---
_id: '18570'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "We present a game theoretic study of hybrid communication networks in which
    mobile devices can connect in an ad hoc fashion to a base station, possibly via
    a few hops using other mobile devices as intermediate nodes. The maximal number
    of allowed hops might be bounded with the motivation to guarantee small latency.
    We introduce hybrid connectivity games to study the impact of selfishness on this
    kind of infrastructure.\r\n\r\nMobile devices are represented by selfish players,
    each of which aims at establishing an uplink path to the base station minimizing
    its individual cost. Our model assumes that intermediate nodes on an uplink path
    are reimbursed for transmitting the packets of other devices. The reimbursements
    can be paid either by a benevolent network operator or by the senders of the packets
    using micropayments via a clearing agency that possibly collects a small percentage
    as commission. These different ways to implement the payments lead to different
    variants of the hybrid connectivity game. Our main findings are: (1) If there
    is no constraint on the number of allowed hops on the path to the base station,
    then the existence of equilibria is guaranteed regardless of whether the network
    operator or the senders pay for forwarding packets. (2) If the network operator
    pays, then the existence of equilibria is guaranteed only if at most one intermediate
    node is allowed, i.e., for at most two hops on the uplink path of a device, but
    not if the maximal number of allowed hops is three or larger. (3) In contrast,
    if the senders pay for forwarding their packets, then equilibria are guaranteed
    to exist given any bound on the number of allowed hops.\r\n\r\nThe equilibrium
    analysis presented in this paper gives a first game theoretical motivation for
    the implementation of micropayment schemes in which senders pay for forwarding
    their packets. We further support this evidence by giving an upper bound on the
    Price of Anarchy for this kind of hybrid connectivity games that is independent
    of the number of nodes, but only depends on the number of hops and the power gradient."
author:
- first_name: Heiner
  full_name: Ackermann, Heiner
  last_name: Ackermann
- first_name: Patrick
  full_name: Briest, Patrick
  last_name: Briest
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Fanghänel, Alexander
  last_name: Fanghänel
- first_name: Berthold
  full_name: Vöcking, Berthold
  last_name: Vöcking
citation:
  ama: Ackermann H, Briest P, Fanghänel A, Vöcking B. Who Should Pay for Forwarding
    Packets? <i>Internet Mathematics</i>. 2008;5(4):459-475. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21">10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21</a>
  apa: Ackermann, H., Briest, P., Fanghänel, A., &#38; Vöcking, B. (2008). Who Should
    Pay for Forwarding Packets? <i>Internet Mathematics</i>, <i>5</i>(4), 459–475.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Ackermann_Briest_Fanghänel_Vöcking_2008, title={Who Should Pay
    for Forwarding Packets?}, volume={5}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21">10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21</a>},
    number={4}, journal={Internet Mathematics}, publisher={Springer}, author={Ackermann,
    Heiner and Briest, Patrick and Fanghänel, Alexander and Vöcking, Berthold}, year={2008},
    pages={459–475} }'
  chicago: 'Ackermann, Heiner, Patrick Briest, Alexander Fanghänel, and Berthold Vöcking.
    “Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets?” <i>Internet Mathematics</i> 5, no. 4
    (2008): 459–75. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21</a>.'
  ieee: H. Ackermann, P. Briest, A. Fanghänel, and B. Vöcking, “Who Should Pay for
    Forwarding Packets?,” <i>Internet Mathematics</i>, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 459–475,
    2008.
  mla: Ackermann, Heiner, et al. “Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets?” <i>Internet
    Mathematics</i>, vol. 5, no. 4, Springer, 2008, pp. 459–75, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21">10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21</a>.
  short: H. Ackermann, P. Briest, A. Fanghänel, B. Vöcking, Internet Mathematics 5
    (2008) 459–475.
date_created: 2020-08-28T12:29:59Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:40Z
department:
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_21
intvolume: '         5'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 459-475
publication: Internet Mathematics
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - '9783540771043'
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
status: public
title: Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets?
type: journal_article
user_id: '15415'
volume: 5
year: '2008'
...