TY - GEN
AB - We consider the following variant of the two dimensional gathering problem
for swarms of robots: Given a swarm of $n$ indistinguishable, point shaped
robots on a two dimensional grid. Initially, the robots form a closed chain on
the grid and must keep this connectivity during the whole process of their
gathering. Connectivity means, that neighboring robots of the chain need to be
positioned at the same or neighboring points of the grid. In our model,
gathering means to keep shortening the chain until the robots are located
inside a $2\times 2$ subgrid. Our model is completely local (no global control,
no global coordinates, no compass, no global communication or vision, \ldots).
Each robot can only see its next constant number of left and right neighbors on
the chain. This fixed constant is called the \emph{viewing path length}. All
its operations and detections are restricted to this constant number of robots.
Other robots, even if located at neighboring or the same grid point cannot be
detected. Only based on the relative positions of its detectable chain
neighbors, a robot can decide to obtain a certain state. Based on this state
and their local knowledge, the robots do local modifications to the chain by
moving to neighboring grid points without breaking the chain. These
modifications are performed without the knowledge whether they lead to a global
progress or not. We assume the fully synchronous $\mathcal{FSYNC}$ model. For
this problem, we present a gathering algorithm which needs linear time. This
result generalizes the result from \cite{hopper}, where an open chain with
specified distinguishable (and fixed) endpoints is considered.
AU - Abshoff, Sebastian
AU - Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
AU - Fischer, Matthias
AU - Jung, Daniel
AU - Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
ID - 16449
T2 - arXiv:1510.05454
TI - Gathering a Closed Chain of Robots on a Grid
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - Pautz, Jannis
ID - 316
TI - Budget Games with priced strategies
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - Kothe, Nils
ID - 277
TI - Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk
ER -
TY - GEN
AB - We consider the problem of dominating set-based virtual backbone used for
routing in asymmetric wireless ad-hoc networks. These networks have non-uniform
transmission ranges and are modeled using the well-established disk graphs. The
corresponding graph theoretic problem seeks a strongly connected
dominating-absorbent set of minimum cardinality in a digraph. A subset of nodes
in a digraph is a strongly connected dominating-absorbent set if the subgraph
induced by these nodes is strongly connected and each node in the graph is
either in the set or has both an in-neighbor and an out-neighbor in it.
Distributed algorithms for this problem are of practical significance due to
the dynamic nature of ad-hoc networks. We present a first distributed
approximation algorithm, with a constant approximation factor and O(Diam)
running time, where Diam is the diameter of the graph. Moreover we present a
simple heuristic algorithm and conduct an extensive simulation study showing
that our heuristic outperforms previously known approaches for the problem.
AU - Abu-Khzam, Faisal N.
AU - Markarian, Christine
AU - Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
AU - Schubert, Michael
ID - 16452
T2 - arXiv:1510.01866
TI - Approximation and Heuristic Algorithms for Computing Backbones in Asymmetric Ad-Hoc Networks
ER -
TY - THES
AU - Jähn, Claudius
ID - 317
TI - Bewertung von Renderingalgorithmen für komplexe 3-D-Szenen
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - Many markets have seen a shift from the idea of buying and moved to leasing instead. Arguably, the latter has been the major catalyst for their success. Ten years ago, research realized this shift and initiated the study of "online leasing problems" by introducing leasing to online optimization problems. Resources required to provide a service in an "online leasing problem" are no more bought but leased for different durations. In this paper, we provide an overview of results that contribute to the understanding of "online resource leasing problems".
AU - Markarian, Christine
AU - Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
ID - 266
T2 - Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC)
TI - Online Resource Leasing
ER -
TY - BOOK
ED - Gausemeier, Jürgen
ED - Grafe, Michael
ED - Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
ID - 17431
TI - Augmented & Virtual Reality in der Produktentstehung: Grundlagen, Methoden und Werkzeuge; Interaktions- und Visualisierungstechniken, Virtual Prototyping intelligenter technischer Systeme mit AR/VR
VL - 342
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - Consider the problem in which n jobs that are classified into k types are to be scheduled on m identical machines without preemption. A machine requires a proper setup taking s time units before processing jobs of a given type. The objective is to minimize the makespan of the resulting schedule. We design and analyze an approximation algorithm that runs in time polynomial in n,m and k and computes a solution with an approximation factor that can be made arbitrarily close to 3/2.
