@article{17662, author = {{Polevoy, Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}}, issn = {{2167-8375}}, journal = {{ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}}, keywords = {{Competition, efficiency, equilibrium, market, social welfare}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{1:1--1:16}}, publisher = {{ACM}}, title = {{{Signaling Competition and Social Welfare}}}, doi = {{10.1145/2560766}}, volume = {{2}}, year = {{2014}}, } @phdthesis{19039, author = {{Petring, Ralf}}, title = {{{Multi-Algorithmen-Rendering: Darstellung heterogener 3-D-Szenen in Echtzeit}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{451, abstract = {{We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria are analysed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence towards an equilibrium may be exponential.}}, author = {{Drees, Maximilian and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}}, editor = {{Lavi, Ron}}, pages = {{110--121}}, title = {{{Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{452, abstract = {{Today's networks, like the Internet, do not consist of one but a mixture of several interconnected networks. Each has individual qualities and hence the performance of a network node results from the networks' interplay.We introduce a new game theoretic model capturing the interplay between a high-speed backbone network and a low-speed general purpose network. In our model, n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway node. A gateway node pays a fixed price for its connection to the high-speed network, but can utilize the high-speed network to gain communication distance 0 to all other gateways. Communication distances in the low-speed network are given by the hop distances. The effective communication distance between any two nodes then is given by the shortest path, which is possibly improved by using gateways as shortcuts.Every node v has the objective to minimize its communication costs, given by the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of the effective communication distances from v to all other nodes plus a fixed price \alpha > 0, if it decides to be a gateway. For both games and different ranges of \alpha, we study the existence of equilibria, the price of anarchy, and convergence properties of best-response dynamics.}}, author = {{Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}}, editor = {{Lavi, Ron}}, pages = {{294}}, title = {{{Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{453, abstract = {{In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions. For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides the first guarantees for general latency functions.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}}, pages = {{30--43}}, title = {{{Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{455, abstract = {{We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games and develop techniques to obtain approximate potential functions that prove the existence of alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria and the convergence of alpha-improvement steps. Specifically, we show how to obtain upper bounds for approximation factor alpha for a given class of cost functions. For example for concave cost functions the factor is at most 3/2, for quadratic cost functions it is at most 4/3, and for polynomial cost functions of maximal degree d it is at at most d + 1. For games with two players we obtain tight bounds which are as small as for example 1.054 in the case of quadratic cost functions.}}, author = {{Hansknecht, Christoph and Klimm, Max and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)}}, pages = {{242 -- 257}}, title = {{{Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games}}}, doi = {{10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{456, abstract = {{We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19].}}, author = {{Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}}, pages = {{480 -- 485}}, title = {{{Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{459, abstract = {{In this survey article, we discuss two algorithmic research areas that emerge from problems that arise when resources are offered in the cloud. The first area, online leasing, captures problems arising from the fact that resources in the cloud are not bought, but leased by cloud vendors. The second area, Distributed Storage Systems, deals with problems arising from so-called cloud federations, i.e., when several cloud providers are needed to fulfill a given task.}}, author = {{Kniesburges, Sebastian and Markarian, Christine and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Scheideler, Christian}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 21st International Colloquium on Structural Information and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO)}}, pages = {{1--13}}, title = {{{Algorithmic Aspects of Resource Management in the Cloud}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{462, abstract = {{We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}}, pages = {{625--630}}, title = {{{A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}}}, doi = {{10.5220/0005110406250630}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{395, abstract = {{We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game) ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1)) the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game, weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1. Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that it is not weakly acyclic.}}, author = {{Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}}, pages = {{435--440}}, title = {{{Multilevel Network Games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{412, abstract = {{In this paper we present and analyze HSkip+, a self-stabilizing overlay network for nodes with arbitrary heterogeneous bandwidths. HSkip+ has the same topology as the Skip+ graph proposed by Jacob et al. [PODC 2009] but its self-stabilization mechanism significantly outperforms the self-stabilization mechanism proposed for Skip+. Also, the nodes are now ordered according to their bandwidths and not according to their identifiers. Various other solutions have already been proposed for overlay networks with heterogeneous bandwidths, but they are not self-stabilizing. In addition to HSkip+ being self-stabilizing, its performance is on par with the best previous bounds on the time and work for joining or leaving a network of peers of logarithmic diameter and degree and arbitrary bandwidths. Also, the dilation and congestion for routing messages is on par with the best previous bounds for such networks, so that HSkip+ combines the advantages of both worlds. Our theoretical investigations are backed by simulations demonstrating that HSkip+ is indeed performing much better than Skip+ and working correctly under high churn rates.