---
_id: '47093'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up
mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties’
commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time,
and our results show that its effect is detrimental. We design a public goods
game to study whether cooperation is promoted by an amendment to the mechanism
that stipulates that all agents must contribute at least a collectively chosen
minimum based on the principle of the lowest common denominator. We find that
binding collective minimum contributions improve the effectiveness of the ratchet-up
mechanism. Non-binding minimum contributions, by contrast, do not encourage cooperation.
Our data indicate that the difference is attributable to conditional cooperative
dynamics. If other participants contribute less than the collective minimum contribution,
even initially cooperative participants start to negatively reciprocate this form
of non-compliance by contributing less.
author:
- first_name: Marius
full_name: Alt, Marius
last_name: Alt
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Kesternich, Martin
id: '98922'
last_name: Kesternich
- first_name: Carlo
full_name: Gallier, Carlo
last_name: Gallier
- first_name: Bodo
full_name: Sturm, Bodo
last_name: Sturm
citation:
ama: Alt M, Kesternich M, Gallier C, Sturm B. Collective Minimum Contributions to
Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management. Published online 2023. doi:10.2139/ssrn.4288327
apa: Alt, M., Kesternich, M., Gallier, C., & Sturm, B. (2023). Collective Minimum
Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public
Goods. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327
bibtex: '@article{Alt_Kesternich_Gallier_Sturm_2023, title={Collective Minimum Contributions
to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods},
DOI={10.2139/ssrn.4288327},
journal={Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, author={Alt, Marius
and Kesternich, Martin and Gallier, Carlo and Sturm, Bodo}, year={2023} }'
chicago: Alt, Marius, Martin Kesternich, Carlo Gallier, and Bodo Sturm. “Collective
Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision
of Public Goods.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2023.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4288327.
ieee: 'M. Alt, M. Kesternich, C. Gallier, and B. Sturm, “Collective Minimum Contributions
to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2023, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.4288327.'
mla: Alt, Marius, et al. “Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet
Effect in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 2023, doi:10.2139/ssrn.4288327.
short: M. Alt, M. Kesternich, C. Gallier, B. Sturm, Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management (2023).
date_created: 2023-09-16T11:52:21Z
date_updated: 2023-12-04T12:27:27Z
department:
- _id: '791'
- _id: '681'
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.4288327
keyword:
- global public goods
- climate change
- institutions
- ratchet-up mechanism
- minimum contributions
- laboratory experiment
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1556-5068
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Collective Minimum Contributions to Counteract the Ratchet Effect in the Voluntary
Provision of Public Goods
type: journal_article
user_id: '46138'
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '47102'
author:
- first_name: Carlo
full_name: Gallier, Carlo
last_name: Gallier
- first_name: Timo
full_name: Goeschl, Timo
last_name: Goeschl
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Kesternich, Martin
id: '98922'
last_name: Kesternich
- first_name: Johannes
full_name: Lohse, Johannes
last_name: Lohse
- first_name: Christiane
full_name: Reif, Christiane
last_name: Reif
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Römer, Daniel
last_name: Römer
citation:
ama: 'Gallier C, Goeschl T, Kesternich M, Lohse J, Reif C, Römer D. Inter-Charity
Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2023;216:457-468. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3466679'
apa: 'Gallier, C., Goeschl, T., Kesternich, M., Lohse, J., Reif, C., & Römer,
D. (2023). Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding,
and Spillovers. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 216,
457–468. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679'
bibtex: '@article{Gallier_Goeschl_Kesternich_Lohse_Reif_Römer_2023, title={Inter-Charity
Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers},
volume={216}, DOI={10.2139/ssrn.3466679},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, author={Gallier, Carlo
and Goeschl, Timo and Kesternich, Martin and Lohse, Johannes and Reif, Christiane
and Römer, Daniel}, year={2023}, pages={457–468} }'
chicago: 'Gallier, Carlo, Timo Goeschl, Martin Kesternich, Johannes Lohse, Christiane
Reif, and Daniel Römer. “Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation:
Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
216 (2023): 457–68. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3466679.'
