---
_id: '20129'
author:
- first_name: Heiko
  full_name: Hamann, Heiko
  last_name: Hamann
- first_name: Hiroki
  full_name: Sayama, Hiroki
  last_name: Sayama
- first_name: John
  full_name: Rieffel, John
  last_name: Rieffel
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Risi, Sebastian
  last_name: Risi
- first_name: Rene
  full_name: Doursat, Rene
  last_name: Doursat
- first_name: Hod
  full_name: Lipson, Hod
  last_name: Lipson
citation:
  ama: 'Hamann H, Sayama H, Rieffel J, Risi S, Doursat R, Lipson H. Evolution of Collective
    Behaviors by Minimizing Surprise. In: <i>14th Int. Conf. on the Synthesis and
    Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE 2014)</i>. MIT Press; 2014:344-351. doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055">10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055</a>'
  apa: Hamann, H., Sayama, H., Rieffel, J., Risi, S., Doursat, R., &#38; Lipson, H.
    (2014). Evolution of Collective Behaviors by Minimizing Surprise. In <i>14th Int.
    Conf. on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE 2014)</i> (pp.
    344–351). MIT Press. <a href="https://doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055">https://doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Hamann_Sayama_Rieffel_Risi_Doursat_Lipson_2014, title={Evolution
    of Collective Behaviors by Minimizing Surprise}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055">10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055</a>},
    booktitle={14th Int. Conf. on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE
    2014)}, publisher={MIT Press}, author={Hamann, Heiko and Sayama, Hiroki and Rieffel,
    John and Risi, Sebastian and Doursat, Rene and Lipson, Hod}, year={2014}, pages={344–351}
    }'
  chicago: Hamann, Heiko, Hiroki Sayama, John Rieffel, Sebastian Risi, Rene Doursat,
    and Hod Lipson. “Evolution of Collective Behaviors by Minimizing Surprise.” In
    <i>14th Int. Conf. on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE 2014)</i>,
    344–51. MIT Press, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055">https://doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055</a>.
  ieee: H. Hamann, H. Sayama, J. Rieffel, S. Risi, R. Doursat, and H. Lipson, “Evolution
    of Collective Behaviors by Minimizing Surprise,” in <i>14th Int. Conf. on the
    Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE 2014)</i>, 2014, pp. 344–351.
  mla: Hamann, Heiko, et al. “Evolution of Collective Behaviors by Minimizing Surprise.”
    <i>14th Int. Conf. on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE 2014)</i>,
    MIT Press, 2014, pp. 344–51, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055">10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055</a>.
  short: 'H. Hamann, H. Sayama, J. Rieffel, S. Risi, R. Doursat, H. Lipson, in: 14th
    Int. Conf. on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE 2014), MIT
    Press, 2014, pp. 344–351.'
date_created: 2020-10-20T09:02:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:20Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '238'
doi: 10.7551/978-0-262-32621-6-ch055
language:
- iso: eng
page: 344-351
publication: 14th Int. Conf. on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (ALIFE
  2014)
publisher: MIT Press
status: public
title: Evolution of Collective Behaviors by Minimizing Surprise
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '20130'
author:
- first_name: Enric
  full_name: Cervera, Enric
  last_name: Cervera
- first_name: Yara
  full_name: Khaluf, Yara
  last_name: Khaluf
- first_name: Mauro
  full_name: Birattari, Mauro
  last_name: Birattari
- first_name: Heiko
  full_name: Hamann, Heiko
  last_name: Hamann
- first_name: Angel P.  del
  full_name: Pobil, Angel P.  del
  last_name: Pobil
- first_name: Eris
  full_name: Chinellato, Eris
  last_name: Chinellato
- first_name: Ester
  full_name: Martinez-Martin, Ester
  last_name: Martinez-Martin
- first_name: John
  full_name: Hallam, John
  last_name: Hallam
- first_name: Antonio
  full_name: Morales, Antonio
  last_name: Morales
citation:
  ama: 'Cervera E, Khaluf Y, Birattari M, et al. A Swarm Robotics Approach to Task
    Allocation Under Soft Deadlines and Negligible Switching Costs. In: <i>Simulation
    of Adaptive Behavior (SAB 2014)</i>. Vol 8575. ; 2014:270-279. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26">10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26</a>'
  apa: Cervera, E., Khaluf, Y., Birattari, M., Hamann, H., Pobil, A. P. del, Chinellato,
    E., … Morales, A. (2014). A Swarm Robotics Approach to Task Allocation Under Soft
    Deadlines and Negligible Switching Costs. In <i>Simulation of Adaptive Behavior
    (SAB 2014)</i> (Vol. 8575, pp. 270–279). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Cervera_Khaluf_Birattari_Hamann_Pobil_Chinellato_Martinez-Martin_Hallam_Morales_2014,
    title={A Swarm Robotics Approach to Task Allocation Under Soft Deadlines and Negligible
    Switching Costs}, volume={8575}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26">10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26</a>},
    booktitle={Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (SAB 2014)}, author={Cervera, Enric
    and Khaluf, Yara and Birattari, Mauro and Hamann, Heiko and Pobil, Angel P. del
    and Chinellato, Eris and Martinez-Martin, Ester and Hallam, John and Morales,
    Antonio}, year={2014}, pages={270–279} }'
  chicago: Cervera, Enric, Yara Khaluf, Mauro Birattari, Heiko Hamann, Angel P. del
    Pobil, Eris Chinellato, Ester Martinez-Martin, John Hallam, and Antonio Morales.