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Scheideler, Christian and Graffi, Kalman}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P)}}, pages = {{1--10}}, title = {{{HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths}}}, doi = {{10.1109/P2P.2014.6934300}}, year = {{2014}}, } @phdthesis{431, abstract = {{In meiner Dissertation besch{\"a}ftige ich mich mit dem Entwurf und der Analyse energieeffizienter Schedulingalgorithmen, insbesondere f{\"u}r sogenannte Speed-Scaling Modelle. Diese stellen das theoretische Pendant von Techniken wie AMDs PowerNOW! und Intels SpeedStep dar, welche es erlauben die Geschwindigkeit von Prozessoren zur Laufzeit an die derzeitigen Bedingungen anzupassen. Theoretische Untersuchungen solcher Modelle sind auf eine Arbeit von Yao, Demers und Shenker (FOCS'95) zur{\"u}ckzuf{\"u}hren. Hier kombinieren die Autoren klassisches Deadline-Scheduling mit einem Prozessor der Speed-Scaling beherrscht. Es gilt Jobs verschiedener Gr{\"o}ße fristgerecht abzuarbeiten und die dabei verwendete Energie zu minimieren. Der Energieverbrauch des Prozessors wird durch eine konvexe Funktion $\POW\colon\R_{\geq0}\to\R_{\geq0}$ modelliert, welche die Geschwindigkeit auf den Energieverbrauch abbildet.Meine Dissertation betrachtet verschiedene Varianten des urspr{\"u}nglichen Speed-Scaling Modells. Forschungsrelevante Ergebnisse sind in den Kapiteln 3 bis 6 zu finden und erstrecken sich {\"u}ber die im Folgenden beschriebenen Aspekte:- Kapitel 3 und 4 betrachten verschiedene \emph{Price-Collecting} Varianten des Originalproblems. Hier d{\"u}rfen einzelne Deadlines verfehlt werden, sofern eine jobabh{\"a}ngige Strafe gezahlt wird. Ich entwerfe insbesondere Online-Algorithmen mit einer beweisbar guten Competitiveness. Dabei liefern meine Ergebnisse substantielle Verbesserungen bestehender Arbeiten und erweitern diese unter Anderem auf Szenarien mit mehreren Prozessoren.- In Kapitel 5 wird statt des klassischen Deadline-Schedulings eine Linearkombination der durchschnittlichen Antwortzeit und des Energieverbrauchs betrachtet. Die Frage, ob dieses Problem NP-schwer ist, stellt eine der zentralen Forschungsfragen in diesem Gebiet dar. F{\"u}r eine relaxierte Form dieser Frage entwerfe ich einen effizienter Algorithmus und beweise seine Optimalit{\"a}t.- Das letzte Kapitel betrachtet ein Modell, welches – auf den ersten Blick – nicht direkt zur Speed-Scaling Literatur z{\"a}hlt. Hier geht es stattdessen um ein allgemeines Resource-Constrained Scheduling, in dem sich die Prozessoren zusammen eine gemeinsame, beliebig aufteilbare Ressource teilen. Ich untersuche die Komplexit{\"a}t des Problems und entwerfe verschiedene Approximationsalgorithmen.}}, author = {{Kling, Peter}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Energy-efficient Scheduling Algorithms}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{435, abstract = {{We give a polynomial time algorithm to compute an optimal energy and fractional weighted flow trade-off schedule for a speed-scalable processor with discrete speeds.Our algorithm uses a geometric approach that is based on structural properties obtained from a primal-dual formulation of the problem.}}, author = {{Antoniadis, Antonios and Barcelo, Neal and Consuegra, Mario and Kling, Peer and Nugent, Michael and Pruhs, Kirk and Scquizzato, Michele}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 31st Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS)}}, pages = {{63----74}}, title = {{{Efficient Computation of Optimal Energy and Fractional Weighted Flow Trade-off Schedules}}}, doi = {{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2014.63}}, year = {{2014}}, } @book{16870, editor = {{Flocchini, Paola and Gao, Jie and Kranakis, Evangelos and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm}}, isbn = {{9783642453458}}, issn = {{0302-9743}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Algorithms for Sensor Systems - 9th International Symposium on Algorithms and Experiments for Sensor Systems, Wireless Networks and Distributed Robotics, {ALGOSENSORS} 2013}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-642-45346-5}}, volume = {{8243}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inbook{16394, author = {{Lukovszki, Tamás and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm}}, booktitle = {{Lecture Notes in Computer Science}}, isbn = {{9783319144719}}, issn = {{0302-9743}}, title = {{{Fast Collisionless Pattern Formation by Anonymous, Position-Aware Robots}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-14472-6_17}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inbook{16395, author = {{Abshoff, Sebastian and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm}}, booktitle = {{Structural Information and Communication Complexity}}, isbn = {{9783319096193}}, issn = {{0302-9743}}, title = {{{Continuous Aggregation in Dynamic Ad-Hoc Networks}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_16}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{19981, author = {{Mertsching, Bärbel and Divband Soorati, Mohammad and Kotthauser, Tobias}}, journal = {{IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Biomimetics (ROBIO)}}, pages = {{661--667}}, title = {{{Automatic Reconstruction of Polygonal Room Models from 3D Point Clouds}}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{20148, author = {{Hamann, Heiko and Karsai, Istvan and Schmickl, Thomas}}, journal = {{Bulletin of Mathematical Biology}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{1181--1206}}, title = {{{Time delay implies cost on task switching: A model to investigate the efficiency of task partitioning}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11538-013-9851-4 }}, volume = {{75}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{20150, author = {{Hamann, Heiko and Schmickl, Thomas and Stradner, Jürgen and Crailsheim, Karl and Thenius, Ronald and Zahadat, Payam}}, journal = {{Chaos, Solitons & Fractals}}, pages = {{100--114}}, title = {{{Algorithmic Requirements for Swarm Intelligence in Differently Coupled Collective Systems}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.chaos.2013.01.011}}, volume = {{50}}, year = {{2013}}, } @inproceedings{20151, author = {{Hamann, Heiko and Schmickl, Thomas and Stradner, Jürgen and Schwarzer, Christopher and Michiels, Nico K. and Esparcia-Alcazar, Anna Isabel}}, booktitle = {{Applications of Evolutionary Computation - 16th European Conference (EvoApplications 2013)}}, pages = {{579--588}}, title = {{{Virtual Spatiality in Agent Controllers: Encoding Compartmentalization}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-642-37192-9_58}}, volume = {{7835}}, year = {{2013}}, }