@article{669,
  abstract     = {{We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games andits bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to modelnetwork scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.We characterize the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergenceof improvement dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of thedecision problem. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approx-imation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.}},
  author       = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}},
  issn         = {{1382-6905}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{1145--1167}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{Congestion games with mixed objectives}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y}},
  volume       = {{36}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}

@article{1369,
  abstract     = {{In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE) do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual player.}},
  author       = {{Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}},
  issn         = {{1382-6905}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}