@proceedings{163,
editor = {Dressler, Falko and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm},
location = {Paderborn, Germany},
publisher = {ACM},
title = {{Proceedings of the 17th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)}},
doi = {10.1145/2942358},
year = {2016},
}
@misc{187,
booktitle = {Transactions on Parallel Computing (TOPC)},
editor = {Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm},
number = {1},
pages = {1},
title = {{Introduction to the Special Issue on SPAA 2014}},
doi = {10.1145/2936716},
year = {2016},
}
@inproceedings{149,
abstract = {In this paper we consider a strategic variant of the online facility location problem. Given is a graph in which each node serves two roles: it is a strategic client stating requests as well as a potential location for a facility. In each time step one client states a request which induces private costs equal to the distance to the closest facility. Before serving, the clients may collectively decide to open new facilities, sharing the corresponding price. Instead of optimizing the global costs, each client acts selfishly. The prices of new facilities vary between nodes and also change over time, but are always bounded by some fixed value α. Both the requests as well as the facility prices are given by an online sequence and are not known in advance.We characterize the optimal strategies of the clients and analyze their overall performance in comparison to a centralized offline solution. If all players optimize their own competitiveness, the global performance of the system is O(√α⋅α) times worse than the offline optimum. A restriction to a natural subclass of strategies improves this result to O(α). We also show that for fixed facility costs, we can find strategies such that this bound further improves to O(√α).},
author = {Drees, Maximilian and Feldkord, Björn and Skopalik, Alexander},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)},
pages = {593----607},
title = {{Strategic Online Facility Location}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43},
year = {2016},
}
@misc{210,
author = {Leder, Lennart},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}},
year = {2016},
}
@article{145,
abstract = {Comparative evaluations of peer-to-peer protocols through simulations are a viable approach to judge the performance and costs of the individual protocols in large-scale networks. In order to support this work, we present the peer-to-peer system simulator PeerfactSim.KOM, which we extended over the last years. PeerfactSim.KOM comes with an extensive layer model to support various facets and protocols of peer-to-peer networking. In this article, we describe PeerfactSim.KOM and show how it can be used for detailed measurements of large-scale peer-to-peer networks. We enhanced PeerfactSim.KOM with a fine-grained analyzer concept, with exhaustive automated measurements and gnuplot generators as well as a coordination control to evaluate sets of experiment setups in parallel. Thus, by configuring all experiments and protocols only once and starting the simulator, all desired measurements are performed, analyzed, evaluated, and combined, resulting in a holistic environment for the comparative evaluation of peer-to-peer systems. An immediate comparison of different configurations and overlays under different aspects is possible directly after the execution without any manual post-processing. },
author = {Feldotto, Matthias and Graffi, Kalman},
journal = {Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience},
number = {5},
pages = {1655--1677},
publisher = {Wiley Online Library},
title = {{Systematic evaluation of peer-to-peer systems using PeerfactSim.KOM}},
doi = {10.1002/cpe.3716},
volume = {28},
year = {2016},
}
@inproceedings{157,
abstract = {Consider a scheduling problem in which a set of jobs with interjob communication, canonically represented by a weighted tree, needs to be scheduled on m parallel processors interconnected by a shared communication channel. In each time step, we may allow any processed job to use a certain capacity of the channel in order to satisfy (parts of) its communication demands to adjacent jobs processed in parallel. The goal is to find a schedule that minimizes the makespan and in which communication demands of all jobs are satisfied.We show that this problem is NP-hard in the strong sense even if the number of processors and the maximum degree of the underlying tree is constant.Consequently, we design and analyze simple approximation algorithms with asymptotic approximation ratio 2-2/m in case of paths and a ratio of 5/2 in case of arbitrary trees.},
author = {König, Jürgen and Mäcker, Alexander and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Riechers, Sören},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)},
pages = {563----577},
title = {{Scheduling with Interjob Communication on Parallel Processors}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_41},
year = {2016},
}
@misc{5406,
author = {Bülling, Jonas},
title = {{Parallelisierung von Algorithmen zur IR-Luftbildanalyse von Laubholzmischbeständen zur Verifizierung der Ausbreitung von Eichenkomplexschäden}},
year = {2016},
}
@misc{688,
author = {Kutzias, Damian},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Friendship Processes in Network Creation Games}},
year = {2016},
}
@inproceedings{209,
abstract = {We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.},
author = {Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)},
pages = {655----669},
title = {{Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47},
year = {2016},
}
@misc{1082,
author = {Handirk, Tobias},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken}},
year = {2016},
}
@article{139,
abstract = {We consider online optimization problems in which certain goods have to be acquired in order to provide a service or infrastructure. Classically, decisions for such problems are considered as final: one buys the goods. However, in many real world applications, there is a shift away from the idea of buying goods. Instead, leasing is often a more flexible and lucrative business model. Research has realized this shift and recently initiated the theoretical study of leasing models (Anthony and Gupta in Proceedings of the integer programming and combinatorial optimization: 12th International IPCO Conference, Ithaca, NY, USA, June 25–27, 2007; Meyerson in Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2005), 23–25 Oct 2005, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 2005; Nagarajan and Williamson in Discret Optim 10(4):361–370, 2013) We extend this line of work and suggest a more systematic study of leasing aspects for a class of online optimization problems. We provide two major technical results. We introduce the leasing variant of online set multicover and give an O(log(mK)logn)-competitive algorithm (with n, m, and K being the number of elements, sets, and leases, respectively). Our results also imply improvements for the non-leasing variant of online set cover. Moreover, we extend results for the leasing variant of online facility location. Nagarajan and Williamson (Discret Optim 10(4):361–370, 2013) gave an O(Klogn)-competitive algorithm for this problem (with n and K being the number of clients and leases, respectively). We remove the dependency on n (and, thereby, on time). In general, this leads to a bound of O(lmaxloglmax) (with the maximal lease length lmax). For many natural problem instances, the bound improves to O(K2).},