AU - Mäcker, Alexander
AU - Malatyali, Manuel
AU - Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
AU - Riechers, Sören
ED - Dehne, Frank
ED - Sack, Jörg Rüdiger
ED - Stege, Ulrike
ID - 274
T2 - Algorithms and Data Structures: 14th International Symposium, WADS 2015, Victoria, BC, Canada, August 5-7, 2015. Proceedings
TI - Non-preemptive Scheduling on Machines with Setup Times
ER -
TY - THES
AU - Markarian, Christine
ID - 267
TI - Online Resource Leasing
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by a potential function argument. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing pure Nash equilibria in such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players have unit weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic) latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts. A ρ--approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a state of a (weighted congestion) game from which no player has any incentive to deviate in order to improve her cost by a multiplicative factor higher than ρ. Do such equilibria exist for small values of ρ? And if so, can we compute them efficiently?We provide positive answers to both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions by exploiting an “approximation” of such games by a new class of potential games that we call Ψ-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!-approximate pure Nash equilibria, where d is the maximum degree of the latency functions. Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate pure Nash equilibria when d is a constant. For games with linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee is 3+√5/2 + Oγ for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for latency functions with maximum degree d≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d). The running time is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ. As a byproduct of our techniques, we also show the following interesting structural statement for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state to a dO(d2)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified in such games as long as d is a constant.To the best of our knowledge, these are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. Our techniques significantly extend our recent work on unweighted congestion games through the use of Ψ-games. The concept of approximating nonpotential games by potential ones is interesting in itself and might have further applications.
AU - Caragiannis, Ioannis
AU - Fanelli, Angelo
AU - Gravin, Nick
AU - Skopalik, Alexander
ID - 320
IS - 1
JF - Transactions on Economics and Computation
TI - Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure
VL - 3
ER -
TY - CONF
AU - Berssenbrügge, Jan
AU - Wiederkehr, Olga
AU - Jähn, Claudius
AU - Fischer, Matthias
ID - 17425
T2 - 12. Paderborner Workshop Augmented & Virtual Reality in der Produktentstehung
TI - Anbindung des Virtuellen Prototypen an die Partialmodelle intelligenter technischer Systeme
VL - 343
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - Consider n nodes connected to a single coordinator. Each node receives an
individual online data stream of numbers and, at any point in time, the
coordinator has to know the k nodes currently observing the largest values, for
a given k between 1 and n. We design and analyze an algorithm that solves this
problem while bounding the amount of messages exchanged between the nodes and
the coordinator. Our algorithm employs the idea of using filters which,
intuitively speaking, leads to few messages to be sent, if the new input is
"similar" to the previous ones. The algorithm uses a number of messages that is
on expectation by a factor of O((log {\Delta} + k) log n) larger than that of
an offline algorithm that sets filters in an optimal way, where {\Delta} is
upper bounded by the largest value observed by any node.
AU - Mäcker, Alexander
AU - Malatyali, Manuel
AU - Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
ID - 16460
T2 - Proceedings of the 29th International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS)
TI - Online Top-k-Position Monitoring of Distributed Data Streams
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game) ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1)) the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game, weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1. Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that it is not weakly acyclic.
AU - Abshoff, Sebastian
AU - Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
AU - Jung, Daniel
AU - Skopalik, Alexander
ID - 395
T2 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)
TI - Multilevel Network Games
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions. For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides the first guarantees for general latency functions.
AU - Feldotto, Matthias
AU - Gairing, Martin
AU - Skopalik, Alexander
ID - 453
T2 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)
TI - Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - We give a polynomial time algorithm to compute an optimal energy and fractional weighted flow trade-off schedule for a speed-scalable processor with discrete speeds.Our algorithm uses a geometric approach that is based on structural properties obtained from a primal-dual formulation of the problem.
AU - Antoniadis, Antonios
AU - Barcelo, Neal
AU - Consuegra, Mario
AU - Kling, Peer
AU - Nugent, Michael
AU - Pruhs, Kirk
AU - Scquizzato, Michele
ID - 435
T2 - Proceedings of the 31st Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS)
TI - Efficient Computation of Optimal Energy and Fractional Weighted Flow Trade-off Schedules
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - In this survey article, we discuss two algorithmic research areas that emerge from problems that arise when resources are offered in the cloud. The first area, online leasing, captures problems arising from the fact that resources in the cloud are not bought, but leased by cloud vendors. The second area, Distributed Storage Systems, deals with problems arising from so-called cloud federations, i.e., when several cloud providers are needed to fulfill a given task.
