---
_id: '669'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games andits bottleneck
variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to modelnetwork scenarios
in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.We characterize
the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergenceof improvement
dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of thedecision problem.
For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approx-imation ratio of
approximate pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion games with mixed objectives. Journal
of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018;36(4):1145-1167. doi:10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2018). Congestion games with mixed
objectives. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 36(4), 1145–1167.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
bibtex: '@article{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2018, title={Congestion games with mixed
objectives}, volume={36}, DOI={10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y},
number={4}, journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer
Nature}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander},
year={2018}, pages={1145–1167} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
Games with Mixed Objectives.” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization 36,
no. 4 (2018): 1145–67. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y.'
ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion games with mixed objectives,”
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1145–1167, 2018.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” Journal
of Combinatorial Optimization, vol. 36, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2018, pp.
1145–67, doi:10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y.
short: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
36 (2018) 1145–1167.
date_created: 2017-10-26T14:11:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:15Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1607.05143'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
file_id: '5226'
file_name: Feldotto2018_Article_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf
file_size: 605207
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 36'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1145-1167
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1382-6905
- 1573-2886
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Congestion games with mixed objectives
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
volume: 36
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1186'
author:
- first_name: Arne
full_name: Kemper, Arne
last_name: Kemper
citation:
ama: Kemper A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: Kemper, A. (2018). Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Kemper_2018, title={Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games
via Potential Functions}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kemper, Arne},
year={2018} }'
chicago: Kemper, Arne. Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: A. Kemper, Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: Kemper, Arne. Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: A. Kemper, Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential
Functions, Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-03-02T13:47:57Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:11Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1187'
author:
- first_name: Marcel
full_name: Nachtigall, Marcel
last_name: Nachtigall
citation:
ama: Nachtigall M. Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition
Game Model. Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: Nachtigall, M. (2018). Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition
Game Model. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Nachtigall_2018, title={Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player
Composition Game Model}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Nachtigall,
Marcel}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Nachtigall, Marcel. Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player
Composition Game Model. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: M. Nachtigall, Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition
Game Model. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: Nachtigall, Marcel. Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition
Game Model. Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: M. Nachtigall, Scenario-Driven Strategy Analysis in a n-Player Composition
Game Model, Universität Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-03-02T13:49:39Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:11Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition Game Model
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1188'
author:
- first_name: Jérôme
full_name: Kempf, Jérôme
last_name: Kempf
citation:
ama: Kempf J. Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions.
Universität Paderborn; 2018.
apa: Kempf, J. (2018). Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Kempf_2018, title={Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kempf, Jérôme}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Kempf, Jérôme. Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
ieee: J. Kempf, Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
mla: Kempf, Jérôme. Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions.
Universität Paderborn, 2018.
short: J. Kempf, Learning Deterministic Bandit Behaviour Form Compositions, Universität
Paderborn, 2018.
date_created: 2018-03-02T13:51:14Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:11Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1369'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash equilibria in restricted
budget games. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018. doi:10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2018). Pure Nash
equilibria in restricted budget games. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
bibtex: '@article{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2018, title={Pure Nash equilibria
in restricted budget games}, DOI={10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7},
journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer Nature},
author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” Journal of Combinatorial
Optimization, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7.
ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash equilibria
in restricted budget games,” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer Nature, 2018, doi:10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7.
short: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial
Optimization (2018).
date_created: 2018-03-18T11:12:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:42Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
file_id: '5225'
file_name: Drees2018_Article_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
file_size: 561187
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1382-6905
- 1573-2886
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '112'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate
dependencies among resources as they exist in in modern networked environments.
Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games
with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study $L_p$ norms and
analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally,
we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe
the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Complementarities.
In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC). LNCS. ; 2017:222--233. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19'
apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Congestion Games with Complementarities.
In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC) (pp. 222--233). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion
Games with Complementarities}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and
Complexity (CIAC)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={222--233}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
Games with Complementarities.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 222--233. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19.
ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Complementarities,”
in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Complementarities.” Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC),
2017, pp. 222--233, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19.
short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:58Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1701.07304'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
file_id: '1566'
file_name: 112-FeldottoLederSkopalik2017.pdf
file_size: 264089
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 222--233
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Congestion Games with Complementarities
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '113'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value
(SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers
weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to
proportional shares) for distributing the total cost of each resource among its
users. We focus on the interesting subclass of such games with polynomial resource
cost functions and present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria
with a polynomial number of strategy updates. Since computing a single strategy
update is hard, we apply sampling techniques which allow us to achieve polynomial
running time. The algorithm builds on the algorithmic ideas of [7], however, to
the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithmic result on computation
of approximate equilibria using other than proportional shares as player costs
in this setting. We present a novel relation that approximates the Shapley value
of a player by her proportional share and vice versa. As side results, we upper
bound the approximate price of anarchy of such games and significantly improve
the best known factor for computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
congestion games of [7].
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Gairing, Martin
last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Grammateia
full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia
last_name: Kotsialou
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Computing Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In: Proceedings
of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE).
; 2017. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14'
apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Computing
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
(WINE). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2017, title={Computing
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games},
DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou,
Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander
Skopalik. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted
Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web
and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14.
ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Computing Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games,” in Proceedings
of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE),
2017.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley
Value Weighted Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 13th International Conference
on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14.
short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:59Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1710.01634'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
file_id: '5231'
file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_ComputingApproximatePureNashEq.pdf
file_size: 279055
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)
status: public
title: Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion
Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '17652'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Stojan
full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan
last_name: Trajanovski
- first_name: Paola
full_name: Grosso, Paola
last_name: Grosso
- first_name: Cees
full_name: de Laat, Cees
last_name: de Laat
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, Grosso P, de Laat C. Filtering Undesirable Flows
in Networks. In: Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International
Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part
I. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing;
2017:3-17. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1'
apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., Grosso, P., & de Laat, C. (2017). Filtering
Undesirable Flows in Networks. In Combinatorial Optimization and Applications:
11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017,
Proceedings, Part I (pp. 3–17). Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_Grosso_de Laat_2017, place={Cham}, series={Lecture
Notes in Computer Science}, title={Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1},
booktitle={Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference,
COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I}, publisher={Springer
International Publishing}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and Grosso,
Paola and de Laat, Cees}, year={2017}, pages={3–17}, collection={Lecture Notes
in Computer Science} }'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, Paola Grosso, and Cees de Laat. “Filtering
Undesirable Flows in Networks.” In Combinatorial Optimization and Applications:
11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017,
Proceedings, Part I, 3–17. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1.'
ieee: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, and C. de Laat, “Filtering Undesirable
Flows in Networks,” in Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International
Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part
I, 2017, pp. 3–17.'
mla: 'Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks.” Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai,
China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, Springer International Publishing,
2017, pp. 3–17, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1.'
short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, P. Grosso, C. de Laat, in: Combinatorial Optimization
and Applications: 11th International Conference, COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China,
December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, Springer International Publishing,
Cham, 2017, pp. 3–17.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:19:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-71150-8_1
extern: '1'
keyword:
- flow
- filter
- MMSA
- set cover
- approximation
- local ratio algorithm
language:
- iso: eng
page: 3-17
place: Cham
publication: 'Combinatorial Optimization and Applications: 11th International Conference,
COCOA 2017, Shanghai, China, December 16-18, 2017, Proceedings, Part I'
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-3-319-71150-8
publisher: Springer International Publishing
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Filtering Undesirable Flows in Networks
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '17653'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: M.M.
full_name: de Weerdt, M.M.
last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Reciprocation Effort Games. In: Proceedings of
the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer; 2017.'
apa: Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2017). Reciprocation Effort Games. In
Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Springer.
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2017, series={CCIS}, title={Reciprocation
Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial
Intelligence}, publisher={Springer}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M.},
year={2017}, collection={CCIS} }'
chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and M.M. de Weerdt. “Reciprocation Effort Games.” In Proceedings
of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer,
2017.
ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Reciprocation Effort Games,” in Proceedings
of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and M. M. de Weerdt. “Reciprocation Effort Games.” Proceedings
of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.
short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:09Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- interaction
- reciprocation
- contribute
- shared effort
- curbing
- convergence
- threshold
- Nash equilibrium
- social welfare
- efficiency
- price of anarchy
- price of stability
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence
publisher: Springer
series_title: CCIS
status: public
title: Reciprocation Effort Games
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '17654'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: M.M.
full_name: de Weerdt, M.M.
last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Competition between Cooperative Projects. In: Proceedings
of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence. CCIS. Springer;
2017.'
apa: Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2017). Competition between Cooperative
Projects. In Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Springer.
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2017, series={CCIS}, title={Competition
between Cooperative Projects}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference
on Artificial Intelligence}, publisher={Springer}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de
Weerdt, M.M.}, year={2017}, collection={CCIS} }'
chicago: Polevoy, Gleb, and M.M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.”
In Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
CCIS. Springer, 2017.
ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Competition between Cooperative Projects,”
in Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
2017.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and M. M. de Weerdt. “Competition between Cooperative Projects.”
Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Springer, 2017.
short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2017.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:19Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- agents
- projects
- contribute
- shared effort game
- competition
- quota
- threshold
- Nash equilibrium
- social welfare
- efficiency
- price of anarchy
- price of stability
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Proceedings of the 29th Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence
publisher: Springer
series_title: CCIS
status: public
title: Competition between Cooperative Projects
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '59'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We consider a scheduling problem on $m$ identical processors sharing an arbitrarily
divisible resource. In addition to assigning jobs to processors, the scheduler
must distribute the resource among the processors (e.g., for three processors
in shares of 20\%, 15\%, and 65\%) and adjust this distribution over time. Each
job $j$ comes with a size $p_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and a resource requirement $r_j
> 0$. Jobs do not benefit when receiving a share larger than $r_j$ of the resource.
But providing them with a fraction of the resource requirement causes a linear
decrease in the processing efficiency. We seek a (non-preemptive) job and resource
assignment minimizing the makespan.Our main result is an efficient approximation
algorithm which achieves an approximation ratio of $2 + 1/(m-2)$. It can be improved
to an (asymptotic) ratio of $1 + 1/(m-1)$ if all jobs have unit size. Our algorithms
also imply new results for a well-known bin packing problem with splittable items
and a restricted number of allowed item parts per bin.Based upon the above solution,
we also derive an approximation algorithm with similar guarantees for a setting
in which we introduce so-called tasks each containing several jobs and where we
are interested in the average completion time of tasks (a task is completed when
all its jobs are completed).
author:
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Kling, Peter
last_name: Kling
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Mäcker, Alexander
id: '13536'
last_name: Mäcker
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Kling P, Mäcker A, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA). ; 2017:123--132. doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578'
apa: 'Kling, P., Mäcker, A., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Sharing is
Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In Proceedings
of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)
(pp. 123--132). https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Kling_Mäcker_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, title={Sharing is Caring:
Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource}, DOI={10.1145/3087556.3087578},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms
and Architectures (SPAA)}, author={Kling, Peter and Mäcker, Alexander and Riechers,
Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={123--132} }'
chicago: 'Kling, Peter, Alexander Mäcker, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource.” In Proceedings
of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA),
123--132, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578.'
ieee: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
Scheduling with a Sharable Resource,” in Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132.'
mla: 'Kling, Peter, et al. “Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a
Sharable Resource.” Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in
Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132, doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578.'
short: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 29th
ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp.
123--132.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:46Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/3087556.3087578
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
file_id: '1578'
file_name: 59-progress.pdf
file_size: 784867
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 123--132
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and
Architectures (SPAA)
status: public
title: 'Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '66'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted
Budget Games. In: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics
Conference (COCOON). LNCS. ; 2017:175--187. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15'
apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Pure Nash
Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games. In Proceedings of the 23rd International
Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON) (pp. 175--187). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Pure
Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören
and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={175--187}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” In Proceedings of the 23rd
International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 175--187. LNCS,
2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15.
ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash Equilibria
in Restricted Budget Games,” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing
and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15.
short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp.
175--187.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:13Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
file_id: '5228'
file_name: Drees2017_Chapter_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
file_size: 346390
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 175--187
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1073'
author:
- first_name: Simon
full_name: Nachtigall, Simon
last_name: Nachtigall
citation:
ama: Nachtigall S. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Nachtigall, S. (2017). Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Nachtigall_2017, title={Sortieren dynamischer Daten}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Nachtigall, Simon}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Nachtigall, Simon. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
ieee: S. Nachtigall, Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
mla: Nachtigall, Simon. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
short: S. Nachtigall, Sortieren dynamischer Daten, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T09:59:32Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Sortieren dynamischer Daten
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1074'
author:
- first_name: Simon
full_name: Pukrop, Simon
last_name: Pukrop
citation:
ama: Pukrop S. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn;
2017.
apa: Pukrop, S. (2017). Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Pukrop_2017, title={Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Pukrop, Simon}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Pukrop, Simon. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität
Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: S. Pukrop, Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
mla: Pukrop, Simon. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität
Paderborn, 2017.
short: S. Pukrop, Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games, Universität Paderborn,
2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:00:25Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1080'
author:
- first_name: Jan
full_name: Bürmann, Jan
last_name: Bürmann
citation:
ama: Bürmann J. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Bürmann, J. (2017). Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Bürmann_2017, title={Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under
Uncertainty}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Bürmann, Jan}, year={2017}
}'
chicago: Bürmann, Jan. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: J. Bürmann, Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
mla: Bürmann, Jan. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
short: J. Bürmann, Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty,
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:07:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1081'
author:
- first_name: Vipin Ravindran
full_name: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran
last_name: Vijayalakshmi
citation:
ama: Vijayalakshmi VR. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion
Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Vijayalakshmi, V. R. (2017). Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in
Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Vijayalakshmi_2017, title={Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Congestion Games under Taxation}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Vijayalakshmi,
Vipin Ravindran}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: V. R. Vijayalakshmi, Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion
Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
mla: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
short: V.R. Vijayalakshmi, Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion
Games under Taxation, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:08:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:51Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1094'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification
has the potential to address these problems. However, gamification is hardly used
in education, because current approaches to gamification require instructors to
engage in the time-consuming preparation of their course contents for use in quizzes,
mini-games and the like. Drawing on research on limited attention and present
bias, we propose a "lean" approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying
learning activities (rather than learning contents) and increasing their salience.
In this paper, we present the app StudyNow that implements such a lean gamification
approach. With this app, we aim to enable more students and instructors to benefit
from the advantages of gamification.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: John, Thomas
id: '3952'
last_name: John
- first_name: Dennis
full_name: Kundisch, Dennis
id: '21117'
last_name: Kundisch
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Hemsen, Paul
id: '22546'
last_name: Hemsen
- first_name: Katrin
full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin
last_name: Klingsieck
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, John T, Kundisch D, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Skopalik A. Making
Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow
Mobile App. In: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design
Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST). LNCS. ;
2017:462-467. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., John, T., Kundisch, D., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., & Skopalik,
A. (2017). Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content
with the StudyNow Mobile App. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)
(pp. 462–467). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_John_Kundisch_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Skopalik_2017,
series={LNCS}, title={Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game
and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science
Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias
and John, Thomas and Kundisch, Dennis and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin
and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={462–467}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Thomas John, Dennis Kundisch, Paul Hemsen, Katrin
Klingsieck, and Alexander Skopalik. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor:
Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” In Proceedings of
the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems
and Technology (DESRIST), 462–67. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, and A. Skopalik,
“Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
the StudyNow Mobile App,” in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST),
2017, pp. 462–467.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling
Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST),
2017, pp. 462–67, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, A. Skopalik,
in: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST), 2017, pp. 462–467.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:37:52Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
- _id: '276'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
file_id: '5230'
file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_MakingGamificationEasyForThePr.pdf
file_size: 1576363
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 462-467
publication: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
the StudyNow Mobile App'
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1095'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification
has the potential to address these problems. However, using gamification currently
is rather tedious and time-consuming for instructors because current approaches
to gamification require instructors to engage in the time-consuming preparation
of course contents (e.g., for quizzes or mini-games). In reply to this issue,
we propose a “lean” approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying learning
activities rather than learning contents. The learning activities that are gamified
in the lean approach can typically be drawn from existing course syllabi (e.g.,
attend certain lectures, hand in assignments, read book chapters and articles).
