--- _id: '271' abstract: - lang: eng text: In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor $\alpha$ through unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold $\alpha_\delta$ (where $\delta$ is a parameter that limits the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that $\alpha$-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist for $\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta$, but not for $\alpha < \alpha_\delta$. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold $\alpha_\delta$ and show that the corresponding decision problem is ${\sf NP}$-hard. We also show that the $\alpha$-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is $\alpha+1$. For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close to the optimum. author: - first_name: Maximilian full_name: Drees, Maximilian last_name: Drees - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Sören full_name: Riechers, Sören last_name: Riechers - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. In: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). Lecture Notes in Computer Science. ; 2015:178-189. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14' apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2015). On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (pp. 178–189). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2015, series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, title={On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2015}, pages={178–189}, collection={Lecture Notes in Computer Science} }' chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.” In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 178–89. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14. ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games,” in Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–189. mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.” Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–89, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14. short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–189.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:45Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:34Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14 external_id: arxiv: - '1507.02908' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z file_id: '1475' file_name: 271-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-662-48433-3_14.pdf file_size: 256718 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z has_accepted_license: '1' page: 178-189 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '16' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '4' name: SFB 901 - Project Area C publication: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science status: public title: On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2015' ... --- _id: '277' author: - first_name: Nils full_name: Kothe, Nils last_name: Kothe citation: ama: Kothe N. Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn; 2015. apa: Kothe, N. (2015). Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Kothe_2015, title={Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kothe, Nils}, year={2015} }' chicago: Kothe, Nils. Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn, 2015. ieee: N. Kothe, Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn, 2015. mla: Kothe, Nils. Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk. Universität Paderborn, 2015. short: N. Kothe, Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk, Universität Paderborn, 2015. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:46Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:44Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2015' ... --- _id: '17657' abstract: - lang: eng text: Inter-datacenter transfers of non-interactive but timely large flows over a private (managed) network is an important problem faced by many cloud service providers. The considered flows are non-interactive because they do not explicitly target the end users. However, most of them must be performed on a timely basis and are associated with a deadline. We propose to schedule these flows by a centralized controller, which determines when to transmit each flow and which path to use. Two scheduling models are presented in this paper. In the first, the controller also determines the rate of each flow, while in the second bandwidth is assigned by the network according to the TCP rules. We develop scheduling algorithms for both models and compare their complexity and performance. author: - first_name: R. full_name: Cohen, R. last_name: Cohen - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy citation: ama: Cohen R, Polevoy G. Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows. Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on. 2015;PP(99):1-1. doi:10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964 apa: Cohen, R., & Polevoy, G. (2015). Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows. Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On, PP(99), 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964 bibtex: '@article{Cohen_Polevoy_2015, title={Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows}, volume={PP}, DOI={10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964}, number={99}, journal={Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on}, author={Cohen, R. and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2015}, pages={1–1} }' chicago: 'Cohen, R., and Gleb Polevoy. “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows.” Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On PP, no. 99 (2015): 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964.' ieee: R. Cohen and G. Polevoy, “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows,” Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2015. mla: Cohen, R., and Gleb Polevoy. “Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows.” Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On, vol. PP, no. 99, 2015, pp. 1–1, doi:10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964. short: R. Cohen, G. Polevoy, Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions On PP (2015) 1–1. date_created: 2020-08-06T15:20:58Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/TCC.2015.2487964 extern: '1' issue: '99' keyword: - Approximation algorithms - Approximation methods - Bandwidth - Cloud computing - Routing - Schedules - Scheduling language: - iso: eng page: 1-1 publication: Cloud Computing, IEEE Transactions on publication_identifier: issn: - 2168-7161 status: public title: Inter-Datacenter Scheduling of Large Data Flows type: journal_article user_id: '83983' volume: PP year: '2015' ... --- _id: '17658' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Abstract We study the problem of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences. In this problem the input consists of a set of users and a set of base stations. Each user has a list of requests, each consisting of a base station, a frequency demand, and a profit that may be gained by scheduling this request. The goal is to find a maximum profit set of user requests S that satisfies the following conditions: (i) S contains at most one request per user, (ii) the frequency sets allotted to requests in S that correspond to the same base station are pairwise non-intersecting, and (iii) the QoS received by any user at any frequency is reasonable according to an interference model. In this paper we consider two variants of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences. In the first each request specifies a demand that can be satisfied by any subset of frequencies that is large enough. In the second each request specifies a specific frequency interval. Furthermore, we consider two interference models, multiplicative and additive. We show that these problems are extremely hard to approximate if the interferences depend on both the interfered and the interfering base stations. On the other hand, we provide constant factor approximation algorithms for both variants of bandwidth allocation with multiple interferences for the case where the interferences depend only on the interfering base stations. We also consider a restrictive special case that is closely related to the Knapsack problem. We show that this special case is NP-hard and that it admits an FPTAS. ' author: - first_name: Reuven full_name: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven last_name: Bar-Yehuda - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Dror full_name: Rawitz, Dror last_name: Rawitz citation: ama: Bar-Yehuda R, Polevoy G, Rawitz D. Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences. Discrete Applied Mathematics . 2015;194:23-36. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013 apa: Bar-Yehuda, R., Polevoy, G., & Rawitz, D. (2015). Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences. Discrete Applied Mathematics , 194, 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013 bibtex: '@article{Bar-Yehuda_Polevoy_Rawitz_2015, title={Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences}, volume={194}, DOI={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013}, journal={Discrete Applied Mathematics }, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Bar-Yehuda, Reuven and Polevoy, Gleb and Rawitz, Dror}, year={2015}, pages={23–36} }' chicago: 'Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, Gleb Polevoy, and Dror Rawitz. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” Discrete Applied Mathematics 194 (2015): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013.' ieee: R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, and D. Rawitz, “Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences,” Discrete Applied Mathematics , vol. 194, pp. 23–36, 2015. mla: Bar-Yehuda, Reuven, et al. “Bandwidth Allocation in Cellular Networks with Multiple Interferences.” Discrete Applied Mathematics , vol. 194, Elsevier, 2015, pp. 23–36, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013. short: R. Bar-Yehuda, G. Polevoy, D. Rawitz, Discrete Applied Mathematics 194 (2015) 23–36. date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:15Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2015.05.013 extern: '1' intvolume: ' 194' keyword: - Local ratio language: - iso: eng page: 23 - 36 publication: 'Discrete Applied Mathematics ' publication_identifier: issn: - 0166-218X publisher: Elsevier status: public title: Bandwidth allocation in cellular networks with multiple interferences type: journal_article user_id: '83983' volume: 194 year: '2015' ... --- _id: '370' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints. We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs).We present a variety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived. ' author: - first_name: Tobias full_name: Harks, Tobias last_name: Harks - first_name: Martin full_name: Höfer, Martin last_name: Höfer - first_name: Kevin full_name: Schewior, Kevin last_name: Schewior - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games with Progressive Filling. In: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14). ; 2014:352-360. doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571' apa: Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Routing Games with Progressive Filling. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14) (pp. 352–360). https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2014, title={Routing Games with Progressive Filling}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)}, author={Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={352–360} }' chicago: Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing Games with Progressive Filling.” In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 352–60, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571. ieee: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games with Progressive Filling,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 2014, pp. 352–360. mla: Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games with Progressive Filling.” Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 2014, pp. 352–60, doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571. short: 'T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 2014, pp. 352–360.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:04Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:30Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z file_id: '1402' file_name: 370-HHSS14.pdf file_size: 179583 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 352-360 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'14) status: public title: Routing Games with Progressive Filling type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '373' author: - first_name: David full_name: Pahl, David last_name: Pahl citation: ama: Pahl D. Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn; 2014. apa: Pahl, D. (2014). Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn. bibtex: '@book{Pahl_2014, title={Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pahl, David}, year={2014} }' chicago: Pahl, David. Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn, 2014. ieee: D. Pahl, Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn, 2014. mla: Pahl, David. Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen. Universität Paderborn, 2014. short: D. Pahl, Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen, Universität Paderborn, 2014. date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:04Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:31Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' language: - iso: ger project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publisher: Universität Paderborn status: public supervisor: - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik title: Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen type: bachelorsthesis user_id: '14052' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17659' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Stojan full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan last_name: Trajanovski - first_name: Mathijs M. full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs M. last_name: de Weerdt citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, de Weerdt MM. Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:861-868.' apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games. In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (pp. 861–868). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={861–868}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 861–68. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.' ieee: G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, and M. M. de Weerdt, “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games,” in Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, 2014, pp. 861–868. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 861–68. short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 861–868.