    “A Swarm Robotics Approach to Task Allocation Under Soft Deadlines and Negligible
    Switching Costs.” In <i>Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (SAB 2014)</i>, 8575:270–79,
    2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26</a>.
  ieee: E. Cervera <i>et al.</i>, “A Swarm Robotics Approach to Task Allocation Under
    Soft Deadlines and Negligible Switching Costs,” in <i>Simulation of Adaptive Behavior
    (SAB 2014)</i>, 2014, vol. 8575, pp. 270–279.
  mla: Cervera, Enric, et al. “A Swarm Robotics Approach to Task Allocation Under
    Soft Deadlines and Negligible Switching Costs.” <i>Simulation of Adaptive Behavior
    (SAB 2014)</i>, vol. 8575, 2014, pp. 270–79, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26">10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26</a>.
  short: 'E. Cervera, Y. Khaluf, M. Birattari, H. Hamann, A.P. del Pobil, E. Chinellato,
    E. Martinez-Martin, J. Hallam, A. Morales, in: Simulation of Adaptive Behavior
    (SAB 2014), 2014, pp. 270–279.'
date_created: 2020-10-20T09:09:59Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:20Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '238'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-08864-8_26
intvolume: '      8575'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 270-279
publication: Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (SAB 2014)
status: public
title: A Swarm Robotics Approach to Task Allocation Under Soft Deadlines and Negligible
  Switching Costs
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
volume: 8575
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '368'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We consider the problem of scheduling a number of jobs on $m$ identical processors
    sharing a continuously divisible resource. Each job j comes with a resource requirement
    r_j \in {0,1}. The job can be processed at full speed if granted its full resource
    requirement. If receiving only an x-portion of r_j, it is processed at an x-fraction
    of the full speed. Our goal is to find a resource assignment that minimizes the
    makespan (i.e., the latest completion time). Variants of such problems, relating
    the resource assignment of jobs to their \emph{processing speeds}, have been studied
    under the term discrete-continuous scheduling. Known results are either very pessimistic
    or heuristic in nature.In this paper, we suggest and analyze a slightly simplified
    model. It focuses on the assignment of shared continuous resources to the processors.
    The job assignment to processors and the ordering of the jobs have already been
    fixed. It is shown that, even for unit size jobs, finding an optimal solution
    is NP-hard if the number of processors is part of the input. Positive results
    for unit size jobs include an efficient optimal algorithm for 2 processors. Moreover,
    we prove that balanced schedules yield a 2-1/m-approximation for a fixed number
    of processors. Such schedules are computed by our GreedyBalance algorithm, for
    which the bound is tight.
author:
- first_name: Andre
  full_name: Brinkmann, Andre
  last_name: Brinkmann
- first_name: Peter
  full_name: Kling, Peter
  last_name: Kling
- first_name: Friedhelm
  full_name: Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
  id: '15523'
  last_name: Meyer auf der Heide
- first_name: Lars
  full_name: Nagel, Lars
  last_name: Nagel
- first_name: Sören
  full_name: Riechers, Sören
  last_name: Riechers
- first_name: 'Tim '
  full_name: 'Suess, Tim '
  last_name: Suess
citation:
  ama: 'Brinkmann A, Kling P, Meyer auf der Heide F, Nagel L, Riechers S, Suess T.
    Scheduling Shared Continuous Resources on Many-Cores. In: <i>Proceedings of the
    26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)</i>.
    ; 2014:128-137. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2612669.2612698">10.1145/2612669.2612698</a>'
  apa: Brinkmann, A., Kling, P., Meyer auf der Heide, F., Nagel, L., Riechers, S.,
    &#38; Suess, T. (2014). Scheduling Shared Continuous Resources on Many-Cores.
    <i>Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures
    (SPAA)</i>, 128–137. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2612669.2612698">https://doi.org/10.1145/2612669.2612698</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Brinkmann_Kling_Meyer auf der Heide_Nagel_Riechers_Suess_2014,
    title={Scheduling Shared Continuous Resources on Many-Cores}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2612669.2612698">10.1145/2612669.2612698</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms
    and Architectures (SPAA)}, author={Brinkmann, Andre and Kling, Peter and Meyer
    auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Nagel, Lars and Riechers, Sören and Suess, Tim },
    year={2014}, pages={128–137} }'
  chicago: Brinkmann, Andre, Peter Kling, Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide, Lars Nagel,
    Sören Riechers, and Tim  Suess. “Scheduling Shared Continuous Resources on Many-Cores.”
    In <i>Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures
    (SPAA)</i>, 128–37, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2612669.2612698">https://doi.org/10.1145/2612669.2612698</a>.
  ieee: 'A. Brinkmann, P. Kling, F. Meyer auf der Heide, L. Nagel, S. Riechers, and
    T. Suess, “Scheduling Shared Continuous Resources on Many-Cores,” in <i>Proceedings
    of the 26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)</i>,
    2014, pp. 128–137, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2612669.2612698">10.1145/2612669.2612698</a>.'
  mla: Brinkmann, Andre, et al. “Scheduling Shared Continuous Resources on Many-Cores.”