Hence, compared to existing approaches, lean gamification substantially lowers
the time requirements posed on instructors for gamifying a given course. Drawing
on research on limited attention and the present bias, we provide the theoretical
foundation for the lean gamification approach. In addition, we present a mobile
application that implements lean gamification and outline a mixed-methods study
that is currently under way for evaluating whether lean gamification does indeed
have the potential to increase students’ motivation. We thereby hope to allow
more students and instructors to benefit from the advantages of gamification. '
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: John, Thomas
id: '3952'
last_name: John
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Hemsen, Paul
id: '22546'
last_name: Hemsen
- first_name: Katrin
full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin
last_name: Klingsieck
- first_name: Dennis
full_name: Kundisch, Dennis
id: '21117'
last_name: Kundisch
- first_name: Mike
full_name: Langendorf, Mike
last_name: Langendorf
citation:
ama: 'John T, Feldotto M, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Kundisch D, Langendorf M. Towards
a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In: Proceedings of the 25th European
Conference on Information Systems (ECIS). ; 2017:2970-2979.'
apa: John, T., Feldotto, M., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., Kundisch, D., & Langendorf,
M. (2017). Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In Proceedings
of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) (pp. 2970–2979).
bibtex: '@inproceedings{John_Feldotto_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Kundisch_Langendorf_2017,
title={Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education}, booktitle={Proceedings
of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)}, author={John,
Thomas and Feldotto, Matthias and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin and Kundisch,
Dennis and Langendorf, Mike}, year={2017}, pages={2970–2979} }'
chicago: John, Thomas, Matthias Feldotto, Paul Hemsen, Katrin Klingsieck, Dennis
Kundisch, and Mike Langendorf. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.”
In Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS),
2970–79, 2017.
ieee: T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, and M. Langendorf,
“Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education,” in Proceedings of the 25th
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017, pp. 2970–2979.
mla: John, Thomas, et al. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.” Proceedings
of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017, pp. 2970–79.
short: 'T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, M. Langendorf,
in: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS),
2017, pp. 2970–2979.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:39:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
- _id: '178'
- _id: '185'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
file_id: '5232'
file_name: TOWARDS A LEAN APPROACH TO GAMIFYING EDUCATION.pdf
file_size: 485333
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2017_rip/46
oa: '1'
page: 2970-2979
publication: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)
status: public
title: Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '200'
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
citation:
ama: Drees M. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games.
Universität Paderborn; 2016.
apa: Drees, M. (2016). Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget
Games. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Drees_2016, title={Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria
in Budget Games}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Drees, Maximilian},
year={2016} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria
in Budget Games. Universität Paderborn, 2016.
ieee: M. Drees, Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games.
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
mla: Drees, Maximilian. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget
Games. Universität Paderborn, 2016.
short: M. Drees, Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games,
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:31Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:18Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z
file_id: '1525'
file_name: 200-thesis.pdf
file_size: 880390
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
related_material:
link:
- relation: confirmation
url: https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:466:2-24915
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games
type: dissertation
user_id: '15415'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '210'
author:
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
citation:
ama: Leder L. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn;
2016.
apa: Leder, L. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Leder_2016, title={Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Leder, Lennart}, year={2016} }'
chicago: Leder, Lennart. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität
Paderborn, 2016.
ieee: L. Leder, Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn,
2016.
mla: Leder, Lennart. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität
Paderborn, 2016.
short: L. Leder, Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives, Universität Paderborn,
2016.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:33Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:42Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2016'
...