@article{2512,
  abstract     = {{In this paper we introduce the concept of an overall power function that is meant
to combine two sources of a party’s power in a parliament. The first source is based
on the possibilities for the party to be part of a majority coalition and it is typically
modeled using a cooperative simple game. The second source takes into account
parties’ asymmetries outside the cooperative game and it is displayed by a vector
of exogenously given weights. We adopt a normative point of view and provide an
axiomatic characterization of a specific overall power function, in which the weights
enter in a proportional fashion.}},
  author       = {{Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  issn         = {{1742-7355}},
  journal      = {{International Journal of Economic Theory}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{189--200}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  title        = {{{Proportionality and the power of unequal parties}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x}},
  volume       = {{7}},
  year         = {{2011}},
}