---
_id: '59'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We consider a scheduling problem on $m$ identical processors sharing an arbitrarily
divisible resource. In addition to assigning jobs to processors, the scheduler
must distribute the resource among the processors (e.g., for three processors
in shares of 20\%, 15\%, and 65\%) and adjust this distribution over time. Each
job $j$ comes with a size $p_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and a resource requirement $r_j
> 0$. Jobs do not benefit when receiving a share larger than $r_j$ of the resource.
But providing them with a fraction of the resource requirement causes a linear
decrease in the processing efficiency. We seek a (non-preemptive) job and resource
assignment minimizing the makespan.Our main result is an efficient approximation
algorithm which achieves an approximation ratio of $2 + 1/(m-2)$. It can be improved
to an (asymptotic) ratio of $1 + 1/(m-1)$ if all jobs have unit size. Our algorithms
also imply new results for a well-known bin packing problem with splittable items
and a restricted number of allowed item parts per bin.Based upon the above solution,
we also derive an approximation algorithm with similar guarantees for a setting
in which we introduce so-called tasks each containing several jobs and where we
are interested in the average completion time of tasks (a task is completed when
all its jobs are completed).
author:
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Kling, Peter
last_name: Kling
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Mäcker, Alexander
id: '13536'
last_name: Mäcker
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Kling P, Mäcker A, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA). ; 2017:123--132. doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578'
apa: 'Kling, P., Mäcker, A., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Sharing is
Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In Proceedings
of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)
(pp. 123--132). https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Kling_Mäcker_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, title={Sharing is Caring:
Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource}, DOI={10.1145/3087556.3087578},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms
and Architectures (SPAA)}, author={Kling, Peter and Mäcker, Alexander and Riechers,
Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={123--132} }'
chicago: 'Kling, Peter, Alexander Mäcker, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource.” In Proceedings
of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA),
123--132, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578.'
ieee: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
Scheduling with a Sharable Resource,” in Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132.'
mla: 'Kling, Peter, et al. “Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a
Sharable Resource.” Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in
Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132, doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578.'
short: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 29th
ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp.
123--132.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:46Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/3087556.3087578
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
file_id: '1578'
file_name: 59-progress.pdf
file_size: 784867
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 123--132
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and
Architectures (SPAA)
status: public
title: 'Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '66'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted
Budget Games. In: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics
Conference (COCOON). LNCS. ; 2017:175--187. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15'
apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Pure Nash
Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games. In Proceedings of the 23rd International
Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON) (pp. 175--187). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Pure
Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören
and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={175--187}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” In Proceedings of the 23rd
International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 175--187. LNCS,
2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15.
ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash Equilibria
in Restricted Budget Games,” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing
and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15.
short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp.
175--187.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:13Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
file_id: '5228'
file_name: Drees2017_Chapter_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
file_size: 346390
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 175--187
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1073'
author:
- first_name: Simon
full_name: Nachtigall, Simon
last_name: Nachtigall
citation:
ama: Nachtigall S. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Nachtigall, S. (2017). Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Nachtigall_2017, title={Sortieren dynamischer Daten}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Nachtigall, Simon}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Nachtigall, Simon. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
ieee: S. Nachtigall, Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
mla: Nachtigall, Simon. Sortieren dynamischer Daten. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
short: S. Nachtigall, Sortieren dynamischer Daten, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T09:59:32Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Sortieren dynamischer Daten
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1074'
author:
- first_name: Simon
full_name: Pukrop, Simon
last_name: Pukrop
citation:
ama: Pukrop S. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn;
2017.
apa: Pukrop, S. (2017). Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Pukrop_2017, title={Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Pukrop, Simon}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Pukrop, Simon. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität
Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: S. Pukrop, Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität Paderborn,
2017.
mla: Pukrop, Simon. Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games. Universität
Paderborn, 2017.
short: S. Pukrop, Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games, Universität Paderborn,
2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:00:25Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1080'
author:
- first_name: Jan
full_name: Bürmann, Jan
last_name: Bürmann
citation:
ama: Bürmann J. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Bürmann, J. (2017). Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Bürmann_2017, title={Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under
Uncertainty}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Bürmann, Jan}, year={2017}
}'
chicago: Bürmann, Jan. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: J. Bürmann, Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
mla: Bürmann, Jan. Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty.
