
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Lydia
full_name: Meijer, Lydia
last_name: Meijer
- first_name: Cees
full_name: de Laat, Cees
last_name: de Laat
- first_name: Paola
full_name: Grosso, Paola
last_name: Grosso
citation:
ama: 'Koning R, Polevoy G, Meijer L, de Laat C, Grosso P. Approaches for Collaborative
Security Defences in Multi Network Environments. In: 2019 6th IEEE International
Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International
Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom). 2019 6th IEEE International
Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International
Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom). ; 2019:113-123. doi:10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9'
apa: Koning, R., Polevoy, G., Meijer, L., de Laat, C., & Grosso, P. (2019).
Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments.
In 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom) (pp. 113–123). https://doi.org/10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Koning_Polevoy_Meijer_de Laat_Grosso_2019, series={2019
6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/
2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)},
title={Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments},
DOI={10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9},
booktitle={2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud
Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing
and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)}, author={Koning, Ralph and Polevoy, Gleb and Meijer,
Lydia and de Laat, Cees and Grosso, Paola}, year={2019}, pages={113–123}, collection={2019
6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/
2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)}
}'
chicago: Koning, Ralph, Gleb Polevoy, Lydia Meijer, Cees de Laat, and Paola Grosso.
“Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments.”
In 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom), 113–23. 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security
and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge
Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9.
ieee: R. Koning, G. Polevoy, L. Meijer, C. de Laat, and P. Grosso, “Approaches for
Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments,” in 2019 6th
IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/
2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom),
2019, pp. 113–123.
mla: Koning, Ralph, et al. “Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi
Network Environments.” 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security
and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge
Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom), 2019, pp. 113–23, doi:10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9.
short: 'R. Koning, G. Polevoy, L. Meijer, C. de Laat, P. Grosso, in: 2019 6th IEEE
International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/ 2019
5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom),
2019, pp. 113–123.'
conference:
name: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom)
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:23:23Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/CSCloud/EdgeCom.2019.000-9
extern: '1'
keyword:
- computer network security
- multinetwork environments
- multidomain defensive action
- task execution order
- timing influence defense efficiency
- distributed attacks
- collaborative security defence approach
- minimize propagation approach
- minimize countermeasure approach
- counteract everywhere approach
- Conferences
- Cloud computing
- Computer crime
- Edge computing
- Security
- Defense Approaches
- Multi-Domain Defense
- Collaborative Defense
- Defense Algorithms
- Computer Networks
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8854057/authors#authors
page: 113-123
publication: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom)
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 'null'
quality_controlled: '1'
series_title: 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing
(CSCloud)/ 2019 5th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable
Cloud (EdgeCom)
status: public
title: Approaches for Collaborative Security Defences in Multi Network Environments
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '8080'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This thesis investigates approximate pure Nash equilibria in different game-theoretic
models. In such an outcome, no player can improve her objective by more than a
given factor through a deviation to another strategy. In the first part, we investigate
two variants of Congestion Games in which the existence of pure Nash equilibria
is guaranteed through a potential function argument. However, the computation
of such equilibria might be hard. We construct and analyze approximation algorithms
that enable the computation of states with low approximation factors in polynomial
time. To show their guarantees we use sub games among players, bound the potential
function values of arbitrary states and exploit a connection between Shapley and
proportional cost shares. Furthermore, we apply and analyze sampling techniques
for the computation of approximate Shapley values in different settings. In the
second part, we concentrate on the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria
in games in which no pure Nash equilibria exist in general. In the model of Coevolving
Opinion Formation Games, we bound the approximation guarantees for natural states
nearly independent of the specific definition of the players' neighborhoods by
applying a concept of virtual costs. For the special case of only one influential
neighbor, we even show lower approximation factors for a natural strategy. Then,
we investigate a two-sided Facility Location Game among facilities and clients
on a line with an objective function consisting of distance and load. We show
tight bounds on the approximation factor for settings with three facilities and
infinitely many clients. For the general scenario with an arbitrary number of
facilities, we bound the approximation factor for two promising candidates, namely
facilities that are uniformly distributed and which are paired.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
citation:
ama: Feldotto M. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation
and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn; 2019. doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-588
apa: Feldotto, M. (2019). Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion
Formation and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588
bibtex: '@book{Feldotto_2019, place={Universität Paderborn}, title={Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games},
DOI={10.17619/UNIPB/1-588},
author={Feldotto, Matthias}, year={2019} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion,
Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588.
ieee: M. Feldotto, Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation
and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion
Formation and Facility Location Games. 2019, doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-588.
short: M. Feldotto, Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation
and Facility Location Games, Universität Paderborn, 2019.
date_created: 2019-02-25T13:03:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:50Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.17619/UNIPB/1-588
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z
date_updated: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z
file_id: '8715'
file_name: Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and
Facility Location Games.pdf
file_size: 3116177
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://digital.ub.uni-paderborn.de/hs/download/pdf/3005508?originalFilename=true
place: Universität Paderborn
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility
Location Games
type: dissertation
user_id: '15415'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '5471'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC),
strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms
for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single
buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The
mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller
to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We
consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations
that are increasing in the number of units in possession, and the more specific
class of valuations that are increasing and submodular. \r\nFurthermore, we present
some approximation results about the performance of certain such mechanisms, in
terms of social welfare: For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show
the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1-e)
approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting."
author:
- first_name: Philip
full_name: Lazos, Philip
last_name: Lazos
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Goldberg, Paul
last_name: Goldberg
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Gerstgrasser, Matthias
last_name: Gerstgrasser
- first_name: Bart
full_name: de Keijzer, Bart
last_name: de Keijzer
citation:
ama: 'Lazos P, Goldberg P, Skopalik A, Gerstgrasser M, de Keijzer B. Multi-unit
Bilateral Trade. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI). ; 2019. doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973'
apa: Lazos, P., Goldberg, P., Skopalik, A., Gerstgrasser, M., & de Keijzer,
B. (2019). Multi-unit Bilateral Trade. Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). Thirty-Third AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Lazos_Goldberg_Skopalik_Gerstgrasser_de Keijzer_2019, title={
Multi-unit Bilateral Trade}, DOI={10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973},
booktitle={Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI)}, author={Lazos, Philip and Goldberg, Paul and Skopalik, Alexander and
Gerstgrasser, Matthias and de Keijzer, Bart}, year={2019} }'
chicago: Lazos, Philip, Paul Goldberg, Alexander Skopalik, Matthias Gerstgrasser,
and Bart de Keijzer. “ Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade.” In Proceedings of the Thirty-Third
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.
ieee: 'P. Lazos, P. Goldberg, A. Skopalik, M. Gerstgrasser, and B. de Keijzer, “
Multi-unit Bilateral Trade,” presented at the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, 2019, doi: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.'
mla: Lazos, Philip, et al. “ Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade.” Proceedings of the
Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019, doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.
short: 'P. Lazos, P. Goldberg, A. Skopalik, M. Gerstgrasser, B. de Keijzer, in:
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
2019.'
conference:
end_date: 2019-02-01
location: Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
name: Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
start_date: 2019-01-27
date_created: 2018-11-12T09:38:16Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:55Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z
date_updated: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z
file_id: '6018'
file_name: 1811.05130.pdf
file_size: 315877
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI)
publication_status: published
status: public
title: ' Multi-unit Bilateral Trade'
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '10281'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Competing firms tend to select similar locations for their stores. This phenomenon,
called the principle of minimum differentiation, was captured by Hotelling with
a landmark model of spatial competition but is still the object of an ongoing
scientific debate. Although consistently observed in practice, many more realistic
variants of Hotelling''s model fail to support minimum differentiation or do not
have pure equilibria at all. In particular, it was recently proven for a generalized
model which incorporates negative network externalities and which contains Hotelling''s
model and classical selfish load balancing as special cases, that the unique equilibria
do not adhere to minimum differentiation. Furthermore, it was shown that for a
significant parameter range pure equilibria do not exist. We derive a sharp contrast
to these previous results by investigating Hotelling''s model with negative network
externalities from an entirely new angle: approximate pure subgame perfect equilibria.
This approach allows us to prove analytically and via agent-based simulations
that approximate equilibria having good approximation guarantees and that adhere
to minimum differentiation exist for the full parameter range of the model. Moreover,
we show that the obtained approximate equilibria have high social welfare.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: 'Pascal '
full_name: 'Lenzner, Pascal '
last_name: Lenzner
- first_name: Louise
full_name: Molitor, Louise
last_name: Molitor
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Lenzner P, Molitor L, Skopalik A. From Hotelling to Load Balancing:
Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. In: Proceedings
of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2019:1949--1951.'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., Lenzner, P., Molitor, L., & Skopalik, A. (2019). From Hotelling
to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.
In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
MultiAgent Systems (pp. 1949--1951). Montreal QC, Canada: International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Lenzner_Molitor_Skopalik_2019, title={ From Hotelling
to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and MultiAgent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Lenzner, Pascal and Molitor,
Louise and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2019}, pages={1949--1951} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, and Alexander Skopalik.
“ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum
Differentiation.” In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 1949--1951. International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, and A. Skopalik, “ From Hotelling to
Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation,” in
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems, Montreal QC, Canada, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation
and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.” Proceedings of the 18th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
conference:
location: Montreal QC, Canada
name: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
date_created: 2019-06-20T14:46:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:33Z
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
file_id: '12962'
file_name: 1903.04265.pdf
file_size: 698599
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3331973
page: 1949--1951
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and MultiAgent Systems
publication_status: published
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
status: public
title: ' From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum
Differentiation'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2484'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study the classic bin packing problem in a fully-dynamic setting, where
new items can arrive and old items may depart. We want algorithms with low asymptotic
competitive ratio while repacking items sparingly between updates. Formally, each
item i has a movement cost c_i >= 0, and we want to use alpha * OPT bins and incur
a movement cost gamma * c_i, either in the worst case, or in an amortized sense,
for alpha, gamma as small as possible. We call gamma the recourse of the algorithm.
This is motivated by cloud storage applications, where fully-dynamic bin packing
models the problem of data backup to minimize the number of disks used, as well
as communication incurred in moving file backups between disks. Since the set
of files changes over time, we could recompute a solution periodically from scratch,
but this would give a high number of disk rewrites, incurring a high energy cost
and possible wear and tear of the disks. In this work, we present optimal tradeoffs
between number of bins used and number of items repacked, as well as natural extensions
of the latter measure.
author:
- first_name: Björn
full_name: Feldkord, Björn
id: '22704'
last_name: Feldkord
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Anupam
full_name: Gupta, Anupam
last_name: Gupta
- first_name: Guru
full_name: Guruganesh, Guru
last_name: Guruganesh
- first_name: 'Amit '
full_name: 'Kumar, Amit '
last_name: Kumar
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: David
full_name: Wajc, David
last_name: Wajc
citation:
ama: 'Feldkord B, Feldotto M, Gupta A, et al. Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little
Repacking. In: Chatzigiannakis I, Kaklamanis C, Marx D, Sannella D, eds. 45th
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018).
