[{"department":[{"_id":"791"},{"_id":"681"}],"keyword":["global public goods","climate change","institutions","ratchet-up mechanism","minimum contributions","laboratory experiment"],"type":"journal_article","date_created":"2023-09-16T11:52:21Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties’ commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time, and our results show that its effect is detrimental. We design a public goods game to study whether cooperation is promoted by an amendment to the mechanism that stipulates that all agents must contribute at least a collectively chosen minimum based on the principle of the lowest common denominator. We find that binding collective minimum contributions improve the effectiveness of the ratchet-up mechanism. Non-binding minimum contributions, by contrast, do not encourage cooperation. Our data indicate that the difference is attributable to conditional cooperative dynamics. If other participants contribute less than the collective minimum contribution, even initially cooperative participants start to negatively reciprocate this form of non-compliance by contributing less."}],"citation":{"ieee":"M. Alt, M. Kesternich, C. Gallier, and B. Sturm, “Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>, 2023, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327\">10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>.","apa":"Alt, M., Kesternich, M., Gallier, C., &#38; Sturm, B. (2023). Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327\">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>","chicago":"Alt, Marius, Martin Kesternich, Carlo Gallier, and Bodo Sturm. “Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.” <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>, 2023. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327\">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>.","short":"M. Alt, M. Kesternich, C. Gallier, B. Sturm, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (2023).","mla":"Alt, Marius, et al. “Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.” <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>, 2023, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327\">10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Alt_Kesternich_Gallier_Sturm_2023, title={Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327\">10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>}, journal={Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, author={Alt, Marius and Kesternich, Martin and Gallier, Carlo and Sturm, Bodo}, year={2023} }","ama":"Alt M, Kesternich M, Gallier C, Sturm B. Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i>. Published online 2023. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327\">10.2139/ssrn.4288327</a>"},"publication":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","user_id":"46138","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4288327","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"47093","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2023-12-04T12:27:27Z","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1556-5068"]},"author":[{"last_name":"Alt","first_name":"Marius","full_name":"Alt, Marius"},{"full_name":"Kesternich, Martin","first_name":"Martin","last_name":"Kesternich","id":"98922"},{"first_name":"Carlo","last_name":"Gallier","full_name":"Gallier, Carlo"},{"full_name":"Sturm, Bodo","first_name":"Bodo","last_name":"Sturm"}],"year":"2023","title":"Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods","status":"public"},{"date_updated":"2023-12-04T12:26:58Z","publication_status":"published","intvolume":"       216","year":"2023","status":"public","title":"Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers","author":[{"full_name":"Gallier, Carlo","last_name":"Gallier","first_name":"Carlo"},{"full_name":"Goeschl, Timo","last_name":"Goeschl","first_name":"Timo"},{"id":"98922","full_name":"Kesternich, Martin","last_name":"Kesternich","first_name":"Martin"},{"full_name":"Lohse, Johannes","last_name":"Lohse","first_name":"Johannes"},{"full_name":"Reif, Christiane","first_name":"Christiane","last_name":"Reif"},{"first_name":"Daniel","last_name":"Römer","full_name":"Römer, Daniel"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["1556-5068"]},"doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3466679","user_id":"46138","volume":216,"page":"457-468","_id":"47102","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization","citation":{"mla":"Gallier, Carlo, et al. “Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>, vol. 216, 2023, pp. 457–68, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679\">10.2139/ssrn.3466679</a>.","ama":"Gallier C, Goeschl T, Kesternich M, Lohse J, Reif C, Römer D. Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>. 2023;216:457-468. