[{"intvolume":"        11","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:00Z","author":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0219-1989","1793-6675"]},"title":"DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES","year":"2009","doi":"10.1142/s0219198909002121","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"text":"We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among\r\nthemselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the\r\nspecifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete\r\nRaiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The\r\nlatter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is\r\nreadily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.","lang":"eng"}],"issue":"01","publication":"International Game Theory Review","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","date_created":"2018-04-26T11:08:41Z","file":[{"creator":"stela","date_created":"2018-11-07T10:42:15Z","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-07T10:42:15Z","file_name":"Dividing by demanding Object division through market procedures.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":300474,"file_id":"5409","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf"}],"has_accepted_license":"1","jel":["C73","C62","D51","D63"],"status":"public","volume":11,"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"_id":"2531","publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","page":"15-32","citation":{"ieee":"C.-J. Haake, “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES,” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 11, no. 01, pp. 15–32, 2009.","apa":"Haake, C.-J. (2009). DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, <i>11</i>(01), 15–32. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>","short":"C.-J. Haake, International Game Theory Review 11 (2009) 15–32.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i> 11, no. 01 (2009): 15–32. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 11, no. 01, World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt, 2009, pp. 15–32, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_2009, title={DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES}, volume={11}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>}, number={01}, journal={International Game Theory Review}, publisher={World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2009}, pages={15–32} }","ama":"Haake C-J. DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>. 2009;11(01):15-32. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>"},"file_date_updated":"2018-11-07T10:42:15Z"},{"date_created":"2018-08-27T15:14:34Z","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","publication":"International Game Theory Review","issue":"03","extern":"1","doi":"10.1142/s0219198903001045","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0219-1989","1793-6675"]},"author":[{"full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","first_name":"Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","id":"37339"}],"title":"Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model","year":"2003","intvolume":"         5","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:00:26Z","publication_status":"published","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Hehenkamp_2003, title={Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model}, volume={05}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>}, number={03}, journal={International Game Theory Review}, publisher={World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard}, year={2003}, pages={249–262} }","ama":"Hehenkamp B. Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>. 2003;05(03):249-262. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>","mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard. “Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 05, no. 03, World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt, 2003, pp. 249–62, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>.","short":"B. Hehenkamp, International Game Theory Review 05 (2003) 249–262.","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard. “Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i> 05, no. 03 (2003): 249–62. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>.","ieee":"B. Hehenkamp, “Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model,” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 05, no. 03, pp. 249–262, 2003.","apa":"Hehenkamp, B. (2003). Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, <i>05</i>(03), 249–262. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045</a>"},"_id":"4161","publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","page":"249-262","volume":"05","user_id":"37339","status":"public"}]