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:26Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' keyword: - competition - equilibrium - market - models - shared effort games - simulation language: - iso: eng page: 861-868 place: Richland, SC publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-1-4503-2738-1 publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems series_title: AAMAS '14 status: public title: Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17660' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Mathijs M. full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs M. last_name: de Weerdt citation: ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing. In: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:1741-1742.' apa: 'Polevoy, G., & de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing. In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (pp. 1741–1742). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={1741–1742}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing.” In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 1741–42. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.' ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing,” in Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, 2014, pp. 1741–1742. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing.” Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 1741–42. short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1741–1742.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:35Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' keyword: - dynamics - emotion modeling - negotiation - network interaction - shared effort game language: - iso: eng page: 1741-1742 place: Richland, SC publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-1-4503-2738-1 publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems series_title: AAMAS '14 status: public title: Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17661' author: - first_name: Thomas C. full_name: King, Thomas C. last_name: King - first_name: Qingzhi full_name: Liu, Qingzhi last_name: Liu - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Mathijs full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs last_name: de Weerdt - first_name: Virginia full_name: Dignum, Virginia last_name: Dignum - first_name: M. Birna full_name: van Riemsdijk, M. Birna last_name: van Riemsdijk - first_name: Martijn full_name: Warnier, Martijn last_name: Warnier citation: ama: 'King TC, Liu Q, Polevoy G, et al. Request Driven Social Sensing. In: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:1651-1652.' apa: 'King, T. C., Liu, Q., Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M., Dignum, V., van Riemsdijk, M. B., & Warnier, M. (2014). Request Driven Social Sensing. In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (pp. 1651–1652). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.' bibtex: '@inproceedings{King_Liu_Polevoy_de Weerdt_Dignum_van Riemsdijk_Warnier_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Request Driven Social Sensing}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems}, author={King, Thomas C. and Liu, Qingzhi and Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Dignum, Virginia and van Riemsdijk, M. Birna and Warnier, Martijn}, year={2014}, pages={1651–1652}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }' chicago: 'King, Thomas C., Qingzhi Liu, Gleb Polevoy, Mathijs de Weerdt, Virginia Dignum, M. Birna van Riemsdijk, and Martijn Warnier. “Request Driven Social Sensing.” In Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 1651–52. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.' ieee: T. C. King et al., “Request Driven Social Sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, 2014, pp. 1651–1652. mla: King, Thomas C., et al. “Request Driven Social Sensing.” Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp. 1651–52. short: 'T.C. King, Q. Liu, G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, V. Dignum, M.B. van Riemsdijk, M. Warnier, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1651–1652.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:45Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' keyword: - crowd-sensing - crowdsourcing - data aggregation - game theory - norms - reciprocation - self interested agents - simulation language: - iso: eng page: 1651-1652 place: Richland, SC publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-1-4503-2738-1 publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems series_title: AAMAS '14 status: public title: Request Driven Social Sensing type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17662' author: - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy - first_name: Rann full_name: Smorodinsky, Rann last_name: Smorodinsky - first_name: Moshe full_name: Tennenholtz, Moshe last_name: Tennenholtz citation: ama: Polevoy G, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M. Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. ACM Trans Econ Comput. 2014;2(1):1:1-1:16. doi:10.1145/2560766 apa: Polevoy, G., Smorodinsky, R., & Tennenholtz, M. (2014). Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., 2(1), 1:1-1:16. https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766 bibtex: '@article{Polevoy_Smorodinsky_Tennenholtz_2014, title={Signaling Competition and Social Welfare}, volume={2}, DOI={10.1145/2560766}, number={1}, journal={ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}, publisher={ACM}, author={Polevoy, Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}, year={2014}, pages={1:1-1:16} }' chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Rann Smorodinsky, and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2, no. 1 (2014): 1:1-1:16. https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766.' ieee: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, and M. Tennenholtz, “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare,” ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1:1-1:16, 2014. mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., vol. 2, no. 1, ACM, 2014, pp. 1:1-1:16, doi:10.1145/2560766. short: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, M. Tennenholtz, ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2 (2014) 1:1-1:16. date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:55Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1145/2560766 extern: '1' intvolume: ' 2' issue: '1' keyword: - Competition - efficiency - equilibrium - market - social welfare language: - iso: eng page: 1:1-1:16 publication: ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. publication_identifier: issn: - 2167-8375 publisher: ACM status: public title: Signaling Competition and Social Welfare type: journal_article user_id: '83983' volume: 2 year: '2014' ... --- _id: '451' abstract: - lang: eng text: We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria are analysed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence towards an equilibrium may be exponential. author: - first_name: Maximilian full_name: Drees, Maximilian last_name: Drees - first_name: Sören full_name: Riechers, Sören last_name: Riechers - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Drees M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions. In: Lavi R, ed. Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). Lecture Notes in Computer Science. ; 2014:110-121. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10' apa: Drees, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions. In R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (pp. 110–121). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Riechers_Skopalik_2014, series={Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, title={Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={110–121}, collection={Lecture Notes in Computer Science} }' chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions.” In Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 110–21. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10. ieee: M. Drees, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, pp. 110–121. mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions.” Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, pp. 110–21, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10. short: 'M. Drees, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, pp. 110–121.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:07Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10 editor: - first_name: Ron full_name: Lavi, Ron last_name: Lavi file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z file_id: '1344' file_name: 451-DRS14.pdf file_size: 283266 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 110-121 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '14' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C2 - _id: '16' name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '4' name: SFB 901 - Project Area C publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science status: public title: Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '452' abstract: - lang: eng text: Today's networks, like the Internet, do not consist of one but a mixture of several interconnected networks. Each has individual qualities and hence the performance of a network node results from the networks' interplay.We introduce a new game theoretic model capturing the interplay between a high-speed backbone network and a low-speed general purpose network. In our model, n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway node. A gateway node pays a fixed price for its connection to the high-speed network, but can utilize the high-speed network to gain communication distance 0 to all other gateways. Communication distances in the low-speed network are given by the hop distances. The effective communication distance between any two nodes then is given by the shortest path, which is possibly improved by using gateways as shortcuts.Every node v has the objective to minimize its communication costs, given by the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of the effective communication distances from v to all other nodes plus a fixed price \alpha > 0, if it decides to be a gateway. For both games and different ranges of \alpha, we study the existence of equilibria, the price of anarchy, and convergence properties of best-response dynamics. author: - first_name: Sebastian full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian last_name: Abshoff - first_name: Andreas full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas last_name: Cord-Landwehr - first_name: Daniel full_name: Jung, Daniel id: '37827' last_name: Jung - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games. In: Lavi R, ed. Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). LNCS. ; 2014:294.' apa: 'Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games. In R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (p. 294).' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}, editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={294}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander Skopalik. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games.” In Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 294. LNCS, 2014.' ieee: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p. 294.' mla: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games.” Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, p. 294.' short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p. 294.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:08Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' editor: - first_name: Ron full_name: Lavi, Ron last_name: Lavi file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z file_id: '1343' file_name: 452-title_multilevel-sagt.pdf file_size: 84783 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: '294' project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '5' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) series_title: LNCS status: public title: 'Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games' type: conference user_id: '15415' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '453' abstract: - lang: eng text: In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions. For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides the first guarantees for general latency functions. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Martin full_name: Gairing, Martin last_name: Gairing - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Skopalik A. Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:30-43. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3' apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (pp. 30–43). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={30–43}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, and Alexander Skopalik. “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 30–43. LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3. ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, and A. Skopalik, “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria,” in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.” Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3. short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z file_id: '1342' file_name: 453-WINE14FGS.pdf file_size: 324307 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z has_accepted_license: '1' page: 30-43 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '455' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games and develop techniques to obtain approximate potential functions that prove the existence of alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria and the convergence of alpha-improvement steps. Specifically, we show how to obtain upper bounds for approximation factor alpha for a given class of cost functions. For example for concave cost functions the factor is at most 3/2, for quadratic cost functions it is at most 4/3, and for polynomial cost functions of maximal degree d it is at at most d + 1. For games with two players we obtain tight bounds which are as small as for example 1.054 in the case of quadratic cost functions. author: - first_name: Christoph full_name: Hansknecht, Christoph last_name: Hansknecht - first_name: Max full_name: Klimm, Max last_name: Klimm - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Hansknecht C, Klimm M, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. In: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX). LIPIcs. ; 2014:242-257. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242' apa: Hansknecht, C., Klimm, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. In Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX) (pp. 242–257). https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Hansknecht_Klimm_Skopalik_2014, series={LIPIcs}, title={Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games}, DOI={10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)}, author={Hansknecht, Christoph and Klimm, Max and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={242–257}, collection={LIPIcs} }' chicago: Hansknecht, Christoph, Max Klimm, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 242–57. LIPIcs, 2014. