@article{51003,
  abstract     = {{<jats:p>There is a tension in Emilie Du Châtelet’s thought on mathematics. The objects of mathematics are ideal or fictional entities; nevertheless, mathematics is presented as indispensable for an account of the physical world. After outlining Du Châtelet’s position, and showing how she departs from Christian Wolff’s pessimism about Newtonian mathematical physics, I show that the tension in her position is only apparent. Du Châtelet has a worked-out defense of the explanatory and epistemic need for mathematical objects, consistent with their metaphysical nonfundamentality. I conclude by sketching how Du Châtelet’s conception of mathematical indispensability differs interestingly from many contemporary approaches.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Wells, Aaron}},
  issn         = {{0031-8248}},
  journal      = {{Philosophy of Science}},
  keywords     = {{History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy, History}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{1137--1148}},
  publisher    = {{Cambridge University Press (CUP)}},
  title        = {{{Du Châtelet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics}}},
  doi          = {{10.1086/714874}},
  volume       = {{88}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}