author = {Abshoff, Sebastian and Kling, Peter and Markarian, Christine and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Pietrzyk, Peter },
journal = {Journal of Combinatorial Optimization},
number = {4},
pages = { 1197----1216},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Towards the price of leasing online}},
doi = {10.1007/s10878-015-9915-5},
year = {2016},
}
@inproceedings{177,
abstract = {Efficiently parallelizable parameterized problems have been classified as being either in the class FPP (fixed-parameter parallelizable) or the class PNC (parameterized analog of NC), which contains FPP as a subclass. In this paper, we propose a more restrictive class of parallelizable parameterized problems called fixed-parameter parallel-tractable (FPPT). For a problem to be in FPPT, it should possess an efficient parallel algorithm not only from a theoretical standpoint but in practice as well. The primary distinction between FPPT and FPP is the parallel processor utilization, which is bounded by a polynomial function in the case of FPPT. We initiate the study of FPPT with the well-known k-vertex cover problem. In particular, we present a parallel algorithm that outperforms the best known parallel algorithm for this problem: using O(m) instead of O(n2) parallel processors, the running time improves from 4logn+O(kk) to O(k⋅log3n), where m is the number of edges, n is the number of vertices of the input graph, and k is an upper bound of the size of the sought vertex cover. We also note that a few P-complete problems fall into FPPT including the monotone circuit value problem (MCV) when the underlying graphs are bounded by a constant Euler genus.},
author = {Abu-Khzam, Faisal N. and Li, Shouwei and Markarian, Christine and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Podlipyan, Pavel},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)},
pages = {477--488},
title = {{On the Parameterized Parallel Complexity and the Vertex Cover Problem}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_35},
year = {2016},
}
@misc{5407,
author = {Koepe, Jörn},
title = {{Price-Based Allocation Games}},
year = {2016},
}
@misc{689,
author = {Schaefer, Johannes Sebastian},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Routing Algorithms on Delayed Networks for Disaster Management Support}},
year = {2016},
}
@phdthesis{154,
author = {Cord Landwehr, Andreas},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Selfish Network Creation - On Variants of Network Creation Games}},
year = {2016},
}
@article{159,
abstract = {Abstract—Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approachto a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the usersin a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformlyraising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacityconstraints. We consider an extension of these allocations byraising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniformtime-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocationsare used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, whichwe formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present avariety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these gamespossess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation ingeneral is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms forprominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), includingthe case when all users have the same source-destination pair.We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nashand strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players havedifferent or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, weshow that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possibleto design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial resultson polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived.},
author = {Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander},
journal = {IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking},
number = {4},
pages = {2553 -- 2562},
publisher = {IEEE},
title = {{Routing Games With Progressive Filling}},
doi = {10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571},
year = {2016},
}
@phdthesis{200,
author = {Drees, Maximilian},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games}},
year = {2016},
}
@misc{251,
author = {Pfannschmidt, Karlson},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{Solving the aggregated bandits problem}},
year = {2015},
}
@phdthesis{270,
author = {Abshoff, Sebastian},
publisher = {Universität Paderborn},
title = {{On the Complexity of Fundamental Problems in Dynamic Ad-hoc Networks}},
year = {2015},
}
@inproceedings{275,
abstract = {We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model (Fabrikant et al., PODC'03) became popular for studying the structure of the Internet or social networks. Despite its significance, locality in this game was first studied only recently (Bilò et al., SPAA'14), where a worst case locality model was presented, which came with a high efficiency loss in terms of quality of equilibria. Our main contribution is a new and more optimistic view on locality: agents are limited in their knowledge and actions to their local view ranges, but can probe different strategies and finally choose the best. We study the influence of our locality notion on the hardness of computing best responses, convergence to equilibria, and quality of equilibria. Moreover, we compare the strength of local versus non-local strategy changes. Our results address the gap between the original model and the worst case locality variant. On the bright side, our efficiency results are in line with observations from the original model, yet we have a non-constant lower bound on the Price of Anarchy.},
author = {Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Lenzner, Pascal},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 40th Conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS)},
pages = {248----260},
title = {{Network Creation Games: Think Global - Act Local}},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-48054-0_21},
year = {2015},
}