    <i>Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures
    (SPAA)</i>, 2014, pp. 128–37, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2612669.2612698">10.1145/2612669.2612698</a>.
  short: 'A. Brinkmann, P. Kling, F. Meyer auf der Heide, L. Nagel, S. Riechers, T.
    Suess, in: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms
    and Architectures (SPAA), 2014, pp. 128–137.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:03Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:30Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1145/2612669.2612698
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-20T07:17:38Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:38Z
  file_id: '1403'
  file_name: 368-BKMNRS14.pdf
  file_size: 485767
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:38Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 128-137
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '16'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt C4
- _id: '14'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject C2
- _id: '4'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and
  Architectures (SPAA)
status: public
title: Scheduling Shared Continuous Resources on Many-Cores
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '370'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of
    bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by
    uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints.
    We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary
    and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These
    allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we
    formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs).We present a variety of results
    for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong
    equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time
    algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case
    when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of
    anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when
    players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show
    that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games
    with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms
    in this direction are also derived. '
author:
- first_name: Tobias
  full_name: Harks, Tobias
  last_name: Harks
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Höfer, Martin
  last_name: Höfer
- first_name: Kevin
  full_name: Schewior, Kevin
  last_name: Schewior
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games with Progressive Filling.
    In: <i>Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
    Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i>. ; 2014:352-360. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571">10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>'
  apa: Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Routing Games
    with Progressive Filling. In <i>Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International
    Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i> (pp. 352–360). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571">https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2014, title={Routing Games
    with Progressive Filling}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571">10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
    Communications (INFOCOM’14)}, author={Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior,
    Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={352–360} }'
  chicago: Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing
    Games with Progressive Filling.” In <i>Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International
    Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i>, 352–60, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571">https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>.
  ieee: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games with Progressive
    Filling,” in <i>Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on
    Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i>, 2014, pp. 352–360.
  mla: Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games with Progressive Filling.” <i>Proceedings
    of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14)</i>,
    2014, pp. 352–60, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571">10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571</a>.
  short: 'T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 33rd
    Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14),
    2014, pp. 352–360.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:30Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z
  file_id: '1402'
  file_name: 370-HHSS14.pdf
  file_size: 179583
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 352-360
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
  Communications (INFOCOM'14)
status: public
title: Routing Games with Progressive Filling
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '373'
author:
- first_name: David
  full_name: Pahl, David
  last_name: Pahl
citation:
  ama: Pahl D. <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>. Universität
    Paderborn; 2014.
  apa: Pahl, D. (2014). <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>.
    Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Pahl_2014, title={Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen},
    publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Pahl, David}, year={2014} }'
  chicago: Pahl, David. <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  ieee: D. Pahl, <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  mla: Pahl, David. <i>Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  short: D. Pahl, Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen, Universität
    Paderborn, 2014.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:31Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
title: Reputationssysteme für zusammengesetzte Dienstleistungen
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '379'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In the leasing variant of Set Cover presented by Anthony et al.[1], elements
    U arrive over time and must be covered by sets from a familyF of subsets of U.
    Each set can be leased for K different periods of time.Let |U| = n and |F| = m.
    Leasing a set S for a period k incurs a cost ckS and allows S to cover its elements
    for the next lk time steps. The objectiveis to minimize the total cost of the
    sets leased, such that elements arrivingat any time t are covered by sets which
    contain them and are leased duringtime t. Anthony et al. [1] gave an optimal O(log
    n)-approximation forthe problem in the offline setting, unless P = NP [22]. In
    this paper, wegive randomized algorithms for variants of Set Cover Leasing in
    the onlinesetting, including a generalization of Online Set Cover with Repetitionspresented
    by Alon et al. [2], where elements appear multiple times andmust be covered by
    a different set at each arrival. Our results improve theO(log2(mn)) competitive
    factor of Online Set Cover with Repetitions [2]to O(log d log(dn)) = O(logmlog(mn)),
    where d is the maximum numberof sets an element belongs to.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian
  last_name: Abshoff
- first_name: Christine
  full_name: Markarian, Christine
  id: '37612'
  last_name: Markarian
- first_name: Friedhelm
  full_name: Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
  id: '15523'
  last_name: Meyer auf der Heide
citation:
  ama: 'Abshoff S, Markarian C, Meyer auf der Heide F. Randomized Online Algorithms
    for Set Cover Leasing Problems. In: <i>Proceedings of the 8th Annual International
    Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>. LNCS. ;
    2014:25-34. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3">10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3</a>'
  apa: Abshoff, S., Markarian, C., &#38; Meyer auf der Heide, F. (2014). Randomized
    Online Algorithms for Set Cover Leasing Problems. In <i>Proceedings of the 8th
    Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
    (COCOA)</i> (pp. 25–34). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Markarian_Meyer auf der Heide_2014, series={LNCS},
    title={Randomized Online Algorithms for Set Cover Leasing Problems}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3">10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
    Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Abshoff, Sebastian and Markarian,
    Christine and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm}, year={2014}, pages={25–34}, collection={LNCS}
    }'
  chicago: Abshoff, Sebastian, Christine Markarian, and Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide.
    “Randomized Online Algorithms for Set Cover Leasing Problems.” In <i>Proceedings
    of the 8th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
    (COCOA)</i>, 25–34. LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3</a>.
  ieee: S. Abshoff, C. Markarian, and F. Meyer auf der Heide, “Randomized Online Algorithms
    for Set Cover Leasing Problems,” in <i>Proceedings of the 8th Annual International
    Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 2014, pp.