ieee: 'C. Gallier, T. Goeschl, M. Kesternich, J. Lohse, C. Reif, and D. Römer, “Inter-Charity
Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers,”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 216, pp. 457–468, 2023,
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3466679.'
mla: 'Gallier, Carlo, et al. “Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation:
Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
vol. 216, 2023, pp. 457–68, doi:10.2139/ssrn.3466679.'
short: C. Gallier, T. Goeschl, M. Kesternich, J. Lohse, C. Reif, D. Römer, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 216 (2023) 457–468.
date_created: 2023-09-16T12:11:20Z
date_updated: 2023-12-04T12:26:58Z
department:
- _id: '791'
- _id: '681'
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3466679
intvolume: ' 216'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 457-468
publication: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1556-5068
publication_status: published
status: public
title: 'Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding,
and Spillovers'
type: journal_article
user_id: '46138'
volume: 216
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '47078'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Informationen sind für eine erfolgreiche Klimapolitik in doppelter
Hinsicht wichtig: Sie werden benötigt, wenn Potenziale zur Vermeidung von Emissionen
identifiziert und klimapolitische Instrumente ausgewählt werden. Und sie sind
zentral, damit Bürger/innen selbst Entscheidungen im Sinne des Klimaschutzes treffen
können.'
author:
- first_name: Marc
full_name: Frick, Marc
last_name: Frick
- first_name: Dario
full_name: Foese, Dario
last_name: Foese
- first_name: Kathrine
full_name: Von Graevenitz, Kathrine
last_name: Von Graevenitz
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Kesternich, Martin
id: '98922'
last_name: Kesternich
- first_name: Ulrich
full_name: Wagner, Ulrich
last_name: Wagner
citation:
ama: Frick M, Foese D, Von Graevenitz K, Kesternich M, Wagner U. Die Doppelwirkung
von Information Für Klimafreundliches Handeln. Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1);
2023:44-50. doi:10.14512/oew380144
apa: Frick, M., Foese, D., Von Graevenitz, K., Kesternich, M., & Wagner, U.
(2023). Die Doppelwirkung von Information für klimafreundliches Handeln
(pp. 44–50). Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1). https://doi.org/10.14512/oew380144
bibtex: '@book{Frick_Foese_Von Graevenitz_Kesternich_Wagner_2023, title={Die Doppelwirkung
von Information für klimafreundliches Handeln}, DOI={10.14512/oew380144},
publisher={Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1)}, author={Frick, Marc and Foese, Dario
and Von Graevenitz, Kathrine and Kesternich, Martin and Wagner, Ulrich}, year={2023},
pages={44–50} }'
chicago: Frick, Marc, Dario Foese, Kathrine Von Graevenitz, Martin Kesternich, and
Ulrich Wagner. Die Doppelwirkung von Information Für Klimafreundliches Handeln.
Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1), 2023. https://doi.org/10.14512/oew380144.
ieee: M. Frick, D. Foese, K. Von Graevenitz, M. Kesternich, and U. Wagner, Die
Doppelwirkung von Information für klimafreundliches Handeln. Ökologisches
Wirtschaften 38(1), 2023, pp. 44–50.
mla: Frick, Marc, et al. Die Doppelwirkung von Information Für Klimafreundliches
Handeln. Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1), 2023, pp. 44–50, doi:10.14512/oew380144.
short: M. Frick, D. Foese, K. Von Graevenitz, M. Kesternich, U. Wagner, Die Doppelwirkung
von Information Für Klimafreundliches Handeln, Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1),
2023.
date_created: 2023-09-15T11:42:23Z
date_updated: 2023-12-06T13:05:08Z
department:
- _id: '791'
- _id: '681'
doi: 10.14512/oew380144
keyword:
- General Medicine
language:
- iso: eng
page: 44-50
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1430-8800
publication_status: published
publisher: Ökologisches Wirtschaften 38(1)
status: public
title: Die Doppelwirkung von Information für klimafreundliches Handeln
type: working_paper
user_id: '98922'
year: '2023'
...