Vol 107. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl,
Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik; 2018:51:1-51:24. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51'
apa: 'Feldkord, B., Feldotto, M., Gupta, A., Guruganesh, G., Kumar, A., Riechers,
S., & Wajc, D. (2018). Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking. In
I. Chatzigiannakis, C. Kaklamanis, D. Marx, & D. Sannella (Eds.), 45th
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)
(Vol. 107, pp. 51:1-51:24). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum
fuer Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldkord_Feldotto_Gupta_Guruganesh_Kumar_Riechers_Wajc_2018,
place={Dagstuhl, Germany}, series={Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
(LIPIcs)}, title={Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking}, volume={107},
DOI={10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51},
booktitle={45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming
(ICALP 2018)}, publisher={Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
author={Feldkord, Björn and Feldotto, Matthias and Gupta, Anupam and Guruganesh,
Guru and Kumar, Amit and Riechers, Sören and Wajc, David}, editor={Chatzigiannakis,
Ioannis and Kaklamanis, Christos and Marx, Dániel and Sannella, DonaldEditors},
year={2018}, pages={51:1-51:24}, collection={Leibniz International Proceedings
in Informatics (LIPIcs)} }'
chicago: 'Feldkord, Björn, Matthias Feldotto, Anupam Gupta, Guru Guruganesh, Amit Kumar,
Sören Riechers, and David Wajc. “Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking.”
In 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
2018), edited by Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, Christos Kaklamanis, Dániel Marx,
and Donald Sannella, 107:51:1-51:24. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
(LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik,
2018. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51.'
ieee: B. Feldkord et al., “Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking,”
in 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
2018), Prag, 2018, vol. 107, pp. 51:1-51:24.
mla: Feldkord, Björn, et al. “Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking.”
45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
2018), edited by Ioannis Chatzigiannakis et al., vol. 107, Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum
fuer Informatik, 2018, pp. 51:1-51:24, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51.
short: 'B. Feldkord, M. Feldotto, A. Gupta, G. Guruganesh, A. Kumar, S. Riechers,
D. Wajc, in: I. Chatzigiannakis, C. Kaklamanis, D. Marx, D. Sannella (Eds.), 45th
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018),
Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2018, pp.
51:1-51:24.'
conference:
end_date: 2018-07-13
location: Prag
name: 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
2018)
start_date: 2018-07-10
date_created: 2018-04-24T15:21:56Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:39Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51
editor:
- first_name: Ioannis
full_name: Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis
last_name: Chatzigiannakis
- first_name: Christos
full_name: Kaklamanis, Christos
last_name: Kaklamanis
- first_name: Dániel
full_name: Marx, Dániel
last_name: Marx
- first_name: Donald
full_name: Sannella, Donald
last_name: Sannella
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1711.01231'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:18Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:18Z
file_id: '5227'
file_name: LIPIcs-ICALP-2018-51.pdf
file_size: 723824
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:18Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 107'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 51:1-51:24
place: Dagstuhl, Germany
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
publication: 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming
(ICALP 2018)
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-3-95977-076-7
issn:
- 1868-8969
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik
series_title: Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)
status: public
title: Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
volume: 107
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2831'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of
a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed
product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance
of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose
is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess
the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations
across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive
valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted)
average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation
method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In
addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate
solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly
optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified
Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation
profiles are incomplete.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Haake C-J, Skopalik A, Stroh-Maraun N. Disaggregating User Evaluations
Using the Shapley Value. In: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics
of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018). ; 2018:5:1-5:6. doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659'
apa: Feldotto, M., Haake, C.-J., Skopalik, A., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) (pp. 5:1-5:6).
Irvine, California, USA. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={10.1145/3230654.3230659},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6}
}'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Claus-Jochen Haake, Alexander Skopalik, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun.
“Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” In Proceedings of
the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018),
5:1-5:6, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659.
ieee: M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value,” in Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), Irvine,
California, USA, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley
Value.” Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659.
short: 'M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings
of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.'
conference:
end_date: 2018-06-18
location: Irvine, California, USA
name: The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018)
start_date: 2018-06-18
date_created: 2018-05-22T10:28:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:01Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1145/3230654.3230659
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: nmaraun
date_created: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
file_id: '3910'
file_name: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf
file_size: 1450171
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 5:1-5:6
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation (NetEcon 2018)
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-5916-0
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3851'
author:
- first_name: Samuel
full_name: Koop, Samuel
last_name: Koop
citation:
ama: Koop S. Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität Paderborn;
2018.
apa: Koop, S. (2018). Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Koop_2018, title={Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Koop, Samuel}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Koop, Samuel. Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität
Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: S. Koop, Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität Paderborn,
2018.
mla: Koop, Samuel. Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien. Universität
Paderborn, 2018.
short: S. Koop, Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien, Universität Paderborn,
2018.
date_created: 2018-08-08T11:56:37Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:45Z
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '17651'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Consider mitigating the effects of denial of service or of malicious traffic
in networks by deleting edges. Edge deletion reduces the DoS or the number of
the malicious flows, but it also inadvertently removes some of the desired flows.
To model this important problem, we formulate two problems: (1) remove all the
undesirable flows while minimizing the damage to the desirable ones and (2) balance
removing the undesirable flows and not removing too many of the desirable flows.
We prove these problems are equivalent to important theoretical problems, thereby
being important not only practically but also theoretically, and very hard to
approximate in a general network. We employ reductions to nonetheless approximate
the problem and also provide a greedy approximation. When the network is a tree,
the problems are still MAX SNP-hard, but we provide a greedy-based 2l-approximation
algorithm, where l is the longest desirable flow. We also provide an algorithm,
approximating the first and the second problem within {\$}{\$}2 {\backslash}sqrt{\{}
2{\backslash}left| E {\backslash}right| {\}}{\$}{\$}and {\$}{\$}2 {\backslash}sqrt{\{}2
({\backslash}left| E {\backslash}right| + {\backslash}left| {\backslash}text {\{}undesirable
flows{\}} {\backslash}right| ){\}}{\$}{\$}, respectively, where E is the set of
the edges of the network. We also provide a fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm.
Finally, if the tree has a root such that every flow in the tree flows on the
path from the root to a leaf, we solve the problem exactly using dynamic programming.'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Stojan
full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan
last_name: Trajanovski
- first_name: Paola
full_name: Grosso, Paola
last_name: Grosso
- first_name: Cees
full_name: de Laat, Cees
last_name: de Laat
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, Grosso P, de Laat C. Removing Undesirable Flows
by Edge Deletion. In: Kim D, Uma RN, Zelikovsky A, eds. Combinatorial Optimization
and Applications. Cham: Springer International Publishing; 2018:217-232.'
apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., Grosso, P., & de Laat, C. (2018). Removing
Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion. In D. Kim, R. N. Uma, & A. Zelikovsky
(Eds.), Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (pp. 217–232). Cham:
Springer International Publishing.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_Grosso_de Laat_2018, place={Cham}, title={Removing
Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion}, booktitle={Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications}, publisher={Springer International Publishing}, author={Polevoy,
Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and Grosso, Paola and de Laat, Cees}, editor={Kim,
Donghyun and Uma, R. N. and Zelikovsky, AlexanderEditors}, year={2018}, pages={217–232}
}'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, Paola Grosso, and Cees de Laat. “Removing
Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion.” In Combinatorial Optimization and Applications,
edited by Donghyun Kim, R. N. Uma, and Alexander Zelikovsky, 217–32. Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2018.'
ieee: G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, and C. de Laat, “Removing Undesirable
Flows by Edge Deletion,” in Combinatorial Optimization and Applications,
2018, pp. 217–232.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion.” Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications, edited by Donghyun Kim et al., Springer International
Publishing, 2018, pp. 217–32.
short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, C. de Laat, in: D. Kim, R.N. Uma,
A. Zelikovsky (Eds.), Combinatorial Optimization and Applications, Springer International
Publishing, Cham, 2018, pp. 217–232.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:19:36Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
editor:
- first_name: Donghyun
full_name: Kim, Donghyun
last_name: Kim
- first_name: R. N.
full_name: Uma, R. N.
last_name: Uma
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Zelikovsky, Alexander
last_name: Zelikovsky
extern: '1'
keyword:
- flow
- Red-Blue Set Cover
- Positive-Negative Partial Set Cover
- approximation
- tree
- MAX SNP-hard
- root
- leaf
- dynamic programming
- FPT
language:
- iso: eng
page: 217-232
place: Cham
publication: Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-3-030-04651-4
publisher: Springer International Publishing
status: public
title: Removing Undesirable Flows by Edge Deletion
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '17666'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Software Defined Networks (SDN) and Network Function Virtualisation (NFV)
provide the basis for autonomous response and mitigation against attacks on networked
computer infrastructures. We propose a new framework that uses SDNs and NFV to
achieve this goal: Secure Autonomous Response Network (SARNET). In a SARNET, an
agent running a control loop constantly assesses the security state of the network
by means of observables. The agent reacts to and resolves security problems, while
learning from its previous decisions. Two main metrics govern the decision process
in a SARNET: impact and efficiency; these metrics can be used to compare and evaluate
countermeasures and are the building blocks for self-learning SARNETs that exhibit
autonomous response. In this paper we present the software implementation of the
SARNET framework, evaluate it in a real-life network and discuss the tradeoffs
between parameters used by the SARNET agent and the efficiency of its actions.'
author:
- first_name: R.
full_name: Koning, R.
last_name: Koning
- first_name: B.
full_name: de Graaff, B.
last_name: de Graaff
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: R.
full_name: Meijer, R.
last_name: Meijer
- first_name: C.
full_name: de Laat, C.
last_name: de Laat
- first_name: P.
full_name: Grosso, P.
last_name: Grosso
citation:
ama: Koning R, de Graaff B, Polevoy G, Meijer R, de Laat C, Grosso P. Measuring
the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures.
Future Generation Computer Systems. 2018. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011
apa: Koning, R., de Graaff, B., Polevoy, G., Meijer, R., de Laat, C., & Grosso,
P. (2018). Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer
infrastructures. Future Generation Computer Systems. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011
bibtex: '@article{Koning_de Graaff_Polevoy_Meijer_de Laat_Grosso_2018, title={Measuring
the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures},
DOI={https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011},
journal={Future Generation Computer Systems}, author={Koning, R. and de Graaff,
B. and Polevoy, Gleb and Meijer, R. and de Laat, C. and Grosso, P.}, year={2018}
}'
chicago: Koning, R., B. de Graaff, Gleb Polevoy, R. Meijer, C. de Laat, and P. Grosso.