    25–34.
  mla: Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Randomized Online Algorithms for Set Cover Leasing
    Problems.” <i>Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
    Optimization and Applications (COCOA)</i>, 2014, pp. 25–34, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3">10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3</a>.
  short: 'S. Abshoff, C. Markarian, F. Meyer auf der Heide, in: Proceedings of the
    8th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
    (COCOA), 2014, pp. 25–34.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:06Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:36Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-12691-3_3
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-20T07:12:57Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:12:57Z
  file_id: '1395'
  file_name: 379-COCOA14.pdf
  file_size: 214299
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:12:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 25-34
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
  Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Randomized Online Algorithms for Set Cover Leasing Problems
type: conference
user_id: '15504'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '380'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed
    by n selfish nodes. Each node v can buy a set of edges, each for a fixed price
    α > 0. Its goal is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game, Fabrikant
    et al., PODC 2003) or maximum (MAX-game, Demaine et al., PODC 2007) of distances
    from v to all other nodes plus the prices of the bought edges. The above papers
    show the existence of Nash equilibria as well as upper and lower bounds for the
    prices of anarchy and stability. In several subsequent papers, these bounds were
    improved for a wide range of prices α. In this paper, we extend these models by
    incorporating quality-of-service aspects: Each edge cannot only be bought at a
    fixed quality (edge length one) for a fixed price α. Instead, we assume that quality
    levels (i.e., edge lengths) are varying in a fixed interval [βˇ,β^] , 0 series
    = {LNCS}'
author:
- first_name: Andreas
  full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
  last_name: Cord-Landwehr
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Mäcker, Alexander
  id: '13536'
  last_name: Mäcker
- first_name: Friedhelm
  full_name: Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
  id: '15523'
  last_name: Meyer auf der Heide
citation:
  ama: 'Cord-Landwehr A, Mäcker A, Meyer auf der Heide F. Quality of Service in Network
    Creation Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web
    and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>. ; 2014:423-428. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34</a>'
  apa: Cord-Landwehr, A., Mäcker, A., &#38; Meyer auf der Heide, F. (2014). Quality
    of Service in Network Creation Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i> (pp. 423–428). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Cord-Landwehr_Mäcker_Meyer auf der Heide_2014, title={Quality
    of Service in Network Creation Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Mäcker, Alexander and Meyer
    auf der Heide, Friedhelm}, year={2014}, pages={423–428} }'
  chicago: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas, Alexander Mäcker, and Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide.
    “Quality of Service in Network Creation Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th
    International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 423–28, 2014.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34</a>.
  ieee: A. Cord-Landwehr, A. Mäcker, and F. Meyer auf der Heide, “Quality of Service
    in Network Creation Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
    on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 423–428.
  mla: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas, et al. “Quality of Service in Network Creation Games.”
    <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
    (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 423–28, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34</a>.
  short: 'A. Cord-Landwehr, A. Mäcker, F. Meyer auf der Heide, in: Proceedings of
    the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014,
    pp. 423–428.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:06Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:36Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_34
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-20T07:05:59Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:05:59Z
  file_id: '1394'
  file_name: 380-WINE2014.pdf
  file_size: 166640
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:05:59Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 423-428
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
status: public
title: Quality of Service in Network Creation Games
type: conference
user_id: '15504'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17659'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
  full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
  id: '83983'
  last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Stojan
  full_name: Trajanovski, Stojan
  last_name: Trajanovski
- first_name: Mathijs M.
  full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs M.
  last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
  ama: 'Polevoy G, Trajanovski S, de Weerdt MM. Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.
    In: <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
    Multi-Agent Systems</i>. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for
    Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:861-868.'
  apa: 'Polevoy, G., Trajanovski, S., &#38; de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Nash Equilibria
    in Shared Effort Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference
    on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i> (pp. 861–868). Richland, SC:
    International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_Trajanovski_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC},
    series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games}, booktitle={Proceedings
    of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems},
    publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems},
    author={Polevoy, Gleb and Trajanovski, Stojan and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014},
    pages={861–868}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }'
  chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Stojan Trajanovski, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Nash Equilibria
    in Shared Effort Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference
    on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, 861–68. AAMAS ’14. Richland,
    SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.'
  ieee: G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, and M. M. de Weerdt, “Nash Equilibria in Shared
    Effort Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous
    Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i>, 2014, pp. 861–868.
  mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games.” <i>Proceedings
    of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>,
    International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp.
    861–68.
  short: 'G. Polevoy, S. Trajanovski, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014
    International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International
    Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp.
