[{"publisher":"Springer Berlin Heidelberg","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:47Z","author":[{"full_name":"Kakvi, Saqib","id":"66268","last_name":"Kakvi","first_name":"Saqib"},{"last_name":"Kiltz","full_name":"Kiltz, Eike","first_name":"Eike"}],"date_created":"2018-05-25T12:36:44Z","title":"Optimal Security Proofs for Full Domain Hash, Revisited","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-017-9257-9"}],"doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["9783642290107","9783642290114"],"issn":["0302-9743","1611-3349"]},"year":"2012","place":"Berlin, Heidelberg","citation":{"ieee":"S. Kakvi and E. Kiltz, “Optimal Security Proofs for Full Domain Hash, Revisited,” in <i>Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012</i>, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 537–553.","chicago":"Kakvi, Saqib, and Eike Kiltz. “Optimal Security Proofs for Full Domain Hash, Revisited.” In <i>Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012</i>, 537–53. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32</a>.","ama":"Kakvi S, Kiltz E. Optimal Security Proofs for Full Domain Hash, Revisited. In: <i>Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012</i>. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg; 2012:537-553. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32\">10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32</a>","bibtex":"@inbook{Kakvi_Kiltz_2012, place={Berlin, Heidelberg}, title={Optimal Security Proofs for Full Domain Hash, Revisited}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32\">10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32</a>}, booktitle={Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012}, publisher={Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, author={Kakvi, Saqib and Kiltz, Eike}, year={2012}, pages={537–553} }","short":"S. Kakvi, E. Kiltz, in: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 537–553.","mla":"Kakvi, Saqib, and Eike Kiltz. “Optimal Security Proofs for Full Domain Hash, Revisited.” <i>Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012</i>, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 537–53, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32\">10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32</a>.","apa":"Kakvi, S., &#38; Kiltz, E. (2012). Optimal Security Proofs for Full Domain Hash, Revisited. In <i>Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012</i> (pp. 537–553). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_32</a>"},"page":"537-553","_id":"2919","user_id":"66268","department":[{"_id":"558"}],"extern":"1","type":"book_chapter","publication":"Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012","status":"public"}]
