@article{2531,
  abstract     = {{We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among
themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the
specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete
Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The
latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is
readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  issn         = {{0219-1989}},
  journal      = {{International Game Theory Review}},
  number       = {{01}},
  pages        = {{15--32}},
  publisher    = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}},
  title        = {{{DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES}}},
  doi          = {{10.1142/s0219198909002121}},
  volume       = {{11}},
  year         = {{2009}},
}

@article{4161,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}},
  issn         = {{0219-1989}},
  journal      = {{International Game Theory Review}},
  number       = {{03}},
  pages        = {{249--262}},
  publisher    = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}},
  title        = {{{Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model}}},
  doi          = {{10.1142/s0219198903001045}},
  volume       = {{05}},
  year         = {{2003}},
}