    861–868.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- competition
- equilibrium
- market
- models
- shared effort games
- simulation
language:
- iso: eng
page: 861-868
place: Richland, SC
publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
  and Multi-agent Systems
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - 978-1-4503-2738-1
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
series_title: AAMAS '14
status: public
title: Nash Equilibria in Shared Effort Games
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17660'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
  full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
  id: '83983'
  last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Mathijs M.
  full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs M.
  last_name: de Weerdt
citation:
  ama: 'Polevoy G, de Weerdt MM. Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing. In:
    <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
    Systems</i>. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous
    Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2014:1741-1742.'
  apa: 'Polevoy, G., &#38; de Weerdt, M. M. (2014). Improving Human Interaction in
    Crowdsensing. In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous
    Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i> (pp. 1741–1742). Richland, SC: International
    Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Polevoy_de Weerdt_2014, place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS
    ’14}, title={Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing}, booktitle={Proceedings
    of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems},
    publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems},
    author={Polevoy, Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs M.}, year={2014}, pages={1741–1742},
    collection={AAMAS ’14} }'
  chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction
    in Crowdsensing.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous
    Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>, 1741–42. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International
    Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.'
  ieee: G. Polevoy and M. M. de Weerdt, “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing,”
    in <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
    Multi-agent Systems</i>, 2014, pp. 1741–1742.
  mla: Polevoy, Gleb, and Mathijs M. de Weerdt. “Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing.”
    <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
    Systems</i>, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
    2014, pp. 1741–42.
  short: 'G. Polevoy, M.M. de Weerdt, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference
    on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous
    Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1741–1742.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- dynamics
- emotion modeling
- negotiation
- network interaction
- shared effort game
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1741-1742
place: Richland, SC
publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
  and Multi-agent Systems
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - 978-1-4503-2738-1
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
series_title: AAMAS '14
status: public
title: Improving Human Interaction in Crowdsensing
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17661'
author:
- first_name: Thomas C.
  full_name: King, Thomas C.
  last_name: King
- first_name: Qingzhi
  full_name: Liu, Qingzhi
  last_name: Liu
- first_name: Gleb
  full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
  id: '83983'
  last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Mathijs
  full_name: de Weerdt, Mathijs
  last_name: de Weerdt
- first_name: Virginia
  full_name: Dignum, Virginia
  last_name: Dignum
- first_name: M. Birna
  full_name: van Riemsdijk, M. Birna
  last_name: van Riemsdijk
- first_name: Martijn
  full_name: Warnier, Martijn
  last_name: Warnier
citation:
  ama: 'King TC, Liu Q, Polevoy G, et al. Request Driven Social Sensing. In: <i>Proceedings
    of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>.
    AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
    Systems; 2014:1651-1652.'
  apa: 'King, T. C., Liu, Q., Polevoy, G., de Weerdt, M., Dignum, V., van Riemsdijk,
    M. B., &#38; Warnier, M. (2014). Request Driven Social Sensing. In <i>Proceedings
    of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i>
    (pp. 1651–1652). Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
    and Multiagent Systems.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{King_Liu_Polevoy_de Weerdt_Dignum_van Riemsdijk_Warnier_2014,
    place={Richland, SC}, series={AAMAS ’14}, title={Request Driven Social Sensing},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
    and Multi-agent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
    and Multiagent Systems}, author={King, Thomas C. and Liu, Qingzhi and Polevoy,
    Gleb and de Weerdt, Mathijs and Dignum, Virginia and van Riemsdijk, M. Birna and
    Warnier, Martijn}, year={2014}, pages={1651–1652}, collection={AAMAS ’14} }'
  chicago: 'King, Thomas C., Qingzhi Liu, Gleb Polevoy, Mathijs de Weerdt, Virginia
    Dignum, M. Birna van Riemsdijk, and Martijn Warnier. “Request Driven Social Sensing.”
    In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
    Multi-Agent Systems</i>, 1651–52. AAMAS ’14. Richland, SC: International Foundation
    for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014.'
  ieee: T. C. King <i>et al.</i>, “Request Driven Social Sensing,” in <i>Proceedings
    of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems</i>,
    2014, pp. 1651–1652.
  mla: King, Thomas C., et al. “Request Driven Social Sensing.” <i>Proceedings of
    the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems</i>,
    International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2014, pp.
    1651–52.
  short: 'T.C. King, Q. Liu, G. Polevoy, M. de Weerdt, V. Dignum, M.B. van Riemsdijk,
    M. Warnier, in: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous
    Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
    and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 2014, pp. 1651–1652.'
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
extern: '1'
keyword:
- crowd-sensing
- crowdsourcing
- data aggregation
- game theory
- norms
- reciprocation
- self interested agents
- simulation
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1651-1652
place: Richland, SC
publication: Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Autonomous Agents
  and Multi-agent Systems
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - 978-1-4503-2738-1
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
series_title: AAMAS '14
status: public
title: Request Driven Social Sensing
type: conference
user_id: '83983'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '17662'
author:
- first_name: Gleb
  full_name: Polevoy, Gleb
  id: '83983'
  last_name: Polevoy
- first_name: Rann
  full_name: Smorodinsky, Rann
  last_name: Smorodinsky
- first_name: Moshe
  full_name: Tennenholtz, Moshe
  last_name: Tennenholtz
citation:
  ama: Polevoy G, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M. Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.