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
short: J. Bürmann, Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty,
Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:07:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1081'
author:
- first_name: Vipin Ravindran
full_name: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran
last_name: Vijayalakshmi
citation:
ama: Vijayalakshmi VR. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion
Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
apa: Vijayalakshmi, V. R. (2017). Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in
Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Vijayalakshmi_2017, title={Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Congestion Games under Taxation}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Vijayalakshmi,
Vipin Ravindran}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
ieee: V. R. Vijayalakshmi, Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion
Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
mla: Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran. Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria
in Congestion Games under Taxation. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
short: V.R. Vijayalakshmi, Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion
Games under Taxation, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:08:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:51Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1094'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification
has the potential to address these problems. However, gamification is hardly used
in education, because current approaches to gamification require instructors to
engage in the time-consuming preparation of their course contents for use in quizzes,
mini-games and the like. Drawing on research on limited attention and present
bias, we propose a "lean" approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying
learning activities (rather than learning contents) and increasing their salience.
In this paper, we present the app StudyNow that implements such a lean gamification
approach. With this app, we aim to enable more students and instructors to benefit
from the advantages of gamification.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: John, Thomas
id: '3952'
last_name: John
- first_name: Dennis
full_name: Kundisch, Dennis
id: '21117'
last_name: Kundisch
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Hemsen, Paul
id: '22546'
last_name: Hemsen
- first_name: Katrin
full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin
last_name: Klingsieck
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, John T, Kundisch D, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Skopalik A. Making
Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow
Mobile App. In: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design
Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST). LNCS. ;
2017:462-467. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., John, T., Kundisch, D., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., & Skopalik,
A. (2017). Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content
with the StudyNow Mobile App. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)
(pp. 462–467). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_John_Kundisch_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Skopalik_2017,
series={LNCS}, title={Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game
and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science
Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias
and John, Thomas and Kundisch, Dennis and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin
and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={462–467}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Thomas John, Dennis Kundisch, Paul Hemsen, Katrin
Klingsieck, and Alexander Skopalik. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor:
Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” In Proceedings of
the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems
and Technology (DESRIST), 462–67. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, and A. Skopalik,
“Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
the StudyNow Mobile App,” in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST),
2017, pp. 462–467.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling
Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST),
2017, pp. 462–67, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, A. Skopalik,
in: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST), 2017, pp. 462–467.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:37:52Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
- _id: '276'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
file_id: '5230'
file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_MakingGamificationEasyForThePr.pdf
file_size: 1576363
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 462-467
publication: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
the StudyNow Mobile App'
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1095'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification
has the potential to address these problems. However, using gamification currently
is rather tedious and time-consuming for instructors because current approaches
to gamification require instructors to engage in the time-consuming preparation
of course contents (e.g., for quizzes or mini-games). In reply to this issue,
we propose a “lean” approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying learning
activities rather than learning contents. The learning activities that are gamified
in the lean approach can typically be drawn from existing course syllabi (e.g.,
attend certain lectures, hand in assignments, read book chapters and articles).
Hence, compared to existing approaches, lean gamification substantially lowers
the time requirements posed on instructors for gamifying a given course. Drawing
on research on limited attention and the present bias, we provide the theoretical
foundation for the lean gamification approach. In addition, we present a mobile
application that implements lean gamification and outline a mixed-methods study
that is currently under way for evaluating whether lean gamification does indeed
have the potential to increase students’ motivation. We thereby hope to allow
more students and instructors to benefit from the advantages of gamification. '
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: John, Thomas
id: '3952'
last_name: John
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Hemsen, Paul
id: '22546'
last_name: Hemsen
- first_name: Katrin
full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin
last_name: Klingsieck
- first_name: Dennis
full_name: Kundisch, Dennis
id: '21117'
last_name: Kundisch
- first_name: Mike
full_name: Langendorf, Mike
last_name: Langendorf
citation:
ama: 'John T, Feldotto M, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Kundisch D, Langendorf M. Towards
a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In: Proceedings of the 25th European
Conference on Information Systems (ECIS). ; 2017:2970-2979.'
apa: John, T., Feldotto, M., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., Kundisch, D., & Langendorf,
M. (2017). Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education. In Proceedings
of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) (pp. 2970–2979).
bibtex: '@inproceedings{John_Feldotto_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Kundisch_Langendorf_2017,
title={Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education}, booktitle={Proceedings
of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)}, author={John,
Thomas and Feldotto, Matthias and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin and Kundisch,
Dennis and Langendorf, Mike}, year={2017}, pages={2970–2979} }'
chicago: John, Thomas, Matthias Feldotto, Paul Hemsen, Katrin Klingsieck, Dennis
Kundisch, and Mike Langendorf. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.”
In Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS),
2970–79, 2017.
ieee: T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, and M. Langendorf,
“Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education,” in Proceedings of the 25th
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017, pp. 2970–2979.
mla: John, Thomas, et al. “Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education.” Proceedings
of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), 2017, pp. 2970–79.
short: 'T. John, M. Feldotto, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, D. Kundisch, M. Langendorf,
in: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS),
2017, pp. 2970–2979.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:39:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
- _id: '178'
- _id: '185'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
file_id: '5232'
file_name: TOWARDS A LEAN APPROACH TO GAMIFYING EDUCATION.pdf
file_size: 485333
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:02:07Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2017_rip/46
oa: '1'
page: 2970-2979
publication: Proceedings of the 25th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)
status: public
title: Towards a Lean Approach for Gamifying Education
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '200'
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
citation:
ama: Drees M. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games.
Universität Paderborn; 2016.
apa: Drees, M. (2016). Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget
Games. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Drees_2016, title={Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria
in Budget Games}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Drees, Maximilian},
year={2016} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria
in Budget Games. Universität Paderborn, 2016.
ieee: M. Drees, Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games.
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
mla: Drees, Maximilian. Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget
Games. Universität Paderborn, 2016.
short: M. Drees, Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games,
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:31Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:18Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z
file_id: '1525'
file_name: 200-thesis.pdf
file_size: 880390
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T10:45:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
related_material:
link:
- relation: confirmation
url: https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:466:2-24915
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games
type: dissertation
user_id: '15415'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '210'
author:
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
citation:
ama: Leder L. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn;
2016.
apa: Leder, L. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Leder_2016, title={Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Leder, Lennart}, year={2016} }'
chicago: Leder, Lennart. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität
Paderborn, 2016.
ieee: L. Leder, Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität Paderborn,
2016.
mla: Leder, Lennart. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. Universität
Paderborn, 2016.
short: L. Leder, Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives, Universität Paderborn,
2016.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:33Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:42Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '17655'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: M.M.
full_name: de Weerdt, M.M.
last_name: de Weerdt
- first_name: C.M.
full_name: Jonker, C.M.
last_name: Jonker
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM, Jonker CM. The Game of Reciprocation Habits. In:
Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Vol Volume 285: ECAI 2016. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications.
; 2016:417-425. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417'
apa: 'Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M. M., & Jonker, C. M. (2016). The Game of Reciprocation
Habits. In Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(Vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, pp. 417–425). https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_Jonker_2016, series={Frontiers in Artificial
Intelligence and Applications}, title={The Game of Reciprocation Habits}, volume={Volume
285: ECAI 2016}, DOI={10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, M.M. and Jonker, C.M.}, year={2016}, pages={417–425},
collection={Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications} }'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, M.M. de Weerdt, and C.M. Jonker. “The Game of Reciprocation
Habits.” In Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Volume 285: ECAI 2016:417–25. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications,
2016. https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417.'
ieee: 'G. Polevoy, M. M. de Weerdt, and C. M. Jonker, “The Game of Reciprocation
Habits,” in Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
2016, vol. Volume 285: ECAI 2016, pp. 417–425.'
mla: 'Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “The Game of Reciprocation Habits.” Proceedings of
the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. Volume 285:
ECAI 2016, 2016, pp. 417–25, doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417.'
short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, C.M. Jonker, in: Proceedings of the 2016 European
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016, pp. 417–425.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:30Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-417
extern: '1'
keyword:
- agents
- action
- repeated reciprocation
- fixed
- floating
- network
- Nash equilibrium
- social welfare
- price of anarchy
- price of stability
- convex combination
language:
- iso: eng
page: 417-425
publication: Proceedings of the 2016 European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
series_title: Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
status: public
title: The Game of Reciprocation Habits
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
volume: 'Volume 285: ECAI 2016'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '17656'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
id: '83983'
last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Mathijs
full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs
last_name: de Weerdt
- first_name: Catholijn
full_name: Jonker, Catholijn
last_name: Jonker
citation:
ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt M, Jonker C. The Convergence of Reciprocation. In: Proceedings
of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
AAMAS ’16. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems; 2016:1431-1432.'
apa: 'Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M., & Jonker, C. (2016). The Convergence of Reciprocation.
In Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (pp. 1431–1432). Richland, SC: International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_Jonker_2016, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS
’16}, title={The Convergence of Reciprocation}, booktitle={Proceedings of the
2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, publisher={International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb
and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Jonker, Catholijn}, year={2016}, pages={1431–1432},
collection={AAMAS ’16} }'
chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Mathijs de Weerdt, and Catholijn Jonker. “The Convergence
of Reciprocation.” In Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, 1431–32. AAMAS ’16. Richland, SC: International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016.'
ieee: G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, and C. Jonker, “The Convergence of Reciprocation,”
in Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, 2016, pp. 1431–1432.
mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “The Convergence of Reciprocation.” Proceedings of
the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2016, pp.
1431–32.
short: 'G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, C. Jonker, in: Proceedings of the 2016 International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2016, pp. 1431–1432.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- agent's influence
- behavior
- convergence
- perron-frobenius
- reciprocal interaction
- repeated reciprocation
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1431-1432
place: Richland, SC
publication: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-4239-1
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
series_title: AAMAS '16
status: public
title: The Convergence of Reciprocation
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '209'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck
variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network
scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.
We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence
of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the
approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. In:
Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization
and Applications (COCOA). LNCS. ; 2016:655--669. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47'
apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed
Objectives. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA) (pp. 655--669). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion
Games with Mixed Objectives}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder,
Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={655--669}, collection={LNCS}
}'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
Games with Mixed Objectives.” In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 655--669.
LNCS, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47.
ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives,”
in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47.
short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:32Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:41Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1607.05143'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
file_id: '5233'
file_name: Feldotto2016_Chapter_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf
file_size: 235739
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 655--669
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '1082'
author:
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Handirk, Tobias
last_name: Handirk
citation:
ama: Handirk T. Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken. Universität
Paderborn; 2016.
apa: Handirk, T. (2016). Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Handirk_2016, title={Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Handirk, Tobias}, year={2016} }'
chicago: Handirk, Tobias. Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken.
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
ieee: T. Handirk, Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken.
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
mla: Handirk, Tobias. Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken.
Universität Paderborn, 2016.
short: T. Handirk, Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken, Universität
Paderborn, 2016.
date_created: 2017-12-19T10:10:17Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:51Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '159'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Abstract—Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approachto a fair allocation
of bandwidth to each of the usersin a network. This allocation can be computed
by uniformlyraising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacityconstraints.
We consider an extension of these allocations byraising the bandwidth with arbitrary
and not necessarily uniformtime-depending velocities (allocation rates). These
allocationsare used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, whichwe formalize
in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present avariety of results for equilibria
in PFGs. We show that these gamespossess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While
computation ingeneral is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms forprominent
classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), includingthe case when all users have the
same source-destination pair.We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for
pure Nashand strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players havedifferent or
the same source-destination pairs. In addition, weshow that when a designer can
adjust allocation rates, it is possibleto design games with optimal strong equilibria.
Some initial resultson polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived.
author:
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Harks, Tobias
last_name: Harks
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Höfer, Martin
last_name: Höfer
- first_name: Kevin
full_name: Schewior, Kevin
last_name: Schewior
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games With Progressive Filling.
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 2016;(4):2553-2562. doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
apa: Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Routing Games
With Progressive Filling. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, (4), 2553–2562.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
bibtex: '@article{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2016, title={Routing Games With
Progressive Filling}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571},
number={4}, journal={IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Harks,
Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016},
pages={2553–2562} }'
chicago: 'Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing
Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no.
4 (2016): 2553–62. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.'
ieee: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games With Progressive
Filling,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no. 4, pp. 2553–2562, 2016.
mla: Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, no. 4, IEEE, 2016, pp. 2553–62, doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.
short: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
(2016) 2553–2562.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:23Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:40Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z
file_id: '1547'
file_name: 159-Harks-Hoefer-Schewior-Skopalik2016.pdf
file_size: 1655309
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 2553 - 2562
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
publisher: IEEE
status: public
title: Routing Games With Progressive Filling
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '149'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In this paper we consider a strategic variant of the online facility location
problem. Given is a graph in which each node serves two roles: it is a strategic
client stating requests as well as a potential location for a facility. In each
time step one client states a request which induces private costs equal to the
distance to the closest facility. Before serving, the clients may collectively
decide to open new facilities, sharing the corresponding price. Instead of optimizing
the global costs, each client acts selfishly. The prices of new facilities vary
between nodes and also change over time, but are always bounded by some fixed
value α. Both the requests as well as the facility prices are given by an online
sequence and are not known in advance.We characterize the optimal strategies of
the clients and analyze their overall performance in comparison to a centralized
offline solution. If all players optimize their own competitiveness, the global
performance of the system is O(√α⋅α) times worse than the offline optimum. A restriction
to a natural subclass of strategies improves this result to O(α). We also show
that for fixed facility costs, we can find strategies such that this bound further
improves to O(√α).'