“Measuring the Efficiency of SDN Mitigations against Attacks on Computer Infrastructures.”
Future Generation Computer Systems, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011.
ieee: R. Koning, B. de Graaff, G. Polevoy, R. Meijer, C. de Laat, and P. Grosso,
“Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures,”
Future Generation Computer Systems, 2018.
mla: Koning, R., et al. “Measuring the Efficiency of SDN Mitigations against Attacks
on Computer Infrastructures.” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2018,
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011.
short: R. Koning, B. de Graaff, G. Polevoy, R. Meijer, C. de Laat, P. Grosso, Future
Generation Computer Systems (2018).
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:23:11Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.08.011
extern: '1'
keyword:
- Software defined networks
- Network function virtualization
- Cyber attacks
- Cyber security
- Defense efficiency
- Overlay networks
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Future Generation Computer Systems
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0167-739X
status: public
title: Measuring the efficiency of SDN mitigations against attacks on computer infrastructures
type: journal_article
user_id: '83983'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '669'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games andits bottleneck
variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to modelnetwork scenarios
in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.We characterize
the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergenceof improvement
dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of thedecision problem.
For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approx-imation ratio of
approximate pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion games with mixed objectives. Journal
of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018;36(4):1145-1167. doi:10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2018). Congestion games with mixed
objectives. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 36(4), 1145–1167.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
bibtex: '@article{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2018, title={Congestion games with mixed
objectives}, volume={36}, DOI={10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y},
number={4}, journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer
Nature}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander},
year={2018}, pages={1145–1167} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
Games with Mixed Objectives.” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization 36,
no. 4 (2018): 1145–67. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y.'
ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion games with mixed objectives,”
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1145–1167, 2018.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” Journal
of Combinatorial Optimization, vol. 36, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2018, pp.
1145–67, doi:10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y.
short: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
36 (2018) 1145–1167.
date_created: 2017-10-26T14:11:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:15Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1607.05143'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
file_id: '5226'
file_name: Feldotto2018_Article_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf
file_size: 605207
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 36'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1145-1167
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1382-6905
- 1573-2886
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Congestion games with mixed objectives
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
volume: 36
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1186'
author:
- first_name: Arne
full_name: Kemper, Arne
last_name: Kemper
citation:
ama: Kemper A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: Kemper, A. (2018). Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Kemper_2018, title={Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games
via Potential Functions}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kemper, Arne},
year={2018} }'
chicago: Kemper, Arne. Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: A. Kemper, Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: Kemper, Arne. Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: A. Kemper, Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions, Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-03-02T13:47:57Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:11Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1187'
author:
- first_name: Marcel
full_name: Nachtigall, Marcel
last_name: Nachtigall
citation:
ama: Nachtigall M. Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition
Game Model. Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: Nachtigall, M. (2018). Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition
Game Model. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Nachtigall_2018, title={Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player
Composition Game Model}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Nachtigall,
Marcel}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Nachtigall, Marcel. Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player
Composition Game Model. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: M. Nachtigall, Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition
Game Model. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: Nachtigall, Marcel. Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition
Game Model. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: M. Nachtigall, Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition
Game Model, Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-03-02T13:49:39Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:11Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition Game Model
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1188'
author:
- first_name: Jérôme
full_name: Kempf, Jérôme
last_name: Kempf
citation:
ama: Kempf J. Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions.
Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: Kempf, J. (2018). Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Kempf_2018, title={Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kempf, Jérôme}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Kempf, Jérôme. Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: J. Kempf, Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: Kempf, Jérôme. Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: J. Kempf, Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions, Universität
Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-03-02T13:51:14Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:11Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1369'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash equilibria in restricted
budget games. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018. doi:10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2018). Pure Nash
equilibria in restricted budget games. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
bibtex: '@article{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2018, title={Pure Nash equilibria
in restricted budget games}, DOI={10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7},
journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer Nature},
author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” Journal of Combinatorial
Optimization, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7.
ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash equilibria
in restricted budget games,” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer Nature, 2018, doi:10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7.
short: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial
Optimization (2018).
date_created: 2018-03-18T11:12:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:42Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
file_id: '5225'
file_name: Drees2018_Article_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
file_size: 561187
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1382-6905
- 1573-2886
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '112'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate
dependencies among resources as they exist in in modern networked environments.
Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games
with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study $L_p$ norms and
analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally,
we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe
the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Complementarities.
In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC). LNCS. ; 2017:222--233. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19'
apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Congestion Games with Complementarities.
In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC) (pp. 222--233). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion
Games with Complementarities}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and
Complexity (CIAC)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={222--233}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
Games with Complementarities.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 222--233. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19.
ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Complementarities,”
in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Complementarities.” Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC),
2017, pp. 222--233, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19.
short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:58Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1701.07304'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
file_id: '1566'
file_name: 112-FeldottoLederSkopalik2017.pdf
file_size: 264089
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 222--233
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Congestion Games with Complementarities
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '113'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value
(SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers
weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to
proportional shares) for distributing the total cost of each resource among its
users. We focus on the interesting subclass of such games with polynomial resource
cost functions and present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria
with a polynomial number of strategy updates. Since computing a single strategy
update is hard, we apply sampling techniques which allow us to achieve polynomial
running time. The algorithm builds on the algorithmic ideas of [7], however, to
the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithmic result on computation
of approximate equilibria using other than proportional shares as player costs
in this setting. We present a novel relation that approximates the Shapley value
of a player by her proportional share and vice versa. As side results, we upper
bound the approximate price of anarchy of such games and significantly improve
the best known factor for computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
congestion games of [7].
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Gairing, Martin
last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Grammateia
full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia
last_name: Kotsialou
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Computing Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In: Proceedings
of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE).
; 2017. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14'
apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Computing
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
(WINE). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2017, title={Computing
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games},
DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou,
Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander
Skopalik. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted
Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web
and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14.
ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Computing Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games,” in Proceedings
of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE),
2017.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley
Value Weighted Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 13th International Conference
on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14.
short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:59Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1710.01634'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
file_id: '5231'
file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_ComputingApproximatePureNashEq.pdf
file_size: 279055
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)
status: public
title: Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion
Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '17652'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Stojan
full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan
last_name: Trajanovski
- first_name: Paola
full_name: Grosso, Paola
last_name: Grosso
- first_name: Cees
full_name: de Laat, Cees
last_name: de Laat
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, Grosso P, de Laat C. Filtering Undesirable Flows
in Networks. In: Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International
Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part
I. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing;
2017:3-17. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1'
apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., Grosso, P., & de Laat, C. (2017). Filtering
Undesirable Flows in Networks. In Combinatorial Optimization and Applications:
11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017,
Proceedings, Part I (pp. 3–17). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_Grosso_de Laat_2017, place={Cham}, series={Lecture
Notes in Computer Science}, title={Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1},
booktitle={Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference,
COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I}, publisher={Springer
International Publishing}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and Grosso,
Paola and de Laat, Cees}, year={2017}, pages={3–17}, collection={Lecture Notes
in Computer Science} }'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, Paola Grosso, and Cees de Laat. “Filtering
Undesirable Flows in Networks.” In Combinatorial Optimization and Applications:
11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017,
Proceedings, Part I, 3–17. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1.'
ieee: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, and C. de Laat, “Filtering Undesirable
Flows in Networks,” in Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International
Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part
I, 2017, pp. 3–17.'
mla: 'Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks.” Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai,
China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, Springer International Publishing,
2017, pp. 3–17, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1.'
short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, C. de Laat, in: Combinatorial Optimization
and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China,
December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, Springer International Publishing,
Cham, 2017, pp. 3–17.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:19:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1
extern: '1'
keyword:
- flow
- filter
- MMSA
- set cover
- approximation
- local ratio algorithm
language:
- iso: eng
page: 3-17
place: Cham
publication: 'Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference,
COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I'
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-3-319-71150-8
publisher: Springer International Publishing
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '17653'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: M.M.
full_name: de Weerdt, M.M.
last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Reciprocation Effort Games. In: Proceedings of
the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer; 2017.'
apa: Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2017). Reciprocation Effort Games. In
Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Springer.
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2017, series={CCIS}, title={Reciprocation
Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial
Intelligence}, publisher={Springer}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M.},
year={2017}, collection={CCIS} }'
chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and M.M. de Weerdt. “Reciprocation Effort Games.” In Proceedings
of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer,
2017.
ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Reciprocation Effort Games,” in Proceedings
of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and M. M. de Weerdt. “Reciprocation Effort Games.” Proceedings
of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.
short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:09Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- interaction
- reciprocation
- contribute
- shared effort
- curbing
- convergence
- threshold
- Nash equilibrium
- social welfare
- efficiency
- price of anarchy
- price of stability
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence
publisher: Springer
series_title: CCIS
status: public
title: Reciprocation Effort Games
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '17654'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: M.M.
full_name: de Weerdt, M.M.
last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Competition between Cooperative Projects. In: Proceedings
of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer;
2017.'
apa: Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2017). Competition between Cooperative
Projects. In Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Springer.
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2017, series={CCIS}, title={Competition
between Cooperative Projects}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference
on Artificial Intelligence}, publisher={Springer}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de
Weerdt, M.M.}, year={2017}, collection={CCIS} }'
chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and M.M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.”
In Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
CCIS. Springer, 2017.
ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Competition between Cooperative Projects,”
in Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
2017.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and M. M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.”
Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Springer, 2017.
short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:19Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- agents
- projects
- contribute
- shared effort game
- competition
- quota
- threshold
- Nash equilibrium
- social welfare
- efficiency
- price of anarchy
- price of stability
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence
publisher: Springer
series_title: CCIS
status: public
title: Competition between Cooperative Projects
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '59'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We consider a scheduling problem on $m$ identical processors sharing an arbitrarily
divisible resource. In addition to assigning jobs to processors, the scheduler
must distribute the resource among the processors (e.g., for three processors
in shares of 20\%, 15\%, and 65\%) and adjust this distribution over time. Each
job $j$ comes with a size $p_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and a resource requirement $r_j
> 0$. Jobs do not benefit when receiving a share larger than $r_j$ of the resource.