    <i>ACM Trans Econ Comput</i>. 2014;2(1):1:1-1:16. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">10.1145/2560766</a>
  apa: Polevoy, G., Smorodinsky, R., &#38; Tennenholtz, M. (2014). Signaling Competition
    and Social Welfare. <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, <i>2</i>(1), 1:1-1:16. <a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Polevoy_Smorodinsky_Tennenholtz_2014, title={Signaling Competition
    and Social Welfare}, volume={2}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">10.1145/2560766</a>},
    number={1}, journal={ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.}, publisher={ACM}, author={Polevoy,
    Gleb and Smorodinsky, Rann and Tennenholtz, Moshe}, year={2014}, pages={1:1-1:16}
    }'
  chicago: 'Polevoy, Gleb, Rann Smorodinsky, and Moshe Tennenholtz. “Signaling Competition
    and Social Welfare.” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i> 2, no. 1 (2014): 1:1-1:16.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766</a>.'
  ieee: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, and M. Tennenholtz, “Signaling Competition and
    Social Welfare,” <i>ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.</i>, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1:1-1:16,
    2014.
  mla: Polevoy, Gleb, et al. “Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.” <i>ACM Trans.
    Econ. Comput.</i>, vol. 2, no. 1, ACM, 2014, pp. 1:1-1:16, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/2560766">10.1145/2560766</a>.
  short: G. Polevoy, R. Smorodinsky, M. Tennenholtz, ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 2 (2014)
    1:1-1:16.
date_created: 2020-08-06T15:21:55Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/2560766
extern: '1'
intvolume: '         2'
issue: '1'
keyword:
- Competition
- efficiency
- equilibrium
- market
- social welfare
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1:1-1:16
publication: ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 2167-8375
publisher: ACM
status: public
title: Signaling Competition and Social Welfare
type: journal_article
user_id: '83983'
volume: 2
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '19039'
author:
- first_name: Ralf
  full_name: Petring, Ralf
  last_name: Petring
citation:
  ama: 'Petring R. <i>Multi-Algorithmen-Rendering: Darstellung Heterogener 3-D-Szenen
    in Echtzeit</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.'
  apa: 'Petring, R. (2014). <i>Multi-Algorithmen-Rendering: Darstellung heterogener
    3-D-Szenen in Echtzeit</i>. Universität Paderborn.'
  bibtex: '@book{Petring_2014, place={Universität Paderborn}, title={Multi-Algorithmen-Rendering:
    Darstellung heterogener 3-D-Szenen in Echtzeit}, author={Petring, Ralf}, year={2014}
    }'
  chicago: 'Petring, Ralf. <i>Multi-Algorithmen-Rendering: Darstellung Heterogener
    3-D-Szenen in Echtzeit</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  ieee: 'R. Petring, <i>Multi-Algorithmen-Rendering: Darstellung heterogener 3-D-Szenen
    in Echtzeit</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  mla: 'Petring, Ralf. <i>Multi-Algorithmen-Rendering: Darstellung Heterogener 3-D-Szenen
    in Echtzeit</i>. 2014.'
  short: 'R. Petring, Multi-Algorithmen-Rendering: Darstellung Heterogener 3-D-Szenen
    in Echtzeit, Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
date_created: 2020-09-04T13:20:12Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:57Z
department:
- _id: '63'
language:
- iso: eng
place: Universität Paderborn
related_material:
  link:
  - relation: confirmation
    url: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:466:2-12816
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Friedhelm
  full_name: Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
  id: '15523'
  last_name: Meyer auf der Heide
title: 'Multi-Algorithmen-Rendering: Darstellung heterogener 3-D-Szenen in Echtzeit'
type: dissertation
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '451'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and
    each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has
    a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has
    to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget
    is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the
    strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity
    of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria
    are analysed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence
    towards an equilibrium may be exponential.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
  full_name: Drees, Maximilian
  last_name: Drees
- first_name: Sören
  full_name: Riechers, Sören
  last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Drees M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Budget-restricted utility games with ordered
    strategic decisions. In: Lavi R, ed. <i>Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium
    on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. ; 2014:110-121.
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10">10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10</a>'
  apa: Drees, M., Riechers, S., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Budget-restricted utility
    games with ordered strategic decisions. In R. Lavi (Ed.), <i>Proceedings of the
    7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i> (pp. 110–121).
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Riechers_Skopalik_2014, series={Lecture Notes in Computer
    Science}, title={Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10">10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
    Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander},
    editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={110–121}, collection={Lecture Notes
    in Computer Science} }'
  chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “Budget-Restricted
    Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions.” In <i>Proceedings of the 7th
    International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, edited by Ron Lavi,
    110–21. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10</a>.
  ieee: M. Drees, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Budget-restricted utility games with
    ordered strategic decisions,” in <i>Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium
    on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, 2014, pp. 110–121.
  mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic
    Decisions.” <i>Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
    Theory (SAGT)</i>, edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, pp. 110–21, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10">10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10</a>.
  short: 'M. Drees, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the
    7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, pp. 110–121.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:07Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10
editor:
- first_name: Ron
  full_name: Lavi, Ron
  last_name: Lavi
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z
  file_id: '1344'
  file_name: 451-DRS14.pdf
  file_size: 283266
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 110-121
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '14'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject C2
- _id: '16'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
  (SAGT)
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '452'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Today's networks, like the Internet, do not consist of one but a mixture of
    several interconnected networks. Each has individual qualities and hence the performance
    of a network node results from the networks' interplay.We introduce a new game
    theoretic model capturing the interplay between a high-speed backbone network
    and a low-speed general purpose network. In our model, n nodes are connected by
    a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway node.