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Björn
full_name: Feldkord, Björn
id: '22704'
last_name: Feldkord
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Feldkord B, Skopalik A. Strategic Online Facility Location. In: Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications (COCOA). LNCS. ; 2016:593--607. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43'
apa: Drees, M., Feldkord, B., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Strategic Online Facility
Location. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA) (pp. 593--607). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldkord_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Strategic
Online Facility Location}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldkord,
Björn and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={593--607}, collection={LNCS}
}'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Björn Feldkord, and Alexander Skopalik. “Strategic Online
Facility Location.” In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference
on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 593--607. LNCS, 2016.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43.
ieee: M. Drees, B. Feldkord, and A. Skopalik, “Strategic Online Facility Location,”
in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Strategic Online Facility Location.” Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43.
short: 'M. Drees, B. Feldkord, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:21Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:10Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z
file_id: '1553'
file_name: 149-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-319-48749-6_43.pdf
file_size: 236253
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 593--607
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Strategic Online Facility Location
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '145'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Comparative evaluations of peer-to-peer protocols through simulations are
a viable approach to judge the performance and costs of the individual protocols
in large-scale networks. In order to support this work, we present the peer-to-peer
system simulator PeerfactSim.KOM, which we extended over the last years. PeerfactSim.KOM
comes with an extensive layer model to support various facets and protocols of
peer-to-peer networking. In this article, we describe PeerfactSim.KOM and show
how it can be used for detailed measurements of large-scale peer-to-peer networks.
We enhanced PeerfactSim.KOM with a fine-grained analyzer concept, with exhaustive
automated measurements and gnuplot generators as well as a coordination control
to evaluate sets of experiment setups in parallel. Thus, by configuring all experiments
and protocols only once and starting the simulator, all desired measurements are
performed, analyzed, evaluated, and combined, resulting in a holistic environment
for the comparative evaluation of peer-to-peer systems. An immediate comparison
of different configurations and overlays under different aspects is possible directly
after the execution without any manual post-processing. '
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Kalman
full_name: Graffi, Kalman
last_name: Graffi
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Graffi K. Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using
PeerfactSim.KOM. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience.
2016;28(5):1655-1677. doi:10.1002/cpe.3716'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., & Graffi, K. (2016). Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer
systems using PeerfactSim.KOM. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience,
28(5), 1655–1677. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716'
bibtex: '@article{Feldotto_Graffi_2016, title={Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer
systems using PeerfactSim.KOM}, volume={28}, DOI={10.1002/cpe.3716},
number={5}, journal={Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience}, publisher={Wiley
Online Library}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Graffi, Kalman}, year={2016},
pages={1655–1677} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
28, no. 5 (2016): 1655–77. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3716.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto and K. Graffi, “Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems
using PeerfactSim.KOM,” Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience,
vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 1655–1677, 2016.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, and Kalman Graffi. “Systematic Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer
Systems Using PeerfactSim.KOM.” Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience,
vol. 28, no. 5, Wiley Online Library, 2016, pp. 1655–77, doi:10.1002/cpe.3716.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, K. Graffi, Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience
28 (2016) 1655–1677.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:00Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '79'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1002/cpe.3716
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z
file_id: '1556'
file_name: 145-Feldotto_et_al-2016-Concurrency_and_Computation-_Practice_and_Experience.pdf
file_size: 3121363
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:57:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 28'
issue: '5'
page: 1655-1677
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: 'Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience'
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley Online Library
status: public
title: Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
volume: 28
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '251'
author:
- first_name: Karlson
full_name: Pfannschmidt, Karlson
last_name: Pfannschmidt
citation:
ama: Pfannschmidt K. Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem. Universität
Paderborn; 2015.