But providing them with a fraction of the resource requirement causes a linear
decrease in the processing efficiency. We seek a (non-preemptive) job and resource
assignment minimizing the makespan.Our main result is an efficient approximation
algorithm which achieves an approximation ratio of $2 + 1/(m-2)$. It can be improved
to an (asymptotic) ratio of $1 + 1/(m-1)$ if all jobs have unit size. Our algorithms
also imply new results for a well-known bin packing problem with splittable items
and a restricted number of allowed item parts per bin.Based upon the above solution,
we also derive an approximation algorithm with similar guarantees for a setting
in which we introduce so-called tasks each containing several jobs and where we
are interested in the average completion time of tasks (a task is completed when
all its jobs are completed).
author:
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Kling, Peter
last_name: Kling
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Mäcker, Alexander
id: '13536'
last_name: Mäcker
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Kling P, Mäcker A, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA). ; 2017:123--132. doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578'
apa: 'Kling, P., Mäcker, A., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Sharing is
Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In Proceedings
of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)
(pp. 123--132). https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Kling_Mäcker_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, title={Sharing is Caring:
Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource}, DOI={10.1145/3087556.3087578},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms
and Architectures (SPAA)}, author={Kling, Peter and Mäcker, Alexander and Riechers,
Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={123--132} }'
chicago: 'Kling, Peter, Alexander Mäcker, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource.” In Proceedings
of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA),
123--132, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578.'
ieee: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
Scheduling with a Sharable Resource,” in Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132.'
mla: 'Kling, Peter, et al. “Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a
Sharable Resource.” Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in
Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132, doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578.'
short: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 29th
ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp.
123--132.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:46Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/3087556.3087578
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
file_id: '1578'
file_name: 59-progress.pdf
file_size: 784867
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 123--132
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and
Architectures (SPAA)
status: public
title: 'Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '66'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted
Budget Games. In: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics
Conference (COCOON). LNCS. ; 2017:175--187. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15'
apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Pure Nash
Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games. In Proceedings of the 23rd International
Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON) (pp. 175--187). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Pure
Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören
and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={175--187}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” In Proceedings of the 23rd
International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 175--187. LNCS,
2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15.
ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash Equilibria
in Restricted Budget Games,” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing
and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15.
short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp.
175--187.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:13Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
file_id: '5228'
file_name: Drees2017_Chapter_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
file_size: 346390
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 175--187
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1073'
author:
- first_name: Simon
full_name: Nachtigall, Simon
last_name: Nachtigall
citation:
ama: Nachtigall S. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Nachtigall, S. (2017). Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Nachtigall_2017, title={Sortieren dynamischer Daten}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Nachtigall, Simon}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Nachtigall, Simon. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
ieee: S. Nachtigall, Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
mla: Nachtigall, Simon. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
short: S. Nachtigall, Sortieren dynamischer Daten, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T09:59:32Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Sortieren dynamischer Daten
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1074'
author:
- first_name: Simon
full_name: Pukrop, Simon
last_name: Pukrop
citation:
ama: Pukrop S. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn;
2017.
apa: Pukrop, S. (2017). Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Pukrop_2017, title={Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Pukrop, Simon}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Pukrop, Simon. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität
Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: S. Pukrop, Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
mla: Pukrop, Simon. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität
Paderborn, 2017.
short: S. Pukrop, Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games, Universität Paderborn,
2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:00:25Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1080'
author:
- first_name: Jan
full_name: Bürmann, Jan
last_name: Bürmann
citation:
ama: Bürmann J. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Bürmann, J. (2017). Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Bürmann_2017, title={Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under
Uncertainty}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Bürmann, Jan}, year={2017}
}'
chicago: Bürmann, Jan. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: J. Bürmann, Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
mla: Bürmann, Jan. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
short: J. Bürmann, Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty,
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:07:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1081'
author:
- first_name: Vipin Ravindran
full_name: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran
last_name: Vijayalakshmi
citation:
ama: Vijayalakshmi VR. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion
Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Vijayalakshmi, V. R. (2017). Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in
Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Vijayalakshmi_2017, title={Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Congestion Games under Taxation}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Vijayalakshmi,
Vipin Ravindran}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: V. R. Vijayalakshmi, Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion
Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
mla: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
short: V.R. Vijayalakshmi, Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion
Games under Taxation, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:08:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:51Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1094'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification
has the potential to address these problems. However, gamification is hardly used
in education, because current approaches to gamification require instructors to
engage in the time-consuming preparation of their course contents for use in quizzes,
mini-games and the like. Drawing on research on limited attention and present
bias, we propose a "lean" approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying
learning activities (rather than learning contents) and increasing their salience.
In this paper, we present the app StudyNow that implements such a lean gamification
approach. With this app, we aim to enable more students and instructors to benefit
from the advantages of gamification.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: John, Thomas
id: '3952'
last_name: John
- first_name: Dennis
full_name: Kundisch, Dennis
id: '21117'
last_name: Kundisch
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Hemsen, Paul
id: '22546'
last_name: Hemsen
- first_name: Katrin
full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin
last_name: Klingsieck
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, John T, Kundisch D, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Skopalik A. Making
Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow
Mobile App. In: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design
Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST). LNCS. ;
2017:462-467. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., John, T., Kundisch, D., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., & Skopalik,
A. (2017). Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content
with the StudyNow Mobile App. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)
(pp. 462–467). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_John_Kundisch_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Skopalik_2017,
series={LNCS}, title={Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game
and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science
Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias
and John, Thomas and Kundisch, Dennis and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin
and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={462–467}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Thomas John, Dennis Kundisch, Paul Hemsen, Katrin
Klingsieck, and Alexander Skopalik. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor:
Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” In Proceedings of
the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems
and Technology (DESRIST), 462–67. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, and A. Skopalik,
“Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
the StudyNow Mobile App,” in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST),
2017, pp. 462–467.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling
Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST),
2017, pp. 462–67, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, A. Skopalik,
in: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST), 2017, pp. 462–467.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:37:52Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
- _id: '276'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
file_id: '5230'
file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_MakingGamificationEasyForThePr.pdf
file_size: 1576363
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 462-467
publication: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
the StudyNow Mobile App'
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1095'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification
has the potential to address these problems. However, using gamification currently
is rather tedious and time-consuming for instructors because current approaches
to gamification require instructors to engage in the time-consuming preparation
of course contents (e.g., for quizzes or mini-games). In reply to this issue,
we propose a “lean” approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying learning
activities rather than learning contents. The learning activities that are gamified
in the lean approach can typically be drawn from existing course syllabi (e.g.,
attend certain lectures, hand in assignments, read book chapters and articles).
Hence, compared to existing approaches, lean gamification substantially lowers
the time requirements posed on instructors for gamifying a given course. Drawing
on research on limited attention and the present bias, we provide the theoretical
foundation for the lean gamification approach. In addition, we present a mobile
application that implements lean gamification and outline a mixed-methods study
that is currently under way for evaluating whether lean gamification does indeed
have the potential to increase students’ motivation. We thereby hope to allow
more students and instructors to benefit from the advantages of gamification. '
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: John, Thomas
id: '3952'
last_name: John
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Hemsen, Paul
id: '22546'
last_name: Hemsen
- first_name: Katrin
full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin
last_name: Klingsieck
- first_name: Dennis
full_name: Kundisch, Dennis
id: '21117'
last_name: Kundisch
- first_name: Mike
full_name: Langendorf, Mike
last_name: Langendorf
citation:
ama: 'John T, Feldotto M, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Kundisch D, Langendorf M. Towards
a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In: Proceedings of the 25th European
Conference on Information Systems (ECIS). ; 2017:2970-2979.'
apa: John, T., Feldotto, M., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., Kundisch, D., & Langendorf,
M. (2017). Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In Proceedings
of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) (pp. 2970–2979).
bibtex: '@inproceedings{John_Feldotto_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Kundisch_Langendorf_2017,
title={Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education}, booktitle={Proceedings
of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)}, author={John,
Thomas and Feldotto, Matthias and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin and Kundisch,
Dennis and Langendorf, Mike}, year={2017}, pages={2970–2979} }'
chicago: John, Thomas, Matthias Feldotto, Paul Hemsen, Katrin Klingsieck, Dennis
Kundisch, and Mike Langendorf. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.”
In Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS),
2970–79, 2017.
ieee: T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, and M. Langendorf,
“Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education,” in Proceedings of the 25th
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017, pp. 2970–2979.
mla: John, Thomas, et al. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.” Proceedings
of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017, pp. 2970–79.
short: 'T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, M. Langendorf,
in: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS),
2017, pp. 2970–2979.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:39:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
- _id: '178'
- _id: '185'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
file_id: '5232'
file_name: TOWARDS A LEAN APPROACH TO GAMIFYING EDUCATION.pdf
file_size: 485333
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2017_rip/46
oa: '1'
page: 2970-2979
publication: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)
status: public
title: Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '200'
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
citation:
ama: Drees M. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games.
Universität Paderborn; 2016.
apa: Drees, M. (2016). Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget
Games. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Drees_2016, title={Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria
in Budget Games}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Drees, Maximilian},
year={2016} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria
in Budget Games. Universität Paderborn, 2016.
ieee: M. Drees, Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games.
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
mla: Drees, Maximilian. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget
Games. Universität Paderborn, 2016.
short: M. Drees, Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games,
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:31Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:18Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z
file_id: '1525'
file_name: 200-thesis.pdf
file_size: 880390
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
related_material:
link:
- relation: confirmation
url: https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:466:2-24915
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games
type: dissertation
user_id: '15415'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '210'
author:
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
citation:
ama: Leder L. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn;
2016.
apa: Leder, L. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Leder_2016, title={Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Leder, Lennart}, year={2016} }'
chicago: Leder, Lennart. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität
Paderborn, 2016.
ieee: L. Leder, Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn,
2016.
mla: Leder, Lennart. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität
Paderborn, 2016.
short: L. Leder, Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives, Universität Paderborn,
2016.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:33Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:42Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '17655'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: M.M.
full_name: de Weerdt, M.M.
last_name: de Weerdt
- first_name: C.M.
full_name: Jonker, C.M.
last_name: Jonker
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM, Jonker CM. The Game of Reciprocation Habits. In:
Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Vol Volume 285: ECAI 2016. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications.
; 2016:417-425. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417'
apa: 'Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M. M., & Jonker, C. M. (2016). The Game of Reciprocation
Habits. In Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(Vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, pp. 417–425). https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_Jonker_2016, series={Frontiers in Artificial
Intelligence and Applications}, title={The Game of Reciprocation Habits}, volume={Volume
285: ECAI 2016}, DOI={10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M. and Jonker, C.M.}, year={2016}, pages={417–425},
collection={Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications} }'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, M.M. de Weerdt, and C.M. Jonker. “The Game of Reciprocation
Habits.” In Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Volume 285: ECAI 2016:417–25. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications,
2016. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417.'
ieee: 'G. Polevoy, M. M. de Weerdt, and C. M. Jonker, “The Game of Reciprocation
Habits,” in Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
2016, vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, pp. 417–425.'
mla: 'Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “The Game of Reciprocation Habits.” Proceedings of
the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. Volume 285:
ECAI 2016, 2016, pp. 417–25, doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417.'
short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, C.M. Jonker, in: Proceedings of the 2016 European
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016, pp. 417–425.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:30Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417
extern: '1'
keyword:
- agents
- action
- repeated reciprocation
- fixed
- floating
- network
- Nash equilibrium
- social welfare
- price of anarchy
- price of stability
- convex combination
language:
- iso: eng
page: 417-425
publication: Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
series_title: Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
status: public
title: The Game of Reciprocation Habits
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
volume: 'Volume 285: ECAI 2016'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '17656'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Mathijs
full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs
last_name: de Weerdt
- first_name: Catholijn
full_name: Jonker, Catholijn
last_name: Jonker
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt M, Jonker C. The Convergence of Reciprocation. In: Proceedings
of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
AAMAS ’16. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems; 2016:1431-1432.'
apa: 'Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M., & Jonker, C. (2016). The Convergence of Reciprocation.
In Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (pp. 1431–1432). Richland, SC: International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_Jonker_2016, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS
’16}, title={The Convergence of Reciprocation}, booktitle={Proceedings of the
2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, publisher={International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb
and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Jonker, Catholijn}, year={2016}, pages={1431–1432},
collection={AAMAS ’16} }'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Mathijs de Weerdt, and Catholijn Jonker. “The Convergence
of Reciprocation.” In Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, 1431–32. AAMAS ’16. Richland, SC: International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016.'
ieee: G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, and C. Jonker, “The Convergence of Reciprocation,”
in Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, 2016, pp. 1431–1432.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “The Convergence of Reciprocation.” Proceedings of
the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016, pp.
1431–32.
short: 'G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, C. Jonker, in: Proceedings of the 2016 International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2016, pp. 1431–1432.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- agent's influence
- behavior
- convergence
- perron-frobenius
- reciprocal interaction
- repeated reciprocation
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1431-1432
place: Richland, SC
publication: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-4239-1
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
series_title: AAMAS '16
status: public
title: The Convergence of Reciprocation
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '209'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck
variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network
scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.
We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence
of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the
approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. In:
Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization
and Applications (COCOA). LNCS. ; 2016:655--669. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47'
apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed
Objectives. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA) (pp. 655--669). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion
Games with Mixed Objectives}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder,
Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={655--669}, collection={LNCS}
}'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
Games with Mixed Objectives.” In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 655--669.
LNCS, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47.
ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives,”
in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47.
short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:32Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:41Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1607.05143'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
file_id: '5233'
file_name: Feldotto2016_Chapter_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf
file_size: 235739
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 655--669
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1082'
author:
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Handirk, Tobias
last_name: Handirk
citation:
ama: Handirk T. Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken. Universität
Paderborn; 2016.
apa: Handirk, T. (2016). Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Handirk_2016, title={Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Handirk, Tobias}, year={2016} }'
chicago: Handirk, Tobias. Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken.
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
ieee: T. Handirk, Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken.
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
mla: Handirk, Tobias. Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken.
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
short: T. Handirk, Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken, Universität
Paderborn, 2016.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:10:17Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:51Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '159'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Abstract—Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approachto a fair allocation
of bandwidth to each of the usersin a network. This allocation can be computed
by uniformlyraising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacityconstraints.
We consider an extension of these allocations byraising the bandwidth with arbitrary
and not necessarily uniformtime-depending velocities (allocation rates). These
allocationsare used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, whichwe formalize
in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present avariety of results for equilibria
in PFGs. We show that these gamespossess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While
computation ingeneral is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms forprominent
classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), includingthe case when all users have the
same source-destination pair.We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for
pure Nashand strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players havedifferent or
the same source-destination pairs. In addition, weshow that when a designer can
adjust allocation rates, it is possibleto design games with optimal strong equilibria.
Some initial resultson polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived.
author:
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Harks, Tobias
last_name: Harks
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Höfer, Martin
last_name: Höfer
- first_name: Kevin
full_name: Schewior, Kevin
last_name: Schewior
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games With Progressive Filling.
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 2016;(4):2553-2562. doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
apa: Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Routing Games
With Progressive Filling. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, (4), 2553–2562.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
bibtex: '@article{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2016, title={Routing Games With
Progressive Filling}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571},
number={4}, journal={IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Harks,
Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016},
pages={2553–2562} }'
chicago: 'Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing
Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no.
4 (2016): 2553–62. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.'
ieee: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games With Progressive
Filling,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no. 4, pp. 2553–2562, 2016.
mla: Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, no. 4, IEEE, 2016, pp. 2553–62, doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.
short: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
(2016) 2553–2562.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:23Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:40Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z
file_id: '1547'
file_name: 159-Harks-Hoefer-Schewior-Skopalik2016.pdf
file_size: 1655309
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 2553 - 2562
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
publisher: IEEE
status: public
title: Routing Games With Progressive Filling
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '149'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In this paper we consider a strategic variant of the online facility location
problem. Given is a graph in which each node serves two roles: it is a strategic
client stating requests as well as a potential location for a facility. In each
time step one client states a request which induces private costs equal to the
distance to the closest facility. Before serving, the clients may collectively
decide to open new facilities, sharing the corresponding price. Instead of optimizing
the global costs, each client acts selfishly. The prices of new facilities vary
between nodes and also change over time, but are always bounded by some fixed
value α. Both the requests as well as the facility prices are given by an online
sequence and are not known in advance.We characterize the optimal strategies of
the clients and analyze their overall performance in comparison to a centralized
offline solution. If all players optimize their own competitiveness, the global
performance of the system is O(√α⋅α) times worse than the offline optimum. A restriction
to a natural subclass of strategies improves this result to O(α). We also show
that for fixed facility costs, we can find strategies such that this bound further
improves to O(√α).'
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Björn
full_name: Feldkord, Björn
id: '22704'
last_name: Feldkord
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Feldkord B, Skopalik A. Strategic Online Facility Location. In: Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications (COCOA). LNCS. ; 2016:593--607. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43'
apa: Drees, M., Feldkord, B., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Strategic Online Facility
Location. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA) (pp. 593--607). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldkord_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Strategic
Online Facility Location}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldkord,
Björn and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={593--607}, collection={LNCS}
}'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Björn Feldkord, and Alexander Skopalik. “Strategic Online
Facility Location.” In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference
on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 593--607. LNCS, 2016.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43.
ieee: M. Drees, B. Feldkord, and A. Skopalik, “Strategic Online Facility Location,”
in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Strategic Online Facility Location.” Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43.
short: 'M. Drees, B. Feldkord, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:21Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:10Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z
file_id: '1553'
file_name: 149-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-319-48749-6_43.pdf
file_size: 236253
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 593--607
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Strategic Online Facility Location
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '145'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Comparative evaluations of peer-to-peer protocols through simulations are
a viable approach to judge the performance and costs of the individual protocols
in large-scale networks. In order to support this work, we present the peer-to-peer
system simulator PeerfactSim.KOM, which we extended over the last years. PeerfactSim.KOM
comes with an extensive layer model to support various facets and protocols of
peer-to-peer networking. In this article, we describe PeerfactSim.KOM and show
how it can be used for detailed measurements of large-scale peer-to-peer networks.
We enhanced PeerfactSim.KOM with a fine-grained analyzer concept, with exhaustive
automated measurements and gnuplot generators as well as a coordination control
to evaluate sets of experiment setups in parallel. Thus, by configuring all experiments
and protocols only once and starting the simulator, all desired measurements are
performed, analyzed, evaluated, and combined, resulting in a holistic environment
for the comparative evaluation of peer-to-peer systems. An immediate comparison
of different configurations and overlays under different aspects is possible directly
after the execution without any manual post-processing. '
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Kalman
full_name: Graffi, Kalman
last_name: Graffi
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Graffi K. Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using
PeerfactSim.KOM. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience.
2016;28(5):1655-1677. doi:10.1002/cpe.3716'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., & Graffi, K. (2016). Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer
systems using PeerfactSim.KOM. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience,
28(5), 1655–1677. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716'
bibtex: '@article{Feldotto_Graffi_2016, title={Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer
systems using PeerfactSim.KOM}, volume={28}, DOI={10.1002/cpe.3716},
number={5}, journal={Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience}, publisher={Wiley
Online Library}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Graffi, Kalman}, year={2016},
pages={1655–1677} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
28, no. 5 (2016): 1655–77. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto and K. Graffi, “Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems
using PeerfactSim.KOM,” Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience,
vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 1655–1677, 2016.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience,
vol. 28, no. 5, Wiley Online Library, 2016, pp. 1655–77, doi:10.1002/cpe.3716.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, K. Graffi, Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
28 (2016) 1655–1677.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:00Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '79'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1002/cpe.3716
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z
file_id: '1556'
file_name: 145-Feldotto_et_al-2016-Concurrency_and_Computation-_Practice_and_Experience.pdf
file_size: 3121363
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 28'
issue: '5'
page: 1655-1677
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: 'Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience'
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley Online Library
status: public
title: Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
volume: 28
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '251'
author:
- first_name: Karlson
full_name: Pfannschmidt, Karlson
last_name: Pfannschmidt
citation:
ama: Pfannschmidt K. Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem. Universität
Paderborn; 2015.
apa: Pfannschmidt, K. (2015). Solving the aggregated bandits problem. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Pfannschmidt_2015, title={Solving the aggregated bandits problem},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pfannschmidt, Karlson}, year={2015}
}'
chicago: Pfannschmidt, Karlson. Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem. Universität
Paderborn, 2015.
ieee: K. Pfannschmidt, Solving the aggregated bandits problem. Universität
Paderborn, 2015.
mla: Pfannschmidt, Karlson. Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem. Universität
Paderborn, 2015.
short: K. Pfannschmidt, Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem, Universität Paderborn,
2015.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Solving the aggregated bandits problem
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '320'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics
of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency
functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by a potential
function argument. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing
pure Nash equilibria in such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players
have unit weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic)
latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game
may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles,
we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts.
A ρ--approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a state of a (weighted congestion) game
from which no player has any incentive to deviate in order to improve her cost
by a multiplicative factor higher than ρ. Do such equilibria exist for small values
of ρ? And if so, can we compute them efficiently?We provide positive answers to
both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions
by exploiting an “approximation” of such games by a new class of potential games
that we call Ψ-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!-approximate
pure Nash equilibria, where d is the maximum degree of the latency functions.
Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate
pure Nash equilibria when d is a constant. For games with linear latency functions,
the approximation guarantee is 3+√5/2 + Oγ for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for latency
functions with maximum degree d≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d). The running time is polynomial
in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ. As a byproduct
of our techniques, we also show the following interesting structural statement
for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree
d ≥ 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state
to a dO(d2)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified
in such games as long as d is a constant.To the best of our knowledge, these are
the first positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in
weighted congestion games. Our techniques significantly extend our recent work
on unweighted congestion games through the use of Ψ-games. The concept of approximating
nonpotential games by potential ones is interesting in itself and might have further
applications.'
article_number: '2'
author:
- first_name: Ioannis
full_name: Caragiannis, Ioannis
last_name: Caragiannis
- first_name: Angelo
full_name: Fanelli, Angelo
last_name: Fanelli
- first_name: Nick
full_name: Gravin, Nick
last_name: Gravin
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Caragiannis I, Fanelli A, Gravin N, Skopalik A. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.
Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2015;3(1). doi:10.1145/2614687'
apa: 'Caragiannis, I., Fanelli, A., Gravin, N., & Skopalik, A. (2015). Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation,
and Structure. Transactions on Economics and Computation, 3(1).
https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687'
bibtex: '@article{Caragiannis_Fanelli_Gravin_Skopalik_2015, title={Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation,
and Structure}, volume={3}, DOI={10.1145/2614687},
number={12}, journal={Transactions on Economics and Computation}, publisher={ACM},
author={Caragiannis, Ioannis and Fanelli, Angelo and Gravin, Nick and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2015} }'
chicago: 'Caragiannis, Ioannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient
Computation, and Structure.” Transactions on Economics and Computation
3, no. 1 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687.'
ieee: 'I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation,
and Structure,” Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 3, no.
1, 2015.'
mla: 'Caragiannis, Ioannis, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted
Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.” Transactions
on Economics and Computation, vol. 3, no. 1, 2, ACM, 2015, doi:10.1145/2614687.'
short: I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik, Transactions on Economics
and Computation 3 (2015).
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:54Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:04Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/2614687
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z
date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z
file_id: '1433'
file_name: 320-a2-caragiannis.pdf
file_size: 260503
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 3'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Transactions on Economics and Computation
publisher: ACM
status: public
title: 'Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence,
Efficient Computation, and Structure'
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 3
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '316'
author:
- first_name: Jannis
full_name: Pautz, Jannis
last_name: Pautz
citation:
ama: Pautz J. Budget Games with Priced Strategies. Universität Paderborn;
2015.
apa: Pautz, J. (2015). Budget Games with priced strategies. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Pautz_2015, title={Budget Games with priced strategies}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Pautz, Jannis}, year={2015} }'
chicago: Pautz, Jannis. Budget Games with Priced Strategies. Universität
Paderborn, 2015.
ieee: J. Pautz, Budget Games with priced strategies. Universität Paderborn,
2015.
mla: Pautz, Jannis. Budget Games with Priced Strategies. Universität Paderborn,
2015.
short: J. Pautz, Budget Games with Priced Strategies, Universität Paderborn, 2015.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:53Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:01Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Budget Games with priced strategies
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '271'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists
of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the
sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a
limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split
between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria,
we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her
utility by more than some fixed factor $\alpha$ through unilateral strategy changes.
There is a threshold $\alpha_\delta$ (where $\delta$ is a parameter that limits
the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that $\alpha$-approximate
pure Nash equilibria always exist for $\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta$, but not for
$\alpha < \alpha_\delta$. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold
$\alpha_\delta$ and show that the corresponding decision problem is ${\sf NP}$-hard.
We also show that the $\alpha$-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is $\alpha+1$.
For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly
from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria
can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response
dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which
includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close
to the optimum.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. On Existence and Properties of
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. In: Proceedings
of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. ; 2015:178-189. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14'
apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2015). On Existence
and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT) (pp. 178–189). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2015, series={Lecture Notes
in Computer Science}, title={On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash
Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers,
Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2015}, pages={178–189}, collection={Lecture
Notes in Computer Science} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth
Allocation Games.” In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), 178–89. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14.
ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “On Existence and Properties
of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games,” in Proceedings
of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015,
pp. 178–189.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.” Proceedings of the 8th International
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–89, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14.
short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–189.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:34Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1507.02908'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z
file_id: '1475'
file_name: 271-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-662-48433-3_14.pdf
file_size: 256718
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 178-189
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT)
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth
Allocation Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '277'
author:
- first_name: Nils
full_name: Kothe, Nils
last_name: Kothe
citation:
ama: Kothe N. Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk.
Universität Paderborn; 2015.
apa: Kothe, N. (2015). Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen
im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Kothe_2015, title={Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen
im Highspeed-Netzwerk}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kothe, Nils},
year={2015} }'
chicago: Kothe, Nils. Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen
im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn, 2015.
ieee: N. Kothe, Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk.
Universität Paderborn, 2015.
mla: Kothe, Nils. Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk.
Universität Paderborn, 2015.
short: N. Kothe, Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk,
Universität Paderborn, 2015.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:46Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:44Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '17657'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Inter-datacenter transfers of non-interactive but timely large flows over
a private (managed) network is an important problem faced by many cloud service
providers. The considered flows are non-interactive because they do not explicitly
target the end users. However, most of them must be performed on a timely basis
and are associated with a deadline. We propose to schedule these flows by a centralized
controller, which determines when to transmit each flow and which path to use.
Two scheduling models are presented in this paper. In the first, the controller
also determines the rate of each flow, while in the second bandwidth is assigned
by the network according to the TCP rules. We develop scheduling algorithms for
both models and compare their complexity and performance.
author:
- first_name: R.
full_name: Cohen, R.
last_name: Cohen
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
citation:
ama: Cohen R, Polevoy G. Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows. Cloud
Computing, IEEE Transactions on. 2015;PP(99):1-1. doi:10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964
apa: Cohen, R., & Polevoy, G. (2015). Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data
Flows. Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On, PP(99), 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964
bibtex: '@article{Cohen_Polevoy_2015, title={Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large
Data Flows}, volume={PP}, DOI={10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964},
number={99}, journal={Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on}, author={Cohen, R.
and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2015}, pages={1–1} }'
chicago: 'Cohen, R., and Gleb Polevoy. “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data
Flows.” Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On PP, no. 99 (2015): 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964.'
ieee: R. Cohen and G. Polevoy, “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows,”
Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2015.
mla: Cohen, R., and Gleb Polevoy. “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows.”
Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On, vol. PP, no. 99, 2015, pp. 1–1,
doi:10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964.
short: R. Cohen, G. Polevoy, Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On PP (2015) 1–1.
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:58Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964
extern: '1'
issue: '99'
keyword:
- Approximation algorithms
- Approximation methods
- Bandwidth
- Cloud computing
- Routing
- Schedules
- Scheduling
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1-1
publication: Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2168-7161
status: public
title: Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows
type: journal_article
user_id: '83983'
volume: PP
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '17658'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Abstract We study the problem of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences.
In this problem the input consists of a set of users and a set of base stations.
Each user has a list of requests, each consisting of a base station, a frequency
demand, and a profit that may be gained by scheduling this request. The goal is
to find a maximum profit set of user requests S that satisfies the following conditions:
(i) S contains at most one request per user, (ii) the frequency sets allotted
to requests in S that correspond to the same base station are pairwise non-intersecting,
and (iii) the QoS received by any user at any frequency is reasonable according
to an interference model. In this paper we consider two variants of bandwidth
allocation with multiple interferences. In the first each request specifies a
demand that can be satisfied by any subset of frequencies that is large enough.
In the second each request specifies a specific frequency interval. Furthermore,
we consider two interference models, multiplicative and additive. We show that
these problems are extremely hard to approximate if the interferences depend on
both the interfered and the interfering base stations. On the other hand, we provide
constant factor approximation algorithms for both variants of bandwidth allocation
with multiple interferences for the case where the interferences depend only on
the interfering base stations. We also consider a restrictive special case that
is closely related to the Knapsack problem. We show that this special case is
NP-hard and that it admits an FPTAS. '
author:
- first_name: Reuven
full_name: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven
last_name: Bar-Yehuda
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Dror
full_name: Rawitz, Dror
last_name: Rawitz
citation:
ama: Bar-Yehuda R, Polevoy G, Rawitz D. Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks
with multiple interferences. Discrete Applied Mathematics . 2015;194:23-36.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013
apa: Bar-Yehuda, R., Polevoy, G., & Rawitz, D. (2015). Bandwidth allocation
in cellular networks with multiple interferences. Discrete Applied Mathematics
, 194, 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013
bibtex: '@article{Bar-Yehuda_Polevoy_Rawitz_2015, title={Bandwidth allocation in
cellular networks with multiple interferences}, volume={194}, DOI={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013},
journal={Discrete Applied Mathematics }, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Bar-Yehuda,
Reuven and Polevoy, Gleb and Rawitz, Dror}, year={2015}, pages={23–36} }'
chicago: 'Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, Gleb Polevoy, and Dror Rawitz. “Bandwidth Allocation
in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” Discrete Applied Mathematics
194 (2015): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013.'
ieee: R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, and D. Rawitz, “Bandwidth allocation in cellular
networks with multiple interferences,” Discrete Applied Mathematics , vol.
194, pp. 23–36, 2015.
mla: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, et al. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with
Multiple Interferences.” Discrete Applied Mathematics , vol. 194, Elsevier,
2015, pp. 23–36, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013.
short: R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, D. Rawitz, Discrete Applied Mathematics 194 (2015)
23–36.
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:15Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013
extern: '1'
intvolume: ' 194'
keyword:
- Local ratio
language:
- iso: eng
page: 23 - 36
publication: 'Discrete Applied Mathematics '
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0166-218X
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences
type: journal_article
user_id: '83983'
volume: 194
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '370'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of
bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by
uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints.
We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary
and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These
allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we
formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs).We present a variety of results
for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong
equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time
algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case
when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of
anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when
players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show
that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games
with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms
in this direction are also derived. '
author:
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Harks, Tobias
last_name: Harks
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Höfer, Martin
last_name: Höfer
- first_name: Kevin
full_name: Schewior, Kevin
last_name: Schewior
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games with Progressive Filling.
In: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications (INFOCOM’14). ; 2014:352-360. doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571'
apa: Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Routing Games
with Progressive Filling. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International
Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14) (pp. 352–360). https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2014, title={Routing Games
with Progressive Filling}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications (INFOCOM’14)}, author={Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior,
Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={352–360} }'
chicago: Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing
Games with Progressive Filling.” In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International
Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 352–60, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.
ieee: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games with Progressive
Filling,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on
Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 2014, pp. 352–360.
mla: Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games with Progressive Filling.” Proceedings
of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14),
2014, pp. 352–60, doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.
short: 'T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 33rd
Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14),
2014, pp. 352–360.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:30Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z
date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z
file_id: '1402'
file_name: 370-HHSS14.pdf
file_size: 179583
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 352-360
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications (INFOCOM'14)
status: public
title: Routing Games with Progressive Filling
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '373'
author:
- first_name: David
full_name: Pahl, David
last_name: Pahl
citation:
ama: Pahl D. Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität
Paderborn; 2014.
apa: Pahl, D. (2014). Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Pahl_2014, title={Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pahl, David}, year={2014} }'
chicago: Pahl, David. Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen.
