[{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"ddc":["040"],"file":[{"date_created":"2018-10-31T08:39:07Z","creator":"stela","date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:39:07Z","file_id":"5134","access_level":"closed","file_name":"A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions.pdf","file_size":154354,"content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","success":1}],"publication":"Social Choice and Welfare","title":"A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions","date_created":"2018-04-26T09:51:08Z","publisher":"Springer Nature","year":"2007","issue":"4","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:39:07Z","user_id":"65453","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"_id":"2496","status":"public","type":"journal_article","doi":"10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8","author":[{"last_name":"Dimitrov","full_name":"Dimitrov, Dinko","first_name":"Dinko"},{"last_name":"Haake","id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen"}],"volume":30,"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:41Z","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Dimitrov_Haake_2007, title={A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions}, volume={30}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8\">10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8</a>}, number={4}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2007}, pages={571–579} }","short":"D. Dimitrov, C.-J. Haake, Social Choice and Welfare 30 (2007) 571–579.","mla":"Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “A Note on the Paradox of Smaller Coalitions.” <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>, vol. 30, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2007, pp. 571–79, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8\">10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8</a>.","apa":"Dimitrov, D., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2007). A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>, <i>30</i>(4), 571–579. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8</a>","ama":"Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>. 2007;30(4):571-579. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8\">10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8</a>","chicago":"Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “A Note on the Paradox of Smaller Coalitions.” <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> 30, no. 4 (2007): 571–79. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8</a>.","ieee":"D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions,” <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 571–579, 2007."},"intvolume":"        30","page":"571-579","publication_status":"published","has_accepted_license":"1","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0176-1714","1432-217X"]}},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"ddc":["040"],"publication":"Social Choice and Welfare","file":[{"access_level":"closed","file_name":"Bidding_for_Envy_Freeness.pdf","file_id":"5412","file_size":199847,"creator":"stela","date_created":"2018-11-07T12:09:41Z","date_updated":"2018-11-07T12:09:41Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free\r\nallocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary\r\nside-payments,assuming that players have quasi–linear utility functions. The\r\nprocedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive\r\nand says explicitly which compensations should be made,and in what\r\norder. Moreover,it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support.\r\nWe formally characterize the properties of the procedure,show how it\r\nestablishes envy-freeness with minimal resources,and demonstrate its application\r\nto a wide class of fair-division problems."}],"date_created":"2018-04-26T10:10:58Z","publisher":"Springer","title":"Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems","issue":"4","year":"2002","user_id":"65453","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"_id":"2497","file_date_updated":"2018-11-07T12:09:41Z","type":"journal_article","status":"public","author":[{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake"},{"first_name":"Matthias","full_name":"Raith, Matthias","last_name":"Raith"},{"first_name":"Francis Edward","last_name":"Su","full_name":"Su, Francis Edward"}],"volume":19,"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:42Z","has_accepted_license":"1","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0176-1714","1432-217X"]},"citation":{"chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Matthias Raith, and Francis Edward Su. “Bidding for Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems.” <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> 19, no. 4 (2002): 723–49.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, M. Raith, and F. E. Su, “Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems,” <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 723–749, 2002.","ama":"Haake C-J, Raith M, Su FE. Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>. 2002;19(4):723-749.","short":"C.-J. Haake, M. Raith, F.E. Su, Social Choice and Welfare 19 (2002) 723–749.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Raith_Su_2002, title={Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems}, volume={19}, number={4}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Raith, Matthias and Su, Francis Edward}, year={2002}, pages={723–749} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “Bidding for Envy-Freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems.” <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>, vol. 19, no. 4, Springer, 2002, pp. 723–49.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Raith, M., &#38; Su, F. E. (2002). Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i>, <i>19</i>(4), 723–749."},"page":"723-749","intvolume":"        19"}]