apa: Pfannschmidt, K. (2015). Solving the aggregated bandits problem. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Pfannschmidt_2015, title={Solving the aggregated bandits problem},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pfannschmidt, Karlson}, year={2015}
}'
chicago: Pfannschmidt, Karlson. Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem. Universität
Paderborn, 2015.
ieee: K. Pfannschmidt, Solving the aggregated bandits problem. Universität
Paderborn, 2015.
mla: Pfannschmidt, Karlson. Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem. Universität
Paderborn, 2015.
short: K. Pfannschmidt, Solving the Aggregated Bandits Problem, Universität Paderborn,
2015.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:50Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Solving the aggregated bandits problem
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '320'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics
of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency
functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by a potential
function argument. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing
pure Nash equilibria in such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players
have unit weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic)
latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game
may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles,
we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts.
A ρ--approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a state of a (weighted congestion) game
from which no player has any incentive to deviate in order to improve her cost
by a multiplicative factor higher than ρ. Do such equilibria exist for small values
of ρ? And if so, can we compute them efficiently?We provide positive answers to
both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions
by exploiting an “approximation” of such games by a new class of potential games
that we call Ψ-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!-approximate
pure Nash equilibria, where d is the maximum degree of the latency functions.
Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate
pure Nash equilibria when d is a constant. For games with linear latency functions,
the approximation guarantee is 3+√5/2 + Oγ for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for latency
functions with maximum degree d≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d). The running time is polynomial
in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ. As a byproduct
of our techniques, we also show the following interesting structural statement
for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree
d ≥ 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state
to a dO(d2)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified
in such games as long as d is a constant.To the best of our knowledge, these are
the first positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in
weighted congestion games. Our techniques significantly extend our recent work
on unweighted congestion games through the use of Ψ-games. The concept of approximating
nonpotential games by potential ones is interesting in itself and might have further
applications.'
article_number: '2'
author:
- first_name: Ioannis
full_name: Caragiannis, Ioannis
last_name: Caragiannis
- first_name: Angelo
full_name: Fanelli, Angelo
last_name: Fanelli
- first_name: Nick
full_name: Gravin, Nick
last_name: Gravin
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Caragiannis I, Fanelli A, Gravin N, Skopalik A. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.
Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2015;3(1). doi:10.1145/2614687'
apa: 'Caragiannis, I., Fanelli, A., Gravin, N., & Skopalik, A. (2015). Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation,
and Structure. Transactions on Economics and Computation, 3(1).
https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687'
bibtex: '@article{Caragiannis_Fanelli_Gravin_Skopalik_2015, title={Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation,
and Structure}, volume={3}, DOI={10.1145/2614687},
number={12}, journal={Transactions on Economics and Computation}, publisher={ACM},
author={Caragiannis, Ioannis and Fanelli, Angelo and Gravin, Nick and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2015} }'
chicago: 'Caragiannis, Ioannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient
Computation, and Structure.” Transactions on Economics and Computation
3, no. 1 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687.'
ieee: 'I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation,
and Structure,” Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 3, no.
1, 2015.'
mla: 'Caragiannis, Ioannis, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted
Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.” Transactions
on Economics and Computation, vol. 3, no. 1, 2, ACM, 2015, doi:10.1145/2614687.'
short: I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik, Transactions on Economics
and Computation 3 (2015).
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:54Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:04Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/2614687
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z
date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z
file_id: '1433'
file_name: 320-a2-caragiannis.pdf
file_size: 260503
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 3'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Transactions on Economics and Computation
publisher: ACM
status: public
title: 'Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence,
Efficient Computation, and Structure'
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 3
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '316'
author:
- first_name: Jannis
full_name: Pautz, Jannis
last_name: Pautz
citation:
ama: Pautz J. Budget Games with Priced Strategies. Universität Paderborn;
2015.
apa: Pautz, J. (2015). Budget Games with priced strategies. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Pautz_2015, title={Budget Games with priced strategies}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Pautz, Jannis}, year={2015} }'
chicago: Pautz, Jannis. Budget Games with Priced Strategies. Universität
Paderborn, 2015.
ieee: J. Pautz, Budget Games with priced strategies. Universität Paderborn,
2015.
mla: Pautz, Jannis. Budget Games with Priced Strategies. Universität Paderborn,
2015.
short: J. Pautz, Budget Games with Priced Strategies, Universität Paderborn, 2015.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:53Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:01Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Budget Games with priced strategies
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2015'
...