[{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"user_id":"31241","_id":"61525","status":"public","abstract":[{"text":"<jats:p> Teams are formed because input from different people is needed. Providing incentives to team members, however, can be difficult. According to received wisdom, declaring all members responsible fails because real responsibility for team output “diffuses.” But why? Also, why and when does formally declaring one member “responsible” mean that this member can be attributed real responsibility? We offer a model that answers these questions. We identify when jointly declaring a team responsible results in reputation free riding. We show that declaring one person responsible can overcome this problem but only if all other team members are protected from being sanctioned. </jats:p><jats:p> This paper was accepted by Dorothea Kübler, behavioral economics and decision analysis. </jats:p>","lang":"eng"}],"type":"journal_article","publication":"Management Science","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567","title":"Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem","author":[{"full_name":"Li, Xinyu","last_name":"Li","first_name":"Xinyu"},{"first_name":"Wendelin","last_name":"Schnedler","full_name":"Schnedler, Wendelin"}],"date_created":"2025-10-06T09:30:55Z","volume":71,"date_updated":"2025-10-06T14:14:19Z","publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","citation":{"apa":"Li, X., &#38; Schnedler, W. (2025). Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem. <i>Management Science</i>, <i>71</i>(10), 8252–8266. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567\">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567</a>","short":"X. Li, W. Schnedler, Management Science 71 (2025) 8252–8266.","mla":"Li, Xinyu, and Wendelin Schnedler. “Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem.” <i>Management Science</i>, vol. 71, no. 10, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2025, pp. 8252–66, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567\">10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Li_Schnedler_2025, title={Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem}, volume={71}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567\">10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567</a>}, number={10}, journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Li, Xinyu and Schnedler, Wendelin}, year={2025}, pages={8252–8266} }","ama":"Li X, Schnedler W. Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem. <i>Management Science</i>. 2025;71(10):8252-8266. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567\">10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567</a>","chicago":"Li, Xinyu, and Wendelin Schnedler. “Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem.” <i>Management Science</i> 71, no. 10 (2025): 8252–66. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567\">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567</a>.","ieee":"X. Li and W. Schnedler, “Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem,” <i>Management Science</i>, vol. 71, no. 10, pp. 8252–8266, 2025, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567\">10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567</a>."},"intvolume":"        71","page":"8252-8266","year":"2025","issue":"10","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0025-1909","1526-5501"]}},{"title":"Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176","publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","date_updated":"2025-01-06T08:19:51Z","author":[{"full_name":"Mohrmann, Ulf","last_name":"Mohrmann","first_name":"Ulf"},{"id":"86351","full_name":"Riepe, Jan","last_name":"Riepe","first_name":"Jan"}],"date_created":"2025-01-06T08:10:27Z","year":"2024","citation":{"ama":"Mohrmann U, Riepe J. Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. <i>Management Science</i>. Published online 2024. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176\">10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176</a>","chicago":"Mohrmann, Ulf, and Jan Riepe. “Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.” <i>Management Science</i>, 2024. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176\">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176</a>.","ieee":"U. Mohrmann and J. Riepe, “Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” <i>Management Science</i>, 2024, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176\">10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176</a>.","apa":"Mohrmann, U., &#38; Riepe, J. (2024). Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. <i>Management Science</i>. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176\">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176</a>","short":"U. Mohrmann, J. Riepe, Management Science (2024).","mla":"Mohrmann, Ulf, and Jan Riepe. “Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.” <i>Management Science</i>, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2024, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176\">10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Mohrmann_Riepe_2024, title={Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176\">10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176</a>}, journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Mohrmann, Ulf and Riepe, Jan}, year={2024} }"},"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0025-1909","1526-5501"]},"publication_status":"published","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"57926","user_id":"91345","abstract":[{"text":"<jats:p> We examine how information processing costs affect the extent to which depositors’ use the details in banks’ income statements. Depositors have a unique cost-benefit structure because they are nonprofessional users of financial information and have high information processing costs. At the same time, they benefit from acting quickly because failing banks make payments on a first-come, first-serve basis. This makes it likely that they will react to a prominent summary measure like the reported net income without adjusting for any risk-irrelevant information included in the line items. In our empirical analysis, we investigate depositors’ behavior as driven by the mechanical revaluations of deferred tax assets due to the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find deposit withdrawals because of this risk-irrelevant information. In cross-sectional tests, we show that the withdrawals are stronger if the information acquisition costs are low, and the information integration costs are high. Overall, our results show that information processing costs are important for understanding depositors’ reactions to accounting information and can lead to deposit flows that cannot be explained by new risk-relevant information. </jats:p><jats:p> This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. </jats:p><jats:p> Funding: We kindly acknowledge funding by the Werner Diez Foundation [Grant 2024.1] to make this work available under a Creative Commons license. </jats:p><jats:p> Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176 . </jats:p>","lang":"eng"}],"status":"public","publication":"Management Science","type":"journal_article"},{"keyword":["Management Science and Operations Research","Strategy and Management"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"31802","user_id":"950","department":[{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"<jats:p> Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. </jats:p><jats:p> This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. </jats:p>"}],"status":"public","type":"journal_article","publication":"Management Science","title":"Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521","publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","date_updated":"2022-06-08T10:08:11Z","date_created":"2022-06-08T08:29:59Z","author":[{"first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Lück","orcid":"0000-0003-0380-1965","id":"950","full_name":"Lück, Sonja"},{"last_name":"Balsmeier","full_name":"Balsmeier, Benjamin","first_name":"Benjamin"},{"first_name":"Florian","last_name":"Seliger","full_name":"Seliger, Florian"},{"first_name":"Lee","last_name":"Fleming","full_name":"Fleming, Lee"}],"volume":66,"year":"2020","citation":{"apa":"Lück, S., Balsmeier, B., Seliger, F., &#38; Fleming, L. (2020). Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. <i>Management Science</i>, <i>66</i>(6), 2677–2685. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521\">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521</a>","bibtex":"@article{Lück_Balsmeier_Seliger_Fleming_2020, title={Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}, volume={66}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521\">10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521</a>}, number={6}, journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier, Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}, year={2020}, pages={2677–2685} }","short":"S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, L. Fleming, Management Science 66 (2020) 2677–2685.","mla":"Lück, Sonja, et al. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” <i>Management Science</i>, vol. 66, no. 6, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2020, pp. 2677–85, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521\">10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521</a>.","ama":"Lück S, Balsmeier B, Seliger F, Fleming L. Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. <i>Management Science</i>. 2020;66(6):2677-2685. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521\">10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521</a>","ieee":"S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, and L. Fleming, “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test,” <i>Management Science</i>, vol. 66, no. 6, pp. 2677–2685, 2020, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521\">10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521</a>.","chicago":"Lück, Sonja, Benjamin Balsmeier, Florian Seliger, and Lee Fleming. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” <i>Management Science</i> 66, no. 6 (2020): 2677–85. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521\">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521</a>."},"intvolume":"        66","page":"2677-2685","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0025-1909","1526-5501"]},"issue":"6"},{"year":"2019","quality_controlled":"1","issue":"4","title":"Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships","date_created":"2020-12-08T13:19:35Z","abstract":[{"text":"We offer the first empirical analysis connecting the timing of general partner (GP) compensation to private equity fund performance. Using detailed information on limited partnership agreements between private equity limited and general partners, we find that “GP-friendly” contracts—agreements that pay general partners on a deal-by-deal basis instead of withholding carried interest until a benchmark return has been earned—are associated with higher returns, both gross and net of fees. This is robust to measures of performance persistence, time period effects, and other contract terms and is related to exit-timing incentives. Timing practices balance GP incentives against limited partner downside protection.","lang":"eng"}],"publication":"Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)","keyword":["venture capital","compensation","private equity","VC partnership","pay-performance relation"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"citation":{"ama":"Hüther N, Robinson DT, Sievers S, Hartmann-Wendels T. Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships. <i>Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)</i>. 2019;66(4):1756-1782. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274\">10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274</a>","chicago":"Hüther, Niklas, David T. Robinson, Sönke Sievers, and Thomas Hartmann-Wendels. “Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships.” <i>Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)</i> 66, no. 4 (2019): 1756–82. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274\">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274</a>.","ieee":"N. Hüther, D. T. Robinson, S. Sievers, and T. Hartmann-Wendels, “Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships,” <i>Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)</i>, vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 1756–1782, 2019.","bibtex":"@article{Hüther_Robinson_Sievers_Hartmann-Wendels_2019, title={Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships}, volume={66}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274\">10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274</a>}, number={4}, journal={Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)}, author={Hüther, Niklas and Robinson, David T. and Sievers, Sönke and Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas}, year={2019}, pages={1756–1782} }","short":"N. Hüther, D.T. Robinson, S. Sievers, T. Hartmann-Wendels, Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+) 66 (2019) 1756–1782.","mla":"Hüther, Niklas, et al. “Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships.” <i>Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)</i>, vol. 66, no. 4, 2019, pp. 1756–82, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274\">10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274</a>.","apa":"Hüther, N., Robinson, D. T., Sievers, S., &#38; Hartmann-Wendels, T. (2019). Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships. <i>Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)</i>, <i>66</i>(4), 1756–1782. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274\">https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274</a>"},"intvolume":"        66","page":"1756-1782","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0025-1909","1526-5501"]},"related_material":{"link":[{"url":"https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/suppl/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274/suppl_file/mnsc.2018.3274.sm1.pdf","relation":"supplementary_material"},{"relation":"other","url":"https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/13/paying-for-performance-in-private-equity-evidence-from-vc-partnerships"},{"url":"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087320","relation":"earlier_version"}]},"main_file_link":[{"url":"https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274"}],"doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:54:31Z","author":[{"last_name":"Hüther","full_name":"Hüther, Niklas","first_name":"Niklas"},{"full_name":"Robinson, David T.","last_name":"Robinson","first_name":"David T."},{"first_name":"Sönke","full_name":"Sievers, Sönke","id":"46447","last_name":"Sievers"},{"full_name":"Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas","last_name":"Hartmann-Wendels","first_name":"Thomas"}],"volume":66,"status":"public","type":"journal_article","article_type":"original","_id":"20688","user_id":"46447","department":[{"_id":"275"}]}]