AU - Kniesburges, Sebastian
AU - Markarian, Christine
AU - Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
AU - Scheideler, Christian
ID - 459
T2 - Proceedings of the 21st International Colloquium on Structural Information and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO)
TI - Algorithmic Aspects of Resource Management in the Cloud
ER -
TY - THES
AB - In meiner Dissertation besch{\"a}ftige ich mich mit dem Entwurf und der Analyse energieeffizienter Schedulingalgorithmen, insbesondere f{\"u}r sogenannte Speed-Scaling Modelle. Diese stellen das theoretische Pendant von Techniken wie AMDs PowerNOW! und Intels SpeedStep dar, welche es erlauben die Geschwindigkeit von Prozessoren zur Laufzeit an die derzeitigen Bedingungen anzupassen. Theoretische Untersuchungen solcher Modelle sind auf eine Arbeit von Yao, Demers und Shenker (FOCS'95) zur{\"u}ckzuf{\"u}hren. Hier kombinieren die Autoren klassisches Deadline-Scheduling mit einem Prozessor der Speed-Scaling beherrscht. Es gilt Jobs verschiedener Gr{\"o}ße fristgerecht abzuarbeiten und die dabei verwendete Energie zu minimieren. Der Energieverbrauch des Prozessors wird durch eine konvexe Funktion $\POW\colon\R_{\geq0}\to\R_{\geq0}$ modelliert, welche die Geschwindigkeit auf den Energieverbrauch abbildet.Meine Dissertation betrachtet verschiedene Varianten des urspr{\"u}nglichen Speed-Scaling Modells. Forschungsrelevante Ergebnisse sind in den Kapiteln 3 bis 6 zu finden und erstrecken sich {\"u}ber die im Folgenden beschriebenen Aspekte:- Kapitel 3 und 4 betrachten verschiedene \emph{Price-Collecting} Varianten des Originalproblems. Hier d{\"u}rfen einzelne Deadlines verfehlt werden, sofern eine jobabh{\"a}ngige Strafe gezahlt wird. Ich entwerfe insbesondere Online-Algorithmen mit einer beweisbar guten Competitiveness. Dabei liefern meine Ergebnisse substantielle Verbesserungen bestehender Arbeiten und erweitern diese unter Anderem auf Szenarien mit mehreren Prozessoren.- In Kapitel 5 wird statt des klassischen Deadline-Schedulings eine Linearkombination der durchschnittlichen Antwortzeit und des Energieverbrauchs betrachtet. Die Frage, ob dieses Problem NP-schwer ist, stellt eine der zentralen Forschungsfragen in diesem Gebiet dar. F{\"u}r eine relaxierte Form dieser Frage entwerfe ich einen effizienter Algorithmus und beweise seine Optimalit{\"a}t.- Das letzte Kapitel betrachtet ein Modell, welches – auf den ersten Blick – nicht direkt zur Speed-Scaling Literatur z{\"a}hlt. Hier geht es stattdessen um ein allgemeines Resource-Constrained Scheduling, in dem sich die Prozessoren zusammen eine gemeinsame, beliebig aufteilbare Ressource teilen. Ich untersuche die Komplexit{\"a}t des Problems und entwerfe verschiedene Approximationsalgorithmen.
AU - Kling, Peter
ID - 431
TI - Energy-efficient Scheduling Algorithms
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - In this paper we present and analyze HSkip+, a self-stabilizing overlay network for nodes with arbitrary heterogeneous bandwidths. HSkip+ has the same topology as the Skip+ graph proposed by Jacob et al. [PODC 2009] but its self-stabilization mechanism significantly outperforms the self-stabilization mechanism proposed for Skip+. Also, the nodes are now ordered according to their bandwidths and not according to their identifiers. Various other solutions have already been proposed for overlay networks with heterogeneous bandwidths, but they are not self-stabilizing. In addition to HSkip+ being self-stabilizing, its performance is on par with the best previous bounds on the time and work for joining or leaving a network of peers of logarithmic diameter and degree and arbitrary bandwidths. Also, the dilation and congestion for routing messages is on par with the best previous bounds for such networks, so that HSkip+ combines the advantages of both worlds. Our theoretical investigations are backed by simulations demonstrating that HSkip+ is indeed performing much better than Skip+ and working correctly under high churn rates.
AU - Feldotto, Matthias
AU - Scheideler, Christian
AU - Graffi, Kalman
ID - 412
T2 - Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P)
TI - HSkip+: A Self-Stabilizing Overlay Network for Nodes with Heterogeneous Bandwidths
ER -
TY - GEN
AU - Pahl, David
ID - 373
TI - Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen
ER -
TY - CONF
AB - Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by n selfish nodes. Each node v can buy a set of edges, each for a fixed price α > 0. Its goal is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game, Fabrikant et al., PODC 2003) or maximum (MAX-game, Demaine et al., PODC 2007) of distances from v to all other nodes plus the prices of the bought edges. The above papers show the existence of Nash equilibria as well as upper and lower bounds for the prices of anarchy and stability. In several subsequent papers, these bounds were improved for a wide range of prices α. In this paper, we extend these models by incorporating quality-of-service aspects: Each edge cannot only be bought at a fixed quality (edge length one) for a fixed price α. Instead, we assume that quality levels (i.e., edge lengths) are varying in a fixed interval [βˇ,β^] , 0 series = {LNCS}
AU - Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
AU - Mäcker, Alexander
AU - Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
ID - 380
T2 - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)
TI - Quality of Service in Network Creation Games
ER -