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679\">10.2139/ssrn.3466679</a>","bibtex":"@article{Gallier_Goeschl_Kesternich_Lohse_Reif_Römer_2023, title={Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers}, volume={216}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679\">10.2139/ssrn.3466679</a>}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, author={Gallier, Carlo and Goeschl, Timo and Kesternich, Martin and Lohse, Johannes and Reif, Christiane and Römer, Daniel}, year={2023}, pages={457–468} }","apa":"Gallier, C., Goeschl, T., Kesternich, M., Lohse, J., Reif, C., &#38; Römer, D. (2023). Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers. <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>, <i>216</i>, 457–468. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679\">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679</a>","ieee":"C. Gallier, T. Goeschl, M. Kesternich, J. Lohse, C. Reif, and D. Römer, “Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers,” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i>, vol. 216, pp. 457–468, 2023, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679\">10.2139/ssrn.3466679</a>.","chicago":"Gallier, Carlo, Timo Goeschl, Martin Kesternich, Johannes Lohse, Christiane Reif, and Daniel Römer. “Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers.” <i>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization</i> 216 (2023): 457–68. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679\">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679</a>.","short":"C. Gallier, T. Goeschl, M. Kesternich, J. Lohse, C. Reif, D. Römer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 216 (2023) 457–468."},"type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"791"},{"_id":"681"}],"date_created":"2023-09-16T12:11:20Z"},{"publication_identifier":{"issn":["1430-8800"]},"author":[{"full_name":"Frick, Marc","last_name":"Frick","first_name":"Marc"},{"full_name":"Foese, Dario","first_name":"Dario","last_name":"Foese"},{"first_name":"Kathrine","last_name":"Von Graevenitz","full_name":"Von Graevenitz, Kathrine"},{"full_name":"Kesternich, Martin","first_name":"Martin","last_name":"Kesternich","id":"98922"},{"last_name":"Wagner","first_name":"Ulrich","full_name":"Wagner, Ulrich"}],"status":"public","year":"2023","title":"Die Doppelwirkung von Information für klimafreundliches Handeln","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2023-12-06T13:05:08Z","_id":"47078","publisher":"Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1)","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"page":"44-50","user_id":"98922","doi":"10.14512/oew380144","citation":{"ama":"Frick M, Foese D, Von Graevenitz K, Kesternich M, Wagner U. <i>Die Doppelwirkung von Information Für Klimafreundliches Handeln</i>. Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1); 2023:44-50. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.14512/oew380144\">10.14512/oew380144</a>","bibtex":"@book{Frick_Foese_Von Graevenitz_Kesternich_Wagner_2023, title={Die Doppelwirkung von Information für klimafreundliches Handeln}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.14512/oew380144\">10.14512/oew380144</a>}, publisher={Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1)}, author={Frick, Marc and Foese, Dario and Von Graevenitz, Kathrine and Kesternich, Martin and Wagner, Ulrich}, year={2023}, pages={44–50} }","mla":"Frick, Marc, et al. <i>Die Doppelwirkung von Information Für Klimafreundliches Handeln</i>. Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1), 2023, pp. 44–50, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.14512/oew380144\">10.14512/oew380144</a>.","chicago":"Frick, Marc, Dario Foese, Kathrine Von Graevenitz, Martin Kesternich, and Ulrich Wagner. <i>Die Doppelwirkung von Information Für Klimafreundliches Handeln</i>. Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1), 2023. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.14512/oew380144\">https://doi.org/10.14512/oew380144</a>.","short":"M. Frick, D. Foese, K. Von Graevenitz, M. Kesternich, U. Wagner, Die Doppelwirkung von Information Für Klimafreundliches Handeln, Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1), 2023.","apa":"Frick, M., Foese, D., Von Graevenitz, K., Kesternich, M., &#38; Wagner, U. (2023). <i>Die Doppelwirkung von Information für klimafreundliches Handeln</i> (pp. 44–50). Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.14512/oew380144\">https://doi.org/10.14512/oew380144</a>","ieee":"M. Frick, D. Foese, K. Von Graevenitz, M. Kesternich, and U. Wagner, <i>Die Doppelwirkung von Information für klimafreundliches Handeln</i>. Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1), 2023, pp. 44–50."},"abstract":[{"text":"<jats:p>Informationen sind für eine erfolgreiche Klimapolitik in doppelter Hinsicht wichtig: Sie werden benötigt, wenn Potenziale zur Vermeidung von Emissionen identifiziert und klimapolitische Instrumente ausgewählt werden. Und sie sind zentral, damit Bürger/innen selbst Entscheidungen im Sinne des Klimaschutzes treffen können.</jats:p>","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2023-09-15T11:42:23Z","department":[{"_id":"791"},{"_id":"681"}],"keyword":["General Medicine"],"type":"working_paper"}]