---
_id: '21408'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: This study presents a model in which heterogenous, risk-averse agents can
    use either (legal) tax optimisation or (illegal) tax evasion to reduce their tax
    burden and thus increase their utility. In addition to introducing individual
    variables like risk aversion or income, we allow agents to observe the behaviour
    of their neighbours. Depending on the behaviour of their peer group’s members,
    the agents’ utilities may increase or decrease, respectively. Simulation results
    show that taxpayers favour illegal evasion over legal optimisation in most cases.
    We find that interactions between taxpayers and their social networks have a deep
    impact on aggregate behaviour. Parameter changes such as increasing audit rates
    affect the results, often being intensified by social interactions. The effect
    of such changes varies depending on whether or not a fraction of agents is considered
    inherently honest.
author:
- first_name: Markus
  full_name: Diller, Markus
  last_name: Diller
- first_name: Johannes
  full_name: Lorenz, Johannes
  last_name: Lorenz
- first_name: David
  full_name: Meier, David
  last_name: Meier
citation:
  ama: 'Diller M, Lorenz J, Meier D. Tax Avoidance and Social Control. In: Neufeld
    JS, Buscher U, Lasch R, Möst D, Schönberger J, eds. <i> Operations Research Proceedings
    2019</i>. Springer; 2020:633-639. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77">10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77</a>'
  apa: Diller, M., Lorenz, J., &#38; Meier, D. (2020). Tax Avoidance and Social Control.
    In J. S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch, D. Möst, &#38; J. Schönberger (Eds.),
    <i> Operations Research Proceedings 2019</i> (pp. 633–639). Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77</a>
  bibtex: '@inbook{Diller_Lorenz_Meier_2020, title={Tax Avoidance and Social Control},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77">10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77</a>},
    booktitle={ Operations Research Proceedings 2019}, publisher={Springer}, author={Diller,
    Markus and Lorenz, Johannes and Meier, David}, editor={Neufeld, Janis S. and Buscher,
    Udo and Lasch, Rainer and Möst, Dominik and Schönberger, JörnEditors}, year={2020},
    pages={633–639} }'
  chicago: Diller, Markus, Johannes Lorenz, and David Meier. “Tax Avoidance and Social
    Control.” In <i> Operations Research Proceedings 2019</i>, edited by Janis S.
    Neufeld, Udo Buscher, Rainer Lasch, Dominik Möst, and Jörn Schönberger, 633–39.
    Springer, 2020. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77</a>.
  ieee: M. Diller, J. Lorenz, and D. Meier, “Tax Avoidance and Social Control,” in
    <i> Operations Research Proceedings 2019</i>, J. S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch,
    D. Möst, and J. Schönberger, Eds. Springer, 2020, pp. 633–639.
  mla: Diller, Markus, et al. “Tax Avoidance and Social Control.” <i> Operations Research
    Proceedings 2019</i>, edited by Janis S. Neufeld et al., Springer, 2020, pp. 633–39,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77">10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77</a>.
  short: 'M. Diller, J. Lorenz, D. Meier, in: J.S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch,
    D. Möst, J. Schönberger (Eds.),  Operations Research Proceedings 2019, Springer,
    2020, pp. 633–639.'
date_created: 2021-03-09T08:26:38Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:59Z
department:
- _id: '187'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77
editor:
- first_name: Janis S.
  full_name: Neufeld, Janis S.
  last_name: Neufeld
- first_name: Udo
  full_name: Buscher, Udo
  last_name: Buscher
- first_name: Rainer
  full_name: Lasch, Rainer
  last_name: Lasch
- first_name: Dominik
  full_name: Möst, Dominik
  last_name: Möst
- first_name: Jörn
  full_name: Schönberger, Jörn
  last_name: Schönberger
language:
- iso: eng
page: 633-639
publication: ' Operations Research Proceedings 2019'
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - 978-3-030-48439-2
publisher: Springer
status: public
title: Tax Avoidance and Social Control
type: book_chapter
user_id: '68607'
year: '2020'
...