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242. ieee: C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games,” in Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 2014, pp. 242–257. mla: Hansknecht, Christoph, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 2014, pp. 242–57, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242. short: 'C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 2014, pp. 242–257.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z file_id: '1341' file_name: 455-HKS14.pdf file_size: 512712 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 242 - 257 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX) series_title: LIPIcs status: public title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '456' abstract: - lang: eng text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19]. author: - first_name: Martin full_name: Gairing, Martin last_name: Gairing - first_name: Grammateia full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia last_name: Kotsialou - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:480-485. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43' apa: Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (pp. 480–485). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}, author={Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={480–485}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Gairing, Martin, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 480–85. LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43. ieee: M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games,” in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–485. mla: Gairing, Martin, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–85, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43. short: 'M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–485.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:21Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:10Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '541' - _id: '63' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z file_id: '1340' file_name: 456-WINE14final.pdf file_size: 377378 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 480 - 485 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games type: conference user_id: '477' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '462' abstract: - lang: eng text: We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Skopalik A. A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games. In: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014). ; 2014:625-630. doi:10.5220/0005110406250630' apa: Feldotto, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014) (pp. 625–630). https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Skopalik_2014, title={A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}, DOI={10.5220/0005110406250630}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={625–630} }' chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014), 625–30, 2014. https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630. ieee: M. Feldotto and A. Skopalik, “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games,” in Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014), 2014, pp. 625–630. mla: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014), 2014, pp. 625–30, doi:10.5220/0005110406250630. short: 'M. Feldotto, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014), 2014, pp. 625–630.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:22Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:15Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.5220/0005110406250630 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z file_id: '1337' file_name: 462-FS2014SIMULTECH.pdf file_size: 993721 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z has_accepted_license: '1' page: 625-630 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 publication: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014) status: public title: A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '395' abstract: - lang: eng text: We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game) ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1)) the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game, weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1. Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that it is not weakly acyclic. author: - first_name: Sebastian full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian last_name: Abshoff - first_name: Andreas full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas last_name: Cord-Landwehr - first_name: Daniel full_name: Jung, Daniel id: '37827' last_name: Jung - first_name: Alexander full_name: Skopalik, Alexander id: '40384' last_name: Skopalik citation: ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Multilevel Network Games. In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:435-440. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36' apa: Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Multilevel Network Games. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (pp. 435–440). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36 bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Multilevel Network Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}, author={Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={435–440}, collection={LNCS} }' chicago: Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander Skopalik. “Multilevel Network Games.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 435–40. LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36. ieee: S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Multilevel Network Games,” in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 435–440. mla: Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Multilevel Network Games.” Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 435–40, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36. short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 435–440.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:09Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:59Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36 file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z file_id: '1382' file_name: 395-WINE2014ACJS.pdf file_size: 161479 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z has_accepted_license: '1' language: - iso: eng page: 435-440 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '7' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3 - _id: '5' name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) series_title: LNCS status: public title: Multilevel Network Games type: conference user_id: '15415' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '412' abstract: - lang: eng text: In this paper we present and analyze HSkip+, a self-stabilizing overlay network for nodes with arbitrary heterogeneous bandwidths. HSkip+ has the same topology as the Skip+ graph proposed by Jacob et al. [PODC 2009] but its self-stabilization mechanism significantly outperforms the self-stabilization mechanism proposed for Skip+. Also, the nodes are now ordered according to their bandwidths and not according to their identifiers. Various other solutions have already been proposed for overlay networks with heterogeneous bandwidths, but they are not self-stabilizing. In addition to HSkip+ being self-stabilizing, its performance is on par with the best previous bounds on the time and work for joining or leaving a network of peers of logarithmic diameter and degree and arbitrary bandwidths. Also, the dilation and congestion for routing messages is on par with the best previous bounds for such networks, so that HSkip+ combines the advantages of both worlds. Our theoretical investigations are backed