---
_id: '51004'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: '<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>For Émilie Du Châtelet, I argue,
    a central role of the principle of sufficient reason is to discriminate between
    better and worse explanations. Her principle of sufficient reason does not play
    this role for just any conceivable intellect: it specifically enables understanding
    for minds like ours. She develops this idea in terms of two criteria for the success
    of our explanations: “understanding how” and “understanding why.” These criteria
    can respectively be connected to the <jats:italic>determinateness</jats:italic>
    and <jats:italic>contrastivity</jats:italic> of explanations. The crucial role
    Du Châtelet’s principle of sufficient reason plays in identifying good explanations
    is often overlooked in the literature, or else run together with questions about
    the justification and likelihood of explanations. An auxiliary goal of the article
    is to situate Du Châtelet’s principle of sufficient reason with respect to some
    of the general epistemological and metaphysical commitments of her <jats:italic>Institutions
    de Physique</jats:italic>, clarifying how it fits into the broader project of
    that work.</jats:p>'
author:
- first_name: Aaron
  full_name: Wells, Aaron
  last_name: Wells
citation:
  ama: Wells A. Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical Explanation. <i>The
    Southern Journal of Philosophy</i>. 2021;59(4):629-655. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12433">10.1111/sjp.12433</a>
  apa: Wells, A. (2021). Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical Explanation.
    <i>The Southern Journal of Philosophy</i>, <i>59</i>(4), 629–655. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12433">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12433</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Wells_2021, title={Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical
    Explanation}, volume={59}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12433">10.1111/sjp.12433</a>},
    number={4}, journal={The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Wells,
    Aaron}, year={2021}, pages={629–655} }'
  chicago: 'Wells, Aaron. “Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical Explanation.”
    <i>The Southern Journal of Philosophy</i> 59, no. 4 (2021): 629–55. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12433">https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12433</a>.'
  ieee: 'A. Wells, “Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical Explanation,” <i>The
    Southern Journal of Philosophy</i>, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 629–655, 2021, doi: <a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12433">10.1111/sjp.12433</a>.'
  mla: Wells, Aaron. “Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical Explanation.”
    <i>The Southern Journal of Philosophy</i>, vol. 59, no. 4, Wiley, 2021, pp. 629–55,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12433">10.1111/sjp.12433</a>.
  short: A. Wells, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2021) 629–655.
date_created: 2024-01-29T16:25:51Z
date_updated: 2024-01-29T16:29:14Z
doi: 10.1111/sjp.12433
intvolume: '        59'
issue: '4'
keyword:
- Philosophy
language:
- iso: eng
page: 629-655
publication: The Southern Journal of Philosophy
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 0038-4283
  - 2041-6962
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley
status: public
title: Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical Explanation
type: journal_article
user_id: '89005'
volume: 59
year: '2021'
...