---
_id: '21408'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This study presents a model in which heterogenous, risk-averse agents can
use either (legal) tax optimisation or (illegal) tax evasion to reduce their tax
burden and thus increase their utility. In addition to introducing individual
variables like risk aversion or income, we allow agents to observe the behaviour
of their neighbours. Depending on the behaviour of their peer group’s members,
the agents’ utilities may increase or decrease, respectively. Simulation results
show that taxpayers favour illegal evasion over legal optimisation in most cases.
We find that interactions between taxpayers and their social networks have a deep
impact on aggregate behaviour. Parameter changes such as increasing audit rates
affect the results, often being intensified by social interactions. The effect
of such changes varies depending on whether or not a fraction of agents is considered
inherently honest.
author:
- first_name: Markus
full_name: Diller, Markus
last_name: Diller
- first_name: Johannes
full_name: Lorenz, Johannes
last_name: Lorenz
- first_name: David
full_name: Meier, David
last_name: Meier
citation:
ama: 'Diller M, Lorenz J, Meier D. Tax Avoidance and Social Control. In: Neufeld
JS, Buscher U, Lasch R, Möst D, Schönberger J, eds. Operations Research Proceedings
2019. Springer; 2020:633-639. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77'
apa: Diller, M., Lorenz, J., & Meier, D. (2020). Tax Avoidance and Social Control.
In J. S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch, D. Möst, & J. Schönberger (Eds.),
Operations Research Proceedings 2019 (pp. 633–639). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77
bibtex: '@inbook{Diller_Lorenz_Meier_2020, title={Tax Avoidance and Social Control},
DOI={10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77},
booktitle={ Operations Research Proceedings 2019}, publisher={Springer}, author={Diller,
Markus and Lorenz, Johannes and Meier, David}, editor={Neufeld, Janis S. and Buscher,
Udo and Lasch, Rainer and Möst, Dominik and Schönberger, JörnEditors}, year={2020},
pages={633–639} }'
chicago: Diller, Markus, Johannes Lorenz, and David Meier. “Tax Avoidance and Social
Control.” In Operations Research Proceedings 2019, edited by Janis S.
Neufeld, Udo Buscher, Rainer Lasch, Dominik Möst, and Jörn Schönberger, 633–39.
Springer, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77.
ieee: M. Diller, J. Lorenz, and D. Meier, “Tax Avoidance and Social Control,” in
Operations Research Proceedings 2019, J. S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch,
D. Möst, and J. Schönberger, Eds. Springer, 2020, pp. 633–639.
mla: Diller, Markus, et al. “Tax Avoidance and Social Control.” Operations Research
Proceedings 2019, edited by Janis S. Neufeld et al., Springer, 2020, pp. 633–39,
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77.
short: 'M. Diller, J. Lorenz, D. Meier, in: J.S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch,
D. Möst, J. Schönberger (Eds.), Operations Research Proceedings 2019, Springer,
2020, pp. 633–639.'
date_created: 2021-03-09T08:26:38Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:59Z
department:
- _id: '187'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77
editor:
- first_name: Janis S.
full_name: Neufeld, Janis S.
last_name: Neufeld
- first_name: Udo
full_name: Buscher, Udo
last_name: Buscher
- first_name: Rainer
full_name: Lasch, Rainer
last_name: Lasch
- first_name: Dominik
full_name: Möst, Dominik
last_name: Möst
- first_name: Jörn
full_name: Schönberger, Jörn
last_name: Schönberger
language:
- iso: eng
page: 633-639
publication: ' Operations Research Proceedings 2019'
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-3-030-48439-2
publisher: Springer
status: public
title: Tax Avoidance and Social Control
type: book_chapter
user_id: '68607'
year: '2020'
...