TY - JOUR AB - We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen ID - 2531 IS - 01 JF - International Game Theory Review SN - 0219-1989 TI - DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES VL - 11 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard ID - 4161 IS - 03 JF - International Game Theory Review SN - 0219-1989 TI - Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model VL - 05 ER -