by simulations demonstrating that HSkip+ is indeed performing much better than Skip+ and working correctly under high churn rates. author: - first_name: Matthias full_name: Feldotto, Matthias id: '14052' last_name: Feldotto orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516 - first_name: Christian full_name: Scheideler, Christian id: '20792' last_name: Scheideler - first_name: Kalman full_name: Graffi, Kalman last_name: Graffi citation: ama: 'Feldotto M, Scheideler C, Graffi K. HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths. In: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P). ; 2014:1-10. doi:10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300' apa: 'Feldotto, M., Scheideler, C., & Graffi, K. (2014). HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P) (pp. 1–10). https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300' bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Scheideler_Graffi_2014, title={HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths}, DOI={10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Scheideler, Christian and Graffi, Kalman}, year={2014}, pages={1–10} }' chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Christian Scheideler, and Kalman Graffi. “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths.” In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 1–10, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300.' ieee: 'M. Feldotto, C. Scheideler, and K. Graffi, “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths,” in Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10.' mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths.” Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10, doi:10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300.' short: 'M. Feldotto, C. Scheideler, K. Graffi, in: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2014, pp. 1–10.' date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:12Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:20Z ddc: - '040' department: - _id: '79' - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300 external_id: arxiv: - '1408.0395' file: - access_level: closed content_type: application/pdf creator: florida date_created: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z file_id: '1361' file_name: 412-FSG2014P2P.pdf file_size: 472321 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:00Z has_accepted_license: '1' page: 1-10 project: - _id: '1' name: SFB 901 - _id: '2' name: SFB 901 - Project Area A - _id: '5' name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1 publication: Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P) status: public title: 'HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths' type: conference user_id: '14052' year: '2014' ... --- _id: '17663' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'In this paper, we define and study a new problem, referred to as the Dependent Unsplittable Flow Problem (D-UFP). We present and discuss this problem in the context of large-scale powerful (radar/camera) sensor networks, but we believe it has important applications on the admission of large flows in other networks as well. In order to optimize the selection of flows transmitted to the gateway, D-UFP takes into account possible dependencies between flows. We show that D-UFP is more difficult than NP-hard problems for which no good approximation is known. Then, we address two special cases of this problem: the case where all the sensors have a shared channel and the case where the sensors form a mesh and route to the gateway over a spanning tree.' author: - first_name: R. full_name: Cohen, R. last_name: Cohen - first_name: I. full_name: Nudelman, I. last_name: Nudelman - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy citation: ama: Cohen R, Nudelman I, Polevoy G. On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on. 2013;21(5):1461-1471. doi:10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792 apa: Cohen, R., Nudelman, I., & Polevoy, G. (2013). On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On, 21(5), 1461–1471. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792 bibtex: '@article{Cohen_Nudelman_Polevoy_2013, title={On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks}, volume={21}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792}, number={5}, journal={Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on}, author={Cohen, R. and Nudelman, I. and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2013}, pages={1461–1471} }' chicago: 'Cohen, R., I. Nudelman, and Gleb Polevoy. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On 21, no. 5 (2013): 1461–71. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792.' ieee: R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, and G. Polevoy, “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks,” Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 1461–1471, 2013. mla: Cohen, R., et al. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On, vol. 21, no. 5, 2013, pp. 1461–71, doi:10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792. short: R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, G. Polevoy, Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions On 21 (2013) 1461–1471. date_created: 2020-08-06T15:22:05Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' doi: 10.1109/TNET.2012.2227792 extern: '1' intvolume: ' 21' issue: '5' keyword: - Approximation algorithms - Approximation methods - Bandwidth - Logic gates - Radar - Vectors - Wireless sensor networks - Dependent flow scheduling - sensor networks language: - iso: eng page: 1461-1471 publication: Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on publication_identifier: issn: - 1063-6692 status: public title: On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks type: journal_article user_id: '83983' volume: 21 year: '2013' ... --- _id: '17664' author: - first_name: Reuven full_name: Cohen, Reuven last_name: Cohen - first_name: Ilia full_name: Nudelman, Ilia last_name: Nudelman - first_name: Gleb full_name: Polevoy, Gleb id: '83983' last_name: Polevoy citation: ama: 'Cohen R, Nudelman I, Polevoy G. On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. In: Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida. ; 2012.' apa: Cohen, R., Nudelman, I., & Polevoy, G. (2012). On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks. In Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida. bibtex: '@inproceedings{Cohen_Nudelman_Polevoy_2012, title={On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks}, booktitle={Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida}, author={Cohen, Reuven and Nudelman, Ilia and Polevoy, Gleb}, year={2012} }' chicago: Cohen, Reuven, Ilia Nudelman, and Gleb Polevoy. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” In Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012. ieee: R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, and G. Polevoy, “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks,” in Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012. mla: Cohen, Reuven, et al. “On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks.” Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012. short: 'R. Cohen, I. Nudelman, G. Polevoy, in: Infocom’2012, Orlando, Florida, 2012.' date_created: 2020-08-06T15:22:24Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z department: - _id: '63' - _id: '541' extern: '1' language: - iso: eng publication: Infocom'2012, Orlando, Florida status: public title: On the Admission of Dependent Flows in Powerful Sensor Networks type: conference user_id: '83983' year: '2012' ...