---
_id: '61525'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Teams are formed because input from different people is needed. Providing
incentives to team members, however, can be difficult. According to received wisdom,
declaring all members responsible fails because real responsibility for team output
“diffuses.” But why? Also, why and when does formally declaring one member “responsible”
mean that this member can be attributed real responsibility? We offer a model
that answers these questions. We identify when jointly declaring a team responsible
results in reputation free riding. We show that declaring one person responsible
can overcome this problem but only if all other team members are protected from
being sanctioned. This paper was accepted by Dorothea Kübler,
behavioral economics and decision analysis.
author:
- first_name: Xinyu
full_name: Li, Xinyu
last_name: Li
- first_name: Wendelin
full_name: Schnedler, Wendelin
last_name: Schnedler
citation:
ama: 'Li X, Schnedler W. Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a
Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem. Management Science.
2025;71(10):8252-8266. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567'
apa: 'Li, X., & Schnedler, W. (2025). Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame:
When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem. Management
Science, 71(10), 8252–8266. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567'
bibtex: '@article{Li_Schnedler_2025, title={Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame:
When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem}, volume={71},
DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567},
number={10}, journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations
Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Li, Xinyu and Schnedler,
Wendelin}, year={2025}, pages={8252–8266} }'
chicago: 'Li, Xinyu, and Wendelin Schnedler. “Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame:
When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem.” Management
Science 71, no. 10 (2025): 8252–66. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567.'
ieee: 'X. Li and W. Schnedler, “Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring
a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem,” Management Science,
vol. 71, no. 10, pp. 8252–8266, 2025, doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567.'
mla: 'Li, Xinyu, and Wendelin Schnedler. “Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame:
When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem.” Management
Science, vol. 71, no. 10, Institute for Operations Research and the Management
Sciences (INFORMS), 2025, pp. 8252–66, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567.'
short: X. Li, W. Schnedler, Management Science 71 (2025) 8252–8266.
date_created: 2025-10-06T09:30:55Z
date_updated: 2025-10-06T14:14:19Z
doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.06567
intvolume: ' 71'
issue: '10'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 8252-8266
publication: Management Science
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0025-1909
- 1526-5501
publication_status: published
publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
status: public
title: 'Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible
Solves a Free Rider Problem'
type: journal_article
user_id: '31241'
volume: 71
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '57926'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: ' We examine how information processing costs affect the extent to
which depositors’ use the details in banks’ income statements. Depositors have
a unique cost-benefit structure because they are nonprofessional users of financial
information and have high information processing costs. At the same time, they
benefit from acting quickly because failing banks make payments on a first-come,
first-serve basis. This makes it likely that they will react to a prominent summary
measure like the reported net income without adjusting for any risk-irrelevant
information included in the line items. In our empirical analysis, we investigate
depositors’ behavior as driven by the mechanical revaluations of deferred tax
assets due to the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Using a difference-in-difference
design, we find deposit withdrawals because of this risk-irrelevant information.
In cross-sectional tests, we show that the withdrawals are stronger if the information
acquisition costs are low, and the information integration costs are high. Overall,
our results show that information processing costs are important for understanding
depositors’ reactions to accounting information and can lead to deposit flows
that cannot be explained by new risk-relevant information. This
paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Funding: We
kindly acknowledge funding by the Werner Diez Foundation [Grant 2024.1] to make
this work available under a Creative Commons license. Supplemental
Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176
. '
author:
- first_name: Ulf
full_name: Mohrmann, Ulf
last_name: Mohrmann
- first_name: Jan
full_name: Riepe, Jan
id: '86351'
last_name: Riepe
citation:
ama: 'Mohrmann U, Riepe J. Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing,
and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Management Science.
Published online 2024. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176'
apa: 'Mohrmann, U., & Riepe, J. (2024). Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly
Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176'
bibtex: '@article{Mohrmann_Riepe_2024, title={Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly
Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act}, DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176},
journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations Research and
the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Mohrmann, Ulf and Riepe, Jan}, year={2024}
}'
chicago: 'Mohrmann, Ulf, and Jan Riepe. “Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly
Information Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act.” Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176.'
ieee: 'U. Mohrmann and J. Riepe, “Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information
Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” Management
Science, 2024, doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176.'
mla: 'Mohrmann, Ulf, and Jan Riepe. “Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information
Processing, and Bank Deposits: Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.” Management
Science, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS),
2024, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176.'
short: U. Mohrmann, J. Riepe, Management Science (2024).
date_created: 2025-01-06T08:10:27Z
date_updated: 2025-01-06T08:19:51Z
doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.03176
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Management Science
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0025-1909
- 1526-5501
publication_status: published
publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
status: public
title: 'Deferred Tax Asset Revaluations, Costly Information Processing, and Bank Deposits:
Evidence from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act'
type: journal_article
user_id: '91345'
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '31802'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition
in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such
duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection
Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of
blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication,
through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced
duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides
a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated
to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the
positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper
was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Lück, Sonja
id: '950'
last_name: Lück
orcid: 0000-0003-0380-1965
- first_name: Benjamin
full_name: Balsmeier, Benjamin
last_name: Balsmeier
- first_name: Florian
full_name: Seliger, Florian
last_name: Seliger
- first_name: Lee
full_name: Fleming, Lee
last_name: Fleming
citation:
ama: 'Lück S, Balsmeier B, Seliger F, Fleming L. Early Disclosure of Invention and
Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science. 2020;66(6):2677-2685.
doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521'
apa: 'Lück, S., Balsmeier, B., Seliger, F., & Fleming, L. (2020). Early Disclosure
of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science,
66(6), 2677–2685. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521'
bibtex: '@article{Lück_Balsmeier_Seliger_Fleming_2020, title={Early Disclosure of
Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}, volume={66}, DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521},
number={6}, journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations
Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier,
Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}, year={2020}, pages={2677–2685}
}'
chicago: 'Lück, Sonja, Benjamin Balsmeier, Florian Seliger, and Lee Fleming. “Early
Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” Management
Science 66, no. 6 (2020): 2677–85. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.'
ieee: 'S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, and L. Fleming, “Early Disclosure of Invention
and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test,” Management Science, vol. 66,
no. 6, pp. 2677–2685, 2020, doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.'
mla: 'Lück, Sonja, et al. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication:
An Empirical Test.” Management Science, vol. 66, no. 6, Institute for Operations
Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2020, pp. 2677–85, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.'
short: S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, L. Fleming, Management Science 66 (2020)
2677–2685.
date_created: 2022-06-08T08:29:59Z
date_updated: 2022-06-08T10:08:11Z
department:
- _id: '200'
- _id: '281'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521
intvolume: ' 66'
issue: '6'
keyword:
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Strategy and Management
language:
- iso: eng
page: 2677-2685
publication: Management Science
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0025-1909
- 1526-5501
publication_status: published
publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
status: public
title: 'Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test'
type: journal_article
user_id: '950'
volume: 66
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '20688'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We offer the first empirical analysis connecting the timing of general partner
(GP) compensation to private equity fund performance. Using detailed information
on limited partnership agreements between private equity limited and general partners,
we find that “GP-friendly” contracts—agreements that pay general partners on a
deal-by-deal basis instead of withholding carried interest until a benchmark return
has been earned—are associated with higher returns, both gross and net of fees.
This is robust to measures of performance persistence, time period effects, and
other contract terms and is related to exit-timing incentives. Timing practices
balance GP incentives against limited partner downside protection.
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Niklas
full_name: Hüther, Niklas
last_name: Hüther
- first_name: David T.
full_name: Robinson, David T.
last_name: Robinson
- first_name: Sönke
full_name: Sievers, Sönke
id: '46447'
last_name: Sievers
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas
last_name: Hartmann-Wendels
citation:
ama: 'Hüther N, Robinson DT, Sievers S, Hartmann-Wendels T. Paying for Performance
in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships. Management Science
(VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+). 2019;66(4):1756-1782. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274'
apa: 'Hüther, N., Robinson, D. T., Sievers, S., & Hartmann-Wendels, T. (2019).
Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships.
Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+), 66(4), 1756–1782.
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274'
bibtex: '@article{Hüther_Robinson_Sievers_Hartmann-Wendels_2019, title={Paying for
Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships}, volume={66},
DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274},
number={4}, journal={Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)}, author={Hüther,
Niklas and Robinson, David T. and Sievers, Sönke and Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas},
year={2019}, pages={1756–1782} }'
chicago: 'Hüther, Niklas, David T. Robinson, Sönke Sievers, and Thomas Hartmann-Wendels.
“Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships.”
Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+) 66, no. 4 (2019): 1756–82.
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274.'
ieee: 'N. Hüther, D. T. Robinson, S. Sievers, and T. Hartmann-Wendels, “Paying for
Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships,” Management
Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+), vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 1756–1782, 2019.'
mla: 'Hüther, Niklas, et al. “Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence
from Venture Capital Partnerships.” Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking
A+), vol. 66, no. 4, 2019, pp. 1756–82, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274.'
short: N. Hüther, D.T. Robinson, S. Sievers, T. Hartmann-Wendels, Management Science
(VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+) 66 (2019) 1756–1782.
date_created: 2020-12-08T13:19:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:31Z
department:
- _id: '275'
doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274
intvolume: ' 66'
issue: '4'
keyword:
- venture capital
- compensation
- private equity
- VC partnership
- pay-performance relation
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274
page: 1756-1782
publication: Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0025-1909
- 1526-5501
publication_status: published
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- relation: supplementary_material
url: https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/suppl/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274/suppl_file/mnsc.2018.3274.sm1.pdf
- relation: other
url: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/13/paying-for-performance-in-private-equity-evidence-from-vc-partnerships
- relation: earlier_version
url: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087320
status: public
title: 'Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships'
type: journal_article
user_id: '46447'
volume: 66
year: '2019'
...