    A gateway node pays a fixed price for its connection to the high-speed network,
    but can utilize the high-speed network to gain communication distance 0 to all
    other gateways. Communication distances in the low-speed network are given by
    the hop distances. The effective communication distance between any two nodes
    then is given by the shortest path, which is possibly improved by using gateways
    as shortcuts.Every node v has the objective to minimize its communication costs,
    given by the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of the effective communication
    distances from v to all other nodes plus a fixed price \alpha > 0, if it decides
    to be a gateway. For both games and different ranges of \alpha, we study the existence
    of equilibria, the price of anarchy, and convergence properties of best-response
    dynamics.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian
  last_name: Abshoff
- first_name: Andreas
  full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
  last_name: Cord-Landwehr
- first_name: Daniel
  full_name: Jung, Daniel
  id: '37827'
  last_name: Jung
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Brief Announcement: A Model
    for Multilevel Network Games. In: Lavi R, ed. <i>Proceedings of the 7th International
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:294.'
  apa: 'Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Brief
    Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games. In R. Lavi (Ed.), <i>Proceedings
    of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i> (p. 294).'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS},
    title={Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games}, booktitle={Proceedings
    of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Abshoff,
    Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander},
    editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={294}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander
    Skopalik. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games.” In <i>Proceedings
    of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, edited
    by Ron Lavi, 294. LNCS, 2014.'
  ieee: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Brief Announcement:
    A Model for Multilevel Network Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 7th International
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, 2014, p. 294.'
  mla: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network
    Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
    Theory (SAGT)</i>, edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, p. 294.'
  short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings
    of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p.
    294.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:08Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
editor:
- first_name: Ron
  full_name: Lavi, Ron
  last_name: Lavi
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
  file_id: '1343'
  file_name: 452-title_multilevel-sagt.pdf
  file_size: 84783
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: '294'
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
  (SAGT)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games'
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '453'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider
    both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing
    utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf
    s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential
    value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the
    set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded
    by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf
    s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like
    results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that
    these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate
    pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions.
    For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves
    the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides
    the first guarantees for general latency functions.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Gairing, Martin
  last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Skopalik A. Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion
    Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:30-43. doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Bounding the Potential
    Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In <i>Proceedings
    of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>
    (pp. 30–43). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Bounding
    the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Skopalik,
    Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={30–43}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, and Alexander Skopalik. “Bounding the
    Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.”
    In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
    (WINE)</i>, 30–43. LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, and A. Skopalik, “Bounding the Potential Function
    in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria,” in <i>Proceedings of
    the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014,
    pp. 30–43.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games
    and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.” <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 30–43, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
  file_id: '1342'
  file_name: 453-WINE14FGS.pdf
  file_size: 324307
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 30-43
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash
  Equilibria
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '455'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion
    games and develop techniques to obtain approximate potential functions that prove
    the existence of alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria and the convergence of
    alpha-improvement steps. Specifically, we show how to obtain upper bounds for
    approximation factor alpha for a given class of cost functions. For example for
    concave cost functions the factor is at most 3/2, for quadratic cost functions
    it is at most 4/3, and for polynomial cost functions of maximal degree d it is
    at at most d + 1. For games with two players we obtain tight bounds which are
    as small as for example 1.054 in the case of quadratic cost functions.
author:
- first_name: Christoph
  full_name: Hansknecht, Christoph
  last_name: Hansknecht
- first_name: Max
  full_name: Klimm, Max
  last_name: Klimm
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Hansknecht C, Klimm M, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
    congestion games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation
    Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)</i>. LIPIcs. ; 2014:242-257.
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>'
  apa: Hansknecht, C., Klimm, M., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash
    equilibria in weighted congestion games. In <i>Proceedings of the 17th. International
    Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)</i>
    (pp. 242–257). <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Hansknecht_Klimm_Skopalik_2014, series={LIPIcs}, title={Approximate
    pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms
    for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)}, author={Hansknecht, Christoph
    and Klimm, Max and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={242–257}, collection={LIPIcs}
    }'
  chicago: Hansknecht, Christoph, Max Klimm, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate
    Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 17th.
    International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization
    Problems (APPROX)</i>, 242–57. LIPIcs, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>.
  ieee: C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria
    in weighted congestion games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop
    on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)</i>,
    2014, pp. 242–257.
  mla: Hansknecht, Christoph, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted
    Congestion Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation
    Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)</i>, 2014, pp. 242–57,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>.
  short: 'C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 17th. International
    Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX),
    2014, pp. 242–257.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
  file_id: '1341'
  file_name: 455-HKS14.pdf
  file_size: 512712
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 242 - 257
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms
  for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)
series_title: LIPIcs
status: public
title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '456'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context
    congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold
    value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with
    cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate
    pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and
    always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19].
author:
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Gairing, Martin
  last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Grammateia
  full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia
  last_name: Kotsialou
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social
    Context Congestion Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
    on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:480-485. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>'
  apa: Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash
    equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i> (pp. 480–485). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Approximate
    pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik,
    Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={480–485}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Gairing, Martin, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate
    Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games.” In <i>Proceedings of
    the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 480–85.
    LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>.
  ieee: M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria
    in Social Context Congestion Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 480–485.
  mla: Gairing, Martin, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context
    Congestion Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web
    and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 480–85, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>.
  short: 'M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–485.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:21Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:10Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
  file_id: '1340'
  file_name: 456-WINE14final.pdf
  file_size: 377378
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 480 - 485
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '459'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this survey article, we discuss two algorithmic research areas that emerge
    from problems that arise when resources are offered in the cloud. The first area,
    online leasing, captures problems arising from the fact that resources in the
    cloud are not bought, but leased by cloud vendors. The second area, Distributed
    Storage Systems, deals with problems arising from so-called cloud federations,
    i.e., when several cloud providers are needed to fulfill a given task.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Kniesburges, Sebastian
  last_name: Kniesburges
- first_name: Christine
  full_name: Markarian, Christine
  id: '37612'
  last_name: Markarian
- first_name: Friedhelm
  full_name: Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm
  id: '15523'
  last_name: Meyer auf der Heide
- first_name: Christian
  full_name: Scheideler, Christian
  id: '20792'
  last_name: Scheideler
citation:
  ama: 'Kniesburges S, Markarian C, Meyer auf der Heide F, Scheideler C. Algorithmic
    Aspects of Resource Management in the Cloud. In: <i>Proceedings of the 21st International
    Colloquium on Structural Information and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO)</i>.
    LNCS. ; 2014:1-13. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1">10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1</a>'
  apa: Kniesburges, S., Markarian, C., Meyer auf der Heide, F., &#38; Scheideler,
    C. (2014). Algorithmic Aspects of Resource Management in the Cloud. In <i>Proceedings
    of the 21st International Colloquium on Structural Information and Communication
    Complexity (SIROCCO)</i> (pp. 1–13). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Kniesburges_Markarian_Meyer auf der Heide_Scheideler_2014,
    series={LNCS}, title={Algorithmic Aspects of Resource Management in the Cloud},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1">10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 21st International Colloquium on Structural Information
    and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO)}, author={Kniesburges, Sebastian and Markarian,
    Christine and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Scheideler, Christian}, year={2014},
    pages={1–13}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Kniesburges, Sebastian, Christine Markarian, Friedhelm Meyer auf der Heide,
    and Christian Scheideler. “Algorithmic Aspects of Resource Management in the Cloud.”
    In <i>Proceedings of the 21st International Colloquium on Structural Information
    and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO)</i>, 1–13. LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1</a>.
  ieee: S. Kniesburges, C. Markarian, F. Meyer auf der Heide, and C. Scheideler, “Algorithmic
    Aspects of Resource Management in the Cloud,” in <i>Proceedings of the 21st International
    Colloquium on Structural Information and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO)</i>,
    2014, pp. 1–13.
  mla: Kniesburges, Sebastian, et al. “Algorithmic Aspects of Resource Management
    in the Cloud.” <i>Proceedings of the 21st International Colloquium on Structural
    Information and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO)</i>, 2014, pp. 1–13, doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1">10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1</a>.
  short: 'S. Kniesburges, C. Markarian, F. Meyer auf der Heide, C. Scheideler, in:
    Proceedings of the 21st International Colloquium on Structural Information and
    Communication Complexity (SIROCCO), 2014, pp. 1–13.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:21Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:14Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '79'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-09620-9_1
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:21:54Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:54Z
  file_id: '1338'
  file_name: 459-SIROCCO2014.pdf
  file_size: 274496
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:54Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 1-13
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 21st International Colloquium on Structural Information
  and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Algorithmic Aspects of Resource Management in the Cloud
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '462'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using
    techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated
    by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly
    complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed
    IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our
    current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Skopalik A. A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely
    Repeated Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation
    and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)</i>.
    ; 2014:625-630. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
    Complex Infinitely Repeated Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 4th International
    Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
    (SIMULTECH 2014)</i> (pp. 625–630). <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Skopalik_2014, title={A Simulation Framework for
    Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
    Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}, author={Feldotto,
    Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={625–630} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for
    Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 4th International
    Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
    (SIMULTECH 2014)</i>, 625–30, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto and A. Skopalik, “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex
    Infinitely Repeated Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014)</i>, 2014, pp. 625–630.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
    Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014)</i>, 2014, pp. 625–30, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014), 2014, pp. 625–630.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:22Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:15Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.5220/0005110406250630
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
  file_id: '1337'
  file_name: 462-FS2014SIMULTECH.pdf
  file_size: 993721
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 625-630
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
  Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)
status: public
title: A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '395'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication
    costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static
    network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed
    network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game)
    ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus
    a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication
    distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as
    shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is
    Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1))
    the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game,
    weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1.
    Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the
    dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that
    it is not weakly acyclic.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian
  last_name: Abshoff
- first_name: Andreas
  full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
  last_name: Cord-Landwehr
- first_name: Daniel
  full_name: Jung, Daniel
  id: '37827'
  last_name: Jung
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Multilevel Network Games.
    In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
    (WINE)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:435-440. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>'
  apa: Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Multilevel
    Network Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and
    Internet Economics (WINE)</i> (pp. 435–440). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS},
    title={Multilevel Network Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung,
    Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={435–440}, collection={LNCS}
    }'
  chicago: Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander Skopalik.
    “Multilevel Network Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
    on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 435–40. LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>.
  ieee: S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Multilevel Network
    Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 435–440.
  mla: Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Multilevel Network Games.” <i>Proceedings of the
    10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014,
    pp. 435–40, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>.
  short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
    10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp.
    435–440.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:09Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:59Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
  file_id: '1382'
  file_name: 395-WINE2014ACJS.pdf
  file_size: 161479
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 435-440
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Multilevel Network Games
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
