--- _id: '21408' abstract: - lang: eng text: This study presents a model in which heterogenous, risk-averse agents can use either (legal) tax optimisation or (illegal) tax evasion to reduce their tax burden and thus increase their utility. In addition to introducing individual variables like risk aversion or income, we allow agents to observe the behaviour of their neighbours. Depending on the behaviour of their peer group’s members, the agents’ utilities may increase or decrease, respectively. Simulation results show that taxpayers favour illegal evasion over legal optimisation in most cases. We find that interactions between taxpayers and their social networks have a deep impact on aggregate behaviour. Parameter changes such as increasing audit rates affect the results, often being intensified by social interactions. The effect of such changes varies depending on whether or not a fraction of agents is considered inherently honest. author: - first_name: Markus full_name: Diller, Markus last_name: Diller - first_name: Johannes full_name: Lorenz, Johannes last_name: Lorenz - first_name: David full_name: Meier, David last_name: Meier citation: ama: 'Diller M, Lorenz J, Meier D. Tax Avoidance and Social Control. In: Neufeld JS, Buscher U, Lasch R, Möst D, Schönberger J, eds. Operations Research Proceedings 2019. Springer; 2020:633-639. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77' apa: Diller, M., Lorenz, J., & Meier, D. (2020). Tax Avoidance and Social Control. In J. S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch, D. Möst, & J. Schönberger (Eds.), Operations Research Proceedings 2019 (pp. 633–639). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77 bibtex: '@inbook{Diller_Lorenz_Meier_2020, title={Tax Avoidance and Social Control}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77}, booktitle={ Operations Research Proceedings 2019}, publisher={Springer}, author={Diller, Markus and Lorenz, Johannes and Meier, David}, editor={Neufeld, Janis S. and Buscher, Udo and Lasch, Rainer and Möst, Dominik and Schönberger, JörnEditors}, year={2020}, pages={633–639} }' chicago: Diller, Markus, Johannes Lorenz, and David Meier. “Tax Avoidance and Social Control.” In Operations Research Proceedings 2019, edited by Janis S. Neufeld, Udo Buscher, Rainer Lasch, Dominik Möst, and Jörn Schönberger, 633–39. Springer, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77. ieee: M. Diller, J. Lorenz, and D. Meier, “Tax Avoidance and Social Control,” in Operations Research Proceedings 2019, J. S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch, D. Möst, and J. Schönberger, Eds. Springer, 2020, pp. 633–639. mla: Diller, Markus, et al. “Tax Avoidance and Social Control.” Operations Research Proceedings 2019, edited by Janis S. Neufeld et al., Springer, 2020, pp. 633–39, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77. short: 'M. Diller, J. Lorenz, D. Meier, in: J.S. Neufeld, U. Buscher, R. Lasch, D. Möst, J. Schönberger (Eds.), Operations Research Proceedings 2019, Springer, 2020, pp. 633–639.' date_created: 2021-03-09T08:26:38Z date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:59Z department: - _id: '187' doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-48439-2_77 editor: - first_name: Janis S. full_name: Neufeld, Janis S. last_name: Neufeld - first_name: Udo full_name: Buscher, Udo last_name: Buscher - first_name: Rainer full_name: Lasch, Rainer last_name: Lasch - first_name: Dominik full_name: Möst, Dominik last_name: Möst - first_name: Jörn full_name: Schönberger, Jörn last_name: Schönberger language: - iso: eng page: 633-639 publication: ' Operations Research Proceedings 2019' publication_identifier: isbn: - 978-3-030-48439-2 publisher: Springer status: public title: Tax Avoidance and Social Control type: book_chapter user_id: '68607' year: '2020' ...