Universität Paderborn, 2014.
ieee: D. Pahl, Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen.
Universität Paderborn, 2014.
mla: Pahl, David. Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen.
Universität Paderborn, 2014.
short: D. Pahl, Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen, Universität
Paderborn, 2014.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:31Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17659'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Stojan
full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan
last_name: Trajanovski
- first_name: Mathijs M.
full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs M.
last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, de Weerdt MM. Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.
In: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:861-868.'
apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Nash Equilibria
in Shared Effort Games. In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (pp. 861–868). Richland, SC:
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC},
series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings
of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems},
publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems},
author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014},
pages={861–868}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Nash Equilibria
in Shared Effort Games.” In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 861–68. AAMAS ’14. Richland,
SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.'
ieee: G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, and M. M. de Weerdt, “Nash Equilibria in Shared
Effort Games,” in Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multi-agent Systems, 2014, pp. 861–868.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” Proceedings
of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp.
861–68.
short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp.
861–868.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- competition
- equilibrium
- market
- models
- shared effort games
- simulation
language:
- iso: eng
page: 861-868
place: Richland, SC
publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multi-agent Systems
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-2738-1
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
series_title: AAMAS '14
status: public
title: Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17660'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Mathijs M.
full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs M.
last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing. In:
Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:1741-1742.'
apa: 'Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Improving Human Interaction in
Crowdsensing. In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multi-agent Systems (pp. 1741–1742). Richland, SC: International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS
’14}, title={Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing}, booktitle={Proceedings
of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems},
publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems},
author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={1741–1742},
collection={AAMAS ’14} }'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction
in Crowdsensing.” In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 1741–42. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.'
ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing,”
in Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-agent Systems, 2014, pp. 1741–1742.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing.”
Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
2014, pp. 1741–42.
short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1741–1742.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- dynamics
- emotion modeling
- negotiation
- network interaction
- shared effort game
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1741-1742
place: Richland, SC
publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multi-agent Systems
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-2738-1
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
series_title: AAMAS '14
status: public
title: Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17661'
author:
- first_name: Thomas C.
full_name: King, Thomas C.
last_name: King
- first_name: Qingzhi
full_name: Liu, Qingzhi
last_name: Liu
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Mathijs
full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs
last_name: de Weerdt
- first_name: Virginia
full_name: Dignum, Virginia
last_name: Dignum
- first_name: M. Birna
full_name: van Riemsdijk, M. Birna
last_name: van Riemsdijk
- first_name: Martijn
full_name: Warnier, Martijn
last_name: Warnier
citation:
ama: 'King TC, Liu Q, Polevoy G, et al. Request Driven Social Sensing. In: Proceedings
of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.
AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems; 2014:1651-1652.'
apa: 'King, T. C., Liu, Q., Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M., Dignum, V., van Riemsdijk,
M. B., & Warnier, M. (2014). Request Driven Social Sensing. In Proceedings
of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems
(pp. 1651–1652). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{King_Liu_Polevoy_de Weerdt_Dignum_van Riemsdijk_Warnier_2014,
place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Request Driven Social Sensing},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems}, author={King, Thomas C. and Liu, Qingzhi and Polevoy,
Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Dignum, Virginia and van Riemsdijk, M. Birna and
Warnier, Martijn}, year={2014}, pages={1651–1652}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }'
chicago: 'King, Thomas C., Qingzhi Liu, Gleb Polevoy, Mathijs de Weerdt, Virginia
Dignum, M. Birna van Riemsdijk, and Martijn Warnier. “Request Driven Social Sensing.”
In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems, 1651–52. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.'
ieee: T. C. King et al., “Request Driven Social Sensing,” in Proceedings
of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems,
2014, pp. 1651–1652.
mla: King, Thomas C., et al. “Request Driven Social Sensing.” Proceedings of
the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp.
1651–52.
short: 'T.C. King, Q. Liu, G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, V. Dignum, M.B. van Riemsdijk,
M. Warnier, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1651–1652.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- crowd-sensing
- crowdsourcing
- data aggregation
- game theory
- norms
- reciprocation
- self interested agents
- simulation
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1651-1652
place: Richland, SC
publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multi-agent Systems
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-2738-1
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
series_title: AAMAS '14
status: public
title: Request Driven Social Sensing
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17662'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Rann
full_name: Smorodinsky, Rann
last_name: Smorodinsky
- first_name: Moshe
full_name: Tennenholtz, Moshe
last_name: Tennenholtz
citation:
ama: Polevoy G, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M. Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.
ACM Trans Econ Comput. 2014;2(1):1:1-1:16. doi:10.1145/2560766
apa: Polevoy, G., Smorodinsky, R., & Tennenholtz, M. (2014). Signaling Competition
and Social Welfare. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., 2(1), 1:1-1:16. https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766
bibtex: '@article{Polevoy_Smorodinsky_Tennenholtz_2014, title={Signaling Competition
and Social Welfare}, volume={2}, DOI={10.1145/2560766},
number={1}, journal={ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}, publisher={ACM}, author={Polevoy,
Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}, year={2014}, pages={1:1-1:16}
}'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Rann Smorodinsky, and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Signaling Competition
and Social Welfare.” ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2, no. 1 (2014): 1:1-1:16.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766.'
ieee: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, and M. Tennenholtz, “Signaling Competition and
Social Welfare,” ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1:1-1:16,
2014.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” ACM Trans.
Econ. Comput., vol. 2, no. 1, ACM, 2014, pp. 1:1-1:16, doi:10.1145/2560766.
short: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, M. Tennenholtz, ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2 (2014)
1:1-1:16.
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:55Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/2560766
extern: '1'
intvolume: ' 2'
issue: '1'
keyword:
- Competition
- efficiency
- equilibrium
- market
- social welfare
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1:1-1:16
publication: ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2167-8375
publisher: ACM
status: public
title: Signaling Competition and Social Welfare
type: journal_article
user_id: '83983'
volume: 2
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '451'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and
each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has
a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has
to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget
is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the
strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity
of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria
are analysed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence
towards an equilibrium may be exponential.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Budget-restricted utility games with ordered
strategic decisions. In: Lavi R, ed. Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium
on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). Lecture Notes in Computer Science. ; 2014:110-121.
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10'
apa: Drees, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Budget-restricted utility
games with ordered strategic decisions. In R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the
7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (pp. 110–121).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Riechers_Skopalik_2014, series={Lecture Notes in Computer
Science}, title={Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions},
DOI={10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander},
editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={110–121}, collection={Lecture Notes
in Computer Science} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “Budget-Restricted
Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions.” In Proceedings of the 7th
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi,
110–21. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10.
ieee: M. Drees, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Budget-restricted utility games with
ordered strategic decisions,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium
on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, pp. 110–121.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic
Decisions.” Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, pp. 110–21, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10.
short: 'M. Drees, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the
7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, pp. 110–121.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:07Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10
editor:
- first_name: Ron
full_name: Lavi, Ron
last_name: Lavi
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z
file_id: '1344'
file_name: 451-DRS14.pdf
file_size: 283266
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 110-121
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '14'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C2
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT)
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '452'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Today's networks, like the Internet, do not consist of one but a mixture of
several interconnected networks. Each has individual qualities and hence the performance
of a network node results from the networks' interplay.We introduce a new game
theoretic model capturing the interplay between a high-speed backbone network
and a low-speed general purpose network. In our model, n nodes are connected by
a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway node.
A gateway node pays a fixed price for its connection to the high-speed network,
but can utilize the high-speed network to gain communication distance 0 to all
other gateways. Communication distances in the low-speed network are given by
the hop distances. The effective communication distance between any two nodes
then is given by the shortest path, which is possibly improved by using gateways
as shortcuts.Every node v has the objective to minimize its communication costs,
given by the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of the effective communication
distances from v to all other nodes plus a fixed price \alpha > 0, if it decides
to be a gateway. For both games and different ranges of \alpha, we study the existence
of equilibria, the price of anarchy, and convergence properties of best-response
dynamics.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian
last_name: Abshoff
- first_name: Andreas
full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
last_name: Cord-Landwehr
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Jung, Daniel
id: '37827'
last_name: Jung
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Brief Announcement: A Model
for Multilevel Network Games. In: Lavi R, ed. Proceedings of the 7th International
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). LNCS. ; 2014:294.'
apa: 'Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Brief
Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games. In R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings
of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (p. 294).'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS},
title={Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games}, booktitle={Proceedings
of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Abshoff,
Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander},
editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={294}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander
Skopalik. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games.” In Proceedings
of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited
by Ron Lavi, 294. LNCS, 2014.'
ieee: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Brief Announcement:
A Model for Multilevel Network Games,” in Proceedings of the 7th International
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p. 294.'
mla: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network
Games.” Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, p. 294.'
short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings
of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p.
294.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:08Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
editor:
- first_name: Ron
full_name: Lavi, Ron
last_name: Lavi
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
file_id: '1343'
file_name: 452-title_multilevel-sagt.pdf
file_size: 84783
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: '294'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games'
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '453'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider
both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing
utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf
s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential
value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the
set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded
by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf
s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like
results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that
these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate
pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions.
For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves
the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides
the first guarantees for general latency functions.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Gairing, Martin
last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Skopalik A. Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion
Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:30-43. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3'
apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Bounding the Potential
Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)
(pp. 30–43). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Bounding
the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria},
DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={30–43}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, and Alexander Skopalik. “Bounding the
Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.”
In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
(WINE), 30–43. LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3.
ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, and A. Skopalik, “Bounding the Potential Function
in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria,” in Proceedings of
the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014,
pp. 30–43.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games
and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.” Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3.
short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
file_id: '1342'
file_name: 453-WINE14FGS.pdf
file_size: 324307
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 30-43
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash
Equilibria
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '455'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion
games and develop techniques to obtain approximate potential functions that prove
the existence of alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria and the convergence of
alpha-improvement steps. Specifically, we show how to obtain upper bounds for
approximation factor alpha for a given class of cost functions. For example for
concave cost functions the factor is at most 3/2, for quadratic cost functions
it is at most 4/3, and for polynomial cost functions of maximal degree d it is
at at most d + 1. For games with two players we obtain tight bounds which are
as small as for example 1.054 in the case of quadratic cost functions.
author:
- first_name: Christoph
full_name: Hansknecht, Christoph
last_name: Hansknecht
- first_name: Max
full_name: Klimm, Max
last_name: Klimm
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Hansknecht C, Klimm M, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
congestion games. In: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation
Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX). LIPIcs. ; 2014:242-257.
doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242'
apa: Hansknecht, C., Klimm, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash
equilibria in weighted congestion games. In Proceedings of the 17th. International
Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)
(pp. 242–257). https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Hansknecht_Klimm_Skopalik_2014, series={LIPIcs}, title={Approximate
pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games}, DOI={10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms
for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)}, author={Hansknecht, Christoph
and Klimm, Max and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={242–257}, collection={LIPIcs}
}'
chicago: Hansknecht, Christoph, Max Klimm, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 17th.
