[{"file":[{"access_level":"closed","file_name":"schnedler2022.pdf","file_id":"34474","file_size":1786516,"creator":"wesch","date_created":"2022-12-16T15:23:08Z","date_updated":"2022-12-16T15:23:08Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Psychologists claim that being treated kindly puts individuals in a positive emotional state: they then treat an unrelated third party more kindly. Numerous experiments\r\ndocument that subjects indeed ‘pay forward’ specific behavior. For example, they are less generous after having experienced stinginess. This, however, is not necessarily\r\ndriven by emotions. Subjects may also imitate what they regard as socially adequate behavior. Here, I present an experiment in which imitation is not possible at the next\r\nopportunity to act with a stranger: after being given either a fun or an annoying job, subjects have to decide whether to be generous or not. I find that although subjects who are given the annoying job report more negative emotions than those with the fun job, they do not treat an unrelated third person more unkindly in terms of passing on less money.\r\n"}],"publication":"Games and Economic Behavior","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"ddc":["330"],"keyword":["Economics and Econometrics","Finance"],"year":"2022","quality_controlled":"1","title":"The broken chain: Evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity","date_created":"2022-12-16T15:20:41Z","publisher":"Elsevier BV","status":"public","type":"journal_article","file_date_updated":"2022-12-16T15:23:08Z","article_type":"original","user_id":"31241","department":[{"_id":"237"}],"_id":"34473","citation":{"apa":"Schnedler, W. (2022). The broken chain: Evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, <i>136</i>, 542–558. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008</a>","mla":"Schnedler, Wendelin. “The Broken Chain: Evidence against Emotionally Driven Upstream Indirect Reciprocity.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 136, Elsevier BV, 2022, pp. 542–58, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008\">10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008</a>.","short":"W. Schnedler, Games and Economic Behavior 136 (2022) 542–558.","bibtex":"@article{Schnedler_2022, title={The broken chain: Evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity}, volume={136}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008\">10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008</a>}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Schnedler, Wendelin}, year={2022}, pages={542–558} }","ama":"Schnedler W. The broken chain: Evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>. 2022;136:542-558. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008\">10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008</a>","chicago":"Schnedler, Wendelin. “The Broken Chain: Evidence against Emotionally Driven Upstream Indirect Reciprocity.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> 136 (2022): 542–58. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008</a>.","ieee":"W. Schnedler, “The broken chain: Evidence against emotionally driven upstream indirect reciprocity,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 136, pp. 542–558, 2022, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008\">10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008</a>."},"jel":["C91","D03"],"page":"542-558","intvolume":"       136","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0899-8256"]},"has_accepted_license":"1","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.008","author":[{"full_name":"Schnedler, Wendelin","id":"31241","last_name":"Schnedler","first_name":"Wendelin"}],"volume":136,"oa":"1","date_updated":"2024-01-15T07:56:56Z"},{"status":"public","type":"journal_article","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:21:31Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"_id":"2269","user_id":"65453","department":[{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"205"}],"citation":{"apa":"Mauleon, A., Roehl, N., &#38; Vannetelbosch, V. (2017). Constitutions and groups. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, <i>107</i>, 135–152. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>","mla":"Mauleon, Ana, et al. “Constitutions and Groups.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 107, Elsevier, 2017, pp. 135–52, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022\">10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>.","short":"A. Mauleon, N. Roehl, V. Vannetelbosch, Games and Economic Behavior 107 (2017) 135–152.","bibtex":"@article{Mauleon_Roehl_Vannetelbosch_2017, title={Constitutions and groups}, volume={107}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022\">10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Mauleon, Ana and Roehl, Nils and Vannetelbosch, Vincent}, year={2017}, pages={135–152} }","ieee":"A. Mauleon, N. Roehl, and V. Vannetelbosch, “Constitutions and groups,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 107, pp. 135–152, 2017.","chicago":"Mauleon, Ana, Nils Roehl, and Vincent Vannetelbosch. “Constitutions and Groups.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> 107 (2017): 135–52. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>.","ama":"Mauleon A, Roehl N, Vannetelbosch V. Constitutions and groups. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>. 2017;107:135-152. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022\">10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>"},"intvolume":"       107","page":"135-152","publication_status":"published","has_accepted_license":"1","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0899-8256"]},"doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:38Z","author":[{"full_name":"Mauleon, Ana","last_name":"Mauleon","first_name":"Ana"},{"first_name":"Nils","full_name":"Roehl, Nils","last_name":"Roehl"},{"full_name":"Vannetelbosch, Vincent","last_name":"Vannetelbosch","first_name":"Vincent"}],"volume":107,"file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:21:31Z","date_created":"2018-10-31T08:21:31Z","creator":"stela","file_size":577360,"access_level":"closed","file_id":"5122","file_name":"Constitutions and groups.pdf"}],"publication":"Games and Economic Behavior","ddc":["040"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2017","title":"Constitutions and groups","publisher":"Elsevier","date_created":"2018-04-09T09:25:05Z"},{"volume":62,"author":[{"last_name":"Dimitrov","full_name":"Dimitrov, Dinko","first_name":"Dinko"},{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:43Z","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003","has_accepted_license":"1","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0899-8256"]},"publication_status":"published","intvolume":"        62","page":"460-475","citation":{"apa":"Dimitrov, D., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2008). Stable governments and the semistrict core. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, <i>62</i>(2), 460–475. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>","short":"D. Dimitrov, C.-J. Haake, Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 460–475.","bibtex":"@article{Dimitrov_Haake_2008, title={Stable governments and the semistrict core}, volume={62}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>}, number={2}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2008}, pages={460–475} }","mla":"Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Stable Governments and the Semistrict Core.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 62, no. 2, Elsevier BV, 2008, pp. 460–75, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>.","chicago":"Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Stable Governments and the Semistrict Core.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> 62, no. 2 (2008): 460–75. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>.","ieee":"D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Stable governments and the semistrict core,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 460–475, 2008.","ama":"Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>. 2008;62(2):460-475. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>"},"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"user_id":"65453","_id":"2502","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:35:54Z","type":"journal_article","status":"public","date_created":"2018-04-26T10:26:50Z","publisher":"Elsevier BV","title":"Stable governments and the semistrict core","issue":"2","year":"2008","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"ddc":["040"],"publication":"Games and Economic Behavior","file":[{"success":1,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":183269,"file_id":"5132","access_level":"closed","file_name":"Stable governments and the semistrict core.pdf","date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:35:54Z","date_created":"2018-10-31T08:35:54Z","creator":"stela"}]},{"extern":"1","_id":"4162","user_id":"37339","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"status":"public","type":"journal_article","publication":"Games and Economic Behavior","title":"Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox","doi":"10.1006/game.2001.0902","publisher":"Elsevier BV","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:00:26Z","author":[{"id":"37339","full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","last_name":"Hehenkamp","first_name":"Burkhard"}],"date_created":"2018-08-27T15:19:40Z","volume":40,"year":"2002","citation":{"ama":"Hehenkamp B. Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>. 2002;40(1):44-76. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0902\">10.1006/game.2001.0902</a>","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard. “Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> 40, no. 1 (2002): 44–76. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0902\">https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0902</a>.","ieee":"B. Hehenkamp, “Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 44–76, 2002.","bibtex":"@article{Hehenkamp_2002, title={Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox}, volume={40}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0902\">10.1006/game.2001.0902</a>}, number={1}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard}, year={2002}, pages={44–76} }","short":"B. Hehenkamp, Games and Economic Behavior 40 (2002) 44–76.","mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard. “Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 40, no. 1, Elsevier BV, 2002, pp. 44–76, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0902\">10.1006/game.2001.0902</a>.","apa":"Hehenkamp, B. (2002). Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, <i>40</i>(1), 44–76. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0902\">https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0902</a>"},"page":"44-76","intvolume":"        40","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0899-8256"]},"issue":"1"}]