International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization
Problems (APPROX), 242–57. LIPIcs, 2014. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242.
ieee: C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria
in weighted congestion games,” in Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop
on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX),
2014, pp. 242–257.
mla: Hansknecht, Christoph, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted
Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation
Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 2014, pp. 242–57,
doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242.
short: 'C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 17th. International
Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX),
2014, pp. 242–257.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
file_id: '1341'
file_name: 455-HKS14.pdf
file_size: 512712
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 242 - 257
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms
for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)
series_title: LIPIcs
status: public
title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '456'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context
congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold
value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with
cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate
pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and
always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19].
author:
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Gairing, Martin
last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Grammateia
full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia
last_name: Kotsialou
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social
Context Congestion Games. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:480-485. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43'
apa: Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash
equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. In Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (pp. 480–485). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Approximate
pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)}, author={Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={480–485}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Gairing, Martin, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of
the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 480–85.
LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43.
ieee: M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria
in Social Context Congestion Games,” in Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–485.
mla: Gairing, Martin, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context
Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web
and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–85, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43.
short: 'M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–485.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:21Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:10Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
file_id: '1340'
file_name: 456-WINE14final.pdf
file_size: 377378
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 480 - 485
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '462'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using
techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated
by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly
complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed
IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our
current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Skopalik A. A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely
Repeated Games. In: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation
and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014).
; 2014:625-630. doi:10.5220/0005110406250630'
apa: Feldotto, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
Complex Infinitely Repeated Games. In Proceedings of the 4th International
Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
(SIMULTECH 2014) (pp. 625–630). https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Skopalik_2014, title={A Simulation Framework for
Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}, DOI={10.5220/0005110406250630},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}, author={Feldotto,
Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={625–630} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for
Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” In Proceedings of the 4th International
Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
(SIMULTECH 2014), 625–30, 2014. https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630.
ieee: M. Feldotto and A. Skopalik, “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex
Infinitely Repeated Games,” in Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
2014), 2014, pp. 625–630.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
2014), 2014, pp. 625–30, doi:10.5220/0005110406250630.
short: 'M. Feldotto, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
2014), 2014, pp. 625–630.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:22Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:15Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.5220/0005110406250630
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
file_id: '1337'
file_name: 462-FS2014SIMULTECH.pdf
file_size: 993721
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 625-630
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)
status: public
title: A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '395'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication
costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static
network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed
network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game)
ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus
a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication
distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as
shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is
Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1))
the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game,
weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1.
Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the
dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that
it is not weakly acyclic.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian
last_name: Abshoff
- first_name: Andreas
full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
last_name: Cord-Landwehr
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Jung, Daniel
id: '37827'
last_name: Jung
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Multilevel Network Games.
In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
(WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:435-440. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36'
apa: Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Multilevel
Network Games. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and
Internet Economics (WINE) (pp. 435–440). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS},
title={Multilevel Network Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)}, author={Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung,
Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={435–440}, collection={LNCS}
}'
chicago: Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Multilevel Network Games.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 435–40. LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36.
ieee: S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Multilevel Network
Games,” in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 435–440.
mla: Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Multilevel Network Games.” Proceedings of the
10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014,
pp. 435–40, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36.
short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp.
435–440.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:09Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:59Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
file_id: '1382'
file_name: 395-WINE2014ACJS.pdf
file_size: 161479
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 435-440
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Multilevel Network Games
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '412'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper we present and analyze HSkip+, a self-stabilizing overlay network
for nodes with arbitrary heterogeneous bandwidths. HSkip+ has the same topology
as the Skip+ graph proposed by Jacob et al. [PODC 2009] but its self-stabilization
mechanism significantly outperforms the self-stabilization mechanism proposed
for Skip+. Also, the nodes are now ordered according to their bandwidths and not
according to their identifiers. Various other solutions have already been proposed
for overlay networks with heterogeneous bandwidths, but they are not self-stabilizing.
In addition to HSkip+ being self-stabilizing, its performance is on par with the
best previous bounds on the time and work for joining or leaving a network of
peers of logarithmic diameter and degree and arbitrary bandwidths. Also, the dilation
and congestion for routing messages is on par with the best previous bounds for
such networks, so that HSkip+ combines the advantages of both worlds. Our theoretical
investigations are backed by simulations demonstrating that HSkip+ is indeed performing
much better than Skip+ and working correctly under high churn rates.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Scheideler, Christian
id: '20792'
last_name: Scheideler
- first_name: Kalman
full_name: Graffi, Kalman
last_name: Graffi
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Scheideler C, Graffi K. HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network
for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths. In: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International
Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P). ; 2014:1-10. doi:10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., Scheideler, C., & Graffi, K. (2014). HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing
Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths. In Proceedings of
the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P) (pp.
1–10). https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Scheideler_Graffi_2014, title={HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing
Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths}, DOI={10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer
Computing (P2P)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Scheideler, Christian and Graffi,
Kalman}, year={2014}, pages={1–10} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Christian Scheideler, and Kalman Graffi. “HSkip+:
A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths.” In
Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
(P2P), 1–10, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto, C. Scheideler, and K. Graffi, “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay
Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths,” in Proceedings of the 14th
IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for
Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths.” Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International
Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10, doi:10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, C. Scheideler, K. Graffi, in: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE
International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:12Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:20Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '79'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1408.0395'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z
file_id: '1361'
file_name: 412-FSG2014P2P.pdf
file_size: 472321
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 1-10
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1
publication: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer
Computing (P2P)
status: public
title: 'HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths'
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17663'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In this paper, we define and study a new problem, referred to as the Dependent
Unsplittable Flow Problem (D-UFP). We present and discuss this problem in the
context of large-scale powerful (radar/camera) sensor networks, but we believe
it has important applications on the admission of large flows in other networks
as well. In order to optimize the selection of flows transmitted to the gateway,
D-UFP takes into account possible dependencies between flows. We show that D-UFP
is more difficult than NP-hard problems for which no good approximation is known.
Then, we address two special cases of this problem: the case where all the sensors
have a shared channel and the case where the sensors form a mesh and route to
the gateway over a spanning tree.'
author:
- first_name: R.
full_name: Cohen, R.
last_name: Cohen
- first_name: I.
full_name: Nudelman, I.
last_name: Nudelman
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
citation:
ama: Cohen R, Nudelman I, Polevoy G. On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful
Sensor Networks. Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on. 2013;21(5):1461-1471.
doi:10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792
apa: Cohen, R., Nudelman, I., & Polevoy, G. (2013). On the Admission of Dependent
Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On,
21(5), 1461–1471. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792
bibtex: '@article{Cohen_Nudelman_Polevoy_2013, title={On the Admission of Dependent
Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks}, volume={21}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792},
number={5}, journal={Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on}, author={Cohen, R.
and Nudelman, I. and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2013}, pages={1461–1471} }'
chicago: 'Cohen, R., I. Nudelman, and Gleb Polevoy. “On the Admission of Dependent
Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On
21, no. 5 (2013): 1461–71. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792.'
ieee: R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, and G. Polevoy, “On the Admission of Dependent Flows
in Powerful Sensor Networks,” Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on, vol.
21, no. 5, pp. 1461–1471, 2013.
mla: Cohen, R., et al. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.”
Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On, vol. 21, no. 5, 2013, pp. 1461–71,
doi:10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792.
short: R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, G. Polevoy, Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On 21
(2013) 1461–1471.
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:22:05Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792
extern: '1'
intvolume: ' 21'
issue: '5'
keyword:
- Approximation algorithms
- Approximation methods
- Bandwidth
- Logic gates
- Radar
- Vectors
- Wireless sensor networks
- Dependent flow scheduling
- sensor networks
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1461-1471
publication: Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1063-6692
status: public
title: On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks
type: journal_article
user_id: '83983'
volume: 21
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '17664'
author:
- first_name: Reuven
full_name: Cohen, Reuven
last_name: Cohen
- first_name: Ilia
full_name: Nudelman, Ilia
last_name: Nudelman
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
citation:
ama: 'Cohen R, Nudelman I, Polevoy G. On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful
Sensor Networks. In: Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida. ; 2012.'
apa: Cohen, R., Nudelman, I., & Polevoy, G. (2012). On the Admission of Dependent
Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. In Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida.
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Cohen_Nudelman_Polevoy_2012, title={On the Admission of
Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks}, booktitle={Infocom’2012, Orlando,
Florida}, author={Cohen, Reuven and Nudelman, Ilia and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2012}
}'
chicago: Cohen, Reuven, Ilia Nudelman, and Gleb Polevoy. “On the Admission of Dependent
Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” In Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida,
2012.
ieee: R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, and G. Polevoy, “On the Admission of Dependent Flows
in Powerful Sensor Networks,” in Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012.
mla: Cohen, Reuven, et al. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor
Networks.” Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012.
short: 'R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, G. Polevoy, in: Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:22:24Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Infocom'2012, Orlando, Florida
status: public
title: On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '17665'
author:
- first_name: Reuven
full_name: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven
last_name: Bar-Yehuda
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Dror
full_name: Rawitz, Dror
last_name: Rawitz
citation:
ama: 'Bar-Yehuda R, Polevoy G, Rawitz D. Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks
with multiple interferences. In: DIALM-PODC. ; 2010:33-42.'
apa: Bar-Yehuda, R., Polevoy, G., & Rawitz, D. (2010). Bandwidth allocation
in cellular networks with multiple interferences. In DIALM-PODC (pp. 33–42).
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Bar-Yehuda_Polevoy_Rawitz_2010, title={Bandwidth allocation
in cellular networks with multiple interferences}, booktitle={DIALM-PODC}, author={Bar-Yehuda,
Reuven and Polevoy, Gleb and Rawitz, Dror}, year={2010}, pages={33–42} }'
chicago: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, Gleb Polevoy, and Dror Rawitz. “Bandwidth Allocation
in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” In DIALM-PODC, 33–42,
2010.
ieee: R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, and D. Rawitz, “Bandwidth allocation in cellular
networks with multiple interferences,” in DIALM-PODC, 2010, pp. 33–42.
mla: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, et al. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with
Multiple Interferences.” DIALM-PODC, 2010, pp. 33–42.
short: 'R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, D. Rawitz, in: DIALM-PODC, 2010, pp. 33–42.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:22:47Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 33-42
publication: DIALM-PODC
status: public
title: Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2010'
...